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

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 779.—OCTOBER, 1893.

TWO MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.

By Captain A. T. Mahan, *U.S. Navy.*

To trace analogies in any sphere of thought possesses an attraction for most minds, and in putting before the readers of the *United Service Magazine* the following short studies, they are presented rather as matters stimulating the interest of curiosity, and only incidentally as suggestive of military or naval instruction; although the events dealt with may fairly lay claim to serve the more useful object, as well as to while away an idle moment. Separated in date by over twenty-two turbulent centuries, the alleged resemblances, if they prove to be valid and fundamental, will afford a keener zest to the intellectual palate from their very remoteness in time, and from the great difference of superficial conditions, which unite to impart to the recognition of family likeness the welcome emotion of novelty. Each, however, belongs to the group of great Maritime Expeditions projected from the country of origin to a distance unusually long for their era, and therefore will, I think, be found to illustrate forcibly the difficulties of such enterprises, the proper military policy of the weaker party, forced to the defensive, and the true use of a navy under the conditions.

Sir Edward Creasy, in his well-known work, ranks the defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse, B.C. 413, as one of the "Fifteen

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Decisive Battles of the World." Whether the claim be good or not, this event certainly has a high value to doubting students of military history by showing that, under all conditions of material or mechanical development, strategic problems remain the same; though affected by tactical difficulties peculiar to each age.

At the time in question, two centuries before the great strife between Rome and Carthage known as the Punic wars, Athens had a naval power which was to the then known world tremendous and overwhelming; extending over and wielding the resources of the islands of the Ægean Sea, and strongly settled upon the coasts of the Dardanelles and the mainland of what we now call Turkey in Europe. She had, during nearly twenty years, been engaged in war with the combined states of the Peloponnesus, at whose head stood Sparta. Lacking the insular position which has been at once the strength and the safety of Great Britain, she had seen her petty land territory in Attica wasted up to the city walls by the far superior armies of the enemy; but she still held out proudly, based upon her great navy and commercial wealth, in other words, upon her Sea Power. She mastered and held two distant advanced posts, upon the hostile coasts: one at Cape Pylus, or the Bay of Navarino, where Sir Edward Codrington destroyed the Turkish fleet in 1827, the other at Naupactus at the entrance of the Gulf of Corinth. Both were valuable strategic points for making raids into the enemy's territory and for intercepting the corn trade from Sicily, which island was peopled by Greeks of race kindred to Sparta. Besides these, the island of Corcyra, now Corfu, was in strict alliance with Athens; and as in those early days the course of galleys bound from Greece to Sicily was to coast to Corfu, then stretch across to the Iapygian Promontory, now Cape Santa Maria di Leuca, and then follow the Italian coast, the strategic worth of the island to its possessors is easily seen. It was therefore chosen as the point of assembly for the transports; but the great bond knitting together all the elements of strength was the Athenian Navy.

This was the situation when, towards the year B.C. 413, Athens determined upon the conquest of Syracuse, the chief city of Sicily, as a prelude to the subjection of the whole island. Of the many motives leading to this serious step, involving a reach over sea of more than double any previous attempt, we are concerned only with the military, and but little with them, as our attention is called mainly to the expedition proper, and not to the whole war. The military reasons for attacking Sicily were, first, the fear that its Greek cities, being mainly colonies of a race antagonistic to Athens, would join with their fleets in the war then raging. If this fear was well founded, sound military policy justified, nay demanded,

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an attack in force upon them before they were ready, for the junction, if effected, would seriously imperil the control of the sea upon which the safety of Athens depended. The second reason was that Sicily, as fruitful then as in all ages, supplied the enemy with wheat, even as Athens drew her grain supplies from the Black Sea. The two together justified the undertaking, if there was strength enough to succeed in it and hold the chief seaports; and after weighing, as well as I can with an unavoidable lack of experience of the sea difficulties of that day, the blunders of the Athenian Commander-in-Chief, I am persuaded the Sea Power of Athens was equal to the task. So much for the general military policy; let us now examine the conditions of the particular field in which this expedition was to act.

Athens was on the side of Greece farthest from Sicily. The Peloponnesus, or Morea, lay between it and her. She held the Islands Cythera (Cerigo) off the south point of the peninsula, and Corcyra (Corfu) on the west, controlled by her sea power the other Ionian islands, and occupied the seaports Naupactus and Pylus. Along the south coast of Italy, which her fleets must probably follow, every city was hostile or unfriendly, until Rhegium was reached on the Straits of Messina; but Tarentum and Locri, at the two ends of this line—the one at the heel, the other at the toe, of the boot of Italy—were strenuously inimical. Messene, on the Straits of Messina, had passed from one party to the other, but was now held against Athens. Then came, on the east coast of Sicily, three friendly cities; beyond which Syracuse, their first objective, was reached. The misfortunes of the expedition never allowed a thought of a farther step.

The choice of Syracuse as the objective was accurate. It was the front and centre, the foundation and keystone, of the whole system of danger to Athens from the western colonies. To strike at it direct was right, if the sea strength of Athens was as great as the event showed. In so doing, the expedition passed by hostile strategic points capable of sheltering an enemy's fleet, but the leader had reason to think that, if unaided, they would not dare to act against him. He was right; their jealousy of Athens refused help, beyond water and permission to anchor, but no seacoast city dared lift a hand against the Power of the Sea. The Athenians thus cut loose from their base, having force amply sufficient to crush Syracuse before help could come, depending with reason upon their control of the sea daunting the enemy near their communications; in fact, the latter, except Tarentum, finally allowed the besiegers of Syracuse to be supplied from their markets, and thus became to them new bases of supplies.

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This was what did happen. What might have happened, with the respectable, though inferior, fleet possessed by Syracuse, and under the strategic conditions, added to the tactical embarrassments inseparable from an expedition composed of ships of war and transports, is admirably set forth in a speech made by a Syracusan, before the popular assembly of the city. This man, named Hermocrates, proposed to make active use of the strategic position of Tarentum, by sending there a fleet which should either deter the enemy by threatening his communications, or, if he persisted, act offensively against them and the fleet, as opportunity arose. His speech was as follows:—

"There is one point more which in my opinion is more critical and important than all the rest; and, although, inured as you are to domestic indolence, it may perhaps not gain your ready approbation, I shall, however, boldly recommend it. Would all of us in general who are inhabitants of Sicily, or at least would only we Syracusans, with what other people we can get to assist us, put out instantly to sea with all the ships we have in readiness, and victualled but for the space of two months, would we then give these Athenians the meeting either at Tarentum or at Cape Iapygia, and there convince them that before they enter the lists of war for the conquest of Sicily they must fight for their passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike them with the utmost terror, and infinitely perplex them with the thought that from a friendly port we sally forth to guard our out-works (for Tarentum will readily receive us); whilst they have a long tract of sea to pass with their cumbersome train, and must find it hard through so long a voyage to be always steering in the regular order. As their course must thus be slow, and must advance only in exact conformity to orders, we shall have a thousand opportunities to attack them. If, again, they clear their ships for action, and in a body bear down expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at their oars, and when spent with toil we can fall upon them. Or, in case that may not be advisable, we have it always in our power to retire into the harbour of Tarentum. And thus the Athenians, if, in constant expectation of being fought with at sea, they make their passage with but a small portion of their stores, will be reduced to a great distress upon coasts which will afford them no supply. Should they choose to continue in their station, they must infallibly be blocked up in it. Should they venture a passage, they must unavoidably leave their tenders and store-ships behind, and, as they have no assurance of a hearty reception from the cities on the coasts, must be terribly dismayed. It is my firm opinion that, amidst the great perplexity of thought which must result from these obstructions, they will

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never presume to set sail from Corcyra; or, at least, while they are agitating the forms of procedure and sending look-out vessels to discover our numbers and position, the season of the year will be protracted to winter."

A further detail affecting naval operations in the field of strategy, as well as of tactics, is evidently deducible from this speech, viz.: If the ancient fleets proposed to themselves to keep the sea for some time, as in this instance to make a straight course from Corcyra to Syracuse, they were forced to carry such a weight of provisions and water as brought them down in the water and rendered them slow and difficult in manœuvring. In other words, the strategic consideration of the route to be followed, whether as shorter, or with reference to the friendly disposition of the coast skirted, involved also the tactical question of the efficiency of their fleets in the all-important point of speed and turning power. It is also worth remarking that the excessive labour of the oar necessitated for the oarsmen an ample supply of nourishment, and especially of fluid in warm weather.

The salient and decisive features, however, in the plan of Hermocrates were: 1, the recognition of the strategic value of Tarentum, and, 2, the use to which he proposed to put this, by rapidly mobilizing the Syracusan or Sicilian fleets, and massing them on the flank of the Athenian line of advance in a position secured from attack. Here was, first, a threat the enemy could scarcely venture to disregard; and, secondly, the preparation of the inferior navy for offensive action at a moment's notice, and upon the weakest yet most vital link in the enemy's scheme of operations.

Here, then, we have put forth two thousand years ago, by a man who never heard the words strategy or tactics technically used, nor tried to formulate their laws, a true and fruitful strategic thought, with the modification due to tactical conditions. If, however, anyone is disposed to infer, from the accurate insight of this untaught genius, the uselessness of studying war as a science, he may be quickly set right by the coldness and insult with which the speech was received, the vainglorious appeal to national self-sufficiency made by the opposition orator, which can be read in Thucydides, the rejection of the advice given, and the consequent siege, suffering, and narrow escape of Syracuse, with the change of attitude before mentioned in the Italian cities, her friends. However many and mixed the motives of the Syracusan assembly, a knowledge of the Art of War might have given the true policy a chance, and turned away the ruin which nearly overtook the city, and would have overwhelmed it but for the imbecility of the Athenian general.

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The incident gives us all the conditions of a distant maritime expedition in any age. We have the home base, Athens; the advanced intermediate bases in Corcyra and other points, which played for Athens the part that Gibraltar, Malta, and foreign coaling stations do to Great Britain; the objective, Syracuse; the doubtful or hostile country to be passed across the Ionian Sea, or along the coasts of Italy; the enemy's advanced post in Tarentum and sister cities; the greater naval power in Athens; the smaller, but still respectable, fleet of Syracuse; the difficulty of communications; the tactical embarrassment of a train of supply ships; the tactical difficulty of ships deeply-laden for a long voyage, which exists to-day; the tactical difficulty of the fatigue of rowers, which has disappeared; the wisdom of meeting the enemy half way and harassing his progress; the danger of awaiting him at home on the defensive; the perception of a navy's true sphere, the offensive. All these broad outlines, with many lesser details, are to be found in this Athenian expedition, and most of them involve principles of present application. In fact, put this early galley expedition under a microscope, and there is seen realised the essential leading features of every maritime invasion.

The attempt of the Athenians, though overwhelmingly disastrous in its issue, was justified, because they were by far the superior naval power, and therefore operated over a controlled sea. The same cannot be said for Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition of 1798. Without attempting to analyze the mingled motives that determined the action of the French general, it is probable that he was largely swayed by his disposition to trust to the chances of war, as he so often did both before and after, and for long not in vain. Also, when the expedition left Toulon, there were but three British ships of the line in the Mediterranean, while even of their presence he may well have been ignorant. There was, therefore, a very reasonable probability that the landing could be effected before an interrupting force could come up. Once on shore, he was not wholly unjustified in relying for further progress upon his own unequalled powers for war and organisation; and there seems reason to believe that, by adopting for the fleet a course analogous to that recommended by Hermocrates, he might greatly have increased the perplexities of the British admiral, and by so far his own chances of success.

His foot firmly planted in Egypt, Bonaparte, having compassed his first objective and so far accomplished his offensive purpose, necessarily passed, as to Great Britain, to the defensive with an inferior navy. This was precisely the position of Syracuse in relation

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to Athens, and the question may be considered, "What use should he have made of his fleet?" Having supreme command of it, as well as of the army, this care was constantly in his mind. There were many considerations, political and administrative, that must justly have influenced him, but from the purely military point of view, his decision appears to have been about the worst possible.

Good communication with home was the one thing necessary to his final success—nay, to the very existence of the French army in Egypt. There was no doubt of its ability to subdue Egyptian opposition, but it was bound to suffer losses by battle and disease; and if it advanced, as it must, there was further loss by unavoidable dissemination of the forces. Its numbers needed frequently to be renewed. Certain supplies, also, must come from home, such as ammunition of all kinds, and equipments for war; not to speak of the moral effect upon the army of finding itself cut off from any probable hope of returning to France. There was, too, the possibility that the fleet might, under favourable circumstances, co-operate with the army, as the frigates, indeed, did a few months later in the Syrian expedition.

The danger that threatened all this was Nelson's fleet, No port, nor number of ports along the line—as for instance, Malta, which the French then held—could keep communications open if that fleet was left untrammelled in its movements. It was now known to be in number approaching that of the French, although the French admiral continued in a state of blissful confidence about his power of resisting it.

The orders of Bonaparte were clear and precise, that the ships of war should be taken into the old port of Alexandria, if there was water enough on the bar. If not, the admiral was to go to Corfu, then in possession of the French, or to Toulon. These orders looked first to the safety of the fleet, and next, to keeping it, if possible, under Bonaparte's own control. Bonaparte could not trust the Directory. He had to fear, not merely the military ignorance and panic that often dictate the measures of governments, but a disloyal readiness to sacrifice national interests in order to ruin an obnoxious rival. The retention in Alexandria was open to two objections. The first, tactical in character, was that the fleet, though perfectly safe, could be easily blockaded there, and could with difficulty come out and form in face of an active enemy; while, secondly, there was the strategic inconvenience that its presence there would draw the English fleet to the precise point where transport ships and supplies from France must converge. The Navy, in taking this position, entirely gave up its special properties, mobility and the offensive, which Hermocrates was so careful to

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insure; and was as useless for the purpose of keeping open communications with home as it became after the battle of the Nile. It is truthfully remarked by a French naval officer that, with the difficulty of exit, it could be checked by an inferior force, which could fall on the head of the column as it came out of the narrow entrance.

The admiral disobeyed these orders, and for the worse. He anchored in an open roadstead, involving no difficulties, except hydrographic, to the attack; and his dispositions to strengthen the defence were slothful and faulty. The question of engaging the enemy under way or at anchor was discussed in a Council of War, where it was decided to await them at anchor, and the line of anchorage was established with that view. This decision, which, it will be noted, was tactical, not strategic, was as unfaithful to the true *rôle* of the Navy as were the orders of Bonaparte for its strategic disposition. The fleet was devoted to a passive defensive, giving up its power of motion, of manœuvre, and of attack.

It is, however, generally admitted, that a strategic fault is more far-reaching than one of tactics, and that a tactical success will fail of producing its full effect if the strategic dispositions have been bad. We may therefore fasten our attention upon the strategic error. Had the result of the Battle of the Nile been favourable to the French, and the fleet been afterwards withdrawn into Alexandria, according to Bonaparte's orders, there would have been no positive gain to the Egyptian expedition. In the supposed case, the French fleet would have gained an advantage over the English Navy by inflicting upon an isolated detachment a certain loss, perhaps even a disabling loss; but the purpose of Bonaparte to keep it under his own hand at Alexandria would have rendered the success futile.

Granting that the strategic disposition proposed was faulty, to what use should the fleet have been put?

It is in a case of this kind that the usefulness of principles, clearly and strongly held, is felt; and it is a very narrow reading of the word "principle" to confine it to moral action. Sound military principle is as useful to military conduct as morality is to uprightness of life.

If we accept the principle upon which Hermocrates, perhaps unconsciously, acted, that the part of the Navy in a defensive operation is to stand ready for immediate offensive action, we see at once that a provision which looked only to its safety, and neutralised its power of movement, such as shutting it up in Alexandria, was probably erroneous. If found there by the English fleet, it was caught as in a vice.

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If not in Alexandria, then where? Bonaparte named two alternative points, Corfu and Toulon. As regards these, it is certain that the fleet could not have been shut up in either as easily as in Alexandria; that a much larger force would have been needed to keep it in; and that a fleet thus employed would have been by far less able to stop the French communications. At Toulon, it is true, the English fleet would have been at the strategic point whence supplies started; but it is easier to run out of, than into, a blockaded port; while as for shutting up a large fleet, it was very hard for the enemy to keep close to Toulon in winter.

Corfu, however, Bonaparte's third alternative, offered very distinct and decisive advantages even over Toulon; for an English fleet watching off that island would have been far removed, over two hundred and fifty miles, from the direct route between Toulon and Egypt. The office of the Navy as accessory to a defensive position, such as was that of the French in Egypt relatively to England, is to keep open communications by acting, or threatening to act, upon the offensive. This can only be done through its power of motion on the open sea, and by assuming, whenever opportunity offers, an initiative suited to its strength; for the initiative is the privilege of the offence. Keeping open communications on a given line means either drawing or driving the enemy off it. If not strong enough to drive him off, then diversion must be attempted, by threatening his interests elsewhere, and in as many quarters as may be, seeking to mislead him continually by all the wiles known to warfare. As with war in general, this is a business of positions, and, consequently, the chief station of a force destined to exert such influence is a matter of prime importance. Corfu, though not without drawbacks, fulfilled the conditions better than any other port then under French control, because the mere presence there of a French squadron detained the enemy's fleet so far from the vital line. Malta, on the contrary, would, like Toulon, have fixed it on the very road which it was desirable to keep open.

Drawing away, or diverting, assumes that strength is inferior to the enemy's, as was then the case with the French. If, however, though weaker in the aggregate, you are stronger than a particular detachment encountered, it should at once be attacked before reinforced. Such weak detachments commonly result from an enemy's fears for his exposed points. Therefore, the aim of the weaker party should be to keep to the sea as much as possible, and in as rapid motion as possible; on no account to separate the battle ships, but to keep them together, seeking to arouse the enemy's anxieties in many directions, so as to induce him to send off detachments. If he make this mistake, either the individual

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detachments will be attacked, one by one, or the main body, if unduly weakened.

These movements are all of a strategic character and aim. If, as the result of them, a collision is effected with a part of the enemy's forces, say, in the proportion to your own of two to three, a strategic advantage will have been achieved. In the action that should then follow, the aim will be to increase this advantage of numbers by concentrating as two to one on part of enemy's ships. This, however, belongs to the province of Tactics, or, more accurately, of Grand Tactics.

Let us now apply these principles to the probabilities in the case before us. The facts were as follows: Nelson first appeared before Alexandria on June 28, three days before Bonaparte. Not finding the French fleet there, he supposed he had mistaken its destination, and hurried back to the Straits of Messina, anxious about Naples and Sicily. If, during the month of July, while he was thus away, the French fleet had sailed, as is here advocated, Nelson on returning would have found this state of things: The army ashore, with its supplies out of his reach; the transports and frigates, equally inaccessible, in the port of Alexandria; and the enemy's fleet gone, on what errand of mischief he could not tell. To remain there with his whole force would be useless; to follow with his whole force would be correct by all principles, but, if he did so, he left Alexandria open. The temptation to leave a blockading force, say two ships (he had no frigate), would be very great.

Alexandria, however, was not the only port in the power of France, and connected with the whole system of her Mediterranean control. At this moment she held firmly both Toulon and Malta, and Corfu with a grip that later on resisted, for a certain time, the attack of a combined Turkish and Russian squadron. It was a matter of importance to the enemy that she should not strengthen herself in Malta and Corfu. All these four points, therefore, claimed the attention of England, yet could not be effectually watched, so as to break up the communications with Egypt, without a dividing of Nelson's fleet, which would have made each fragment hopelessly weak. To the power of distraction thus in the hands of France is to be added the unprotected condition of England's allies or friends in Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, all which were open to the French fleet to attack.

It will be seen, therefore, that so long as the French had in the Mediterranean ready for action a compact force of thirteen serviceable ships of the line, the number engaged at the Nile, besides frigates, Nelson's fleet had several different objects, all of importance,

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demanding its attention. There were the four hostile ports just mentioned, the enemy's communications to Egypt, and the protection of its own friends. Besides all this, there was the additional object—the French fleet. There can be little doubt that the instinct or genius of Nelson would have led him straight for the enemy's fleet—the true key to such a strategic situation; but not every admiral is a Nelson, and even he, until he had found and beaten the fleet, could not effectually stop the communications. Such a dispersal of his ships as followed the battle of the Nile—some to Naples, some to Malta, some to Gibraltar, some before Alexandria—would have been simply insane under the present supposition. In these positions each of the small detachments named did good service, and in perfect safety, having the enemy's fleet off their minds. But if, instead of being at sea in the Mediterranean, or in port at Corfu, the French fleet had been safely moored in the harbour of Alexandria, Nelson's task would have been simpler. The blockade of that port would have settled the communications and left him perfectly easy as to the fate of Naples and Sicily. Toulon lost its importance with the English fleet thus placed across the path of any reinforcements it might send; and Nelson, from his fourteen ships, could have safely spared two, if not three, for the blockade of Malta. For it will be remembered that in Alexandria the French fleet laboured under the tactical disadvantage of having to come out by a narrow entrance, against a fleet which could come close to that entrance, so far as depth of water was concerned, and had, during the summer, a leading wind to approach. In other words, the French fleet would have to come out in column, in face of a resolute enemy, able to deploy his vessels across its head, and fall upon the leading ships in detail.

It may be objected, that the quality of the French fleet was so inferior, that the suggested use of it as a cruising squadron could only end in disaster. There is some truth in such a statement; and there were also political and administrative reasons, as already admitted. If engaged in a criticism upon the management of the French navy under Bonaparte in its totality, full weight would have to be allowed to these considerations. Using the case, however, as is here done, simply as an illustration of strategy, it is permissible to disregard them; to assume, as must be done in an *abstract* military problem, a practical equality, where numerical equality is found. None but a hopeless *doctrinaire* will deny that circumstances powerfully modify the application of the most solid general principles; yet, principles are only elicited by eliminating from a number of cases those conditions which are peculiar to each, so that the truth common to all becomes clear. As regards the particular

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effect upon Nelson, of such a use of the French fleet as here advocated, it must be remembered by us, who now see things with the facility of what American slang calls "hind-sight," that if ever Nelson lost his head, it was when he found the French not in Alexandria, at his first visit; and after all was over, he spoke most dejectedly of the state of his health, induced by "the fever of anxiety" through which he had passed. We may now lightly dismiss the contingencies here suggested; that great seaman felt their pressure and knew their weight. It may, besides, be said that, if Nelson had missed the French fleet twice more, or a few weeks longer, he might have lost his command, so great was the popular clamour over his first failure; and there was scarcely another English admiral at that time fitted to deal decisively with an equal enemy. Napier estimates the presence of Napoleon on a battle-field as equal to thirty thousand men, and it is no exaggeration to say that Nelson, for thorough dealing with an enemy's fleet, was equal to a reinforcement of three ships of the line. The mere success of the French fleet in dodging pursuit and raising alarm, might have cost England her most efficient sea-commander.

It may be further interesting to note that the course recommended by Hermocrates, and here suggested for the French fleet, is identical in principle with certain well-known instances in land warfare. When the allied Austrians, English, and Dutch were falling back through Belgium before the victorious French advance in 1794, upon reaching a certain point they separated, the Anglo-Dutch retreating upon Holland, with the vain thought of covering it by direct interposition, while the Austrians took the road to Germany. Jomini shows that if, instead of this folly of separating, they had massed their entire force in a well-chosen position covering their communication with Germany, and to one side of the line leading to Holland, which was the objective of the French, the latter could not dare to pass them, leaving their communications open to attack. They must have stopped, and fought a pitched battle upon ground of their enemy's own choosing before they could touch Holland. This again, in 1800, was the principle dictating Bonaparte's order to Massena to throw a heavy garrison into Genoa. The Austrians could not pass by it—could not advance in full force along the Riviera against southern France—while that garrison flanked their line of communication. They were compelled to mask the place with a large detachment, whose withdrawal from the main body vitally effected the campaign. This again, in 1808, was the real significance of Sir John Moore's famous advance upon Sahagun, in Spain. The threat to Napoleon's communications arrested his advance, postponed the imminent reduction of Spain,

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gave time for Austria to ripen her preparations, and entailed upon the Emperor, in place of a rapid conquest, the wasting Peninsular War, with its decisive ultimate effects upon his fortunes. Napier shrewdly says that his own history might never have been written, had Moore not made the move he did.

But let it be always remembered that the strength of such dispositions lies not in inanimate fortresses, so much as in the living power of the men—troops or seamen—whose purposes they subserve. To use Napoleon's phrase, "War is a business of positions;" but not so much on account of the positions themselves as of the men who utilize them.

A. T. MAHAN.

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THE VOLUNTEERS AT ALDERSHOT.

By Colonel Howard Vincent, C.B., M.P.

The work and bearing of the Volunteers at Aldershot in August has formed the subject of much criticism. They have been strongly assailed by the well known correspondent of the *Times*. His views secure, and deservedly, the more attention among Metropolitan Volunteers, as he has long taken active interest in their theoretical instruction in the art of war, and rendered, indeed, not a little much appreciated service therein. This denunciation follows closely on that of the Prize Essayist of the Royal United Service Institution, though the armoury of the latter consisted mainly when orally brought to task in some extracts of isolated indiscipline, apparently poured into a hungry mouth by a press-cutting agency. Both these severe critics are past officers of the Royal Engineers, and neither has had recent regimental or field experience, nor any actual service with the Volunteer force. These facts discount not a little their derogatory remarks, and although the *argumentum ad hominem* is ever to be deprecated, it is important they should be known.

They stand, moreover, in strong contrast to the views frequently expressed by such high experts as Lord Wolseley, Lord Methuen, and Sir Evelyn Wood.

Indeed, although the official report of the latter General on the recent concentration of Volunteers under him has not at the moment of writing been made public,* there would appear to be little more to be said, after his emphatic declaration to the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, published on August 21:—

"The Volunteers are worth at least 100,000 extra men to the Regular Army. . . It is absurd to talk of their want of discipline, although some men may have failed at times, that is the rare exception. . . They make first-rate Infantry, for they are intelligent and full-grown men. Besides the Infantry, there is a capital Artillery Volunteer force."

The Editor of the *United Service Magazine* asks me, nevertheless, as one of the officers lately commanding a provisional

* It has since been issued, and while calling attention to one or two matters, says: "There is, however, a continuous improvement in the force."

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battalion at Aldershot, to write a short article on the week's work. I respond with diffidence, and especially as something may be construed into adverse comment on some of the arrangements. This is, however, far from my intention.

To Sir Evelyn Wood, every Volunteer of the 17,000 felt sincerely grateful for his incessant exertions to give as large a number of the force as possible, the benefit of a continuous sojourn in camp. What official difficulties had to be surmounted, only those can understand who have experience of the inexplicable ways of the civilian War Office. The Commandant at Aldershot was, moreover, thoroughly seconded by all his generals and staff officers, in his desire to do all that could be done to make the week's training successful. There is no single man now in the army, whose opinion is worth anything, who does not recognise what the Volunteer force has done, and is doing for the country, what it has done and is doing, to popularise the army and military institutions, and what incomparable material it contains for the effective defence of England. This feeling was very noticeable among the superior officers and officers commanding regiments, many of whom were detailed to move about among the Volunteers during the operations, in the capacity of umpires. Nor is it possible not to note with other than intense satisfaction, that this attitude, on the part of the higher ranks, is fast growing upon the juniors. Company officers, sergeants, and privates no longer look, as they once did, upon the Volunteers as a spurious body assuming their titles, imitating their uniforms, adopting their customs, playing at their exercises, but for the most part regard them now as brothers in arms, on whom reliance could be placed in case of an emergency.

The concentration included thirty-four battalions of infantry, of which eight came from the Metropolis, four from Scotland, four from the Mersey, four from the Home Counties, six from the Western Counties, five from Staffordshire, and three from the Welsh Border. A more representative body could not have been brought together. There were artisans from East London; mechanics from Liverpool; printers, engravers, and other workers from the Scottish capital; tin-platers from Wales, and agricultural labourers from the South, the West, and the Midlands. Among them, too, were a considerable number of Government employés, professional men, business men, and tradesmen. In the majority of cases, the Government grant of 2s. per diem, defrayed the expenses of rank and file, and enabled a small pecuniary allowance to be made to individuals. But the officers and the non-commissioned officers were all put to heavy, and

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inevitable mess expenses, and some battalions, such as the South London Provisional, the greater number having been out at Easter, and so exhausting their camp claim on the Government for the year, had to pay their own expenses, or a large proportion towards them, the balance being defrayed by regimental funds.

In point of physique the representatives of the London Grey Brigade possibly carried off the palm, but their numbers were, unfortunately, very few. In respect of strength, physical development, equipment, and appearance, the Post Office Corps probably led the way, very closely followed, however, by the Royal Berkshire; but the red tunics of the latter, as also of the Staffordshire Brigade, put them at a distinct disadvantage compared to the black of the Queen's Edinburgh, the Post Office, the Mersey Brigade, and the splendid Wiltshire Battalions, with their large number of cyclists and excellent ambulance arrangements.

There can be little doubt that imperfections of clothing tell much more adversely in red than in black or grey. Red also shows wear, stains, and dirt much more, and requires white belts, which are difficult to clean, more especially in the sooty atmosphere of our large manufacturing towns. It is, however, contended that there should be no such distinction of dress between regular and auxiliary troops, as to enable an enemy at once to know what corps are opposed to him. A singular illustration of the advantage of this similar clothing was forthcoming on the day of the principal operations, when the main subject of discussion between the two chief umpires was whether a battalion they had both seen at a particular time and place belonged to the regular army or to the volunteers. Each of the distinguished generals maintained his opinion, and supported it by evidence: the one that it was a well-known regiment wearing a distinctive badge at the back of the head-dress, the other that it was some battalion of red-coated auxiliaries.

So is history written! By far the better solution would probably be for sufficient "fighting" clothing to be kept ready for the first Army Corps, at any rate of that volunteer grey which the smallest experience shows to be almost invisible compared to conspicuous and bullet-attracting red, than for the Volunteers to adopt the costly and unsuitable scarlet, which would have certainly to be laid aside in case of war.

The greatest good probably attending the Aldershot week was in the camp life.

The camping grounds had been, without exception, well selected; the tent equipage was substantial, good, and sufficient, a fact of no

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small satisfaction to the tax-payer, considering that 20,000 men were under canvas, and all the arrangements of the Army Service Corps as to the transport of baggage, the provision of permanent and daily stores were admirable. The improvement in recent years in this latter particular is most noteworthy. The returns have been greatly reduced and simplified, the non-commissioned officers and men do their work well, and I heard no single complaint concerning the department most difficult to manage, giving constant foundation for British grumbling, and which from time immemorial has always been the weak spot in our own as in many foreign armies. It has passed through many phases, been repeatedly re-organised and as often re-christened. But if the work of the officers conducting the Commissariat, Equipment, and Transport Service at Aldershot at the present time is a specimen of what they are capable of doing in real war, the country will have no cause to complain that its soldiers are not placed in stomachic condition to fight.

Time has been when the camp discipline of the Volunteer force has left much to be desired, when the guards and sentries did their work most ineffectually, and singing and talking disturbed an entire camp long after "lights out" had been sounded. A great improvement has been effected in this matter, and as a whole the Volunteer camps were very quiet, well kept, and orderly. Sir Evelyn Wood's view on this subject is very gratifying. It was, indeed, astounding to see how quickly men of different corps, or of detached, and therefore stranger, companies of the same corps, settled down together. It is their ordered association which accomplishes the most good in camp life, between regiments of the same brigade, between detachments of the same district, between companies of regiments, and men of companies. All get to know each other, to trust each other, to appreciate the intricacies of regimental interior economy, and to become proud of their corps.

There was possibly, as the *Times* Correspondent affirms, and is strongly supported on this head by Sir Evelyn Wood, considerable difference in the military aptitude of regiments, and maybe the foundation of the difference rested chiefly in the officers, and their opportunities for acquiring knowledge. It is a delicate, a difficult, and an invidious subject to treat of, and more especially when one remembers the heavy pecuniary and personal sacrifices which have been made by the officers of the Volunteer force, and with but very scant and tardy acknowledgment from the Sovereign or the State.

While it would be difficult to impose any fresh obligations upon captains of companies and subalterns, without considerable risk of further augmenting the present deficiency, numbering upwards of 1,500, more pains ought to be taken, as is now the case in the

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Army, that candidates for field rank, and more especially the command of regiments, are in every way suited thereto. It is a matter vital to the welfare of the force, and far more intimately connected with the difficulty of obtaining competent officers than appears at first sight. The command of a regiment should not be allowed, in my humble opinion, to drift by mere seniority in the Volunteers any more than in the Regular Army or Militia, and brigadiers should be held strictly responsible as to their confidential reports on this head. The time has now probably arrived when a five- or seven-year tenure of command might be established, as in the other branches of the military service, and subject in the Volunteers to renewal twice or thrice. Nor could any expenditure be more advantageous to the Volunteer force and to the country than a grant of say £100 a year, to cover out-of-pocket expenses, to half-pay regular officers of "*proved*" capacity and "TACT," willing to assume command of regiments in difficulty in this respect. Such a course would be attended with the additional advantage that it would increase the knowledge of the organisation of the Volunteer force among the future superior officers of the Army—a matter sadly lacking at the present time, as was aptly illustrated when the other day the Under Secretary of State for War, surrounded by the superior officers at Pall Mall, denied to a deputation of commanding officers the existence of that civil contract of service—the foundation of the force—which in nearly every regiment binds the Volunteer to serve a certain number of years—three to five, and so to recoup by the capitation grant the cost of the uniform supplied to him. Again, some regular officers are quite unable to grasp the fact that, because the private soldier in one regiment is of the same stamp as the private soldier in another, the Volunteers in one corps may be drawn from a totally different class to those in another, and while anxious that there should be no favour shown them in military treatment, but rather the reverse, are disinclined to deprive themselves without adequate reason of that fare they are accustomed to, and are willing individually to pay for.

Nor is it outside the frequent experience of nearly every commanding officer of Volunteers to receive some inquiry or direction, evidently showing that at the source whence it emanates, he is supposed to reside permanently at his head-quarters, and to have around him his entire regiment standing to their arms, instead of being distributed over many square miles, involving an expenditure to circularise them, receive and tabulate answers on any subject, of from £5 to £10, and not less than a week in time.

The five days' manœuvres at Aldershot were, as was natural, well divided in theory. The first day was devoted to outpost duty and

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exercise, under brigadiers. It was excellent, and could only have been improved upon by the action of an opposing force.

The second day was applied to attack exercise, under the supervision of generals of division against a skeleton enemy. The usual slowness of movement was well shown, and the necessity for greater pace and more appreciation of local and varying conditions thoroughly illustrated.

The Wednesday, or third day, was the hardest of all. The Volunteers paraded for the most part, at, or before 5.45 a.m., and were from nine to ten hours under arms in an extraordinary and most unusual heat. They marched from between four to seven miles, and so far as the larger force were concerned, were then halted by brigades, under a fierce sun, on an open heath, for over an hour and a half—a time which was wisely allowed the regular troops in their quarters in the morning. On the day's operations, the latter consequently lost by falling out, a less proportion, with the exception of one or two regiments, than the Volunteers.

The Correspondent of the *Times*, described the Wednesday, as "a hard day for the Volunteers, who had the rare chance of seeing how troops of various arms move together in large bodies."

But in what way the actual operations differed to any very considerable extent from any of those Easter Monday Reviews, against which Lord Methuen has so justly inveighed in eloquent terms, without, however, it must be noted, proposing as yet anything to take their place, it was not very easy to discover. Certainly, the crowds were absent, but they were replaced by the enormous number of troops, whom it was impossible to move satisfactorily in so confined an area as the Fox Hills. Although the northern retreating force had been severely defeated the previous evening, and was only covering its retirement by a rear guard, against line after line of Sir Baker Russell's fresh troops, battalions of defenders stood shoulder to shoulder in line, in column, and in square, and received with the utmost complacency volley after volley to the full extent of their assailants' pouches.

Then came the march home. The Volunteers had had nothing to eat save the necessarily somewhat hurried breakfast at 5 a.m., and the rations of bread and cheese issued in some provident corps to the haversacks. The heat was tremendous, the road heavy, and frequently blocked. Few battalions had been supplied with a water cart, from which to refill their water-bottles. A large number of men fell out, and particularly from the town artisan corps. Some battalions lost twenty, thirty, and even up to fifty men and more, or one-fourth of their strength. Working out these "heat and fatigue casualties" by professions and occupations in a provisional

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battalion it appeared that business men lost only 2 per cent., art and professional men and students lost 3 per cent., Civil Service employés lost 7 per cent., commercial and scholastic employés lost 8 per cent., and clerical and civil clerks lost 13 per cent. (the latter company having been on duty the day before, and placed on a flank), the whole battalion thus composed losing but 7 per cent. of its total strength—a very much smaller ratio than in the case of most corps.

On the matter of this falling out the lieutenant-general made an observation which should impress itself on the mind of every officer, namely, that an excessive number falling out in a regiment shows that there is some flaw in the regimental system; an excessive number falling out in a company some flaw in the company system—insufficient attention on the part of officers to the men's breakfasts before they start, insufficient attention to them on the march, either by want of cheering voice, or carelessness in permitting men to straggle. It strikes me in this regard that if the colonels and captains, whether of regulars or auxiliaries, are to be held strictly responsible, there should be more latitude in permitting halts, in altering the company's order of march, in opening the ranks as wide as possible, and allowing tunic collars to be unbuttoned from the first, and rifles to be slung. There should also be greater official encouragement of chorus singing on the march as with the Germans. The Russian column of fours march with a rank on each side of the road, whenever it is wide enough, so that a current of air passes from end to end of the column, so that men can see each other and pass jokes and pleasant banter, and that the officers marching in the centre have every individual under their eyes, and so that most especially the traffic, and not least of all the light-hearted aides-de-camp unnecessarily galloping to and fro and creating a tremendous dust have a clear lane, without that incessant "right incline" and "left incline," which exasperates and tires the marching officer as much as the marching soldier. I speak of what I have felt in the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, through long marches of pleasant memory. Again, there are few practical men who will not appreciate the desirability of a short halt in some retired spot not more than half an hour after starting. The soldier has been necessarily hurried over his breakfast, and getting ready for parade, and the general or colonel who has breakfasted and dressed at leisure does not always, however well intentioned, remember in time the needs of his humble brother on foot.

On the last day but one of the Aldershot operations, the result of the previous long day prevented much being done. One side at least was having valuable practice in outpost duty, when by some

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means or other the opposing force came right up to them within four minutes of the hour hostilities were announced to commence.

The Friday was also a somewhat inconclusive day, but afforded most valuable exercise in gradual retirement from ridge to ridge under fire, to at least one regiment of the West London Brigade, and the perception shown by the Volunteers in availing themselves of the accidents of ground both in advancing to the attack and retiring under fire, was the subject of at least the verbal commendation of more than one umpire.

It may be that the written reports of the umpires attached to brigades and battalions enter fully upon the aptitude shown by the Volunteers and their officers in this manœuvre, or their imperfections and mistakes in another operation.

This will be useful if transmitted to commanding officers. But I venture, with respect, to say it would have been far more so, if verbally reported to the lieutenant-general in the hearing of the colonels of volunteers, and subjected to his criticism and that of the brigadiers and generals of divisions. Then the result could have been made known to those concerned (now scattered to the four winds) and attention paid to the points suggested on the following day. As it was, it must be confessed that the "critique," which has become a valuable feature of each day's work, was rather amusing than instructive. The colonels of Volunteers stood around expecting to have their sins of omission and commission laid bare by kindly hand, and resolved to profit by the friendly reproof and encouragement of the most genial of generals. They had the satisfaction, however, of hearing reproof directed instead to their comrades of the regular service—how this gallant general had given a verbal order to his staff officer instead of a written one, and its consequent transformation in passage as at Balaklava; how that battery or squadron had violated certain established principles; and how a well-known and very conspicuous commander had so moved his division against the opposing force as to direct the fire of a portion of it against himself, and by the close movements of his brigades had been theoretically compelled to lay down his arms to inferior but skilfully planted forces. But the general result of the whole week, and laying aside details, was undoubtedly satisfactory from every point of view, and the gratitude of the Volunteer force, as of the country, is due to Sir Evelyn Wood for the way in which he has signalised the last year of his conspicuous command at Aldershot. He has shown the Army more effectually than has ever been done before of what sterling stuff the Citizen Force is composed, and he has shown the Volunteers in the most practical manner the estimation in which they are held by an army

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which is now more capable than at any previous time of its modern history of repeating its illustrious deeds of the past.

It cannot be doubted that His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught will follow an example so useful, and so far-reaching in its beneficial consequences. Experience, too, will enable the exercises to be made year after year more instructive, by increased realism, and such a division of forces as may prevent over-crowding on limited ground. Subject to such timely forethought and warning as may obviate difficulties of men obtaining the necessary holiday, of scratch catering, and the physical inconveniences which must ensue therefrom, the more realistic the operations, the more searching the criticism, the greater the advantage to the force and the country.

C. E. HOWARD VINCENT.

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THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS BATTALION OF 1893.

By Captain Dyas, *Royal Warwickshire Regiment.*

August—a time of rest for most men—means hard work for the soldier and for the many thousands of volunteers who give up part of their holiday to join their comrades of the line at Aldershot. Among them all there is no corps that excites more interest than the School-boy Battalion.

Many of our Public Schools have their own Cadet Corps. Of these, some go in chiefly for rifle-practice, while others make the most of very limited opportunities for drill and manœuvre; but all have to contend against the disadvantage of want of time, lack of suitable ground, and small numbers. To give these young soldiers a wider view of the *use* of military training, and an invaluable opportunity of acquiring it, is the object of the Public Schools Battalion. Each school is invited to send its Cadet Corps to Aldershot for the first week of the holidays. Sir Evelyn Wood, who takes the keenest interest in every detail, selects a Commanding Officer and Staff from the many officers who are willing to devote a week or two to the boys, and he even gives up his own fields for a camp ground.

Each detachment is complete when it arrives—with its own discipline and organisation, its own officers and non-commisioned officers, its own *esprit-de-corps.* In camp it is treated as a distinct unit: in the field, however, it is necessary to form two or more into one company. This year fourteen schools sent detachments; the boys of the Rugby corps were to have formed an eighth company, but to their own great disappointment and that of the Battalion, some cases of influenza prevented their coming at the last moment.

	Detachments.	Officers.	N.C.O.'s & Men.	Companies on Parade.	
1	Haileybury College	4	69	No. 1	Grey Companies.
2	Marlborough College	2	28		
3	Wellington College	3	30	" 2	
4	Highgate School	2	25		
5	Berkhampstead School	1	29	" 3	
6	Epsom College	2	34		Rifle Company.
7	Forest School	2	24	" 4	
8	Felstead School	2	26		
9	Sherborne School	2	19		Red Companies.
10	Hurstpierpoint College	1	23	" 5	
11	Weymouth College (R.E.)	1	29		
12	Winchester College	3	35		
13	Cheltenham College (R.E.)	2	28	" 6	
14	Bradfield College	3	63	" 7	
	Total	30	462		

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Major W. H. Sawyer, the Prince of Wales' (North Staffordshire) Regiment, again commanded the Battalion, with Captain H. C. Prichard, Northamptonshire Regiment, as Second-in-command. The Company officers were masters or older boys. Their duty is one that requires no little study, and their time for such work is very limited, yet it is no exaggeration to say that the knowledge they had acquired, and the manner in which they applied it, would in many cases have done credit to any regiment in the Service. In the ranks, too, were not a few of the masters—also many "old boys" who, though they had long left school, had come back to serve with their old corps.

THE WEEK'S WORK WAS ARRANGED AS FOLLOWS:—

July 29th, Saturday } Camp pitched.
July 31st, Monday } Volunteer fatigue party of Winchester Corps arrived early on 31st.

August 1st, Tuesday.—Detachments marched in.

August 2nd, Wednesday.—Field Day.

August 3rd, Thursday.—6.30 to 7.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m., Battalion drill; 9 a.m. to 12, R.E. Company bridging practice. *Afternoon.*—Entertainment at gymnasium.

August 4th, Friday.—Field Day.

August 5th, Saturday.—10.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m., Battalion drill; 9 a.m. to 12, R.E. Companies bridging practice. *Afternoon.*—Battalion Sports; 8 p.m., Night March, and attack of a position.

August 6th, Sunday.—10 a.m., Church parade. *Afternoon.*—Inspection of Camp.

August 7th, Monday.—Field day. 9 p.m., Camp Fire.

August 8th, Tuesday.—Camp struck. Detachments left Aldershot. Volunteer fatigue party from Wellington, Bradfield, Haileybury, and Winchester remained until 9th.

August 9th, Wednesday.—Stores returned. Camp ground cleared and handed over.

To save time the camp had been pitched before the detachments marched in. The 1st August (the day of arrival) was spent in drawing bedding and other stores. Work began with daylight on the following morning, and from that moment until the detachments left Aldershot, not a single hour was wasted. Indeed, the difficulty was to find time for all that had to be done. Field-days and Battalion-drill accounted for every morning from Reveillée until one or two o'clock. The afternoons were also well occupied; one being devoted to the Battalion Sports, when the tent pitching and bugler's competitions were won by Wellington, while Haileybury carried off the V.C. race, and Bradfield the tug-of-war; but perhaps *the* events of the week were the night march (and storming of Long Hill) on Saturday, and the camp-fire on the last evening.

Nothing short of sixteen busy hours a day would satisfy these keen soldiers, and every man on duty, from the Captain of the day to the orderly bugler, begged that he might not be left in camp. On field-days an ambulance-wagon followed the Battalion—but the

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only sick ever seen in it were *those who had been taken out to look on.* A new formula had to be invented—it was no longer "Private Atkins is excused from parade," but "Pte. T. A. is not permitted to attend," . . . and if such a thing as defaulters' drill had been known in the camp, the whole Battalion would probably have asked permission to fall in with them. A guard, furnishing a double sentry, mounted every afternoon and was relieved at Reveillée on the following morning (in time to go on early parade). Unfortunately it was not until the end of the week that it became known that almost every man had earnestly desired to go on guard at least once. But this would have entailed a guard of sixty men every night! Except when on parade, the detachments furnished N. C. O's. and men for the usual routine work of the camp: orderlies, clerks, post-corporal, cyclist-messengers, and the daily "duties" and fatigues. Not the least difficult task was to provide for the carrying on of these duties while the whole Battalion was studying the Art of War in Long Valley or elsewhere. With this object seven N. C. O's. from the Army School of Cookery, one sergeant and fourteen privates of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment were attached to the Battalion. Of course, it must be admitted that a corps should be complete in itself and independent of help from without; that though fighting is the most important part of a soldier's work, still it *is* only a part; and that a Battalion that cannot cook its own food will fare ill in a campaign—for an empty stomach is a bad thing at all times, and a very bad thing indeed when there is fighting to be done. Remembering, however, the real object of assembling the Battalion, and the limited time, it must also be allowed that the decision arrived at was the right one; and that was, to give battle-training the first place, and then to devote any time that could be spared to instruction in the other important duties of the soldier.

So much for what was done during the week: now for the way in which it was carried out. It was impossible not to be struck by the intense keenness with which the boys threw themselves into everything they did. It affected all with whom they came in contact. Old soldiers of the line, heroes of a hundred field-days, men who could remember the days when huts still stood at Aldershot—looked on, at first with wonder, then with interest; finally a wave of irresistible enthusiasm would carry them to the very verge of Cocked-hat wood but only to see whole companies swept away by the murderous Maxim or the yet deadlier umpire. Even *he* would sometimes pause in his work of destruction, forgetting to deal death around him as he watched this refreshing eagerness.

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As an illustration of this feeling, no better instance could be quoted than a little incident that occurred during one of the almost tropical thunderstorms on Friday. A soldier of the line was seen to emerge from a copse; he was soaked to the skin and looked unhappy. At this moment a schoolboy, laden with ammunition, and returning to the fray, dashed past him, exclaiming, in perfect good faith, "Isn't this *jolly!*" A sudden outburst of firing drowned the answer, but the other soldier was seen to be deeply affected.

But there was more than keenness: there was a quick intelligence that grasped every order, and every word of instruction. A thing once said was a thing learnt and never forgotten. Of course these boys were only spending seven days of their holiday in this way, and it is hardly fair to compare their keenness with that of men whose soldiering extends over as many years; still one cannot help wishing that it might be possible to infuse a similar spirit into every regiment of our Army. With good discipline and sound training such a force would be indeed invincible.

Now the question has been asked—"What is the use of this Public Schools Battalion—or indeed, of having boy volunteers at all?" Some men who take an intelligent interest in the service, and whose opinions on other matters are worthy of respect, go so far as to speak of it as playing at soldiers and a waste of money.

The tax-payer may smile at the first of these charges—to him, it seems all "playing at soldiers"—but he will certainly frown at the second; so it is as well to explain at once that if money is wasted it does not come from *his* pocket. The expenses are few and are all borne by the boys themselves. They draw soldiers' rations, but on payment. All Government stores lent to the corps are returned when the camp is struck, and all that are damaged or deficient are paid for. Officers appointed to the staff of the Battalion of course receive no extra pay or allowances. The contribution of the public, then, is reduced to something very small indeed, and is represented by the value taken out of the tents by a week's wear.

To return to the original question—the use of having schoolboy volunteers. Only a small proportion will enter the regular army, and although they must undoubtedly be the better for this early commencement of their soldiering, still full provision is made for their instruction at Sandhurst or Woolwich, and with their regiments. The greater number, however, are destined for civil life, but if of these a certain number are encouraged to devote some of their leisure to a study of the profession of arms—if from good soldiers they become good officers of volunteers—if, in fine, the Battalion can serve the purpose of a Sandhurst for the citizen army—then this alone will be a sufficient result to justify the annual

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camp at Aldershot. So far this has not answered the contention of those who are for doing away with the Volunteers altogether. They say, and with some truth, that many men who would otherwise enlist find in this force a sufficient outlet for their martial ardour; that the tax-payer could be induced to pay for an additional 100,000 men but for the existence of his 200,000 Volunteers; that such discipline as they can boast would go to pieces under the slightest strain; that, in fact, they do more harm than good. There is one simple answer to all this. The Volunteers exist and they will continue to exist. Let the country make the best of them—not by destroying, but by improving. Enforce a sterner discipline: many men may leave the force in consequence, but what is lost in numbers will be more than gained in efficiency, and the men who remain will be the best.

Again, any man, whatever his calling, must profit by a military training. Discipline, obedience, unselfishness, self-control, the habit of exercising command, of bearing responsibility—all these are useful to the civilian as well as to the soldier. The physical is no less than the mental gain. A soldier is made to stand upright for other reasons than because square shoulders look better than round ones. How is it that our scientific instructors so often forget that round backs mean contracted chests, weak lungs, and ill-health? No object lesson could have been more striking than that provided by Colonel Fox when he invited the whole Battalion to the grounds of the gymnasium. Soldiers were there seen going through the successive stages of their outdoor exercises. First the young fellows who had recently begun the course; then those who had completed a month; and finally the gymnastic instructors themselves. If only people would realise the transformation that may be effected by even a few weeks of such training there would be an outdoor gymnasium to every board school and the recruiting sergeants' standard would no longer have to be lowered inch by inch to admit the weedy recruit.

There is one great service that can be rendered, and rendered peculiarly well, by the Public Schools' Battalion. They see enough of the army at Aldershot to encourage them to learn more, and the knowledge thus acquired, they can spread throughout the country. To most Englishmen, War is a far-off thing—a subject for telegrams in the morning journals, and sketches in the illustrated papers. Invasion is not a matter to be treated seriously. Europe may blaze; but the flames will never cross the Channel! They have no Gravelotte or Jena—no fields dotted with the green mounds and white crosses that mark the spot where thousands of brave men have died for their country, and where thousands more will

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have to die in years to come. In less fortunate lands whose frontiers are marked by a few white stones, or a dotted line on a map, war is a very real and a terrible thing—always possible and always near. There, every man must be ready to defend his fatherland; to face a well-armed invader with weapons equally good. But this means years of training—years that are taken from the work by which a nation lives—and this is called Conscription. Now, conscription may undermine a People's strength, but invasion and defeat mean absolute ruin. Is there, then, no alternative between a death by slow starvation and sudden destruction?

There is one nation that does seem to have solved this problem. Of all European races the Swiss yield to none in patriotism, and they are by far the most practical. Every Switzer can handle a rifle, and handle it right well, for he learns to shoot as a boy. In his country the use of the rifle is as general and as popular as was the use of the bow in England in the days of Agincourt and Crecy. But important as shooting is, it is as nothing compared with discipline. Without discipline the best trained and best equipped soldiers are but an unruly mob, dangerous to their friends and contemptible to their foes. Nowhere is this better understood than in the land whose motto is, "Each for All and All for Each," where discipline is not enforced from above, but rises spontaneously from below—the first lesson to be learnt; the last to be forgotten. Thus when the recruit joins the army his duty is already more than half learnt, and his training in the ranks is counted not by years, but by days. Hence the Swiss Army is the least expensive, and certainly not the least efficient, of any in Europe. What is possible in Switzerland should not be impossible for us. It is true that there they have greater facilities for making rifle-ranges. Land is cheaper, and it is possible to fire across their deep valleys without danger to the cultivators below. But if in England land is dearer so are the people richer, and they can afford to pay. As for that true discipline that is the strength of a great nation, it is relaxing everywhere. How is it that we, who pride ourselves in our cricket and our football, forget that a team obeying one leader —even an indifferent one—must always beat the men, however skilful, who obey no law but their own will.

What we want, and what the Public Schools Battalion can help us to do, is to dispel the ignorance that exists in this country as to what is necessary for the safety and honour of England and of the great Empire, without which England would be what she once was —an insignificant island in the northern seas and a prey to every invader.

J. R. DYAS.

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THE *TIMES* AND THE VOLUNTEERS.

By Eustace Balfour, *Major, London Scottish R.V.*

It is not commonly known in this country that General Boulanger wrote a history of the Franco-German war, or rather that he commenced such a history, for as far as I am aware, only one volume was ever published. The book is of no great military value, or at any rate, throws no special light on the tactical and strategic events of that great struggle. It possesses, however, a certain interest, partly arising from the strange personality to its author, and partly due to the fact that he had access to the archives of the French War Office when the work was being compiled.

But it contains one passage, so apt and fitting in respect to the controversy which has arisen from the account written by the military correspondent of the *Times* of the Volunteer week at Aldershot in August last, that I venture to commence this article by quoting a translation of it. General Boulanger writes:—

"It is certain that we made a serious mistake in trusting to the assembly of the *Garde Nationale Mobile*, as this force was not organised.

"Marshal Canrobert has drawn a vivid picture of this young army of the second line.

"The officer commanding the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Rhine [Canrobert] was in the act of organising his force in the Camp at Châlons during the second fortnight of July, when the *Gardes Mobiles de la Seine* suddenly appeared in the camp.

"Let him speak for himself:—

"'My Army Corps,' he says, 'was far from being completely organised. I was devoting myself to the task, and just when I was beginning to see the results of my work, the *Gardes Nationaux Mobiles de Paris* began to arrive, without my having received any warning. On that very day I received a message: "The first battalions will arrive to-night." The first, second and third battalions arrived in a fairly good state. I say "fairly good" for the sake of politeness, as they were not soldiers; but anyhow they might have been worse. I did my best for them; I had tents pitched; I sent them portable cooking apparatus, and I wished to look at them. I did so, and I found them well-intentioned; one battalion was commanded by M. Saillard,

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a very strong man, who maintained good discipline [*qui l'entretenait dans un bon esprit*].'

"The Marshal returned to his quarters fairly satisfied with what he had seen, and thus continues his account:—

"'The *Mobiles* continued to arrive; at last, when there were seven or eight battalions, I reviewed them, to give them a little soldierly pride, a little taste for their profession, to instruct them in their duties, and to appeal to their patriotism.

"'I had reviewed my Army Corps the day before; the *Mobiles* had been there as spectators and had had a chance of seeing an Army Corps of sound soldierly spirit, although not yet completely organised.

"'Then I went to see them. The first battalion received me very well; the second in the same way; the third . . . fairly [*assez bien*]; the fourth began to shout "*à Paris!*" I was so astounded at hearing these young men shouting "*à Paris!*" that I said to them, "My children, I suppose I am rather deaf, surely what you mean to say is '*à Berlin!—non, à Paris, à Paris!*'" They had their caps [*kepis*] on, and I made them take them off. It has been said that they insulted me, and even threw stones at me; they insulted me no more than they insulted their country when they shouted "*à Paris!*" instead of shouting "*à Berlin!*" But they showed a very bad spirit.'

"After having related this painful incident, the Marshal states facts which may reduce their importance.

"'Now,' he says, 'it must be admitted that we had not sufficiently prepared for their reception. These boys arrived at the Châlons Camp, and little, if anything, had been prepared for their reception. I had their tents pitched, and provided them with straw and such blankets as I had. In the month of August many are not required. I sent them portable cooking apparatus, but, as they had no camp equipment, no kettles, no water-bottles, no mess tins —you must pardon my mentioning these indispensable articles of war equipment—they found themselves before a large cauldron, and I cannot imagine how they could manage to feed. Here perhaps was a lack of foresight. The discomforts they had experienced, in addition to the inefficiency of the permanent staffs [*cadres*], this camp life, so new to the town-bred Parisian, had completely demoralised them, and, in my view, they were a force which I could not trust.'

"The officer commanding the Sixth Army Corps then explains how he introduced some [regular] officers in order to prevent even more serious irregularities, and he thus finishes his report:

"'Besides all this, the *Mobiles* were not armed. Their rifles

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kept on coming. They had to be unpacked and cleaned. This was a matter of time; they were not armed, and I was delighted at the fact.

"'After this show of insubordination [*espèce d'émeute*] I wrote to the Government. I told them that it seemed to me unwise to assemble all the battalions of *Mobiles* here, because their organisation was not sufficiently trustworthy for them to remain in force in the Châlons Camp; that as I had to march with my Army Corps they would be left quite alone, and that they were not a military body; that it was therefore necessary to distribute them in frontier localities from Dunkerque to Belfort. At that time we did not expect the events that followed.'

"I have made a point of giving almost complete Marshal Canrobert's report, because it gives an almost exact picture of the condition of the *Garde Nationale Mobile* at the outbreak of the war of 1870.

"What was to be done with conscripts who had never received arms, and who therefore could not know the rifle which they would have to use? Who had no change of clothes, no personal equipment, no field transport, no cooking apparatus, and whose permanent staffs, far from removing these disabilities, did but increase them?

"These drawbacks to the *Garde Nationale Mobile de Paris* were nothing as compared with the wretched state of those from the country districts.

"I do not think that at any time in any country such a sight has been seen of troops sent to face an enemy in such a miserable state."

Now, putting aside questions of personal and camp equipment, stores, transport, and arms (in some of which many Volunteer brigades are lamentably deficient), the scenes which occurred in that camp at Châlons are the scenes which the *Times* correspondent seems to expect would occur if the Volunteers were mobilised, and concentrated at their various points of assembly. At least that is the effect that I find has been produced by his account on the mind of the average intelligent reader. Some battalions are ignorant but of good stuff, others fair, others "do not know what discipline means, and never will learn it." These are they who, when the General came round to review them the day after their arrival, would cry, "We want to go back home."

This, I say, is the effect that has been produced by the *Times* Correspondent. And, although I do not hold this to have been entirely intentional, yet at the same time a less picturesque and more guarded expression of his views would have saved him from a part of the serious responsibility which he has incurred.

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For that responsibility is serious. He has used the great influence which his position gives him, and which his skill as a writer enables him to wield with such effect, to condemn in no unmeasured terms as unsound a portion of a fabric which has been the growth, and the steady growth, of more than thirty years. It is as if he were to say to a builder, "It is useless for you to continue. The labour of your workmen will be thrown away, for you are employing a material so rotten that it cannot stand the slightest strain or pressure, and nothing that you can do will ever improve it."

Before any man—be he the highest expert authority in the Empire—ventures to make such statements as this he must be doubly and trebly certain of his facts, and he must be doubly and trebly certain that his conclusions follow from those facts. It is therefore worth while to examine both his facts and his methods of argument.

I am ready to admit that there is in the article in question a large amount of truth. It is true, for instance, that there are differences in training, quality, and other characteristics between different corps. Every writer of any weight who has dealt with the subject of the Volunteers for many years past has recognised this fact. Indeed, the surprising thing would be to find it otherwise. Amongst Volunteers themselves it is assumed to be as much a matter of course as the fact of differences in uniform. It is also true that talking in the ranks is a most unsoldierlike habit too often indulged in. It is also true that battalions which during the year only work in detached companies are at a great disadvantage when suddenly called upon to execute battalion movements, especially in extended formations. It is also true that, under the influence of the excitement of their first sham fight, men do not obey their company officers with the same readiness as on the parade ground. It is also true that men unaccustomed to field exercises do not like lying down under cover, partly, I think, from a keen desire to to see what is going on. It is also true that inexperienced company officers in country corps are, until they gain confidence, very much under the influence of their guides, philosophers, and friends, the local staff sergeants. It is also true that in every battalion will be found individual instances of discontent. It is also true that the understanding of the tactical employment of small units as parts of a larger force is only slowly being regarded as an essential part of Volunteer officers' and non-commissioned officers' education. And to this I will add the lamentable fact that serious instances of insubordination do from time to time occur—almost invariably, however, arising from ignorance.

Now the bulk of the *Times* article consists of a dish of these

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truths served up spicily, and presented to us as a great novelty. Herein is the art of the journalist. And I for one have no objection to these faults and shortcomings being pointed out, and even harshly dwelt upon, although I cannot but think that a more restrained and judicial method of stating these well-worn criticisms would have been more useful. That, however, is a minor point. But there is one statement the inaccuracy of which I must point out. Talking of the force at Aldershot, the *Times* Correspondent says:—"These 20,000 [the numbers were 17,412] may fairly be regarded as a sample of the *best portion* of the 220,000 [it should be 217,000] efficients of the Volunteers of Great Britain." On what authority, or from what information, is this statement made? We are not told. And yet, as I shall presently show, if it is untrue, that fact will go far to shake the correspondent's conclusion. My own view is that the 17,412 Volunteers were an average sample of the whole force, but in no sense picked; but, unlike the *Times* Correspondent, I am prepared to give my reasons. At the same time, I admit that the assumption he makes is not unnatural on the part of one only superficially acquainted with the inner working of Volunteer corps. It is not unnatural on the face of it to suppose that those who take the trouble to undergo the training given during the Volunteer week at Aldershot are picked men. But, looking at the question a little more closely, we find that this process of selection could only be carried out in two ways: firstly, by choosing the best corps; or secondly, by the best men in each corps attending. Now, we know that there was no process of selection in the matter of corps. Any selection, then, which took place must have been a natural one, arising from the superior Volunteers in each battalion attending, and the inferior ones staying away. That this process of natural selection did not take place in many of the battalions at Aldershot I can vouch for as a fact, from personal knowledge and enquiry. But to one really acquainted with Volunteers it would have appeared strange if it had. Every corps may be roughly divided into three classes, which, of course, merge into each other. First, there are the keen old hands, the backbone of the force, men who never miss a drill when they can possibly attend. Secondly, come a very large class of those whose keenness has worn off, but who still retain sufficient interest in the work to be (technically) efficient in drill and musketry. Thirdly, we find the younger men, recruits probably, in their first or second years, who will sooner or later belong to our first or second groups. (We have, of course, also those who are idle from the beginning.) Now I am convinced that it is the experience of almost every Volunteer officer, as it certainly is mine, that the large majority of

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the Volunteers from each battalion who attend on occasions of this kind belong either to the keen old hands or to the comparatively young soldiers, especially to the latter, as being the most numerous.* If I am right in these contentions, then the statement that Volunteers at Aldershot were a sample of the *best* Volunteers in the kingdom is incorrect.

So much for the facts contained in the *Times* article. One may dismiss them quietly in the old saying: "What is new isn't true, and what is true isn't new." Now as to the conclusions drawn therefrom. The argument seems to be this:—Here we have 20,000 Volunteers which are a sample of the best. Among this sample of the best are many whose characteristics are such that it would take a long time [this is very indefinite], to make those of whom they are samples into soldiers. Also, among this sample of the best are a certain number who "do not know what discipline means, *and never will know it.*" Therefore we must differentiate between the good and the bad. The word differentiate meaning, in this connection, the removal of the names of the bad corps from the Army List.

It is clear, in the first place, that this argument is deprived of half of whatever force it may have if the "sample of the best" theory is untenable. And I think that I have shown that so it is. But I confess I am absolutely staggered by the further statement that there are men in appreciable numbers in the force who will never know what discipline is. From whence does the authority for this statement come? To what class do these men belong? That some, possibly many, Volunteers are still ignorant of the full meaning of the word discipline, I can well believe. In process of time they will be taught. But to say that they cannot be taught, or rather, that they are incapable of learning, is a conclusion which the writer has certainly not justified by anything that he has placed before us in his article. Further, it is a statement extremely difficult of proof, and one which, before acceptance, would require an overwhelming mass of evidence to support it. Where is that evidence? For on the face of it, the improbability is great. The recruits who join the regular army are largely drawn from the same class as those Volunteers who belong to corps formed of artisans and labourers. But there is this difference between them—a difference wholly in favour of the Volunteer. In the case of the regular army a large number of the recruits have already failed in that natural capacity for discipline which should have maintained them in the struggle for existence.

* There was one battalion (possibly many more) at Aldershot which contained a large number of recruits who had then for the first time put on their uniforms. Of course, however, they had done some plain-clothes drills and had received a certain amount of musketry instruction.

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In the case of the Volunteers, the recruits are of necessity earning their daily bread with their own hands—a discipline in itself. If then, there be any considerable body of Volunteers incapable of learning discipline, *a fortiori* there must be a very considerable body of regular recruits equally incapable. But we know that this is not so. How then can the statement as to the Volunteers be true?

I will conclude by noticing one further passage. "Now, there is," says the *Times* Correspondent, "among certain Volunteer officers a disposition to claim exemption from criticism by Regular officers, on the ground that the Volunteers cannot 'be understood,' so they say, except by their own officers." This may be the writer's experience, it certainly is not mine. What is true is, that there is a disposition to resent criticism by anyone whatever, based on wrong assumptions. But I never yet heard, and I do not think that any Volunteer officer ever seriously expressed, any objection to such criticism, for instance, as Sir Evelyn Wood has given of the work done during this very week at Aldershot, criticism which bears on the face of it the most careful and searching inquiry into the most minute matters.

But I go farther than this. Criticism may be constructive or destructive. If constructive, its aim is by pointing out faults to lead to improvement; if destructive, its aim is by the same process to lead to abolition, or, at least, to "differentiation." I need not say that the criticisms in the two cases will be widely different in tone. Colonel Farquharson in his—happily unimportant—prize essay was destructive. He, it is true, did not merely "differentiate," he tried to immolate the Volunteer force on a bonfire of newspaper cuttings. But the *Times* Correspondent is frankly destructive of what he is pleased to term, in his answer to Lord Wantage's remonstrances, "rotten branches." But he has failed to show that there are any rotten branches. He has discovered what we all have long seen, that some branches bear more fruit than others, and he has pointed out some twigs waiting for the pruning knife. The readers of this magazine, if they have ever taken the trouble to wade through some former articles of mine, will know that in Volunteer matters I am a radical reformer. But until opportunity arises for the carrying out of reforms in our present system, we have but one course open to us—to do our best under existing conditions, and to welcome criticism made by responsible officers with the object of improving us. But even the branches which bear least fruit decline to be "differentiated" out of existence, although the axe may be wielded by the military correspondent of the *Times*.

EUSTACE BALFOUR.

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THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION PRIZE ESSAY—A REPLY.

By Lieut.-Colonel J. Farquharson, R.E.

In the August number of this Magazine there appeared an article on the Royal United Service Institution Prize Essay, for 1893, on Army Organisation. The writer of the article, unlike most of the contributors to the Magazine, covers his identity under the title of "Regular." This title is ambiguous. There is the Regular usually known as combatant, and the Regular usually known as non-combatant; and it might have been more candid in the writer of the article to have indicated to which branch he belongs, as the point somewhat affects the authority of one who writes on such a subject as Army Organisation.

He expresses surprise that the meeting called by the Council of the United Service Institution for the discussion of the Essay was not attended by many Regular officers of distinction. His surprise will not be generally shared. It was well understood beforehand that the principal or only "discussion" likely to take place would be an attack by Volunteer officers on the Essay or the Essayist, and that a good deal of what "Regular" genially describes as "pardonable warmth" might be shown by those officers. In the result most of those who were present probably came to the conclusion that Regular officers of distinction showed a wise discretion in stopping away. He is probably right in the opinion that there is no good object to be attained in further discussing such a subject as the discipline of the Volunteers. But I cannot agree with him when he says that the "question is essentially one of opinion, and not of fact." The discipline of an existing force must be essentially a question of fact. It would be interesting to hear what the German Emperor would say if he were told that the discipline of his Army is "essentially a question of opinion." And I have some reason to complain of the assumption in the article that the Essay treats the Militia and Volunteers as if they were precisely similar forces. This is not the case; and "Regular" must know that it is not the case, as he was present at the

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United Service Institution meeting and must have heard what was there said on the subject.

He first proceeds to dispute some figures which I brought forward to show that the English home army of, and prior to, 1870 was nearly as strong as, and was more efficient than, the English home army of 1891. This point is one merely of historical interest and does not affect the main principles stated in the Essay. My figures may possibly be wrong. But I may point out a source of error involved in the figures adduced by "Regular." He states that the average strength of the English army at home for the whole of the year 1870 was 89,670 men,—not 105,000 as I stated it; and that, on 1st January, 1871, 190 men per 1,000 were under 20 years of age, while on 1st January, 1892, only 178 men per 1,000 were under 20 years of age. And from those figures he apparently concludes that the English home army of 1870 was a younger army than the English home army of 1891. The ordinary reader would not observe that the period named for his average strength, namely, the whole of the year 1870, is quite different from that named for his number of men under 20 years of age, namely, the 1st January, 1871. Yet that difference destroys the value of his figures. If he was in the service in 1870 he ought to know that early in that year there was a reduction of the Army, and that in the autumn of that year there was a large increase due to the panic caused by the Franco-Prussian War. This accounts both for the low average strength of 1870, and for the high proportion of youths on 1st January, 1871. And in fact any one can see that there must be some fallacy in figures which, if they are meant to prove anything, are meant to prove that an army enlisted for 12 and 21 years with the colours, like the English Army of, and prior to, 1870, was a younger army than an army enlisted for from 3 to 7 years with the colours, like the English Army of 1891.

"Regular" next proceeds to supply that criticism on the Army Organisation proposed in the Essay which he considers to have been so lamentably absent at the Royal United Service Institution meeting. He takes first what is called in the Essay the "Training Army," but what he throughout prefers to call the "Home Army." And not only does he give it his own name, but he adopts his own method of describing it: "The *Home* Army to be used only for large European Campaigns requiring more than 25,000 men, or to resist invasion." I do not know what his nationality may be, but this definition of the functions of a Home Army is curious. As to its correctness, I may quote the following sentence taken *verbatim* from one of the later pages of the Essay: "It will have been seen,

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from the whole of the previous parts of this paper, that the main object of the military organisation of this country ought to be to provide a force capable of defending our colonies and posts abroad as effectively as the home country." "Regular" apparently considers that Colonial Defence and European Campaigns mean one and the same thing. As a matter of fact, I do not think that European Campaigns are once mentioned in the Essay. He proceeds: "Colonel Farquharson's plan would confine the Home Army to these shores, except in the event of a European war requiring the dispatch of more than 25,000 men. Such a war has not taken place since Waterloo, for the original force in the Crimea was less than the number given." The only meaning that can be applied to this latter sentence is, that if 25,000 men are despatched from England in June and none follow, the war must be considered a great war; but if 24,000 are despatched in June, and 24,000 follow in July and August, the war must be considered a little war. He entirely ignores, for instance, the Indian Mutiny, during which, although probably only a few thousand men landed in India at one and the same time, yet probably as great a strain was thrown upon our military system as it has ever had to meet. He brings out the usual platitude about a "boy army," which we always hear about every reserve system. He says that the term of service with the colours (two years) proposed in the Essay for the Training Army is too short. This would be intelligible and consistent in the case of one who holds that it takes ten or twelve years to make a soldier. But it is not consistent in the case of "Regular." He accepts as satisfactory the present system, including the Militia and Volunteers. His opinion must therefore be that a few weeks' or a few months' training is sufficient to make a soldier, but that a two years' training is insufficient. Similarly he objects to the proposed Reserve of 250,000 men as being too few for a European war. Possibly it might be; but under the present system, of which he entirely approves, we have only 70,000 or 80,000. His opinion must therefore be that 70,000 or 80,000 men are a sufficient number, but that 250,000 are too few. It is difficult to treat such reasoning seriously. Of course, whether the training proposed in the Essay had been for two weeks, or two years, or twenty years, and whether the number proposed for the Reserve had been 10,000, or 100,000, or 1,000,000 men, there would equally be critics, but most of them would use arguments having some pretence to consistency. He dwells strongly and repeatedly on the point that the "Home Army" would have no experience of war, "from its commanding officer down to its youngest drummer boy." There is, so far as I know, nothing in the Essay to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief

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would not be, as he is now, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Queen's troops, wherever serving; nor is there anything to the effect that, except, of course, in the case of the officers for the Reserve, the officers of the Training and the Colonial Armies would not be as interchangeable and as open to special or to staff employment in the case of all wars as they are now. The argument of "Regular" as to inexperience in war applies, therefore, only to the non-commissioned officers and men of the proposed Training Army; and, as usual, he does not seem to have the least idea how far it would carry him. For it involves the assumption that every army in Europe is inefficient except our own, and that of our own army only a small part can be efficient, as there can now remain in the ranks only a small number of the men who have served in our small wars. And his argument raises the further question whether our small wars form the best training for a European War. Should our men, for instance, fight in square as they did at Ulundi, at Tamai, and at Abu Klea, if they were fighting against a European enemy? He adopts the curious notion of one of the speakers at the United Service Institution, that the officers of the Training Army, because they would be always serving at home in time of peace, would be the "dregs" of the service; which, by the way, seems to be rather a heavy back-handed blow at the officers of the Militia and Volunteers whom he has taken under his patronage. At the meeting at the United Service Institution I objected to this theory that, on the same principle, the officers of the German Army and the officers of the English Guards must be "dregs"; the rejoinder of "Regular," in his article, is as follows:—"The parallel is not a true one. The German Army serves entirely at home; if it had a chance of exercising its officers and men in minor campaigns, be sure it would do so, but it never fights minor campaigns." His logic here reaches its climax. He first asserts that my parallel is not a true one, and then immediately proceeds not only to state its truth, but to state the reason of its truth.

The arguments of "Regular" as to the proposed Training Army thus appear to be somewhat deficient in the element of sound reasoning. Those as to the proposed Indian Army, which he next takes up for criticism, are different. They consist in stating his own opinions as confidently as if they were existing facts, as follows: The "Indian Army would have men in its ranks too old, and with too long service to serve efficiently in India. Its transport arrangements to and from India would be most cumbersome and costly, likewise its system of periodical individual relief. It would have but a small reserve, and it would be most difficult to supply with recruits. Its pension list must be very large—in fact, it would

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be unpopular, cumbrous, inefficient, and costly." We have seen that "Regular" considers the discipline of an existing force to be essentially a question of opinion, and not of fact. But he has no doubt whatever that the above opinions as to a non-existent force are entirely equivalent to facts, although in favour of them he quotes no opinion but his own. He says the difficulty of "relieving not units but individual men would be enormous," although similar difficulties are successfully met every year in our existing battalions and batteries. As to age, pensions, and cost, including the cost of transport, even if he is right, these are stated in the Essay to be entirely questions for the Indian Government. If it wants younger men for a long-service army than those proposed in the Essay it must pay for them; at present it takes the best years of men's lives, and they are then turned adrift at an age when they cannot advantageously take up a new calling. Judging, indeed from the complaints now made about "home charges," it does not seem impossible that the Indian Government itself might prefer to raise its own European army, as it did before the present system came into force. As to the smallness of the Indian reserve, complained of by "Regular," his criticism is, as in the case of the Training Army, inconsistent. At present in the event of a great European War, such as a war with France, or a war with France and Russia, there is no Indian reserve at all; we could not spare a man of our present strength. "Regular," therefore, apparently thinks that no reserve at all is satisfactory, but a reserve of 20,000 is too few. On this point, however, it is clear from what he says that he has entirely failed to comprehend the main principle of the Essay. The reserve of 20,000 men for India was, like the small reserve for the Colonial Army, proposed merely for minor contingencies and for the smoother working of the system. Behind these reserves there are the large reserves of the Training Army, every man of whom would be available for the defence of every foreign possession of the Empire, including, of course, India; and it was one of the main objects of the Essay to show that the greatest defect of our present system is that such reserves do not now exist.

"Regular" next proceeds to consider the proposed Colonial Army, which he thinks would certainly be the most popular of the three. Many will think that it would be the least popular. Peace service in Colonial garrisons means exile without the advantages of Indian service; and this discovery that the English Army is eager for service of that kind will probably be a surprise to the Horse Guards. He says the Colonial Army "would be maintained on a peace footing at almost double its necessary strength, with a correspondingly unnecessary expenditure." Our present Colonial

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garrisons are about 30,000 European troops; the Essay takes them at the same number, that is, proposes no change; but because the Colonial Army of 55,000 includes not only the garrisons of 30,000, but their reliefs of 25,000 men, "Regular" considers the above statement justifiable. This is another case of his being unable to see how far his arguments would carry him. Our Colonial garrisons are relieved now: does "Regular" believe that the strength kept up to relieve them is unnecessary? or, if it is necessary, that it costs nothing? Yet it is plain that his argument must lead to that conclusion. He adds that the proposed reliefs would be costly and difficult of adjustment "since they must be made for each individual man, not for each regiment or unit," but refrains from giving the reasons for this necessity. The Essay expressly indicates that the Colonial reliefs are to be by units or regiments, as, indeed, they always have been, and as they are now. He thinks that the prospect of active service in our small wars will add greatly to the attractions of the proposed Colonial Army. Everyone knows that the real field for distinction in our minor wars is India. In the last eighty years we have only, outside of India, had on the average about one small war in every ten or fifteen years; and unfortunately they cannot all be considered to have been very glorious, while less than half of the proposed Colonial Army would have had the chance of being employed even in those. In short, my own opinion is that service both for officers and men in an organisation such as that proposed in the Essay would be regulated, as it is at present for the Army and the Militia and the Volunteers, mainly by personal predilections and personal conditions, and not by mere speculations as to chances of active service.

Only one other point remains, that of recruiting. On this point "Regular," says that Colonel Farquharson "does not trouble himself to show how men are to be obtained, nor consider whether they can be obtained; he constructs his system, and gives no thought to the first and most vital question of all for a voluntary army, how are we to get the men to maintain it?" It is not easy to excuse this statement, like some of the others, on the ground either of ignorance or confusion of thought. If he will read the Essay, either for the first time or otherwise, he will find a whole page of Chapter V. devoted to showing that our present system of Army service is probably the greatest obstacle to recruiting, and that even from the point of view of recruiting that system may have to be changed. Ignoring this part of the Essay, he takes up another part, which also deals with this subject, to which he says that no thought had been given. My argument in this second part he considers "so absurd as scarcely to require refutation. The conditions

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of service in our present Militia are the very opposite of those in the two foreign armies Colonel Farquharson would create; and to argue that because we get sufficient Militia recruits now we should get enough long-service recruits then for India and the Colonies can only be described as childish." Perhaps it is so, as the argument is stated by "Regular." But his method of stating arguments occasionally, as we have seen, leaves something to be desired, and he will perhaps allow me to state the argument in my own way; namely, that as we now get 35,000 recruits a year for an army which has to serve for seven years mostly abroad and is then turned adrift, we might possibly get 15,000 recruits for eighteen years' service with a pension at the end; and that as we now get 40,000 recruits a year for the Militia and an indefinite number for the Volunteers, we might possibly get 50,000 recruits for two years' home service even if accompanied by liability to serve abroad during a great war. "Regular" is evidently unaware that some of our ablest officers of Militia have publicly expressed the opinion that to make their men liable to foreign service during a great war would not in the least injuriously affect their recruiting.

He concludes his remarks by paying me—unintentionally, of course—a compliment. "The organisation devised by Colonel Farquharson is, in fact, that of a student, not of a practical soldier." It is generally supposed that in these days, or, for that matter, in any other days, no one can be much of a practical soldier without being something of a student. I am unfortunate in being unable to be complimentary in return. The kind of study which leads to the conclusion that an army enlisted for twelve or twenty-one years must be younger than an army enlisted for from three to seven years; and the kind of soldiering which leads to the conclusion that men trained for two weeks or two months are just as good soldiers as men trained for two years, are not likely to carry much weight either with students or with practical soldiers.

J. FARQUHARSON.

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AUTUMN MANŒUVRES IN THE RHINELAND.

By Major F. Trench, R.A.

If the poet Burns really yearned for his "giftie" he should certainly have turned his ploughshare into a sword, for surely in no other walk in life is so much time devoted to being seen by others whose duty is to tell us how they see us. Unfortunately, self-knowledge is not the whole duty of the soldier. France forgot this fact once, and from '66 to '70 shut her ears to Baron Stoffel's warnings. She knew her army was good—it was unpatriotic to admit for one moment that the German one might be better. It is well, therefore, now and again, to take a week in the autumn and make a pilgrimage to the military Mecca of the day.

And, indeed, a soldier may pass a very pleasant time on the manœuvre grounds of the sturdy Brandenburgers or the active Rhinelanders. The German officer has a very kindly feeling for his English brother-in-arms, and once the high ceremonial of clicked heels and formal salute is over his hospitable solicitude is unwearying. One lends you his horse, another has a spare room, which you must use during your stay, a third shares his billet in the crowded village, while a fourth presents you to His Excellency the General, who has ever a friendly greeting for the Herr Kamerad, and even goes out of his way to direct attention to any point of special interest.

With regard to the time of year one selects for one's visit, that should depend a good deal on what one is most anxious to see. As is well known, the German system of training is one of absolute decentralization. Every portion of the soldier's instruction is some particular person's duty, and from September to October the year is divided into fixed periods, at the end of each of which, and after a searching inspection, the soldier is incorporated in a larger unit and passes to an instructor higher in rank, and a higher grade of instruction.

At first sight, the so-called Imperial Manœuvres, which take place in September, at which the Emperor commands in person, and where a whole army-corps fights on each side, would seem to be most instructive. They have drawbacks, however. The ground manœuvred over, and the bodies of troops handled, are too large for anyone outside the staff to know much about the day's work as a whole. Every officer is a little more tied to his duty, and has less

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time to devote to strangers. Finally, the spectators are very numerous, do a good deal of damage to the crops, and call for much activity on the part of the field gendarme.

For these and many other reasons, that portion of the military year which is most suitable for a visit, is that devoted to Brigade and Division manœuvres. They last about a fortnight, and generally take place toward the end of August, that being the time when least harm is done to the crops. Even then, this item of damage is a serious one in the military expenditure, for, though the fields are unfenced in Germany, damage to the amount of £500 or £1000 may often be done by a division in a single day. A mixed commission of soldiers and experts ride over the ground on the morrow and determine the compensation due to the farmer, who receives it with hardly any delay.

This year the progamme of the autumn manœuvres of the 8th Army Corps was as under:—

August	18th to 21st,	Brigade manœuvres.
„	22nd to 26th,	Division manœuvres.
„	30th & 31st,	Move to Treves by rail and road.
Sept.	2nd	Parade before the Emperor.
„	6th to 9th,	Manœuvres against the 16th Corps.

but the present account refers only to that portion which took place in August, and which preceded the move to Treves.

The theatre of manœuvres was what is called the Volcanic Eifel, the rolling hill country which lies between the Moselle and the Ahr, westward of Coblenz and the Rhine.

The ground is open, quite unenclosed, gently undulating, and suitable for the employment of all three arms. The director and umpire-in-chief was H. E. General von Loë, the commander of the 8th Corps. He enjoys one of the highest reputations among the German generals, both as a soldier and a diplomat, and has been employed on several important political missions, notably to the Vatican. He is said to be a great favourite with the Emperor, and was promoted field-marshal on his 76th birthday, which occurred quite recently. In spite of his advanced age he is a splendid horseman and simply indefatigable.

The German Army is nothing if not systematic, so the manœuvres were preceded by the issue of a small pamphlet of a score of pages containing all the instructions which are specially necessary for peace manœuvres as distinguished from actual warfare. These related, *inter alia*, to the division of troops into opposing forces, and their commanders, to umpires, who judged between them and the rules by which they were to be guided, to localities which were to be avoided for medical reasons as well as

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to equipment, &c., which was on its trial and not finally adopted into the army. The advantage of this plan is evident: it eliminates from subsequent orders everything which they would not contain in war time, and tends to make them more realistic and concise.

Speaking generally, the units belonging to the opposing forces remained on their own sides throughout, a skeleton force being used to augment the strength of either side whenever it was deemed desirable. The Special ideas were consecutive, and continued the operations of the previous day. The General idea which ran throughout the whole was that the Western Force was trying to seize the passages of the Rhine at Coblenz, considered for the nonce an unfortified town.

All troops were in field service order, helmet covers being used to distinguish the Western Force. The men all carried tents, but I doubt the kit and equipment having scaled the full 68lb. The Western Force was accommodated in billets or bivouacked; the Eastern marched back daily to barracks in Coblenz and Ehrenbreitstein, with the exception, of course, of its outposts.

The marching was excellent. The manœuvre days lasted generally about ten hours, and, with the exception of an hour's rest in the middle, the men were on the move the whole time. In spite of their heavy kits, out of a dozen occasions on which I timed battalions by the milestone, there was not one when the pace was less than four miles an hour, either going to the rendezvous or returning home at the end of the day's work. The Coblenz garrison have a reputation as good marchers even in Germany, but there is no doubt that the general average is high, and that it is entirely due to the careful systematic manner in which the young soldier is trained in the art. He begins by only two marches a week, without even his rifle, and covering about ten miles; gradually the weight of his kit, or the sandbags which replace it, is increased till he carries nearly five stone, the marches themselves lengthening to five-and-twenty miles, and four being made each week. The men's footgear, consisting of Wellington boot and greased cloth, is also the object of constant care on the part of the company officers. As far as one could judge, there is absolutely no "tailing" on the road. In the cavalry, not only is there no distance from nose to croup, but each horse does not even take up a horse's length, as the noses in each section overlap by several inches the croups in front of them. This the hoses do without any urging whatever on the part of the men.

To anyone fresh from our own camps of exercise there is perhaps nothing more striking at German manœuvres than the amount of independence and initiative allowed to the commanders

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of the smaller units. The senior gives his orders as to what he wishes done, and trusts his subordinate to carry them out intelligently and in accordance with the "Manual of Instructions for Field Service." If the trust turns out misplaced there is no interference at the time, but severe censure is meted out at the subsequent critique. Repeated display of carelessness or inability to comprehend the conditions of modern warfare results in retarded promotion or transfer to the reserve.

This is the same principle which obtains in all the training of the soldier. The recruit on arrival is given over to a selected officer who knows exactly what he has to teach him, and the precise number of weeks at his disposal. During this time, though the captain is often present on parade, he rarely interferes, and even then it is generally to offer advice, not to give an order. The allotted time expired, a searching inspection is made and the recruits are embodied in the company which is now taken in hand by its chief and drilled as a whole for some three months; then comes the inspection of the company and the commencement of battalion drill. Thus the process continues throughout the year, each rank having its definite duty, its definite responsibility, and each officer being made or marred according as good or inferior results are shown at the successive inspections Work below the average on two following years entails severe reprimand. On the third year it results in retirement.

It has been well said that "tactics crystalize in orders," and in no way is this decentralization more clearly shown than the manner and nature of the orders issued at the commencement of a field-day. Arrived at the rendezvous, the mounted officers fall out and assemble round the general of the day, who details in a few crisp, concise sentences what is known of the enemy, what his own intentions are, his dispositions for his force, orders for the baggage, and where he himself will be found. The orders are terse, yet clear, complete and consecutive. During their delivery, when any unit is mentioned for any duty, its next higher superior tells it off there and then. Thus, if the general says: "Advanced guard one battalion, 28th Regiment," the regimental commander at once says: "First (or second or third) battalion;" and the battalion commander takes this as his order and gets no other. The whole thing doesn't last ten minutes, and in a couple more the troops are moving. Perhaps no fresh orders will be given for an hour—even during the development of the attack they are far from numerous. Everything seems to work quite smoothly; there is no hurry and bustle, no galloping of orderlies with orders and counter orders, no temporary assumption by colonels of the duties of corporals.

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What is the secret of this calm? Why does the fight develop itself so easily and naturally? There is no doubt that much of the credit is due to the excellent system of training officers in the issue of orders, which is in vogue in the German Army. It is so simple, yet so effective, that a description of it may not be devoid of interest.

It is a sort of war-game with maps alone; there are no blocks representing troops, and nothing is written down. The players are captains and subalterns, and a field officer acts as instructor. There are also probably a fair proportion of senior officers present, taking an interest in the game. One room has a good supply of maps corresponding to our one-inch survey, and there is a second room to which the opposing sides retire alternately. So far it is very like our war-game. The special idea is read to one side, and the officers to command the units are selected haphazard. A very little time is given, and then each officer recites the orders he would give. There are criticised *qua* orders by the instructor, and then the other side comes in and takes its turn. After about half-a-dozen moves by each side, both come in together for a criticism, of the tactics, after which the senior officer present adds a few remarks. Great value is attached to brevity and to completeness; the orders must run in natural sequence (*i.e.*, with regard to the places of troops on the map or the time at which they move); nothing must be omitted, nothing must be inserted which hampers the initiative of the subordinate. The skill of many quite young officers at this game is remarkable, and one has often wished at minor tactic days that we had something similar.

To return to the manœuvres themselves. The critiques were very thorough and minute, and lasted always one, sometimes two hours. Accidents and errors of judgment were gently treated, but violations of principle or disregard of the prescriptions of the Field Service manual received severe condemnation. All officers—save the generals and umpires—dismounted, and had their horses led away. This allows officers to approach much more closely, permits of everyone, even to windward, hearing distinctly, and prevents interruptions caused by kicking horses.

The umpires seemed less numerous than is the custom with us, but somehow the number seemed sufficient. The decisions were given very rapidly, and there were no instances of long delay at critical moments of the fight while umpires are having a consultation, which occasionally happens at our own field days. When small bodies met, if there was no umpire present, the opposing commanders decided amicably who should retire, and units obviously worsted did not refuse to move till an umpire could be

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found to order them to go. Bodies were not put out of action either temporarily or permanently, but use was made of a new screen, which has been recently introduced. It is about a yard square, painted yellow, with a broad black cross, and carried by every company, squadron and battery. The infantry carry it shoulder high, the artillery place it alongside the screen which indicates their target. The order to raise it is given by an umpire whenever the opposing side has established such a superiority of fire that the unit in question is no longer capable of offensive action, and would have to give way before an attack. Similarly, permission to lower it can only come from an umpire, and is given when the defeated unit either receives reinforcements equal in size to itself, or when, retreating, it reaches strong formed bodies or passes out of the enemy's field of fire.

Skeleton forces were largely used, especially for infantry and artillery. The units were marked by a section and a red screen for a company, a half-troop and a white screen for a squadron, and one gun and a yellow screen for a battery. The artillery of the skeleton force generally fired black powder. Special care was taken that these "skeletons" should always occupy the same frontage and depth as the units they represented would have done, and that they should not hide behind cover too small to have screened the full force. That regulations to this effect are necessary might be doubted; but the present writer remembers a little episode which took place a couple of years ago—and nearer home. A staff officer and a mounted policeman dismounted behind a gorse bush, and then suddenly galloped at some batteries with the remarkable statement that they were two squadrons!

The number of gallopers and orderlies used was very small indeed, and the regulations are very strict against this mode of frittering away one's cavalry. Cyclists are often used to carry messages, and many officers told me that they preferred them, and found that with pneumatic tyres cycles could go across any country. In this connection it must, of course, be remembered that hedges are unknown and fences very rare. There is no organisation of cyclist bodies, such as our volunteers have, or official provision of machines, but a small number of men—about six in each battalion—are allowed, during their second year of service, to ride their own. At manœuvres these men carried exactly the same kit and equipment as their comrades who were marching.

The cavalry are now all armed with the lance, but are rather inclined to look the gift in the mouth. Admitting that the lance is the queen of weapons, they say that her majesty wants a lot of wooing—more, indeed, than the short service soldier has leisure for.

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The steel shafts, too, are very cold in winter, and difficult to repair if bent. The hussars say the weapon is over heavy for their small men, and look upon the armoury with which they are provided as an *embarras de richesses.* The scouting was well done, and the information sent in sufficient and, in the main, accurate. It is probable, however, that in future warfare the intelligent interest which cavalry takes in its opponents' affairs will be ill repaid by smokeless powder and the small-bore bullet.

The batteries have not yet received the new gun, but expect it during the winter. An additional ammunition-waggon has been added per battery, and a couple of them will now carry 150 high-explosive shells. Indirect laying seems to have gone out of fashion, and no aiming pickets were put out. Only two ammunition-waggons—half the first échelon—come into action with the battery, and take post behind Nos. 5 and 6. The positions were well chosen, and only changed two or three times in the course of the morning's fighting. I saw no brigade-divisions come into action in échelon —a very favourite formation a few years ago. The special interval between batteries has gone, and the guns are fifteen yards apart right through the line. The batteries are commanded from the centre, not from a flank as formerly All these changes are the result of the introduction of smokeless powder.

Coming now to the main arm, the succeeding lines which followed each other in the attack of positions, were very numerous, and time and again, companies were ordered to hoist the yellow screen with the black cross, and fall back on reinforcements. Even when the umpires considered that the assailant had established a superiority of fire, and allowed him to close with the defenders, unless the advance was made at a good pace and with loud cheers, it was judged to have failed. There is no neutral zone which must be kept between opponents, and cavalry even ride through a battery when they get the chance. The men are allowed to mingle freely, and seem to be on the best of terms with each other.

The retreat and pursuit which follow a battle are much more practiced than by us ; and only on rare occasions did the fighting for the day terminate with the assault on the position. The pursuit was usually kept up for an hour or two ; the fight was then stopped, the troops marched back to their respective billets and barracks, outposts placed, and the mounted officers assembled for the critique. This, however, is a family party; and the discreet stranger, being a Lutheran in his views as to what a man should love, joins a returning company which, with much singing of patriotic songs, brings him to barracks again.

F. TRENCH.

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THE LOSS OF THE *VICTORIA;* AND THE MANŒUVRING POWERS OF STEAMSHIPS.

By Vice-Admiral Colomb.

Some surprise and a good deal of hostile criticism has been aroused by the appearance of a letter of mine in the *Times* of the 31st of July, on the loss of the *Victoria.* The letter sought to answer the two fundamental questions which naturally arose in every mind, had been asked over and over again in the public press, and formed the staple of every gathering of naval officers, "How did so able a man, considered by those who were serving under him as only second to Sir Thomas Symonds and Sir Geoffrey Hornby as a handler of fleets, come to commit so fatal and glaring an error?" And "How did it happen that he got no warning of the collision he was clearly ordering by his signal, except that of his own flag captain, and a certain hesitation in answering the fatal signal on the part of the rear-admiral?" My belief, as expressed, was, and is, that each result was due to a certain habit of mind in regarding the movement of steamships. I believed, and believe, that the late Sir George Tryon and his captains were in the habit of considering that in manœuvring their ships at speed, they had a much greater control over them than was in fact the case. That the general tone of thought in the Mediterranean fleet was not in accordance with the actual physical conditions connected with the manœuvring powers of ships. That the sort of experience they were getting was not of a kind to direct their attention to the very strict limits within which the manœuvring powers of the battle-ships are confined, and that when these were suddenly about to be brought into violent contrast, the absolute certainty of the result was realised by no one. If this was the cause, then my remedy was prescribed for me. It was that the exactitudes and certainties of steamships' manœuvring powers should for fleet manœuvring be brought into that prominence in naval officers' minds, which was their due. That these exactitudes and certainties should be more applied to the principles of fleet manœuvring than they are; and that, therefore, "common knowledge"—that is, knowledge so familiar that it would be impossible to lose sight of it under any circumstances—of the certainties and exactitudes of manœuvring powers should be established.

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I was not at all surprised at the hostile criticism which was pretty general. I have been for so many years of my life accustomed to see hostile criticism turn into cordial acceptance, that whenever I feel myself called on to express a strong view, or take a strong course, it is "common knowledge" to me that I shall "catch it," generally. Something, either in my way of putting things most probably, or less probably something in the thing itself, arouses opposition, and causes men to see more in my words than is either in them or in my thoughts. For instance, in this case, most of my hostile critics evidently have a vision of backward steps in fleet manœuvring, if my views obtained. They think of them as inevitably connected with slower speeds, greater distances apart, more deliberation, and slower execution of every manœuvre; with certainly more hanging back and fumbling with flags; and complicated arrangements that nobody understands in the presence of an enemy, to conquer which all the dash and *abandon* it is possible to summon up, is necessary.

I may of course be wholly mistaken; but I have totally different ideas connected with my views. I see great simplification in all fleet manœuvring; the closest order; the highest speeds; an apparent recklessness of movement which is now undreamt of. As to the presence of the enemy, I see no signals at all; nothing but the simplest movements, with all the dash and go that the pluckiest of commanders can put into them.

I was therefore ready enough for hostile, even for angry criticism, and was content to wait till the tide turned. But I was not prepared so well for the seeming surprise with which my expressed ideas were received. First, because the controversy is really such an old one of itself and in its nature; and because I have been saying the same thing right and left, in the highways and byeways, the closets and the market places, with hard words and soft words, for more than twenty-five years.

I am not now going to revive the controversy, but I am going to trace the long history of the application, the misapplication, and the total neglect of the seamanship of steamer's manœuvring powers to the purposes of the sea, for the last forty years or so.

Part of the surprise has arisen from forgetting that the loss of the *Victoria* was, when all is said and done, a collision due to the misapplication of two ships' manœuvring powers, and that ships are sunk at the rate of three or four a week all the year round on just the same principles, though not exactly under the same circumstances. Scarcely any of these are due to anything but mistaken seamanship and want of common knowledge of the manœuvring powers of ships when brought into contrast with one another.

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I must say a preliminary word about diagrams. From the early days of steamers, down to our own, it has been recognised that steamers, from many causes, required such comparatively large spaces, and such comparatively long times to manœuvre in, whether in the case of turning, or of increasing or reducing speed, that the consideration of such things became a necessity which had not existed with sailing vessels. If for any reasons, such as the framing of rules for avoiding collisions, the investigation of collisions, or later on in time, the framing of a system of manœuvring fleets, it was necessary to assume something as to how steamers manœuvred; it was always found necessary to make diagrams. Of course such diagrams could be made without employing any scale; and of course they could go farther and assume the movements of the ships themselves, also without any reduction to scale. But it is obvious that a diagram must certainly be useless unless it is to some sort of scale, however rough; and equally obvious that even if it is done to scale, a diagram which assumes movements in steamers of which they are incapable, must be equally misleading. On the face of it, it would seem simply ridiculous to make diagrams which are not to scale, and do not profess to make more than a guess at the steamers' method of moving. The height of absurdity would appear to be reached when grave laws passing through the hands of statesmen and pressed upon the acceptance of the world, should be founded on such diagrams. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that if the actual movements of any steamships be ascertained by experiment, they can be reduced to diagram, and to scale, and conclusions which are based upon that diagram will be true as far as they go, and may be relied on.

The history of the manœuvring powers of steamers and their application to the needs of the sea, is the history of diagrams in which pure assumptions not drawn to scale are called on to prove issues vital to life and property; of an occasional omission of the notion that any such things existed, and of a possibly growing tendency to avoid assumptions, to make diagrams only to scale and within the boundaries of ascertained facts, and then to use them within legitimate limits.

When steamships began to multiply at sea, and collisions amongst themselves and with sailing vessels began also to multiply, somewhere near 1850, it became necessary to make laws —Rules of the Road—in the hope of reducing their number. It fell to the lot of the late Admiral Beechey, who was attached to the Board of Trade, to begin; and he has left us a full record, with diagrams, of the method by which he arrived at his conclusions. He knew that there was a peculiarity in the way steamers turned,

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which was not common to sailing vessels. But instead of setting to work to find out by experiment exactly what these peculiarities were, he imagined them, and made diagrams on paper of what he thought they might be, and he drew a Rule of the Road for all classes of ships on the basis of these almost entirely speculative diagrams. The Rules soon became British law, but were found to be so destructive of shipping, that a Parliamentary Committee declared—I think in the year 1860—that whatever else was done, these destructive rules must certainly be swept away. They were swept away accordingly, and a long confused discussion ensued between all the great departments concerned as to what rules should succeed them.

Admiral Beechey's diagrams make it quite plain that what was wanted to settle the question was experiment and correct diagrams founded thereon, but no one seems to have thought of it. The substitute for Admiral Beechey's rules was a set based, not even on speculative diagrams, but drawn without taking any account whatever of the manœuvring powers either of steam or of sailing ships. The remarkable feature of these rules was that they carefully banished the rules which the old seamanship had established before the days of steam, and introduced new principles, which had always been condemned in the strongest terms by the old seamen.

Difficulties in giving the new steam line-of-battle-ships and frigates sufficient manœuvring powers arose about this time, and strongly excited the attention of the late Admiral the Right Hon. Sir Cooper Key, who then held office as Captain of the Steam Reserve at Devonport. He at length came to the conclusion that he could only get to the root of the mischief by making comparative experiments. He chose a gun-boat for the purpose, and I was his delighted assistant in making a series of experiments in measuring manœuvring powers, which resulted in the introduction of the "balanced rudder" into the navy, where it still holds its own. The value of the rudder was proved by the reduction of the results to diagrams drawn to scale, but the method of measurement, though the best that could then be devised, was somewhat crude, and in a sense misleading.

Near about the same period, the remarkably long time occupied by the new ironclad, the *Warrior*, in turning, attracted the close attention of her captain (now Admiral the Hon. Sir A. Cochrane, K.C.B.), whose second in command was our lamented Sir George Tryon, and he set to work to design methods for ascertaining the space, as well as the time, she required to turn in. Experiments, reduced to diagram, disclosed remarkable results, though the methods of measurement used were still defective. They led to

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the belief that the path described by a ship in turning was, in all cases, very nearly circular; and in face of the results, with the acceptance of the assumption, the Admiralty presently ordered that experiments, with regard to what was called "the turning circle," were to be made with all ships as part of their steam trials, which, for all I know to the contrary, may still be done.

More than this. The whole navy was stirred to its depths by what it learned concerning these newly discovered "manœuvring powers." The naval literature of the day teemed with discussions over the facts disclosed and its consequences; more and better methods of measurements were devised and put in use; the reforming head of the constructive branch of the navy (now Sir E. Reed, K.C.B.) proposed to reconstruct the whole navy in accordance with what the experiments had shown. Out of his views emerged the *Bellerophon*, the *Hercules*—still regarded with loving remembrance as the most perfect ship of her day—the *Sultan*, four ships of the *Audacious* class, and two ships of the *Swiftsure* class.

More still. An eminent Russian admiral, Gregory Boutakov, was so struck by the bearing of the experiments on fleet manœuvring, that he designed a complete and most elaborate system, based almost wholly on the *Warrior* diagrams, but assuming an immense mass of theoretical consequences which, from the English point of view, could never be taken into account, because they were unverified by experiment.

In France the matter created still more stir. Numbers of officers turned their minds to devising experimental methods of measuring manœuvring powers. Great numbers of experiments were made; and piles of treatises, large and small, were written on the subject. Schemes for manœuvring fleets—some of great extent and elaboration—were prepared, but most of them erected a mountain of theoretical and untested consequences upon a molehill of verified experiment. But everywhere it was insisted that no plan of fleet manœuvring, no ideas of the attack and defence of steam fleets, no possibilities of using the ram, could rest on anything but the ascertained manœuvring powers of single ships.

On the other hand, we had the firm rejection of everything of this kind when we betook ourselves to framing rules for enabling friendly ships to avoid collision with one another.

Such was the general state of things when in 1864 it fell to the lot of the present Admiral Brent and the writer to design a system of manœuvring for British ironclad steam fleets. The new plan was based on our knowledge of the foregoing facts, and the Channel Fleet, under command of the late Admiral Sir Sydney Dacres, G.C.B., with the present Admiral of the Fleet, Sir G. Phipps

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Hornby, G.C.B., as his flag captain, was put through a considerable series of test experiments: measuring the manœuvring powers of each ship; applying the measurements to the construction of diagrams by which the manœuvring of the fleet should be guided. The methods of measurements still left much to be desired. The exact path of ships in turning was still unknown. It was still considered to be nearly circular, and the "diameter of the turning circle" was made the basis of the whole system. It was assumed that a fleet could be brought to a general level as regarded this "circle"; that by differences of helm angle, according to the powers of each ship, the "circle" might be that of the longest ship present, or, more perfectly, might have a diameter of 800 yards, while half that distance, or "the radius of the turning circle," might be fixed as the distance apart of ships when acting together.

As much experiment as could be got, was got, in order to establish the new system; and it is impossible to separate its great success—in face of so many previous failures—from its unique experimental basis. It was by no means supposed to be complete or perfect, but it certainly was never intended that anything should creep into it except by way of comparative and continually increasing accuracy in experiment. Ten years later, it was necessary to warn the Service that many things in the system were based upon "supposed" and "theoretical" considerations. Dangers lurked—it was pointed out—in some of the movements. Speed and certainty it was officially claimed could only be achieved in fleet manœuvring by an accurate knowledge of what every ship did under different conditions of helm and speed. It was well understood that any officer in a fleet might by practice become a most skilful handler of his ship, without ever having any real notion of what sort of a path she described in turning. This followed, because, as a rule, the movements of ships in manœuvres were similar, and, when the guide made a movement, it was for every other ship but a copying of it. But it was equally clearly concluded that in manœuvring, ships were occasionally thrown into opposition. There was then nothing to copy and nothing to fall back upon but knowledge of the actual, and not the relative, movements of the ships. As far as possible such movements were studiously excluded from the scheme, but some remained, and were so far dangerous. What was wanted to render them safe, was more accurate knowledge of the nature of the path a ship described in turning, and more especially of the space and time she required to turn so far one way, and then so far back again the other way.

But meantime there had grown up the school adverted to in my letter to the *Times*, which scarcely recognised the experimental

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basis of the system adopted. The tendency became greater to believe that eye and judgment were better without any substratum of accurate knowledge. The same spirit, which, in the matter of avoiding collisions, had passed from the construction of fancy diagrams of manœuvring powers to no consideration whatever of such things, possessed a portion of the navy. Though every captain who had served in fleets knew that if he spent ten or twelve seconds over his helm, he was governing his ship's movements, perhaps, for the next five minutes in time, and for the next mile in space, it did not occur to most that he was then acting not on his eye and judgment, but on experimental experience, which was accurate only so far as his observation was accurate.

It was about this time that, for quite another purpose, Mr. Philip Watts, late of the Admiralty, designed a system of measuring manœuvring powers which gave us the means of obtaining, not one isolated, and not very correct, space measurement, but the position of any and every point in the path described by a ship in turning, and of the exact effect of variations of helm and engines in modifying the path. It was first applied to the *Thunderer*, and the results were published, with diagrams to scale, about the time we began to discourage the experimental method in the improvement of fleet manœuvring. The remarkable fact was disclosed that, for the *Thunderer* at least, the theoretical supposition that her path in turning was nearly circular, must be given up. A reference to what had been done in measuring the turning powers of more recent ships by the earlier methods led to the conclusion that whatever might have been the case with the ships of 1864, it was pretty certain that most of the newer ships must move more or less like *Thunderers*, and that no ship probably could avoid showing some of the characteristics which the *Thunderer* exhibited in turning. The bearing of the new and more accurate experiment was immense, but it was not used, and came more immediately into play upon the question of preventing collisions at sea.

Ever since 1867—when a man-of-war (the *Amazon*) had run down and sunk a merchant steamer (the *Osprey*) in the Channel at night, and, after drowning some of the people, had gone to the bottom herself—there had been war against the rules for preventing collisions, established in 1861. The officials had intrenched themselves and made terms, surrendering a part where the error was too glaring to be defended, but maintaining the keep where the fundamental error was enshrined. The supporters of the error scattered diagrams to prove it was no error by scores of thousands, yet never a diagram of them all other than a fancy one. Never a reference, never an argument, touching the actual movements of

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ships, on which the whole thing certainly rested. As long as attackers would speculate with fancy diagrams, the defenders would join in heartily. But when an attacker proposed to construct his diagrams from actual experiment with ships, or, worse still, when he showed how in Russia considerable numbers of collision experiments had been tried—well, that was not in the bond.* But nothing was so laughed to scorn as the idea of our going to experiment ourselves with manœuvring powers, combining with them the lights and appliances devised for preventing collision in order to ascertain by trial whether, considering that three or four ships were sunk every week by collision, there might not possibly be a flaw somewhere.

But now came this much more accurate knowledge, through the Admiralty experiments with the *Thunderer;* and near about the same time came about the most tremendous loss of life that the manœuvring powers of steamships ever had anything to do with. The *Bywell Castle* ran down the *Princess Alice* in the river Thames, and drowned 600 men, women, and children in one or two minutes of time.

A committee was assembled which the general public supposed was to inquire into the causes of the accident, with a view to remove them for the future.† It was wholly a question of manœuvring powers to be applied under certain pressing and immediate conditions. It required, therefore, "common knowledge" for their application, for no man in a moment of emergency can go into elaborate mental discussions of pros and cons before he acts. The captain of the *Bywell Castle* saw by certain changes in the coloured side-lights of the *Princess Alice* that she was pursuing a path that he had not expected, and which he thought contravened the rules of the river navigation. Whatever she had done, however, were it wrong or right, he was bound to avoid sinking her; and the question before him was how to do so? There was not much choice. The reduction of his speed was a measure certain to conduce to safety. The only matter of choice was whether to turn to the right or whether to turn to the left? Apart from any consideration of manœuvring powers—of the path the *Bywell Castle* would pursue in turning—it was natural that the *Bywell Castle* should turn to the right. She did so, sank the ship, and drowned the multitude. Would it have been just the same if

* I heard of a member of Parliament who possessed himself of a real diagram and took it to a Cabinet Minister. The answer was prepared in the form of a fancy diagram, and was thought conclusive.

† This was so far from being the case that, by decision of the committee, allusion to the accident could only be made by permission of the chairman.

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she had turned to the left? Was this latter turn as absolutely safe as the former had been absolutely dangerous? No one could strictly answer, unless he knew what these two paths were. It was possible to ascertain them with accuracy by proper experiment.*

While the committee declined altogether to go into the question of the causes of the destruction of the *Princess Alice*, it was ready to go into proposals for obviating such accidents in future—provided such proposals did not ask for experiment, did not use experiment, and rested on diagrams drawn according to the fancy of the draughtsman. The experiments with the *Thunderer* were rejected; previous Admiralty experiments generally were rejected; nothing that could be proved by experiment was admitted, and the rules for preventing collision in the Thames were modified accordingly. One of the advocates for experiment endeavoured to show that for any ships whose manœuvring powers had been measured, some of these rules would be destructive. That any two of such ships must come into collision if they did what the rules directed. The proof offered was by diagrams to scale, based on the best experimental information available. The chairman of the late committee, admitted by all to be a most able man, replied by diagrams not drawn to scale, and having no reference whatever to the possible movements of any ships that ever sailed or steamed. Nor was it possible to bring him to see that there was anything incongruous in supporting a rule for the guidance of ships by the supposititious movements of things that were not ships.

After this, three things went on together. Lloyd's went on reporting the destruction of three or four ships every week, with plenty of lives, by collision; the believers in experiment went on to perfect Mr. Watt's system of measuring manœuvring powers, and to adapt it to data necessary for perfecting fleet manœuvring, and for securing true methods of stopping the collisions that Lloyd's reported; the defenders of existing rules went on pouring out fancy diagrams, based on supposititious and generally impossible movements of ships, which they offered to the faithful as the real panacea.

Real data began to accumulate; real facts to multiply; and the press kept its columns open to the supporters of the fancy and experimental methods, who both had a right royal time of it. The advocates for experiment and action founded thereon were always in a great minority; but they were very pertinacious, and as they got fact after fact piled up, it became difficult to dislodge them, and they presently began to make way.

* If my recollection is correct, some such experiments were tried with the *Bywell Castle*.

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It was in the United States Navy that seamen began to awake to the serious consideration of the question. Treatises were published on that side of the water, based on the experiments made on this side, and showing that there was no way out of the conclusions so far as the prevention of collisions went. This current of opinion uniting with other currents over there, produced the Maritime Conference of 1889, as to which it may be said, that its main object, as well as its main result, was a fundamental modification of the International Regulations for preventing collisions at sea.

But British naval officers were not very far behind. The Admiralty had been making examinations for itself, and presently went over to the enemy. British delegates were to attend the Conference, and some line must be taken by them. The Admiralty saw that the question in all its main issues could not be got away from experimental knowledge of the manœuvring powers of ships. If that showed that the existing regulations for preventing collisions were right, they must be supported. If experiment showed they were wrong, they must be opposed. They made numbers of diagrams to scale on the best experimental information, and came to the conclusion that the main principle of the rules was wrong. They confirmed their work by a large number of experiments made on purpose. The British delegates carried their clauses, and restored—not quite in a complete form, but still near enough—the rule that the practical wisdom of our seamen ancestors had established, and held for, perhaps, hundreds of years, and which could never have been disturbed, if supposed reformers had not attacked it with fancy paper diagrams, and supposititious movements of steamships which they scorned to verify.

Now note a remarkable fact in corroboration of all that has been said. The rules agreed to by the Washington Conference are not yet law, and the rules for preventing collisions at sea, based in part on Admiral Beechey's fancy diagrams, and in part, on no diagrams at all, while wholly resting on the rejection of all experiments, are still in force. The eminent Mr. John Glover has examined their consequences during a recent period of ten years. He has shown that, in the decade of which he treated, our modern methods have immensely decreased every kind of wreck but one. That one, wreck by collision, we have managed to increase.

Note, again, that a few years ago a strong believer in the importance of these matters proposed to the Royal Society to take the most recent experiments with reference to the manœuvring powers of steamships into consideration. This learned body came to the conclusion that the subject was of "too practical" a character

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for its purposes. It intimated that it would consider any paper which might treat the subject theoretically, but unfortunately the proposer was not a mathematician, and the subject dropped. Had it been otherwise, perhaps the high principles which the Royal Society would certainly have evolved out of so interesting a study might have passed with authority into so many minds, that the common knowledge sought for might have been established with far reaching results.

Now we can see how, when this terrible disaster comes to pass, one who had been for something like thirty-three years a student of cause and effect in all matters relating to the manœuvring powers of ships, could take but one view of it. The collision was ultimately due—from whatever point of view we may choose to look at it—to the manœuvring powers inherent in, and inseparable from, two of Her Majesty's finest and most powerful war-ships. I had been a justified believer in the cause I advocated, because I had seen it repelled and condemned in almost all quarters for something over twenty years, only to be accepted at last on the question of the rule of the road. In so far as I had been able to apply it myself to the question of fleet manœuvring, the whole navy became witnesses to the success of the application. On the other hand, I had been a witness to the singular prejudice resident in the minds of seamen, which led them to suppose, when they were asked to give their minds to a study of the *real* motions of their ships, that they were being asked to do something which was an impracticable fad, evolved out of the brains of mere theorists. I had seen this prejudice yield, here a little and there a little, as results obtained by careful and exact experiment became incorporated into the "common knowledge" of seamen.* What was there to separate in my mind the ultimate causes of this horrible collision from those which had been always admitted as operative in the partial collisions which had taken place from time to time in the course of fleet manœuvres, or the "close shaves" we hear of? In all such cases we heard that so and so—naming the captain—gave too much or too little helm, or put his helm the wrong way and so on; acts unexplainable, but on the ground that the effect of the helm on the path of the ship was not "common knowledge" to so and so. Or when obedience to a signal has produced a greater risk than was anticipated, no one

* A striking instance of the process was afforded by a captain who had served under Sir George Tryon, and who stated in the *Times* that "everybody knew that the paths of ships in turning were not circular." The fact being that it is not universally true, and was first disclosed to be true of some ships by the Admiralty experiments with the *Thunderer*.

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ever dreamt of saying anything but that "room enough" was not given; the actual room given being perfectly well known beforehand. What can it all come to but that this question of "room enough" is a question of common knowledge of the room required?

What again was to separate in my mind the ultimate causes of the loss of the *Victoria* and the loss of the *Princess Alice?* Both hung on the manœuvring powers of the ships. Both hung on the misapplication of them. It has been in my experience to rush on deck only just in time to reverse the helm given by the officer of the watch and to avoid a disastrous collision. When I compared notes with him afterwards, I found that the only difference between us was that I had a familiar picture in my mind of the sort of path my ship would pursue under either helm, while such a picture was totally absent from his.

There ought not, therefore, to have been the least surprise on the part of anyone that I should have written as I did. I have said nothing in this paper which cannot be easily verified, and such opinions as I have expressed in it are common property, and no one apparently is ready to deny that the "common knowledge" I think we want, should be had if we have not got it.

The only fundamental difference seems to be that those who think they differ with me (I scarcely think they really do) appear to claim that instead of going directly to work to obtain the knowledge in the easiest and quickest way, we had better let it be evolved out of a prolonged series of mistakes and accidents. In that way, it seems to be argued, we can best get the necessary knowledge. But Mr. John Glover shows us, and tells us, that in the ordinary form of accident by collision, the process has not answered. Can we rightly assume that it will be different with fleet manœuvring? Can we increase the speed, precision, and safety of fleet manœuvring by this sort of method of continually cutting out our errors? Surely the direct method is preferable.

If I may venture to say so, I think we forget that the success of our system of manœuvring arises from its experimental foundation. All the experiments known to exist before 1864 were pressed into it, and the Channel Fleet was put, individually and collectively, through a course of comparative and verifying experiments. The result, of course, was that little or nothing was allowed into the signal book which was not pretty fairly covered by experiment. Hence all has gone fairly well with it. I feel sure that only continued motion in the same path can possibly take us to the goal we aim at.

P. H. COLOMB.

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THE NAVAL MANŒUVRES.

By Captain Orford Churchill, R.N.

The following remarks are put forward with a view to summarising the lessons learnt from the manœuvres of this summer.

It may be well to enquire first of all, of what advantage are these manœuvres, and what do we learn from them? What was the special lesson taught during the last operations; and how should future manœuvres be arranged so as to throw the greatest amount of light on the many problems of naval warfare that await solution?

The general object of such manœuvres is threefold: (1) Mobilisation, (2) Exercises on an extended scale only possible with the large fleets that mobilisation give us, and (3) Mimic hostilities, having in view some special strategical subject upon which it is desired to throw light for future guidance.

The partial mobilisation which is now carried out annually, may be described as a testing of the machinery which is used for manning all the ships that are available, a bringing together of the *personnel* and *materiel*, ascertaining how far the supply of officers and men in the navy is sufficient to commission all the ships that are ready for immediate service, at the same time leaving a fair number of men at the depôts in readiness for the ships that could be pushed forward by the dockyards, and completed for sea at short notice.

The state of readiness or unreadiness for war of Her Majesty's ships is now indicated by classification; from the day on which a ship is launched or is dismantled after a commission, she takes her place in a class which to the initiated clearly defines her position as to preparedness for fighting purposes; as she progresses towards completion she moves forward in her classification until she is finally placed in the A division of the Fleet Reserve, which means

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that she is in all respects ready for commissioning; her guns, coal, stores, and a skeleton crew are on board, all that remains to be done is to receive the remainder of her men from the depôts, combustibles from the Ordnance Department, and provisions from the Victualling yards—a matter of a few hours at the outside; the ship is then ready for sea. Such is the system of mobilization now fairly in working order, a system which, as far as the crews are concerned, depends upon the reserves of men kept in the general depôts, the Gunnery and Torpedo depôts, and at the Marine head-quarters. The rosters of these men have to be regulated in view of the ships ready for sea at the several ports, and when foreign reliefs have to be provided and the proper proportion of home service given to each men after a period of service abroad, it will be seen that the drafting arrangements necessary to keep such a system in complete working order are by no means simple. Taking all these difficulties into consideration, I think it is a matter for congratulation that the mobilisation scheme works as well as it does. I had good opportunities of forming an opinion as to the quality of the men who composed the crews of many of the mobilised ships this year, and, as far as the seamen are concerned, judging from their general appearance, at no time have I seen a higher standard attained. The stoker class left much to be desired, the numbers were there, but in physique they were not what they should be; this is a matter which I think requires serious consideration and is a difficulty which can only be met by extending to the stokers the training system which has been productive of such good results to the seamen.

The mobilisation having been completed at the several ports, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, the newly commissioned ships joined the fleets to which they were attached, the places of assembly being:

A Division, Red Fleet, Portland.
B Division, Red Fleet, Milford Haven.
D Division, Blue Fleet, Berehaven.
C Division, Blue Fleet, Blacksod Bay.
Torpedo-Boat Flotilla, Falmouth.

From these places the introductory cruises and exercises were carried out for about a week, after which A and B Divisions of the Red Fleet put into Torbay and Lamlash respectively, the two divisions of the Blue Fleet returning to their ports of assembly, and the Torpedo-Boat Flotilla assembling at ports on the East Coast of Ireland, the ships then completed with coal in readiness for the mimic hostilities.

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The opposing fleets were as follows:

The Red Fleet.

A Division.	Tactical Value in Points.	B Division.	Tactical Value in Points.
Group (*a*)—		Group (*a*)—	
Royal Sovereign	12	Anson	12
Rodney	12	Thunderer	12
Nelson	12	Rupert	12
Conqueror	12	Immortalité	12
Narcissus	12		
Blenheim	12		
Group (*b*)—		Group (*b*)—	
Sappho	4	Tribune	4
Pique	4	Iphegenia	4
Naiad	4	Mersey	4
Rainbow	4	Iris	4
Intrepid	4	Bellona	4
Thetis	4	Satona	4
Group (*c*)—		Group (*c*)—	
Speedwell	1	Barracouta	1
Skipjack	1	Sheldrake	1
Salamander	1	Grasshopper	1
Niger	1		
Gossamer	1		
Gleaner	1		
Spider	1		
Rattlesnake	1		

The Blue Fleet.

C Division.	Tactical Value in Points.	D Division.	Tactical Value in Points.
Group (*a*)—		Group (*a*)—	
Alexandra	12	Swiftsure	12
Superb	12	Hero	12
Benbow	12	Aurora	12
Audacious	12		
Australia	12		
Galatea	12		
Group (*b*)—		Group (*b*)—	
Terpsichore	4	Andromache	4
Indefatigable	4	Apollo	4
Melampus	4	Brilliant	4
Æolus	4	Retribution	4
Spartan	4	Forth	4
		Thames	4
		Pearl	4

Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

		Torpedo Boats. No.	No.	No.
Vulcan	Raven	59	34	63
Curlew	Barosa	60	45	64
Magnet	Jason	66	52	67
Traveller	Circe	77	53	68
Hearty	Seagull	79	57	72
		81	58	75
		82	80	83
		85	84	87

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An analysis of the Tactical Values Assigned by the Rules to the Red and Blue Fleets respectively, gives the following results:—

The Red Fleet.				The Blue Fleet.			
A Division,	Group	(a)	72 Points.	C Division,	Group	(a)	72 Points.
,,	,,	(b)	24 ,,	,,	,,	(b)	20 ,,
,,	,,	(c)	8 ,,	,,	,,	(c)	4 ,,
B Divisison	,,	(a)	48 ,,	D Division	,,	(a)	36 ,,
,,	,,	(b)	24 ,,	,,	,,	(b)	28 ,,
,,	,,	(c)	3 ,,	,,	,,	(c)	— ,,
		Total	179 Points.			Total	160 Points.

In addition to the number of fighting units shown above, the Blue Fleet had attached to it the torpedo boat flotilla, to which no points were assigned for tactical purposes, except to the four torpedo catchers which were valued at one point each.

It will be seen that the tactical values of the two fleets were as 179 to 160, that is to say, the Red Fleet was not quite one-eighth superior to the Blue Fleet, exclusive of the torpedo boat flotilla, which was on the Blue side. Probably this was an oversight in arranging the composition of the fleets, or in assigning the respective values to the various ships engaged. It had the effect of bringing about indecisive actions, for if the whole Red Fleet engaged the whole Blue Fleet, no definite result followed, because neither side had a superiority of one-eighth, which according to the rules it must have to claim an advantage; moreover, it necessitated bringing the torpedo catchers of the Red Fleet into action for the sake of the points assigned to them, so that strategically they were of value, whilst tactically they were of no use during the daylight actions, in which torpedo boats took no part, when their services as torpedo boat destroyers were not required, whilst they themselves were frequently exposed to the fire of battleships to which they could make no effective reply.

The object of the mimic hostilities was to ascertain whether it was possible for the two divisions of the Red Fleet, situated as they were at Torbay and Lamlash, to unite so as to crush the two divisions of the Blue Fleet, either in detail or collectively, and so command the Irish Channel in such a manner as to be able to send an expedition across it, or to conduct other hostile operations in its waters. The starting points of the Blue Fleet were Berehaven and Blacksod Bay, the Berehaven division having to pass to the southward and the Blacksod Bay division to the northward of Ireland for the purpose of uniting, all four fleets starting from their bases at the same hour.

The 27th of July was the day selected for the commencement of hostilities, and immediately on receipt of the necessary telegram

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from the Admiralty each of the four divisions weighed and steamed as quickly as its slowest unit was capable of to a previously-arranged rendezvous, where it would meet the other division of the same colour. Twenty-four hours previous to the outbreak of hostilities a telegram had been received by the respective Admirals to the effect that cruisers might observe probable hostile movements of the enemy. There seems to have been a want of reality about this measure, for it enabled the cruisers to be used for strategical purposes, if so desired. Perhaps it would be better that cruisers should be allowed to go out from their bases for the purpose of getting touch of the enemy and returning to the main body of the Fleet to which they were attached before the expiration of the twenty-four hours, or that they should not start at all until war was declared, we should then be more nearly assimilating our proceedings to those of real warfare.

On the afternoon of the 28th of July, the day following the declaration of hostilities, the two divisions of the Red Fleet met in the Irish Channel at a pre-arranged rendezvous, but, unfortunately for them, a dense fog came on at the moment of junction, before the combined Fleet could be formed up into its proper order; this necessitated the use of fog signals and gave the torpedo boats of the Blue Fleet an opportunity for attacking, which they were not slow to take advantage of. The ships comprising the Red Fleet could not see the torpedo boats, owing to the denseness of the fog, until they were close alongside; and yet the ships were obliged to sound their syrens constantly, in order to avoid the danger of collision with each other, by this means indicating their positions to the enemy. The torpedo boat action that ensued resulted in the supposed destruction of one battleship and several cruisers belonging to the Red side. The fog, which lasted for several hours, not only allowed the torpedo boats to attack with success, but it also permitted the first division of the Blue Fleet to pass to the westward of the combined Red Fleet without being engaged, although the fact of its being in the immediate neighbourhood was known to the Red Fleet, the Blue flagship's signal guns being distinctly heard whilst the fog lasted.

The first division of the Blue Fleet, under cover of the fog, got away to the northward, joined the second division, and returning south met the Red Fleet off the Calf of Man at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 29th. A general engagement lasting two hours followed, but the numbers being so nearly equal no advantage could be claimed on either side, the slight superiority originally possessed by the Red Fleet having been materially reduced by the loss of several vessels in the torpedo boat action of the previous

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evening, and by the absence of *Narcissus*, whose defective machinery had necessitated her putting into Milford Haven for repairs.

Both fleets now returned to their own harbours for twenty-four hours, in accordance with the rules governing indecisive actions. On the 31st of July they put to sea again, and on the 4th of August another general action took place off Bardsey Island with similar indecisive results, for the two divisions of the Blue Fleet having once joined no strategy on the part of the leader of the Red Fleet could give him that preponderance of power by numbers over Blue necessary to obtain permanent control of the Irish Channel, unless the Blue Fleet voluntarily separated into detachments liable to capture; this, of course, its leader did not permit, and therefore the rest of the operations became somewhat tame. The Red Fleet, about thirty strong, cruised to the southward, whilst the Blue Fleet, of nearly equal tactical strength, maintained its position to the northward, occasional raids being made by the torpedo boats of the Blue Fleet with varying success against the Red battleships and cruisers, and by the cruisers of the Red Fleet against those of the Blue; but the command of the Irish Channel was not obtained by Red, nor was the Red Fleet much crippled by Blue torpedo boats. Two of the Blue cruisers were torpedoed by boats of their own side; this is, however, what might not improbably occur in real warfare, and only points to the necessity for unceasing vigilance on both sides.

As a net result of the operations, twenty-six Torpedo boats out of the twenty-nine belonging to the Blue side, including those attached to the *Vulcan*, were captured and destroyed by ships of the Red Fleet. One battleship and four cruisers of the Red side appear to have been captured, against three cruisers of the Blue Fleet captured by the Red. The existing rules relating to capture do not seem to be very satisfactory. These rules are, doubtless, framed with a view to giving as much experience as possible to officers in command, but whilst Torpedo boats, for instance, can come to life again so shortly after having been destroyed, it is impossible to estimate at its proper value the efforts made for their destruction by the ships of the fleet. This is but one of the many difficulties that present themselves when framing rules to govern these pacific hostilities.

The question of how to keep a large fleet supplied with coal is one on which these annual manœuvres should throw some light, but I think we have still much to learn on the subject. A number of colliers, each of about seven or eight hundred tons burthen, were this year chartered and placed at the disposal of the several

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squadrons, an officer being appointed to each fleet in charge of the coaling arrangements. This seems to be a very useful plan, for we are accustoming a number of officers of the mercantile marine to act in concert with war fleets, and we shall have a number of officers of the navy who are in the habit of making all arrangements for the supply of coal from the colliers to ships of the fleet.

During this year's manœuvres colliers were, by the rules, exempt from capture. This I cannot help thinking was a mistake. In future wars the guarding of our colliers from attack by the enemy will form an important part of the operations; convoys will be required to safeguard them at all times when under weigh, and at anchor colliers will have to be placed under the guns of friendly forts or ships and secured from attack of torpedo boats by nets, &c. The colliers attached to a fleet are of as much importance as its food supply. Has it not been said that ships without coal are like bodies without souls? Surely, then, it would be well to teach ourselves how best to guard the coal supplies of our fleets under all circumstances in which they may be placed in the ever-changing scenes that a future war may present to us.

I think that the colliers used this year with the fleets were not large enough, nor had they speed enough; they should be sufficiently fast to avoid capture by the enemy's cruisers, if that speed can be combined with sufficient coal stowage. Also the mechanical contrivances used for transferring the coal from the holds of the colliers to the bunkers of the men-of-war were in many cases sadly defective, and might easily be made less so. In most cases the method adopted was the primitive one of hoisting out two bags of coal at a time by means of a whip brought to a steam-winch in the collier, aided by a derrick worked by manual power in the man-of-war; but in some instances the transporter was used with very satisfactory results. This appliance is new, and consists of a long bar suspended nearly in a horizontal position, slightly inclined downwards towards the ship receiving the coal; one end of the bar plumbs the hold of the collier, and the other end that part of the ship where the coal is intended to be deposited. The coal is placed in a large caldron, which is fitted to slide down the bar of its own weight when full, and is pulled back by hand when empty; this arrangement shortened the time of coaling by about one-half, and is certainly capable of further development. There is also the question of coaling from a collier at sea. This is a matter which has been much discussed, but we do not seem to get any practical results from the discussions. Every seaman knows that in bad weather, with a heavy sea running, it is impossible for two ships to lie alongside of one another when under weigh

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in such a manner as to admit of coaling, also that in perfectly smooth weather, when there is no swell, it is a fairly easy thing to do; but there is the intermediate state of the weather, that state most frequently experienced when two ships, unless fitted with special appliances, cannot lie alongside one another at sea without damage to the weaker one.

Is it not possible to supply to the colliers large floating fenders of the kind used to keep ships off from a dockyard jetty, technically known as camels, and fitted to trice up against the collier's side when not in use? It seems to me that something of the kind might be used with advantage. In an open anchorage in bad weather it is difficult to place ships alongside one another for coaling without causing damage, and yet in war time we should have to attempt it constantly, and here I think camels would be of use as well as when actually under weigh. It seems strange that so little progress should have been made in the art of coaling. Ships have often coaled at sea. The *Alabama* frequently coaled at sea from her prizes thirty years ago, and yet we have only advanced a little beyond the most primitive method of filling bags in one ship and hoisting them into the other by means of whips and derricks. I do not envy the feelings of a cruiser captain in war time whose ship is several hundred tons of coal short, when he sees it being put on board two bags at a time, and knows that the enemy's fleet is within striking distance.

I think the want of more and better signalmen has shown itself very clearly during the late manœuvres, especially in the case of the torpedo catchers, whose complements of signalmen are manifestly inadequate. These vessels were frequently unable to take in signals at important crises in the operations, the movements of the fleet being retarded and hampered in consequence. The experience necessary to make a good signalman can only be gained at sea with a fleet; no amount of harbour training can make a signalman conversant with the difficulties of quickly, and with certainty, taking in flashing and other signals when the ship is going at a high rate of speed in thick weather.

At present the prospects of signalmen with reference to advancement do not compare favourably with those held out to gunnery and torpedo petty officers, and until those prospects are materially improved I do not think that the best men will offer themselves for signal ratings. I am of opinion that all captains' commands should bear a signal Boatswain for change of Boatswain's stores and signal duties, smaller vessels bearing a Chief yeoman of signals for the same purpose. This would, I think, tend

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very much to raise the status of the signal staff generally; it would place a far greater number of higher ratings and emoluments within the the reach of signalmen, and thereby attract men of the highest intelligence to the signalling branch; and now that masts and yards no longer exist it seems to me that the duties hitherto performed by ordinary Boatswains are of so light a nature that a special officer is no longer required to superintend them. I would therefore suggest that it would be for the good of the service if, in course of time, all Boatswains became signal Boatswains; this would cause no additional expense, because the Boatswain of the ship would be the officer in charge of the signal department, and instead of paying attention to squaring yards he would devote most of his energies to signals and signalmen.

With reference to the mechanical contrivances for signalling, it seems to me that all ships should be fitted with masthead semaphores and masthead flashing-lights. The advantages of these means of communication are too obvious to require comment. Further, I think that all flag signalling should be minimised as much as possible. The danger of signal halliards being shot away in action is very great; also the fact should be considered that signalmen must necessarily be much more exposed to fire when using signal halliards than when using a semaphore, the arms of which should be at the masthead, and the levers in an armoured structure in close communication with the conning tower. Much fault was found with the torpedo catchers this year. They failed to keep up as high a rate of speed as they were expected to do, and it is clear that a torpedo boat destroyer that cannot steam as fast as a torpedo boat is not of much use. These vessels are evidently not fast enough for the work they have to do. The new type of catcher of the "Havock" class, now building, gives promise of better results, and it is to be hoped will approach more closely to the ideal torpedo boat destroyer, but we have not yet gauged their capabilities; the part they will have to play in future wars will be an important one.

The second class cruisers of the "Pique" class, of which we had twenty engaged during this year's manœuvres, appear to have done well. They are at any rate a great improvement on anything of the kind that we have had before. They can all of them steam nearly twenty knots an hour, and can keep up eighteen knots with comparative ease; but their coal endurance at high rates of speed is not so good as one would wish to see it. They can keep the sea at ten knots speed continuously for nineteen days, at fifteen knots for six days, and at eighteen knots for four days. The new first-class cruisers now ready will doubtless show a considerable

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advance upon this both in speed and in endurance, but they have not yet been thoroughly tested.

I think that cruisers of the "Pique" class would be improved by having the two foremost and two after 4·7 guns mounted in sponsons so as to obtain a greater amount of right ahead and right astern fire; at present their only end on fire is from six-inch guns, one on the forecastle and one on the poop. I am quite aware of the drawbacks to sponsons, but it seems to me that a cruiser ought not to be dependent upon one gun alone for fore and aft fire when chasing or being chased; it is putting too many eggs into one basket. The duties of cruisers in future wars will be of a very arduous nature, especially for the officers commanding them, keeping touch of the enemy whilst avoiding capture themselves will require ceaseless vigilance combined with physical powers that can dispense with sleep almost entirely; these qualities cannot be cultivated under more advantageous circumstances than during the annual manœuvres and familiarity with a cruiser's duties can, I think, short of actual war, only be obtained in that manner.

ORFORD CHURCHILL.

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THE HOME CAMPAIGN OF 1893.

By Charles Williams

We hear a great deal, in and out of Parliament, about what the service of the Army costs the country, but nothing of what the service of the country costs the Army; yet in a good many regiments the amount expended by the officers far exceeds the sum total of the pay and allowances they receive from public funds—I mean the amount expended for military purposes. Even in the German Army this is so often the case that though, of late, "many arrangements have been made with a view to lighten the demands on the the purses of officers," yet, in his "Letters on Cavalry," Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen tells us: "It may be accepted as a fact that there is no cavalry regiment in which an officer can live, unless he is prepared to spend £100 a year out of his own pocket. Nothing less than this amount will do for him until he becomes a first captain [corresponding, nearly, to our major]; for as he grows older his needs grow greater; and, since he must serve twenty years before he can attain that rank, we may reckon that a cavalry officer in the course of his service spends £2,000, that is to say, he sacrifices that amount to the Fatherland." In our own service this amount may safely be doubled in the cavalry, and I conceive it costs the average infantry officer not less than £100 a year until he becomes a major over and above his pay and allowances, while in some regiments this amount will have to be considerably increased for absolutely necessary out-of-pocket expenses. And this is the case in spite of the comparatively small cost of messing nowadays, and the strict supervision instituted by Lord Wolseley, when he was Adjutant-General, into mess and wine expenditure, and of the fact that in these times the number of mess guests is greatly reduced and the subaltern has only one-sixth of the costs of extra expenditure to pay that falls on his colonel, whereas at one time all such expenses were shared equally. Nor can the officer's expenses be said to cease when he has paid those of his regiment. If he wants to perfect himself in his profession, and to qualify himself for higher employment than is to be found in merely regimental work, he must do it largely at his own cost,

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while there is little hope, even if he be exceptionally fortunate in his promotion, that he will ever be able to recoup himself on attaining senior rank, since successive Secretaries of State have so cut down the remuneration of general officers at home that no man can hope to receive the command of an average district unless he is known to possess private means. This is one result of Mr. Cardwell's attempt to make the Army open to poor men. Does an officer, not detailed in ordinary course of duty, wish to gain enlarged experience of his work by attending any of our too rare manœuvres? He has to do so at his own expense—an expense, thanks to the "patriotic" feeling of our people, always more than it would cost him to live for a like period at the most costly London or Brighton hotels. In the programme of the manœuvres just concluded on the border of Berks and Wilts one of the most striking features was the number of officers who were named as attending without cost to the public. I take them as they come: A sub-lieutenant, a yeomanry colonel, a late lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, a colonel commanding a volunteer brigade, a captain of Household Cavalry, a lieutenant Grenadier Guards, and several gallopers, a line captain, and several gallopers, while it was expressly notified that officers of the Intelligence Department would have no expenses allowed out of the Manœuvre Fund, and it was, above all, declared, sweepingly, "that no pay will be granted to officers in respect of any staff appointment they may hold during these manœuvres." Hence we may see that one effect of our present system of economy is that a poor officer may as reasonably hope to improve himself in his professional acquirements by attending the manœuvres as he may expect to make his wife or sister a present of a diamond necklace that attracts his admiration in Bond Street. This aspect of the Army it is not convenient for Radical Reformers to dwell upon, any more than they think it expedient to remind the country that the amount of the non-effective vote of which they, with some justice, complain, is more than half due to the "thorough" measure which Mr. Gladstone took in abolishing purchase in the Army by the unprecedented and autocratic use of the Royal Prerogative. Nor do I think it is sufficiently realised by "the public who pays" that the present system makes it better for the average officer, at the very height of his physical powers and in the prime of his professional knowledge, to leave the service than to continue in it, giving his country the benefit of the experience he has gained. What does all this matter, if a few pounds more can be pared off the cost of the services by the real rulers of the land, the Treasury clerks? If manœuvres were instituted as often as they ought to be to maintain

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and increase the efficiency of the Army, it would be much better for an officer to stay away than to go, for I venture to declare that no single officer, whatever his rank or branch of the service, who attended these last manœuvres has failed to find himself out of pocket by the enterprise.

Last year when I wrote on the manœuvres around Aldershot, where the expense to the officer stationed at our chief training camp was less than it has been this year, attention was drawn to the improvement in the quality of the soldier. That improvement, it is apparent, continues. At the start there were a great many weaklings who fell out during the marches to the ground, roughly speaking fifty miles from their starting point. In some cases the breakdown was to be attributed to too much beer before leaving Aldershot. But beer will not account for all of the failures. The fact is that one indispensable part of a soldier's training is, if not forgotten, far too little practised in this country. We are continually bewailing the absence of a Manœuvre Act to enable us to use any ground needed for the purposes of preparation for war, and I am wholly at one with the apostles of this movement. But we need no Manœuvre Act to enable the Army, winter and summer, to use "the Queen's Highway." Our neighbours practice marching far more than we do, and not only add thereby to the endurance of the men, in the most necessary part of a soldier's work—for the army that cannot march long distances is beaten before it starts—but popularise the service and show the tax-payers something of what they are getting for their money. At Aldershot there have been some attempts by field columns to give the men and officers practice in marching, but not on a scale sufficient to inure them to the labour required. At other stations there is little or nothing done to practice route marching. Perhaps we have not in our whole service now, what, in the old phrase, was called "a marching regiment." We send troops by train in many cases, in some by both train and steamer, where they might easily march and be all the better men and soldiers for marching. In this connection I some months ago heard a capital story. A battalion was ordered from the Curragh to Fermoy, just a hundred miles as the crow flies and the road runs. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of the colonel, it was sent from the Curragh to Kingsbridge by train, then marched across Dublin, then entrained at Westland Row for Kingstown, there embarked on an old troop-ship which knocked for three nights and two days about the Irish Sea, after which the battalion was disembarked at Queenstown, entrained to Cork, there put into another train, and so at length got to Fermoy, between which and the Curragh is 120 miles of

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one of the best railways and 100 miles of one of the best roads in Ireland. There is not one single station, holding even one battalion, at which habitual route marching is not practicable. In France nothing is commoner than to see infantry battalions wending their way, for pure practice, along highways and byeways. When a battalion, with us, engages in a march through its very territorial district the event is so extraordinary that it is recorded in the newspapers at as great length as the last sensational murder or the last advertising robbery of a burlesque actress's jewels. I submit that the British custom of refusing to practice the infantry in the art and duty of marching is reprehensible, and that the outcry when a regiment or battalion in marching has some proportion of breakdowns is nothing less than hypocritical. It is scarcely too much to say that the battalion or brigade which does not have thirty good long marches a year, especially during the slack season, has either an inefficient or a lazy chief. And, it need hardly be said that the marching should be progressive, going from ten by easy stages to twenty or even five-and-twenty miles a day.

I heard no complaints this year about the quality or the quantity of the rations, and the teaching of the Army School of Cookery, at Aldershot, has evidently borne fruit in the field. We had no such dainty persons in camp this year as those yeomanry of three years ago, in Berkshire, who complained that the beef was so tender they did not like it, as they felt nothing between their teeth. The bread and meat were of singular excellence, and the advance parties, now universally sent forward, had everything ready for a good meal within a few minutes of the arrival of a battalion in camp. The wise forethought of the Army Service Corps in buying hay in the teeth of the refusal of the civilians in Pall Mall to sanction early purchases shows at once the advantage of decentralisation, and the saving of a sum of £1200 on the Manœuvre Vote. In careful decentralisation—these manœuvres go some distance to show—lies a very desirable reform in the future, and one which will scarcely find a foe in Sir Evelyn Wood when he assumes the control of the Quartermaster-Generalship at Army Head-quarters, though in Pall Mall, as an old admiral used to say of Whitehall, the taint of centralisation and red tape and hostility to progress seem to be in the very bricks and mortar. "'Twere vain to tell you all I feel," as the sentimental young person says in the old song, of Sir Evelyn's work at Aldershot, and in the manœuvres he has instituted in connection with the command. It is nearly hopeless to expect as much under his successor, or any possible successor, with one exception. The Staff which has helped him so much in the epoch-making period of the last four years and

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nine months is being broken up, and though they say there are as good fish in the sea as ever were caught, there is no doubt the Aldershot Staff, of late years, has been of the very highest quality. It is scarcely possible that it will be matched as a whole in our time. No Staff in time of peace has ever been "tried so high," and none has ever worked together so self-sacrificingly for the common good. It has been seen at its best in the manœuvres of the last three years, of the last four autumns. And soon, the place that knoweth it now will know it no more. The high tension must be relaxed. None other than the departing chief, save, perhaps, Lord Roberts, could keep up the concert pitch of the last seven-and-fifty months. An officer may be found here, and another there, to equal those that are going; but the band, as a whole, will not be what it has been. One, who was a capital administrator, was in the habit of saying he never spared himself, and he never spared anybody else. But Sir Evelyn Wood has rather made his Staff what it is by example than by strictness. He has always, in the work of the camp as in the work of the manœuvres, been foremost in taking the blame on his own shoulders for anything falling short of his ideal. There has been nothing more wholly admirable in the unequalled mastery he shows of the art and mystery of conducting a "palaver" than his ready assumption of responsibility for anything which might have misled a subordinate. He has never failed to take upon himself the blame for any act of his Staff, done in good faith. And as with the Staff, so with the leaders of units, a frank exposition of the reasons for doing anything, however apparently unreasonable in itself, has never been visited by severe censure. Nothing has called for that, even in its mildest form, save an attempt to mislead. Blunders—bad blunders, and they have not been wanting at any of the manœuvres, or in any given month's working of the camp, have been made to conduce to the "teaching," to the instruction which Sir Evelyn is never tired of intimating he seeks for himself as for others. Ever master of himself and his subject and his company, he has yet been ever deferential to those who have a right to be heard on any phase of a question. And his care for the rank and file, in the field as in the camp, has been as conspicuous as his consideration for the officers, always within the lines of duty. It seems to me, who have watched Aldershot very closely, that he leaves the district beloved by every soul in it.

Has the most been got out of the mimic campaign that has just ended? On this question I speak with diffidence. Frankly, I think more might have been done, but the Commander-in-Chief, who was once, curiously enough, confounded with a clerk in

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charge, meaning a most able and kindly C.-in-C. of a telegraph tent, would insist, in spite of the most earnest advice from his neighbours in the official hierarchy, in being present during the very days that his presence dislocated everything; in suiting his august convenience instead of merely turning up the last day, when he and the British public, together, might have been entertained by a "march past." That knocked, it will be grievous to some people to hear, the heart out of at least three days of the available time over which the limitations of the Manœuvre Vote could be made to run. I am heartily sorry to have to say these things, being myself a Royalist of the Royalists, and a Tory of the Tories. But the public service in these days will not wait for the racing and sporting engagements of the most illustrious personages. And I can here only record and express regret for facts which the men whom the Army really trust would have altered if they could. Even the *Times* has told His Royal Highness as much as this; and he will deceive himself vastly if he supposes the facts are otherwise than as now stated.

Hence, I am not so entirely prepared to insist on the waste of opportunity in the exercise of the cavalry under General Keith Fraser, who is one of the most cosmopolitan of cavalry authorities, and the one man, I venture to say, to whom the country is chiefly indebted for the restoration of the system of squadron units. Still, more might have been done had the Inspector-General been close at hand to the head-quarters of the Umpire-in-chief. I fear the heresy still exists that cavalry can work independently as cavalry in the ordinary operations of war. No one can be more persuaded than myself that cavalry ought to have separate annual manœuvres. but they are useless unless they consent to act as the screen and the willing victims to cover infantry, and, I may add, artillery, Further I am not prepared to go than to say that, after the Duke disappeared, there were only four days left for the instruction of cavalry as such, before the cavalry division was broken up, and it was left to be handled as brigades by two infantry generals, who, clearly, had not realised the potentialities of the more mobile arm. Colonel Wardrop and Colonel Dickson are both men of ideas. They have, moreover, both studied the theory and practice of cavalry work in a way to which few, indeed, in this country can pretend. And, between them, they tried what may, without offence, be termed the two extremes of cavalry manœuvring—the concentrated and the dispersed form of action. Colonel Wardrop broke up his brigade more frequently than his friend and foe, but, it so happened, the most brilliant effect of the manœuvres was produced by Colonel Dickson launching that very ably handled

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regiment, the Royal Horse Guards Blue, against a Horse Artillery battery which had been left practically unprotected while its cavalry brigade made an attack on a convoy, and this regiment, during the operation, was as much cut off from its brigade as ever was one of Wardrop's. The opinion of skilled observers, however, seemed to be that it is a mistake in a broken country like that of the North Downs to break up a brigade. So very much can be seen on the selected ground, from a few prominent points, that a cavalry leader should not let himself be without a reserve of power in case of his enemy having "spotted" his design from afar, or had it communicated by signal. On this signalling question, let me incidentally observe on the remark of the very able and very painstaking correspondent of the *Times*, one of the first authorities in Europe on tactics, that he saw no signalling during the whole of the operations. Alas! my complaint is quite the other way. And I believe the Inspector of Signalling will thoroughly endorse my opinion. The signalling was quite unnecessarily frequent. It seemed to be done, here, there, and everywhere, not as a thing subsidiary to and in aid of the work going on, but as a thing to be done for its own sake, and with the utmost recklessness as to whether it could be read by the enemy. In the cavalry, it is true, there was less complaint to be made. Only once or twice did I notice much flag-wagging in the cavalry. But what I did notice was the almost absolute isolation of the Horse Artillery batteries. One of them, instead of assisting to form a brigade division of flying artillery, was attached throughout to an infantry brigade. If there is any Continental teaching as regards cavalry on which we can rely, it is that, in the language of an author already quoted, "we need not wonder that artillery is not always correctly employed, when we see a battery taken away from its brigade-division from the moment of mobilisation to the end of the war."

It is to be feared that no great instruction was to be had in the whole course of the manœuvres in the combined working of the Three Arms. It is all but confessed that the Cavalry work by itself was not what it was hoped it would be when the scheme was first issued. It is tolerably clear that there was not much idea, save in one active brain, of working together the cavalry and horse artillery, and not much came of that. It is certain that the Divisional chiefs depended almost wholly on their infantry, and that artillery was only used in a perfunctory way by them, for the most part only to prepare a fight and seldom or slightly to influence the fight. I cannot be very far wrong in saying that the artillery would have been more usefully used if the Divisional Generals had cared to establish a better understanding between themselves and

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their commanders of brigade-divisions. General Crealock made more corporate use of his one [horse] battery than either of the Generals of Division—one of them a gunner—made of his brigade-division. Whatever ideas they may have had for the conduct of this and that contest did not permeate those below them, and the best artillery officer in the world may well be undecided in his movements on occasions when he does not understand what is expected of him. Of course, if the Chiefs of Divisions had been permanently working with their gunners, the latter would have come to understand their "little ways" before taking the field. But as nearly everybody was new to everybody else, and as ideas were not too often communicated with precision, over and above the "Special Ideas" which ruled the purpose of either side, it would have been wonderful had there been no cause for complaint in the handling of the guns. It struck me, moreover, more than once, that it was not until the "palaver," on some days, that the "true inwardness" of Sir Evelyn Wood's General and Special Ideas was recognised by Divisional and Brigade commanders. Those who have been through an Aldershot course in the last five years could see further into the working of that busy and inventive brain, which has now done for a while with field schemes, than those who have been brought for the first time under its magnetic influence. And, it may be, sufficient allowance was not always made for the rawness—if the word is not offensive—of those who have had their training elsewhere than at Aldershot. But when all is said that can be usefully said on this subject, it is too apparent, as usual, that the field training of our best men in the comparatively junior ranks is not by a very great deal what it should be, and that no corps zeal, no study of books, no practice on a barrack-yard scale, no mere fortnight once a year, will make our troops what the nation has a right to ask that they shall be made, if only the nation will insist on the elementary steps necessary for the conduct of the fighting business, as of any other business, and place the management of its soldiers, subject only to the control in financial matters of Parliament, in the hands of soldiers.

As regards the Infantry, who, after all, are the army, they must be said to appreciate the new Drill Book more than their officers. While the Umpire-in-chief had to continually call attention to the provisions of paragraph so-and-so, the observant person who went on foot among the men engaged in firing could not fail to be struck with the thorough comprehension of the principles of modern fighting shown by not only the non-commissioned officers but the men, who have very thoroughly assimilated the fact, on which I ventured to insist last year, that the magazine rifle needs no sighting up to five

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hundred yards. One defect in the working is still too apparent. The men crowd together in the supports to a very dangerous extent on coming under fire at a range of six to eight hundred yards, a range which is no more to a magazine rifle than a hundred yards was to a minie. For, let this be understood, over and above the point-blank question I spoke of a year since, that (and I use the words of the highest authority at Army Head-quarters) "if a magazine rifle were fired at the proper angle on the nearest sea-shore, the bullet would go over the top of Snowdon"—and the summit is not less than ten miles from the sea. But there is a great disinclination to let the rifle be tried in the field at what used to be long, and are now only reasonable, ranges. One is always hearing the truism that it is no use to let a man fire at an object further than he can see it. Yet sights differ, and what is to one man a very impalpable thing at a mile is to another as clear as though it were half the distance off—especially if the latter have been bred in a hilly country. Suppose we had a system of musketry by which the men with long sight should be picked out, and taught to practice at distant objects? Where would then be the difficulty of finding in any battalion a number of men who could put one shot in five, or let me say one shot in ten, into a battery at 2,500 yards, with the certainty of at least shaking the nerves of the gunners, who would be unable to return the particular fire as they would never make out the locality of the tiny puff and crack of the marksman's rifle? Those of us who were at Abu Klea, going up or coming down, will not forget the feeling of nervousness engendered by the dropping of vertical bullets, by high angle firing, into the bivouacs. There was no replying to it, and it shook the nerves of men whom no odds could daunt. It seems to me obvious that it would be a great economy to use the new rifle in this way, considering the relative cost of artillery and small arms ammunition. Perhaps some light might be thrown on this subject by the Report of the high-angle firing practice in 1881 at Dungeness, under the direction of Colonel T. Fraser, R.E., C.B., whose observations there is not time to look up for my present purpose. But, all round, there is a singular lack of confidence in the accuracy and carrying power of the new rifle on the part of tacticians, as notable as the confidence in it of the men from the time the recruit begins to practice with it. To my mind it is far from impossible that in the magazine rifle the twelve-pounder gun may yet find its master.

In every other respect than the tendency to crowd, which, however praiseworthy at the moment of delivering, is more open to reprobation earlier in, the attack, especially against fire from

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trenches, the men have greatly improved since last year. The Guards, as in 1892, were at first too stiff, their line being for the earlier days without that flexibility, that conformation to the features of the ground, which we now associate with good field work. But they soon shook that off, and though, almost up to the last, they continued to observe the Home District "use" of advancing by half-companies instead of sections, as "Infantry Drill, 1893," prescribes for Guards as for Line, they were in the closing days as nearly a perfect body of troops as it is given to the world to see. The difference between battalions which have gone through a period of Aldershot training and those coming from isolated stations was apparent even to the provincial sightseer, although some of the best troops in the Aldershot command had the misfortune to be unintelligently directed. And, on the whole, the conclusion to be most certainly deduced from the manœuvres of this year is that they would have done a great deal of good had the time available for training been about twice as long as it was. Is there any Member of Parliament who will refuse his assent to the propositions that what is worth doing at all is worth doing well, and that it is absurd to "spoil the ship for a ha'porth of tar"? Roughly speaking, the cost of each man at the late manœuvres has been eight shillings for three weeks. Would the country have been a halfpenny the worse, to its knowledge, had the cost been twelve shillings, which would have enabled the lessons, if any, taught being thoroughly taught during a month?

One of the benefits most confidently looked for from the manœuvres of this autumn was a demonstration of the value of balloons in war. There have been during this year not a few experiments carried on at Aldershot which have been most satisfactory—to the experts. The result of these everyone who takes an interest in the progress of military science expected to see manifested on the Berks-Wilts border. And I believe the results have been satisfactory—to the experts. But to the common or garden observer they have been sadly to seek. One of the things that was to have been achieved was the taking, sending down, developing, and printing of a photograph or sketch of an enemy's position, so that the general should have a copy in his hand within an hour. No one can deny that such a sketch would have been a great thing, and of inestimable value to a general with a quick eye and a correspondingly rapid initiative. But I cannot hear that there has been any reasonable approximation to this ideal. Some curious results have undoubtedly been obtained. It has been shown, for example, that the lens of a camera in the car is far more sensitive than the retina of

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the eye. Photographs have been obtained of the formal "ceremonial" march on the Duke's day, which discover the weak points in the marching of some of our best drilled battalions. One of the Engineer officers has brought out the fact that the balloon revolves so rapidly in a moderate breeze, that, given a radius of a mile, an object passes the lens at the rate of a mile a minute. But on some days the wind was too high, even had the greatly improved new gear been always available, to allow any work of good quality to be done. And it seemed to some of us that the balloon, to be of any use in war, must take a good many risks more than it seems likely to do, judging from its distance during manœuvres. If a balloon is very far behind the line of advancing "skirmishers," it will not get good views of the enemy's position, and the risk of closer approach is infinitesimal. The chance of hitting a balloon, until we get light howitzers restored to the field plant of an army, is, so far as artillery goes, scarcely worth reckoning, and the worst effect of the hole made by a rifle bullet or a dozen of them in the gas-bag would be the slow subsidence of the air-carriage and its passengers. On the whole, the value of the balloon in war has yet to be demonstrated in this country, though I, for one, believe we are on the eve of very remarkable results. In sieges, or in ascertaining the features of more or less permanent positions, we may look for great help. In field work the probabilities are less hopeful, though still full of encouragement. At any rate, we have now got hold of some gear which will enable us to get photographs when the wind is travelling at the rate of thirty-five miles an hour, when, until this year, twenty-five was the maximum force that could be contended with. As regards the plan of having Staff-College men to go up in balloons and report on an enemy's position, one must not say it can never be done, for of course there are plenty of men with *p.s.c* after their names who could make themselves at home in a balloon as well as anywhere else. But the balloon, and especially the captive balloon, is not a conveyance for everybody. Some it makes deathly sick; some have created in them an irrepressible desire to throw themselves over, and have to be held in the car by main force. Unless balloon ascents are to be made a feature of the Staff-College course, it is unlikely there will ever be produced a sufficient number of Staff-College officers capable of keeping their heads level enough during a captive ascent to obtain or retail valuable information. It is to be feared this sort of exploitation must be mainly left in the hands of the enthusiastic young "sappers" who are taking so kindly to this new field of duty.

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Two features of last year's programme were conspicuous by their absence from the scheme of this year. There was no attack on isolated artillery, save once when the guns were not intended to be isolated. And one cannot pretend to regret the omission of a problem which, however great its theoretical interest, can rarely, if ever, be paralleled in war. The other omission was, perhaps, more regrettable. There was no attempt at a night attack. It seems there were excellent local reasons for this. Last year the two attacks at Aldershot were on Government ground, where the general commanding could do as he would. In the night attack by Crealock on Utterson, no private property was touched upon. In Berkshire the whole countryside would have been disturbed, and there is no telling what harm might have resulted to the live-stock of the obliging farmers. It is impossible not to feel, however, that a series of manœuvres without a night attack on a rather large scale somewhat resembles the famous play with its name-character absent from the boards, for no one pretends to doubt that the fighting of the future will consist very largely of night marches and night attacks.

There seems to have been a persistent misapprehension in the otherwise admirable preliminary arrrangements, a misapprehension which I cannot account for, as the same prevailed during the cavalry manœuvres of 1890. There is not the least doubt that Sir Evelyn Wood desired to have a camp on the south side of the great Ridgeway, if only for the reason that on such ground the north and south fighting affords better instruction than that from east to west, or *vice versa*. But the belief in the insufficiency of the water supply for man and beast resulted in placing all the camps to the north, where the springs from the chalk do chiefly, if strangely, break out. It cannot be denied, either, that there was less water this autumn on either side than three years ago. But at Aldbourne there are deep wells, never known to fail in the driest season, and certainly very far from failing this year; while the stream that runs from Lambourne by Shefford was copious enough for the use of any two brigades upon the ground, without depriving the occupiers on the line to the Kennet valley of their reasonable supply. The C.R.E. at Aldershot, than whom no more zealous or trusty officer lives, formed a contrary opinion, but I speak from the evidence of my eyes, and the testimony of local folks of various classes of society. No doubt there were apprehensions from the early Spring of a failure in supply, but the worst fears were by no means realised. I am far from attributing blame to anyone in this respect, for, indeed, nothing could have been more thoroughly, and long, and anxiously thought out by

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Sir Evelyn and his Staff, and Major Kennedy in particular, than the best use of the ground. The latter began his investigations while it was yet Winter, and the lieutenant-general took much exercise in the saddle during the months immediately preceding the manœuvre period over every portion of the area. Those privileged to see his final report on the three weeks' work, out and home, will learn whether, on the whole, he was satisfied with the outcome of the enormous labour of himself and his Staff.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

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MILITARY RE-ORGANISATION IN NEW SOUTH WALES.

By Frank Williams.

The question of the efficient administration of the Colonial Defence forces in British possessions is one of interest to the whole Empire. It is also a subject in which, as in many of the political developments of the present and the future, the Colonies must, to a very great extent, work out their own salvation. Military science may be the same all the world over, but the application of this knowledge must vary according to the circumstances of the case. It is idle for *savants* in the art of war to endeavour to transplant to young and popularly governed Communities the historic army-administration of the Horse Guards or to reproduce, in the Antipodes, in miniature facsimile, a Southern Aldershot. Yet, while this is the case, the Colonies, and especially those of Australia, do not disdain but are proud to largely follow the model of the Motherland, and, through her instructive example, to learn and adopt the most naturally adaptable of her military methods.

It is especially so in the parent Colony of the Australian group. In New South Wales for many years past the many-headed monster, who pays for military display, has growled loudly and frequently that he has not, in effective and efficient defence service, received his *quid pro quo.* The Australian by nature is not opposed in any degree to spectacular militarism, but his financial exigencies have led him to demand at least some attention to economy of administration and to suitable and effective defence. In the Colony the popular opinion is decidedly against the establishment, and more particularly against the maintenance, of a large standing army, except upon the rare occasions of a vice-regal opening of Parliament or some similar function; yet the spirit of New South Welshmen is essentially patriotic, and, in that degree, military. The country relies largely upon its leaders seeking the means of defence in the training by competent

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instructors, who are kept in close touch with the progress of military science, of a body of citizen-soldiery, a partially-paid force representative of all branches of the service; in fact a general militia. To render this volunteer body efficient the Colony is prepared to maintain a nucleus of professional soldiers, and to remunerate them at a rate that in older lands would be considered high. The necessity for the reorganisation of the New South Wales forces has been impressed upon the public mind from time to time owing to what can only be termed extravagant administration and unsuitable training. Serious abuses, arising mainly from political and personal influences, crept into the service; circumlocution and red-tapeism were absolutely rampant; personal jealousies amongst leading officers were the common causes of injustice to the ranks and reckless expenditure of the finances, and as a consequence all branches of the service were permeated with an individual absence of cofidence in commanding officers and with a corresponding lack of efficiency. Now when it is stated that in 1892 the total annual expenditure on the navy and military forces of the colony was no less than £280,068, exclusive of the combined contribution of all the colonies under the Australasian Naval Defence Acts of the Imperial and Colonial Parliaments, for a force of 5765 men, of whom over four-fifths were partially paid (an arrangement similar to the capitation grants to English Volunteers), it will be admitted that the combative force is not commensurate with the cost of its maintenance. The total here given was exclusive of, approximately, 5000 reserve men, who, while not being drilled in the ordinary acceptation of the term, but being enrolled as Volunteers, and forming a military organisation of efficient "shots," still retained, in their system of interior management, all the elements of civilian bodies into which they have since, to a far greater extent, been re-constructed. This condition of affairs was essentially the case when the force was characterised by an all round lack of efficiency, engendered by an absence of modern experience. To meet the popular demand for the re-organisation of the forces, a year ago a Royal Commission was issued to Major-General Tulloch, C.B., C.M.G. (the Commandant of the Victorian Military forces) as president, with four other gentlemen, all of whom were prominent members of the commercial community, to inquire into and report upon the condition of the defences. The report of the Commission was elaborate and particular in details, and a few references to it, and to the contemporary articles in the local press, will afford striking illustration of the disabilities and abuses of the past military management here.

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The Commissioners, summing up their discoveries, declared "the state of the defence force in general is unsatisfactory." Having laid down this conclusion, they proceeded to give proof of their assertion, and to recommend certain alterations, a number of which have already been adopted. First of all, allusion was made to the defective political administration of the past, "most important papers having been put on one side for months, or entirely ignored." Then it was stated that, while the forts and batteries were sufficient, their armament was "largely composed of guns of an obsolete type." The Field Artillery was considerably under the strength considered necessary by the Colonial Defence Committee of the War Office; their guns were also of obsolete type, and practical training in field-firing had never been given. The Cavalry and Mounted Infantry were numerically strong, but weak in efficiency and in the barest knowledge of drill, beyond a rough-riding training, which, like Dogbery's "reading and writing," "comes by nature" to an Australian native. The Ambulance Service was an ornamental toy; the Commissariat and Transport Corps, for a total force of over 5,000, consisted of thirty-nine men and a couple of waggons, drawn by livery-stable horses. One of the most glaring discoveries by the Commission was, to put it mildly, the incompetence of the officers. This did not so much refer to the officers of the permanent forces, who were necessarily, by daily drill, taught a certain portion of their duties, but to the officers of the partially-paid force. Few of these officers had much professional knowledge beyond ordinary drill, having to pick up as best they could what was barely sufficient to enable them to pass the written examinations required for promotion. The head-quarters and brigade offices and secretarial department were situated in different parts of Sydney, considerable distances separating most of them; the great mass of the Permanent Artillery were quartered at the Victoria Barracks, some miles from the guns at the coast which they were supposed to work; a gross abuse of the system of officers' allowances had crept in, and subalterns, who never sat astride a horse except when off duty, were allowed forage pay in addition to allowances for quarters, fuel and light, all of which were supplied without cost to them. In some cases junior officers, whose pay was set down at from £150 to £240 per annum, actually received nearly double those amounts by this abuse of the mistaken liberality of Parliament. Not only were the guns at the forts obsolete, but, such as they were, the men, proportionately to their strength, were barely instructed in their manipulation. In fact, throughout the permanent forces, a system of *laisser faire* reigned supreme. Among the partially-paid

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troops the same lack of control was apparent, though this was in their case somewhat compensated for by the patriotism and *esprit de corps* of the men who were, however, shamefully neglected by the head-quarters staff. The internal economy of the permanent forces was a missing quantity; desertions were frequent, the number in 1890-91, in a strength of 534 men, being fifty-nine or 11.04 per cent., and the "provost" was constantly full of offenders, mostly on charges connected with alcoholism.

It will be seen from what has been said that the state of the forces was unsatisfactory. It is not necessary for the purpose of this article to lay the blame at the door of any individual person in authority; the whole system was at fault, and it was compulsory in the public interest to reform it altogether. This had been promised by many successive Governments. The Military Commission recommended that to effect the desired reforms it was imperative that the Commandant, the Assistant-Adjutant-General, and the Local Naval Commandant should be officers "very specially selected" from the Imperial Service, to be changed every five years, and also that, for the next three years at least, the officer commanding the Artillery forces should be one nominated by the Artillery authorities of the War Office for his special qualifications. "To keep up the efficiency," said the report of the Commission, "it is necessary that the principal staff officers should be specially selected from the Imperial Service, who have made names for themselves in their profession. Hereafter, when Australian officers, amongst whom there are unquestionably some most able but only partially trained men, have had an opportunity of doing duty for a few years with Imperial regiments and batteries, and possibly qualifying to go through a staff college course, they may, with safety to the Colony, be employed in the highest positions; but there are none so available at present, and cannot be for some time. . . . These Imperial officers should not only be thoroughly capable men from a professional point of view, but should also be of such mental stamina that, when necessary, they should be able to put on one side Imperial traditions and customs and frame such regulations as may suit local circumstances. At present there appears to be a mixture of Imperial and Colonial regulations without that freedom from office work and correspondence which might be adopted in an administration suitable for citizen-soldiery who are only under arms for limited periods." The retirement through ill-health of Major-General Richardson, C.B., afforded the Government an opportunity to request the War Office to nominate an Imperial officer to succeed him. The choice fell upon Colonel Edward T. H. Hutton (60th Rifles), A.D.C. to the Queen, an

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officer who, taught in the school of which Lord Wolseley is the head, is a representative exponent of modern soldiering. Colonel (locally Major-General) Hutton came to the Colony to perform the task of re-organisation. He had heard before his arrival of the condition of the forces, but wisely preferred to be his own judge of the exact position. Soon after his arrival, he said, "I accept no opinions and take no man's verdict upon what I am about to see here. I shall and do judge for myself." In this spirit he has since acted, and as a consequence his re-organisation so far has been thorough and earnest.

Addressing the N.S.W. Permanent Artillery Regiment after his first inspection, Major-General Hutton said:

"I consider myself, coming here to command the New South Wales troops, as exceptionally fortunate in finding ready to hand so magnificent a body of men as this regiment of New South Wales Artillery. No commander of the same experience, or, indeed, half the experience, that I fortunately have had, could see so fine a body of men as I see now before me without feeling himself exceptionally favoured. I consider myself fortunate in this respect in having this regiment here, namely, that I have a corps to regard as the backbone and stiffening of the remainder of the troops of this colony. A regiment of this sort is the nucleus and the centre of the important functions connected with the defence of this colony, and I consider the colony to be exceptionally lucky in this respect. The general defence of the colony itself must undoubtedly be placed in the hands of the partially-paid troops. The actual defence force to which this colony must look for its protection is the partially-paid troops, or what we call in the Imperial service the Militia. Such a force, however, to be really effective, must have the backbone and the stiffening of such men as I see before me. Having such a regiment as this comprised in my command—who are, practically, a *corps d'élite* of picked men, a large proportion of whom have served in the Imperial service under distinguished officers—I expect a high degree of efficiency indeed, when I have an opportunity of going into details. It has been my fortunate lot during the last fifteen years, and during the last four campaigns in which I have served, to be at the head of a picked force of Infantry, selected for their military qualities from the best regiments of British Infantry—men of the same stamp as those which I see before me. Therefore, I am well aware of how to handle such troops, and to exact from them the highest degree of efficiency and co-operation when I need it."

Speaking later, after a general review, to the regiment of Cavalry (Volunteers), the Commandant said:—

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"I am extremely gratified—I may say, I am astonished—at the manner in which you have done your work to-day. You have ridden excellently, and you have executed the various manœuvres in a workmanlike manner. You will, I trust, rely more on the use of your firearms, and become as efficient with them as you are with your lances. If you do that, and attend to your dismounted duty as well and as successfully as you have to-day performed your cavalry work, you will make a most valuable adjunct to the Imperial service. What I intend is that your carbines shall be carried as in the Lancer Regiments in the Austrian service, in the Russian service, and to a large extent in the French service, on your backs. This is a matter of great importance, and my chief reason for the change is, that the men may be armed in the event of their being dismounted. In an engagement in Afghanistan not long ago the 9th Lancers lost very heavily. Their carbines were carried on the off side and their swords on the near side of their horses, and the men who were dismounted were helpless, and were every one of them speared or shot down by the Afghans. After that the 9th Lancers resolutely requested to have their carbines with them. I again express my gratification at your behaviour this afternoon."

On the same occasion he addressed to the Mounted Infantry (also Volunteer) these remarks:—

"I address you Mounted Rifles as such, for you are representative of the regiment—I want you to understand that you, as mounted rifles, are distinctly the force of Australia. The Australians, of which you are splendid examples, are the finest type on the face of the earth for mounted riflemen. Everyone knows and acknowledges that fact in England, and, indeed, throughout the whole Empire. Your horses are small and rough, but that does not matter at all, for they are of the right stamp, and you sit them well. I am very well pleased with the work you have done to-day, individually, but I must say that your manœuvring was indifferent. Your officers did not seem to know what mounted riflemen can and should do. I intend to have this altered, and will make you a force that will be fit to take a place anywhere in the world. Suppose the Imperial authorities wanted troops to help England in an hour of need, it is men of your stamp that would be required. I intend to devote myself for the next three years to the work of making you Mounted Rifles one of the best forces of the world, and, with your co-operation, have not the least doubt but that I shall succeed. Except that you ride wonderfully well, and do your individual work satisfactorily, you have as yet but a small idea of the fire power you represent."

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Similar remarks were made concerning the other arms of the service, but in all cases the Commandant confined himself to speaking of the physique and general appearance of the men, and was careful not to praise either the attainments of the officers or the drill of the rank and file. In fact, subsequent to some minor field operations which followed the review, his plain-spoken criticism on the execution of movements (elaborately and carefully planned by himself and officers of the staff), was such as seemed, at first hearing, somewhat contradictory of his previous words of praise; but when both sides were analysed, his latter remarks only served to emphasise the fact that it was physique and bearing, as distinct from the efficiency, of the brigades which had attracted his attention, merited and received his commendation.

Such was the position in which Major-General Hutton found the service. And it still must be remembered that at the date of writing, nothing he has done has been subjected to the annoying interference of Parliamentary criticism and political influence, factors which, it must be said in fairness, have been to no mean extent the cause of the unsatisfactory disorganisation of the defences. In this respect, the General arrived at a time fortunate for the welfare of the country. Almost his first appearance in Sydney was at the prorogation of Parliament, and he had hardly had time to learn the names of the officers of his personal staff before legislators were scattered all over the colony, and the work of re-organising was thus undertaken with an unfettered hand, and apparently *carte blanche* from the Premier, Sir George Dibbs, who combines the Ministerial control of the defences with his duties as Chief Secretary, and who, during session, would undoubtedly have been to some extent induced by political supporters to hold views regarding military affairs which his individual inclination would have opposed, and which his knowledge of the subject would not justify. Colonel Hutton's own opinions, expressed before he had had any experience of politics in New South Wales, are interesting. Addressing the troops, he said :—

"I wish it to be distinctly understood by every officer, non-commissioned officer, and man that my intention here is to meet in every way compatible with efficiency the wishes and the determination of the politicians at the head of this country, and in every possible manner to reduce expenditure."

It is highly probable that the next session of Parliament will cause him to modify his desires to meet the wishes of "politicians at the head of this country."

The military staff, the Soudan and Russian scares not excepted, never did such genuinely solid work before; and, while the head-

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quarters' staff from officers to orderlies have shown themselves good and willing workers, their new chief has already made their labours pleasurable to them by judiciously expressed appreciation of their efforts. Major-General Hutton has, it is clear, grasped at once the strength and the weakness of the whole system and service. He has already effected vitally important changes. Elsewhere in this article it has been mentioned that the majority of the men of the permanent force were quartered away from the batteries, small detachments only having been detailed to out-stations. This was a weakness frequently pointed out in the press, especially just prior to the publication of the report of the Royal Commission, when it was urged as a salient point in an outline scheme of re-organisation from the pen of a local journalist, who, under the name of "Citizen Soldier," devoted some attention to these subjects in the past, but who has since left the press, that the Permanent Artillery, as then employed, was a wasteful expense, and that while the men should be placed at the guns on the coast, the Victoria Barracks should be applied to other purposes than Artillery head-quarters. The Artillery authorities have, however, always shelved the question of giving up the barracks, and it has remained for the General to carry into effect a change for which press and public had long seen the necessity. In future the permanent and partially-paid Artillery will be divided into a number of companies, each company covering a district, and each district officer will be quartered at prescribed district head-quarters. To soldiers this will seem an unnecessary explanation of detail, but the reason why an Australian writer should refer to the subject pointedly will be understood when it is stated that in the past the condition has been such as to allow of an officer commanding a district covering the fortifications on the northern shores of Port Jackson residing in quarters at Victoria Barracks, in the heart of the metropolitan eastern suburbs on the opposite side of the water, and some miles away. That is now a thing of the past, and the details of the new scheme will of course be made known only to certain responsible officers; but military men have already arrived at the conclusion that before much else is done every organisation of troops throughout the Colony will be allotted some particular post and responsibility; and although only the re-organisation of the Artillery has been mentioned in this necessarily short paper, other services and departments have been dealt with in a way that is at least to the taste of those who have suffered for so long under a distressing want of experienced administration.

Another important feature in the re-arrangement of affairs has been in the departmental control as between the Ministerial chief

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and the active head of the forces. Until some three years ago the Commandant also had the responsibility of adviser on military affairs. Politicians with good intentions, but unsuccessful methods, determined upon the necessity for the construction of a department of Defence with a permanent "Military Secretary," the idea being that with such a department expenditure would pass under review, and revenue be more carefully handled. Upon those lines, Colonel Charles F. Roberts, C.M.G., for some years commanding the artillery forces of the Colony, was appointed to the responsible position of Military Secretary. He had hardly taken office, however, when the question arose as to whether he should have direct communication with the Minister, or whether all matters affecting the department should go through the Principal Under Secretary. The seniority of the latter gentleman was proclaimed, and thus all chance of business being expedited disappeared. In fact, as regards matters of correspondence, there was merely another link added to the long chain of circumlocution. The extent to which the new Secretary should exercise the functions of military adviser was the next subject of contention. It was urged, and has since been settled, that his position was essentially to be a financial one. He, by influence and assertion, speedily brought about a condition under which Major-General Richardson, who then commanded, was the subordinate, in an administrative sense, to the military adviser. Though he submitted, not without some protest, to his every action being overlooked by an official whose standing, from a military point of view, was junior to his own, and notwithstanding that no definition of his duties had ever been given, the question of the actual location of the direct responsibility of "military adviser" was never settled until a few weeks ago.

The true position and standing of the Military Secretary and his department has since been clearly defined in an announcement that the Minister of Defence had approved of the creation of a department "under the direction of the General Officer commanding . . . and all correspondence for the Minister of Defence shall be submitted through the General Officer commanding." The order goes on to set forth that the Military Secretary's Department "will comprise (a) finance, (b) accounts and pay of troops, (c) artillery and stores not on charge of troops"; and making the Military Secretary responsible to the General Officer commanding for those subjects. Nothing could be clearer now than the status of the Military Secretary under the new régime. This is perhaps the most important step Major-General Hutton has taken, but it is one of which the force has not yet been realised outside military circles, and which is certain to provoke much discussion in Parliament

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when the House meets in the approaching spring. The step has, however, been taken ; and while Major-General Hutton seems of a disposition which would make him the last man likely to revoke the cards he has played, Sir George Dibbs is equally unlikely after the lapse of a few months to "go back" upon the authority which in so signal a manner reversed the whole current of the conduct of the military affairs in the colony. Thus the new Commandant is Commandant is the full meaning of the word. It only remains to be seen as before stated whether his efforts at re-organisation are successful or not. Time and circumstances alone can provide the solution of the problem.

Another great question which has been discussed frequently in the past, although not widely, is now passing under review among those who, while not in the service, are of it in spirit. That question is, is it desirable that Imperial officers should be imported to the Colonies as commandants of local forces and to important staff positions for short periods of say, three years, as in the case of Major-General Hutton? The question is one of too debateable a nature to be fully argued in any space forming only a contributory part to a collection of general remarks on a general subject. As regards Imperial officers, the Colonies have on the whole been decidedly fortunate in the selection made by the War Office. No doubt much benefit has been derived from the instruction imparted to the New South Wales forces in particular by officers of the Imperial service. Notably has this been the case in respect of Colonel Bingham, R.A., Major Churchward, R.A., Captains Bunbury and Milward, R.A., Major Penrose, R.E., and the present Commanding Engineer and Director of Military Works, Major (local Colonel) Renny-Tailyour, R.E. But (and here I refer to the case of New South Wales for my argument) while those capable officers have been of valuable service, the day is approaching when officers of the local forces will be in a position to undertake the duties of chief instructors. Thus we find that year after year local officers have gone through "courses" in England, and have qualified with marked success, and these officers are in a position to now replace Imperial officers. Thus we have at the present time Captain Bridges of the Artillery Regiment occupying the office of Chief Instructor in Artillery, recently vacated by Major Churchward, R.A., and Captain Lee performing the duties formerly entrusted to Lieutenant (local Captain) McNeill, 4th Dragoon Guards, in connection with the Cavalry regiment. Both these local officers qualified in England quite recently, and Captains Savage and Morris have only just returned to Sydney with highly creditable certificates of competency from Shoeburyness and the Isle of

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Wight. By periodically sending regimental officers to the "home courses," we are enabled to keep pace with the times. Why should not the same system apply to the general staff? The Royal Commission urged among other things the importation of an Imperial officer for the position of Adjutant-General. Lieut.-Colonel Mackenzie, who at present holds the position on Major-General Hutton's staff, is well qualified for staff rank. Three months attachment for duty to a general officer's staff, say, in India, would fully qualify him to meet all the requirements of the situation, and thus, by enabling him to further advance himself in professional knowledge, the Colony might at the same time reward him for his past services and save the expense advocated by the Royal Commission. The same thing applies to other staff officers, and why not progressively to the general officer commanding? Under present conditions the commandant of the military forces holds office for three years, and at the end of that time, when he has everything complete according to his ideas, he will return to England. His successor will have, probably, largely different views; he will come fresh from a school of later development, and what is good on the basis of 1893 may not hold good in the mind of the military tactician in 1896 or 1897. Therefore it may be inferred that no sooner has one organisation been thoroughly accomplished than Imperial ideas will lead to the advocacy of a different state of things. With citizen-soldiery nothing is more disorganising and more injurious to the practical utility of the troops than frequent re-arrangement. Such re-arrangement must follow each change of commanding officers, and if the system is to be followed in New South Wales with periodical up-heavals anything like the present very necessary one, it is difficult to imagine whether ten years hence we shall be any further advanced as regards our ability to defend ourselves. The subject is one admitting of great argument, and one which from the peculiar nature of that section of the New South Wales Parliament that has been instrumental in bringing about the introduction of Imperial commandants has never been threshed out in debate. Why not enable some officer of the staff to go through a course of training with Imperial troops in order to qualify for the important position, and then, having given him the command, enable him to periodically renew his acquintance with the "home" service or refresh his knowledge in India? A discussion of this very broad question in recognised military journals in England would be iuteresting, and would materially aid Australian Colonists to decide upon a course of action. More especially would this be the case were it possible to omit from the controversy the question of the

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precedents established by the younger colonies of the Australasian group. But it will be for the Government of the day in three years' time to decide whether the officer commanding the military forces of New South Wales is to be absolutely and solely a New South Wales officer, or whether he is to be an officer of Her Majesty's Imperial Army.

F. WILLIAMS.

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NOTICES OF BOOKS, ETC.

These notices give a brief abstract of the general scope of the volumes referred to, and, without reviewing them at length, call attention to their most striking points.

Guide to Health in Africa, with Notes on the Country and its Inhabitants. By THOMAS HEAZLE PARKE. With Preface by H. M. STANLEY. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.

The very recent death of the young author of this book, for Dr. Parke was only thirty-six years of age when he passed away, lends a sad interest to this his last literary effort. A distinguished career has been suddenly cut short. Dr. Parke served in the Nile Campaign of 1882, and fought at Abu Klea, Gubat, and Metemneh in the Bayuda Desert, and remained in Egypt after the campaign until he started with Stanley's Expedition in 1887. "Few men," says the latter in his preface, "could be so well qualified as he to instruct the missionary, traveller, merchant, miner, and soldier in the 'secrets' of African diseases. I am personally a witness to his excellence as a physician and to his skill as a surgeon, and I repeat what I have said already elsewhere, that he is the cleverest of his profession that has been in Equatorial Africa, and that no expedition had more reason to be proud of its doctor than the E. P. R. E. had of Dr. Parke."

All who knew the late traveller will cordially agree with Mr. Stanley's praise of one of his subordinates in his African explorations; and the volume is of the greatest value to those who have to work in the interior of the African Continent. Chapters are devoted to the native flora and fauna of the country, the prevailing diseases are clearly described, and some very useful notes are appended as to the preservation of health, the articles to be eaten, cooking, transport, and disinfection, which will render the small volume of value to all who have to travel under a tropical sun.

The Art of Subsisting Armies in War. Compiled by HENRY G. SHARPE, Captain and Commissary of Subsistence, U.S. Army. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1893.

To every English soldier any professional work which comes from an officer of an army which is so near akin in blood to that of Great Britain, is always sure to be cordially welcomed The well-printed, portable, and excellent *brochure* by Captain Sharpe is well worth reading. It commences by giving a very

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well-selected list of the authorities he has consulted—a list which gives evidence on the face of it of careful and extensive reading—and in the preface he points out "the necessity for the establishment of a Staff School," in the American army, which might "thereby tend to increase the efficiency of our Staff Corps and of such branches in the National Guard in the different States." In this desire he is not alone. The value of the training, continuously in peace time, of a "higher Staff" has never been more clearly proved than by the way the higher Staff of the German army has done its work and prepared the way in peace for the success of the army in war.

"Captain Sharpe deals, in eight well-considered chapters, with the important question of the line of communication, transport, supplies, magazines, requisitions, &c., all of which are well worth reading by European as well as American students of this branch of the Art of War.

The United States: An Outline of Political History, 1492-1871. By GOLDWIN SMITH, D.C.L. London: Macmillan & Co. 1893.

This small but most interesting volume deals with the history of America from the time of the first discovery up to the year 1871. Naturally so extensive a story can only be briefly told in the 300 pages Mr. Goldwin Smith has devoted to the work. As he rightly remarks in his preface, it is designed rather for Englishmen than Americans, for the former require but an outline of the political history of the United States. Such an outline is admirably given in the volume in question. The author does not think it certain that Norsemen visited the American Continent before the Spaniards, though he admits it is possible; and he views the spirit that sees in the doubtful remains at Newport, Dighton Rock, and Watertown (which have been thought Norse), but "the yearnings of a new nation for antiquity." Both the War of Independence and that of possible Rupture and final Reconstruction are dealt with in the clearest and most succinct way, and, throughout, the volume is valuable to all English-speaking people, and will, it is to be hoped, be followed by one dealing with the later history of the great Republic.

Army and Navy German Examination Papers. Compiled from papers recently set at Public Examinations, and edited, with a complete German-English Vocabulary. By J. F. DAVIS. London: Hachette & Co. 1893.

In these days of competitive examination all books such as this have a distinct value. They are not only books that teach the

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subjects they deal with, but, in addition, they help students to see what kind of questions they may have to deal with and what kind of test they may be subjected to. The preface contains some hints as to the spelling of German words, and the whole volume is of use to those who have to undergo the ordeal of a modern examination in German.

A Manual of Ambulance Transport. By Surgeon-General Sir T. LONGMORE, C.B., Q.H.S., F.R.C.S. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, &c. 1893.

The official manual on the subject dealt with, treating in a very complete and exhaustive way Ambulance Transport in War, the Organisation of the Medical Services in Foreign Armies, the Geneva Convention, Ambulance Transport, Material, &c.

This very useful volume is well illustrated and well indexed.

Catch Questions in Infantry Drill. By Lieut. G. D'ARCY-EVANS.

On Outpost Duty: What to do and How to do it. Compiled by WILLIAM GORDON.

On Guard: What to do and How to do it. By Major M. QUAYLE-JONES.

Company Drill Made Easy in Accordance with the Newly Revised Infantry Drill. By WILLIAM GORDON.

Battalion Drill Made Easy, with Explanatory Notes. By WILLIAM GORDON.

The above group, published by Gale & Polden, London and Aldershot, comprises a series of small pocket-manuals of from some 40 to 280 pages, simplifying or condensing what has already appeared in Drill Books and other official and unofficial publications.

They are well done, but it is somewhat astounding to find that recognised authorities require so much simplification and elucidation.

Duties of Guides and Markers. By Captain WILLIAM D. MALTON.

Method of Instructing a Company Practically on Parade in Company Drill. By Major F. C. RICARDO.

These, published by Clowes & Son, London, form a series similar to the above.

Where is it? Book of Reference for Officers of the Royal Marines. By Captain R. F. G. PERCY, R.M.L.I. London: W. Clowes & Son. 1893.

A small pocket handbook to assist "Company Officers and

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Second Lieutenants preparing for the Examination in 'Interior Economy' for the rank of Lieutenant."

The subjects referred to are arranged alphabetically, and are clearly and briefly explained, with references to the authorities whence the information was obtained.

The Army and Navy Calendar for the Financial Year 1893-94, *being a Compendium of General Information relating to the Army, Navy, Militia, and Volunteers.* By JOHN HAZARD. W. H. Allen & Co. 1893.

This excellent book of reference fully bears out its title, and the present, the twelfth edition, contains the "various classes of Government and Civil Employment open to Pensioners and Reservists of good Character," as well as maps of Bisley and Shoeburyness, and many of the chief naval and other stations. It contains 293 pages of useful matter.

Military Topography. Illustrated by Practical Examples of a Practical Subject. By Major-General W. E. MONTAGUE, C.B. London: W. Blackwood & Sons. 1893.

General Montague has struck out a new line in this volume. It consists of a series of questions, the solutions of which are given, as well as some useful notes to the diagrams. The illustrations, forty-one in number, are very well executed, and comprise problems in intersection, resection, &c., Field Book problems in traversing (with contours), form lines and section lines, more advanced examples, and lastly, sections.

The book will be found useful by both teachers and students.

Notes on the Duties of an Instructor of Signalling in the Army. By Lieut. C. DEANE SHUTE, the Welsh Regiment. Devonport: A. H. Swiss. 1893.

A small *brochure* of thirty pages, giving a number of useful hints derived from personal experience on a very important part of Army work. Divided into two parts, the first section deals with the "duties of a Regimental Signalling Instructor," the second with "the duties of the Brigade Signalling Officer." All officers who have to do with signalling will find a good many useful and valuable hints compressed into a very compact and readable form.

Cycling and Health, la santé par le tricycle. By OSCAR JENNINGS, M.D. Paris, M.R.C.S. England. London: Iliffe & Son. 1893.

This, the second edition printed in English, is something more than a eulogy of a pastime that now numbers among its adherents

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and followers thousands of men, women, and children in every civilised country. The preface explains the author's views very fully, taking as he does the healthful and hygienic view of this popular amusement. "Cycling is the exercise for the middle-aged," he says, "and the best proof of this is to be found in the enthusiasm with which all who have given it a fair trial have adopted it and discourse of it. 'Once converted,' says a correspondent, alluding to his experience among the clergy, 'they remain converted; there are no backsliders.' 'After a year's trial,' says a clergyman, 'both preacher and parish are reasonably well satisfied. The preacher, on his part, testifies that he takes his steak and his slumbers better, has more sunshine on Sunday, less blue-Monday, fewer headaches, and swifter thoughts (motion caught from the wheel); while the parish, on theirs, are witnesses that the pastor never preached so well before."

And to summarize his views, Dr. Jennings holds that he "can assure the prejudiced reader that cycling, sensibly used, is entirely the opposite as regards difficulty, fatigue, and danger to what he has been led to suppose. It enables the middle-aged man to enjoy all the benefits of athletics without their drawbacks, and it offers the invalid an exercise, not only that he can do, but that he will do, and almost surely with enthusiasm." The book contains much information valuable to medical officers as well as soldiers. The effect of cycling on different persons and for different diseases forms the subject of the fourteen chapters devoted to the subject.

The Art and Pastime of Cycling. By R. J. MECREDY AND GERALD STONEY. Third Edition. London: Iliffe & Son. 1893.

The authors, in this volume of 262 pages, illustrated with cuts of machines, tents, camps, &c., give a valuable amount of information regarding cycles, repairs, racing, dress, and such minor but useful details as all beginners, and for that matter, more experienced riders, find valuable, especially when the questions dealt with are treated in a practical and readable form. "No handbook," the writers assert, "exists to instruct the novice in these and hundreds of other points dealing with modern types of cycles; and it is to meet this want that we have compiled this." The volume is both useful and interesting, and the writers express their views from the standpoint of practical men with practical experience of what they write about.

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LIST OF BOOKS, ETC., RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

Manual of Ambulance Transport, by Surgeon-Gen. Sir T. Longmore.

Round the Black Man's Garden, by Zélie Colvile. Wm. Blackwood & Sons.

Militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine. Vienna.

Revue Militaire de l'Etranger. L. Brandoin.

Militarische Zeitschrift. Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller.

The Art and Pastime of Cycling. Mecredy & Kyle.

Company's Drill, by Major F. C. Ricardo. W. Clowes & Sons, Ltd.

Guide to Health in Africa, by Surgeon-Major T. H. Parke. Sampson Low, Marston & Co.

Duties of Guides and Markers, by Capt. Wm. D. Malton. W. Clowes & Sons.

With Capt. Stairs to Katanga, by Joseph A. Moloney, L.R.C.P., F.R.G.S. Sampson Low & Co.

History of the Gold Coast of W. Africa, by A. B. Ellis. Chapman & Hall.

Army and Navy German Exam. Papers, by John Francis Davis. Hachette & Co.

Cycling and Health, by Oscar Jennings. Iliffe & Son.

Catch Questions in Infantry Drill, by Lieut. G. D'Arcy-Evans. Gale & Polden.

On Outpost Duty. Compiled by Wm. Gordon. Gale & Polden.

The Art of Subsisting Armies in War, by Henry G. Sharpe. J. Wiley & Sons.

Where is it? by R. F. G. Percy. Wm. Clowes & Sons.

The Army and Navy Calendar, by John Hazard. W. H. Allen & Co.

War-ships of the World. "Lloyds."

The United States, by Goldwin Smith. Macmillan & Co.

In a Conning Tower, by H. C. Arnold-Forster. Cassell & Co.

Clear Round, by A. G. Gordon. Sampson Low & Co.

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To accompany General Middleton's Article on the

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 780.—NOVEMBER, 1893.

SUPPRESSION OF REBELLION IN THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES OF CANADA, 1885.

I.

BY GENERAL SIR FRED. MIDDLETON.

THE short campaign in the North-West Territories of Canada in 1885 against the rebel French half-breeds and Indians under Riel was remarkable as having been carried out solely by colonial militia, who had never seen a shot fired in anger, without the presence of any of the regulars of the mother country, except the General Officer commanding, his Aide-de-camp, and a few others. It is true a small part of the force employed consisted of some of what is called the "Permanent Militia"—regularly enlisted men, who can compare favourably with our regulars—but the main part of the force consisted of the ordinary militia of the country, men who had some of them undergone the usual militia training, some of them having not even had that. These men had all been suddenly called from the desk, the store, the plough, and other civil avocations, to take up arms against a far distant enemy, who bore the character of being wily and brave, perfect bush-fighters, and good shots. That these sons of Canada did their duty when thus called upon will I trust be made clear in the following short account of the campaign.

I do not propose entering into the causes of the rising, and though the movements of the different columns were all made

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under my directions and orders, I shall confine myself principally to the relation of the movements and actions of the column which was under my immediate personal command, and which chanced to be called upon to take the most prominent action in putting down the rising, only referring to the others when necessary for the perspicuity of my narrative.

On the 23rd of March, at 2 p.m., I was informed by the Minister of Militia and Defence, Mr. (now Sir Adolphe) Caron, that the French half-breeds under Riel—the well-known rebel who had been driven out of Manitoba by Lord Wolseley in 1870—were causing such trouble in the North-West Territories as would probably necessitate military action, and that the Premier, Sir J. Macdonald, wished me to start as soon as possible for Winnipeg. Mr. Caron gave me no specific directions, but I understood that on arrival in Manitoba I was to be governed by circumstances, and if necessary take the field against the insurgents in the North-West. The Canadian Pacific Railway at that time was not quite finished, and as it was considered necessary that I should lose no time, I had to take the American train through Chicago and St. Paul's, from Toronto, for which place I left that evening, with my Aide-de-camp, Captain E. Wise, then of the Cameronians, now of the Derbyshire Regiment.

We arrived at Winnipeg at 7 a.m. on the 27th, after three days' and three nights' continuous travelling. I drove at once to Government House, where I learnt that reliable news had arrived from the West of the defeat, with the loss of eleven killed, of a party of North-West Mounted Police and Volunteers near Fort Carlton, a stockaded mounted police station not far from Batoche, Riel's head-quarters. After conferring with His Honor, Mr. Aikin, the Lieutenant-Governor, I resolved to proceed at once to the North-West, taking with me the Winnipeg Militia, which had already been called out in anticipation, and which consisted of a battery of artillery of two 9-pounders M. L., three officers, fifty-nine non-commissioned officers and men, commanded by Major Jervis, a small troop of cavalry, thirty-five strong, commanded by Captain Knight, and the 90th Battalion of Rifles, 290 strong, with twenty-four officers, commanded by Major Mackeand. I inspected these troops at once, and found them in fairly good order and full of fight, and I gave orders that the Rifle Regiment should be prepared to start with me that night for Qu'appelle, whither a detachment of thirty men and three officers had already been sent; the battery, which was not complete in horses, to follow the next day with the infantry reserve ammunition, and the cavalry to remain behind at Winnipeg.

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The weather was very cold, with a good deal of snow on the ground, and each man was supplied with three blankets and a waterproof sheet, being already in possession of fur gloves and caps, mufflers and high snow boots.

During my short stay of a few hours at Winnipeg I was lucky enough to obtain the services of two men who were to prove of great assistance to me. One was an old friend, Major Boulton,* the other a Captain Bedson, the Warden of the Government Gaol, at Stoney Mountain, near Winnipeg. Boulton had served at Gibraltar with our 100th Regiment in 1860, when I was Aide-de-camp to the General commanding the brigade there. He soon after left our service, and being Canadian born, returned to Canada, and eventually settled down near the Shell river. He had been made prisoner by Riel in his first rising in 1869, and barely escaped being shot by him as a poor settler called Scott was. Boulton heard of my arrival, found me out, and offered to raise a small body of mounted scouts, and join my force. I at once accepted, and I may add here that he joined me on the 15th of April, seventeen days after he had received authority from Ottawa to raise them, with sixty men horsed, equipped, armed with repeating Winchester rifles, with transport complete ; and right good yeoman service did he and his men perform during the campaign. Bedson had served in our 16th Regiment, and his services were simply invaluable to me during the whole campaign. He is dead, I regret to say, after attaining the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Canadian Militia.

I left Winnipeg at 6 p.m. of the day of my arrival there with the 90th Rifles, 260 strong, having with me, besides my Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton, Deputy-Adjutant-General of the District, Captain Bedson, Mr. Secretan, a friend of Bedson's, and a Mr. Macdowall,† a gentleman in the lumbering trade at Prince Albert, both of whom were also of great use to me afterwards. We arrived the next morning at about 9 a.m. at Troy, which is or was the name given to the Canadian Pacific Railway Station at Qu'appelle. Here we detrained, and as the weather was very cold, and a great deal of snow on the ground, I put the troops into the emigration sheds instead of encamping them in their bell-tents. My reason for selecting Qu'appelle as the primary base was that it was the nearest spot on the Canadian Pacific Railway line to Winnipeg—which may be said to have been my real base—from whence there was a direct trail to Batoche, Riel's head-quarters.

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* Now the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Boulton, Canadian Senator.

† Since a member of the Dominion Parliament.

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I was met here by His Honor Mr. Dewdney, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, with whom we proceeded to the so-called hotel of the small town of Qu'appelle, no very luxurious establishment, but which I made my head-quarters during my stay there. I passed the most of the day with my Aide-de-camp in sending and receiving telegrams, mostly in cipher, which made it tedious work. In the evening, before he left for Regina, I had a long conference with Mr. Dewdney, who, I may mention here, assisted me to the full extent of his power in every way during the whole campaign. I found from him that Battleford and Prince Albert were the two most important settlements supposed to be in danger. They are both situated on the north branch of the Saskatchewan river, about 100 miles apart by land and about 280 and 170 miles by trail respectively, from Qu'appelle. Batoche, the rebel head-quarters on the south branch of the Saskatchewan, is about thirty-eight miles south of Prince Albert and about eighty miles east of Battleford.

We were still in telegraphic communication with Battleford by Clarke's Crossing, but Riel had cut the wire passing by Batoche to Prince Albert, which latter place, therefore, communicated with us by mounted messengers to Battleford or Humboldt. Mr. Dewdney considered that Prince Albert was comparatively safe, as Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, commanding the North-West Mounted Police, was there with a force consisting of 180 mounted police, ninety volunteers, and a mountain gun, with plenty of ammunition and food for a month; but Battleford was supposed to be in a more ticklish position, being in dangerous propinquity to a large band of Indians under a somewhat famous chief called Poundmaker, who was known to be discontented and in communication with Riel. However, it was garrisoned by a party of forty-seven mounted police, with a volunteer company of some thirty-five settlers, who, with the women and children, were all living in the so-called fort or stockade, with clear ground round about it, the rest of the settlement having been abandoned. There was also an important Hudson Bay post at Fort Pitt, a stockade on the North Saskatchewan, some ninety miles to the north of Battleford, which was then being held by a detachment of twenty-four mounted policemen under Inspector Dickens, son of the late Charles Dickens. They were also in danger, being in close proximity to another large body of unfriendly Indians under a chief known as Big Bear.

The Indians still further to the west about Calgary, and Fort Macleod and Edmonton, were known to be discontented, but were kept in check by mounted police, and near Gleichen there was a large reserve of Blackfoot Indians, under an important

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chief called Crowfoot, but whom Mr. Dewdney thought likely to remain quiet. Indeed, he suggested that I should have a small party of them attached as scouts to my force, but that I declined, not thinking it advisable.

Up to this time the Red Indians had not joined Riel in any numbers, but were what is called "sitting on the fence," awaiting events, and it was generally feared that there might be a general rising of them, if the Government troops met with any serious reverse.

It was known that Reil was doing all he could to induce them to join him at once, sending his messengers far and wide loaded with false statements. Among other lies, he informed them that England was engaged in a war with Russia, and could not spare a man of her army to help the Canadian Government, whose own soldiers were no use, and could not fight or move in the prairies, and that a large body of Fenians and Indians from the United States with artillery were coming to join him, &c. He even tried to work the old "eclipse of the sun" dodge. Having ascertained from an almanack that there was soon to be an eclipse of the sun, he informed the Indians that on that day the sun would be darkened, and that as soon as they saw that, they were to consider it a warning from the "Manitou" for them to rise at once against the whites and join him, after plundering the settlements near them.

On the whole, Mr. Dewdney was of opinion that affairs were in a very critical state, and that if we were defeated, the consequences would be most disastrous to the country, as there would probably be a general rising of the Indians.

He further informed me that Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine had telegraphed to him to warn me that the rebels were good shots, and that I should not start without at least 1500 men. I told him that I could not afford to wait for that number, as it might be weeks before I could get them, and that I should advance as soon as possible with what troops I could muster, and trust to getting reinforcements later on, and I telegraphed to that effect to the minister at Ottawa, at the same time writing to him to explain my proposed plan of operation, which was as follows :—

To move the principal column under my own command direct to Clarke's Crossing, a telegraph station and ferry on the South Saskatchewan about forty miles by trail from Batoche. A second column under Lieutenant-Colonel Otter, a capable officer belonging to the Permanent Militia, who was coming up with the reinforcements, to meet me there from Swift Current, a Canadian Pacific Railway station some 150 miles to the westward of Troy and a few

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miles from the south branch of the Saskatchewan, which I was recommended to use eventually as a line of communication, making Swift Current my main base. I was given to understand by an old scout that I might fall in with the enemy at or near Clarke's Crossing, and it seemed somewhat probable, but, if not, the two columns would then move, one on each side of the river, and attack Batoche, which I understood had houses and Indian camps on both sides of the river, with a large ferry-boat to connect them. After the capture, one column, if necessary, might march to Prince Albert, the other pushing on to Battleford, whither, I proposed sending at once a reinforcement of mounted police under Lieutenant-Colonel W. Herchmer, from Regina, the mounted police having been put under my command. A third column I proposed forming at Calgary, giving the command to Major-General Strange, late R.A., and commanding the Canadian Militia, who had placed his services at the disposal of the Government. This column, after over-awing the Indians in the district, would move on to Edmonton, and proceed down the North Saskatchewan to Fort Pitt, where I hoped to meet them after having disposed of Poundmaker and his band. We should then, together, follow up, and dispose of Big Bear, which would pretty well break the neck of the rebellion.

I also would shortly have two small bodies of mounted scouts patrolling east and west of the Cypress Hills between the line of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the American frontier, not only to watch any Fenian or Indian advance from the United States that might chance to take place, but also, if possible, to bar the most probable line of retreat to the States of the defeated rebels.

I soon came to the conclusion that I could not, at least at first, spare troops to keep my communications open, but that did not trouble me much, as, from what I could gather, I made up my mind that the rebels would not wander far afield, but would remain in or close to Batoche. Moreover, while my reinforcements were coming up, my communications would be kept open, and lastly, it was evidently necessary that I should make a forward movement without delay, with as great a show of force as I could muster.

The next day, the 28th, I set to work to make arrangements for the immediate advance of the troops I had with me. I appointed Capt. Bedson chief transport officer, with Mr. Secretan as his assistant, and Capt. Swinford, of the 90th, chief commissariat officer, and with their able assistance was able to extemporize a good working system of transport and commissariat. Afterwards our transport and stores, &c., were nearly all supplied through the

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Hudson Bay Company; Mr. Wrigley, their chief commissioner, being most indefatigable and successful in his endeavours to make things go smoothly.

The medical arrangements had also to be considered. The old English system of each regiment having its own medical man was then in vogue with the Canadian Militia, and I had only an assistant surgeon with the 90th Regiment; the surgeon, Dr. Orton, being at Ottawa attending to his duties as a member of the Canadian Parliament, but who intended to join his regiment, as he eventually did, on the 9th of April. In the meanwhile the assistant surgeon, who had a pair of field panniers, was sufficient for our immediate wants, and I knew the Minister of Militia was organizing a small medical staff corps with the assistance of Dr. Bergin, M.P.

It was still very cold, and there was a good deal of snow on the ground, but some horses having arrived, sent by the Hudson Bay Company for myself and staff, my Aide-de-camp and I were obliged to try them with swords on. Most of them proved fairly quiet, and I selected a large black gelding, which carried me well throughout the whole campaign, becoming well known later on as "Sam," a skilful thief when forage was scarce. They were all a useful lot of animals, costing on an average about 200 dollars. The saddles sent with the horses were all Mexican saddles, which are those principally used in the North-West. Nearly all my scouts and the mounted police used them. This saddle has a very sharp tree, and a horn on the pommel for the lasso or "lariat" to be fastened to; the stirrups, made of wood, are very large and worn long, the leg of the rider being almost straight. The saddle is fastened on in a peculiar way by strong strips of green hide attached to the girth drawn through iron rings fixed on the saddle. Those accustomed to their use prefer these saddles, but I was very glad that I had my own English saddle.

It was very necessary to have horses accustomed to the country, as the prairies are full of holes made by badgers and gophers, the latter being a sort of ground squirrel with the habits and customs of the prairie dog. "Muskegs," or treacherous bogs, are also frequently met with, which are sometimes very dangerous if not impassable, especially to horses not accustomed to them. These particularly disagreeable prairie obstacles are said to be caused by the common practice of the beaver of damming up small streams so as to obtain a pool to live and play in; and it is the case that you generally come across traces of beaver occupancy of ground in the neighbourhood of these "muskegs." Moreover, the western horses were accustomed to be picketed out in extreme cold weather, and

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to starve or half-starve occasionally on prairie grass. A knowledge of all this determined me not to attempt to use any of the militia cavalry with the columns, as not suitable for the work, but to post any that might be sent up, on the line of communication between Qu'appelle and Humboldt, there being several small bands of Indians and some half-breeds of doubtful character about the Touchwood Hills between these two places. This was afterwards carried out; the Governor-General's Body Guard from Toronto, about seventy strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Denison, being posted at Humboldt, and the Cavalry School Corps, A. troop, about forty strong (permanent force), under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Turnbull, at Touchwood. Both these posts were important, and I had every reason to be satisfied with the zealous and admirable manner in which the duties connected with them were carried out by the two able commanders.

While inspecting some wagons we were going to hire for our transport, I was shown a comfortable sort of covered ambulance with two fine large mules, which rejoiced in the names respectively of "Dewdney" and "Reid," after the Lieutenant-Governor and his secretary, and was informed by one of my staff that this affair was meant for my use on the march. Much amused at the idea, I assured my informant that I intended to ride or march, and unless ill or wounded should certainly not trouble "Dewdney" and "Reid" to drag me about.

A Captain French, who had been in the Irish Militia, brother of a distinguished artillery officer, came to me during the day and offered to raise a small party of scouts from among the settlers in the neighbourhood of Fort Qu'appelle. He had lately been an officer in the mounted police, in which force he bore a very high character for intelligence and pluck, and had not long left it for the purpose of marrying and settling in the Qu'appelle valley. He was naturally well acquainted with the Indians and the country, and as I knew that Boulton could not be with me for some days, I accepted his offer, and authorised him to raise at once twenty-five or thirty men from among the settlers of the neighbourhood, the men to receive five dollars a-day and find their own horses. French succeeded in getting together a very first-rate party of about thirty men, well mounted and armed with repeating Winchesters, in three or four days, and joined me at Fort Qu'appelle. There were several men of good birth among this party, among them being the Hon. M. Gifford and Hon. E. Fiennes, and the whole of them did good service, French, Gifford, and Fiennes being especially useful and hard-

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working. The two latter were principally used by Lord Melgund and myself as orderly officers, sometimes riding long distances by themselves at great personal risk.

We had a good deal of telegraphing during the day, which was cold and raw, a great deal of snow falling.

A great many reports were rife about the Indians rising, and about the strength of the half-breeds under Reil. I may say here, that during the whole campaign I was constantly receiving from different parts of the country most alarming reports, some of them coupled with pitiful requests for troops, or arms and ammunition. A great many of these reports were totally without foundation, and the rest greatly exaggerated. At first I was rendered very uneasy, especially as it would have required at least 5000 men, and the same number of arms with ammunition to comply with their requests, but I soon began to find out that, at this crisis, exaggeration was a "prairie peculiarity," and at last I named these stories and reports "Nor'-Westers," and it came to be a joke in my force about "the General's horror of Nor'-Westers."

On the morning of the 30th March, I sent off, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton, a wing of the 90th Regiment, 145 strong, and one nine-pound gun, and twenty-five men of the battery to Fort Qu'appelle, an old Hudson Bay post about eighteen miles off on our road. As it was their first march, I sent two or three empty wagons with them, to give the men a lift occasionally. Captain Bedson drove me over to Fort Qu'appelle that afternoon in a "buck-board," a peculiar sort of carriage, of simple construction, used in the country. I found the party had arrived quite fresh, though the marching had been heavy, owing to the slushy snow. The occasional lift in the carts had been very acceptable to the men.

Fort Qu'appelle is really only a cluster of wooden buildings surrounded by a stockade, but a small town has grown up around it. It lies on a small river running through a broad valley with high land on each side of it. The river just here widens out into two or three small lakes, the scenery being very fine. The place owes its name to a curious echo which the valley is said to possess.

Mr. Archie McDonald, the Hudson Bay factor there, entertained us at luncheon, and we made arrangements with him for the supply of 200 carts to be got in as soon as possible, and drove back to Qu'appelle. Next day the weather was very bad, and it snowed hard, especially towards and during the night. Busy again with telegrams and preparations. I decided to leave Captain

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Swinford at Qu'appelle for the present, and appointed a Mr. Underwood—who had been an officer in our regular army—supply officer to the column, and a very good officer he proved to be. I also secured the services of a Major Bell, superintendent of the Bell Farm, near Qu'appelle, who was of great assistance, and did good service throughout in procuring and forwarding carts and forage to the front. I heard from Ottawa that the following troops had left for the front:

	Officers.	N.C.O.'s & Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Royal Canadian Artillery, A and B Batteries (permanent)	13	213	27	4
Infantry School Corps—C Company (permanent)	5	85		
2nd Battalion (Queen's Own)	18	257		
10th Battalion (Royal Grenadiers)	17	250		

These troops were coming up by Canadian Pacific Railway, though there were still unfinished gaps in the line to the east of Port Arthur; but it was thought better, as a matter of policy, to use our own line, as it undoubtedly was, though the troops had to cross those gaps under great difficulties, both of ground and weather. An extract from the report to me of Lieutenant-Colonel Montizambert, commanding the artillery on this march, will give an idea of these difficulties and hardships which were so cheerfully borne by these citizen soldiers, both infantry and artillery:—

"Here began the difficulties of passing the gaps on the unconstructed portion of the road. About 400 miles between the west end of the track and Red Rock or Nepegon, 66 miles from Port Arthur, had to be passed by a constantly varying process of embarking and disembarking guns and stores from flat cars to country team sleighs, and *vice versâ*. There were 16 operations of this nature in cold weather and deep snow. On starting from the west-end of the track on the night of the 30th March the roads were found so bad that it took the guns 17 hours to do the distance (30 miles) to Magpie camp. On from there to east-end of the track by team sleighs and marching 23 miles further on, on flar cars (uncovered and open) 80 miles, with the thermometer at 50 deg. below zero. Heron Bay, Port Munro, McKellar's Bay, Jackfish, Isbester, McKaye's Harbour were passed by alternate flat cars on construction tracks; and, teaming in fearful weather round the north shore of Lake Superior, Nepegon or Red Rock was reached on the evening of the 3rd April. The men had had no sleep for four nights."

On the 31st March, which was a bitter cold day, with heavy snow towards the evening, I devoted myself to organizing and telegraphing, and on the 1st April, to my great satisfaction, Lord

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Melgund arrived from the East. He was an old Guardsman, and as I knew, had been lately serving with mounted infantry in the field. I had telegraphed to him to say I should be glad if he would join me, if his Excellency Lord Lansdowne could spare him for a time from his duties as Military Secretary. His Excellency most kindly and thoughtfully did spare him, and I received the most cheerful and valuable support and assistance from Lord Melgund (now the Earl of Minto) during the whole time he was with me. I observed on that morning several strangers in the little hotel, and was soon enlightened as to their business. They were newspaper correspondents, four being Canadian, and one a Yankee. As regards them and their after proceedings, I may say here that the Canadians were anxious to do, and did do, their work honestly and fairly according to their lights, with one exception, and his fault arose more from error of judgment than intention, though I was obliged to send him away from my camp. The Yankee reporter was all right at first, but latterly fell off and got rather wild in his statements. They were all more or less handicapped by the novelty of their positions as war-correspondents, and when I was obliged to decline confiding all my information and intentions to them, they were more or less inclined to attribute it to my not knowing myself what I was going to do! I must, however, except one of the Canadians, a Mr. Chambers, whom I always found to be reasonable and satisfied with what I could tell him. Later on we were joined by the well-known Mr. Henty, as correspondent of the *Standard*, which was the only English paper that condescended to send a war-correspondent to us; however, we could not have had a better representative of the English press.

During this and the following day, I received rather alarming news from Battleford, the mounted police officer in command there being evidently a pessimist, and from what I could gather I did not believe Battleford was in such danger as he described, but I telegraphed to Lieutenant-Colonel Herchmer, at Regina, to hurry on to Battleford with his party of mounted police and one mountain gun.

The next day, the 2nd, I left Qu'appelle at 8.30 a.m. with the other wing of the 90th, and the other gun of the battery, and arrived at Fort Qu'appelle at 12.15 p.m. after a longish and sloppy march owing to the melting snow, as it was a fine sunshiny day. The men in this case also were assisted by occasional lifts in wagons. They camped with the others, and my staff and self put up at the hospitable abode of Mr. McDonald, the Hudson Bay factor.

The next day, the 3rd, I had "my army" out early at blank

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cartridge firing, to see how our steeds would stand it, and found that they nearly all stood the firing well, chargers as well as draught horses. I then tried a little drill with the 90th, which they went through very well, considering they had had very little training of any sort, the regiment having been formed quite lately by Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy, who had gone to Egypt with the Canadian boatmen, and of whose sad death by smallpox we were so soon to hear. After the drill was over I went down the ranks of the 90th, and questioned each man, and found that many of them had never fired a rifle, some even had never fired any weapon at all. This was not a cheerful look-out after receiving Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine's telegram to Mr. Dewdney, dwelling on the excellence of the shooting of the half-breeds, and that my force should be 1,500 strong, and another message from the same to the same, which one of my telegraphic operators intercepted, to the following effect: "Matters are in a very critical state—feel confident all Indians will join rebels if immediate steps are not taken; 1,500 men sufficient if immediately sent in, otherwise several thousand will be required. Teton Sioux roaming the country on the warpath," &c.

I ordered the regiment to parade for ball-practice in the afternoon, some of their men themselves making and putting up three movable targets with marker's butts in the meanwhile. I here discovered, in the handiness and capability of the men as workmen, a superiority in the Canadian militiamen over our regular soldiers.

The ball-practice was continued the next day, and accustomed the men to the recoil of their weapon if it did nothing else. At this time the whole of the Canadian militia, cavalry, and infantry were armed with the Snider, and it was feared at first that we should be at a disadvantage, as the half-breeds were known to be most of them well armed with repeating rifles. It was at one time proposed to arm the troops being sent forward with Martini Henrys, of which there were some 10,000 in store, but I did not think it advisable to put an entirely new arm into the hands of men just entering into a campaign, particularly one which was known to have a much greater recoil; better not to "swap horses crossing a stream," as President Lincoln once said. The Sniders were therefore retained, and, as it proved, they were quite good enough for our work when they were held straight.

Fifty of the best shots of one of the regiments were armed with Martini-Henrys, but we never derived much advantage from them. The few pieces of artillery we had were all muzzle-loaders, nine-pounders, but that did not matter much, as we knew the enemy were not to be feared in respect of artillery, though they were said

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to have one or two guns, which proved, however, to be only a "Nor'-Wester."

Thanks to the energy of Mr. Archie McDonald, assisted by Major Bell, a good many teams came in, and Bedson collected a quantity of hay and oats. The price of forage had naturally gone up, and as far as I can remember the price then was, hay twenty dollars a ton, and oats one dollar fifty cents a bushel. These wagons, or teams as they are called in the North-West, constituted our transport during the whole campaign. They were the ordinary waggons used by the farmers of the country, and were lightly though strongly built on four high wheels, which were very narrow as compared with those of English carts. They proved admirably suited for rough work and roads, and were able to go wherever the the guns went. They were drawn by two horses of a good class, and were capable of carrying about one-and-a-half tons weight. The cost at first was high, but, after all, not much more than they were worth at the time to the Government. It was ten dollars per team —including driver—per diem, and all found. The forage allowed was forty pounds of oats and thirty pounds of hay, the teamster receiving the same ration as the soldier, with arms and ammunition. Later on the price of forage and line of wagons was much reduced. A man of the name of Gordon came in from Prince Albert with an account of the fight at Duck Lake.

The next day was Sunday, and after Divine service I rode out on the trail* we should have to follow on the morrow. I found that the bridge across the stream joining two small lakes required strengthening to allow the infantry and wagons to pass, and that the guns would have to ford it. The ascent to the plateau was also very steep and muddy. After that the trail appeared fair enough. The view from the plateau of the valley, with the settlements and the tents, was very picturesque.

On my return I sent men at once to work at the strengthening of the bridge, which was done in a few hours.

This day, 5th April, I put Lord Melgund in orders as chief of the staff.

Among other grave points to be considered in my arrangements for the forthcoming campaign was the question of "drink." At that time the sale of all stimulants, including beer, was prohibited in the North-West Territories from the fear that the Indians might get it, liquor of any sort having the effect of bringing out all their bad qualities and deadening any good ones they might chance to possess, and the half-breeds were not much better. The whites in

* Prairie roads are always called "trails" in the North-West.

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the territories were allowed under certain circumstances to obtain a permit for the introduction of a small quantity of liquor into the territories, but these permits were only obtained from the Lieutenant-Governor himself, who was very chary of granting them. It is needless to say that under these circumstances most extraordinary stratagems were had recourse to, in order to smuggle liquor into the country. Eggs, carefully opened and cleaned, were filled with liquor, and then carefully fastened up and imported as "eggs" in boxes. Casks, filled with whiskey and a little kerosine oil poured into them, were imported as lamp oil, medicine-bottles, labelled "Davis's Pain Killer" and "Jamaica Ginger," filled with pure whiskey, &c., &c.

The question for my consideration was whether I should allow the troops to have a certain ration of liquor, in which case of course the Government would allow of its being admitted for their use. It was pointed out to me that most of the men in the militia, though not by any means drunkards, were in the habit of having a certain amount of stimulants daily, some few a good deal, and that, with the cold weather and hardships they would have to undergo, the sudden withdrawal of stimulants might have a deleterious effect, &c. After due consideration, bearing in mind that Lord Wolseley allowed no liquor in the Red River Expedition of 1870, I resolved that I would allow none to be issued to the troops on this Expedition, or to be carried with them either by officers or men, except a certain amount as medical comforts. It was a bold step to take under the circumstances of the case, but I was fully borne out by the result.

At first a few men suffered from pains in their limbs from sleeping on wet or damp ground, and there were a few cases of frost-bites, and cold and coughs, also a few cases of snow-blindness, to meet which the Government had supplied goggles, but in a short time this was got over, and there was little or no sickness, severe as was the weather, and men who had believed that they would surely succumb to this deprivation of their accustomed stimulants found themselves at the end of the campaign in better health than they had been for years before. I do not mean to say that there was a perfect absence of drink in my camp, as in spite of all my care I fear that some was occasionally surreptitiously obtained, but the amount thus introduced was so small that I may say my orders were virtually carried out. As for myself, I can say that I honestly carried out my own orders, and that from the day I left Qu'appelle to the day I arrived at Winnipeg on my return home, not a drop of any stimulant passed my lips, in which I believe I was imitated by the great majority of

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my officers. Hot tea was generally available for everyone at all times, and was found a much better preventative for colds and coughs than any amount of spirits could have been. I also attribute in part our freedom from ill effects consequent on exposure to rain and cold to the free use of tobacco, which was always plentiful, and was almost universally used.

I received here a message from Mr. Caron informing me that he had heard Battleford was to be attacked immediately by six-hundred Indians, and asking me to make arrangements to meet this danger, which, though not believing in their necessity, I had already done by ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Herchmer, with fifty men and one mountain gun, to proceed at once from Regina to Battleford. I continued to receive such urgent appeals from Superintendent Morris at Battleford that I telegraphed to him that I would march on Battleford from Clarke's Crossing, after disposing of Riel.

While here, with the assistance of Captain Bedson and a man well acquainted with the prairies, I selected on the map certain spots for camping. The camp stations were named, some of them after officers with the force, and a few teams were generally sent on the day before to collect firewood, &c., under Mr. Sinclair, the foreman of teamsters, an excellent man, sometimes under Mr. Secretan himself, they and the teamsters being armed and old prairie hands.

F. MIDDLETON.

(To be continued.)

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THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION.

By C. J. Willdey.

The Universal Postal Union is an agreement among nations for the purpose of establishing a common standard derived from the latest study of, and experience in, postal matters. It does not compel its members to adopt all its measures. There is a minimum of discipline which it enforces, and there are counsels of perfection to which it invites, the degree of response to which seems to measure the height of civilisation attained; in other words, abstention from some of the voluntary conventions of the Union show that the internal arrangements of a country are not equal to the standard laid down. The Union is a successful attempt of a meeting of different civilisations for the purpose of striking out among them a common one that can be put to the test every day.

The object in instituting the Union was to simplify the complicated multitude of independent treaties, and to cheapen the extortionate tolls demanded by intermediate countries for the use of their territories as means of transit between others. The cost of sending a letter abroad was absurdly high, far more than any expenditure warranted. This is now much changed for the better. Fixed principles for the exchange of letters, newspapers, &c., between two countries are almost universally adopted, and a little insight into them will help people to draw their own conclusions as to what further modifications and additions seem desirable.

Germany was the originator of it. It first saw the light on the 1st of July, 1850, as the *Deutsche Postverein*, or German Postal Union, being a postal treaty between the then separate German states, among which Austria then counted, and the non-German states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or, as we should now understand it, between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The war of 1866 rent Austria from Germany, but did not sever the Postal Union. An attempt was made by the North German Confederation in 1869 to spread it among other countries, but it was interrupted by the war of 1870. After the conclusion of peace it was again set on foot, and finished at the Postal Congress at Berne in 1874, at which was concluded a treaty between the countries of Europe, Egypt, and the United States of America, binding all the

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signatory parties to a common international postage within certain narrow limits for letters, postcards, newspapers, books, and samples; to allow each the use of its territory for mails between other states to pass across at a certain fixed tariff, whatever the extent of it; to forward them by sea in its packets at certain fixed rates, whatever the rate paid by itself to the owners of the packets; and to suppress the interminable complication of international accounts up to that time necessary to enable two or more countries to participate in the postage collected by only one of them.

Suppose, for instance, a letter from England going to Italy, the United Kingdom took the money when it sold the stamps, but had to allow France so much by weight for permitting the letter to cross her territory, while France in her turn allowed Italy so much for receiving and delivering it. The trouble of making up the mails and keeping the accounts was enormous, and the whole thing strangled correspondence, and helped to put a scotch on the wheels of international friendship and commerce. Now each country keeps its own postage, the amounts due to intermediate countries for transit being regulated by statistics extending over four weeks in every three years.

It would be uninstructive to follow the gradual growth of the Union, absorbing one state after another, till at last only a little bit of the world is left out; and I propose, therefore, to give but a very brief sketch of the latest development of it, as concluded at the Postal Congress of Vienna, on the 4th July, 1891.

In the first place, as to the political constitution of the Postal Union. Its members meet every five years. Each state has only one vote, though it may send several members. Norway and Sweden count as separate states. The French and the Dutch colonies count each as separate states, apart from their mother countries. Canada, the Australian colonies, and British India count as three states, the smaller British colonies forming one state along with Great Britain. The colonies of all other countries are represented by their mother countries. This distribution of power seems equitable, and the one state one vote principle cannot be questioned. A small country can teach as good a lesson in civilisation as a large one. Switzerland's Postal System is one of the best in the world, and Denmark has notions of her own on the subject which are worth listening to. What seems far more open to question is to allow any state to send more than one representative. This privilege seems to have been abused. The Congo Free State sent four representatives, Montenegro four, Liberia three, and Siam two, while the more important states of Belgium, Spain, and Brazil sent only one each. The talking power of these

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states must have been vastly over-proportioned to what they had to teach. The Congress, moreover, seems to have been unduly packed with German influence, the ten representatives of Liberia, Montenegro, Guatemala, Salvador, and Venezuela all bearing German names.

Of conventions concluded by the Congress there are seven in number. There is one principal convention, obligatory on all the states of the Union; and six minor or optional conventions, or "arrangements," not binding on all, but on those states only whose representatives have signed them. The principal convention concerns only the exchange of letters, postcards, printed matter of all kinds, commercial papers, and samples. The six minor ones refer to parcel post, money orders, insured letters and boxes, cashing bills of exchange, subscription to newspapers through the Post Office, and certificates of identity.

Article No. 1 of the principal convention declares that the different states of the Union should form but one territory for the reciprocal exchange of correspondence; and Article 2 defines the nature of the mail-matter such correspondence is to consist of. Article 3 has an important bearing on questions now much agitated—the liberty of adjacent states to correspond independently of the Union. This article distinctly lays down that countries coterminous with one another, or in the habit of corresponding with one another without the intermediation of a third country, possess the right to frame independent arrangements between themselves for the exchange of their mail-matter. The United Kingdom, therefore, has the right to negotiate independent postal treaties with Canada, the United States, the West Indies, Brazil, Uruguay, the Argentine Republic, the West African colonies, France, Belgium, and Holland, because she is in the habit of sending direct to them. On the other hand, with Italy or Paraguay for instance, she has not, because letters for these countries must cross France or the Argentine Republic, respectively, to get there. With Australia and New Zealand she would have the right to negotiate for the direct forwarding of correspondence by a packet sailing from a British Port, but not so for such mails as were forwarded *viâ* Brindisi or San Francisco.

It would seem at first sight that so long as we paid France and Italy for the mail train those countries provide, no country need care a straw what we ourselves charged for the mail-matter inside it, but it is clear from the treaty that it would at least be a grave discourtesy to the Union to attempt a reduction without application to the Head Office at Berne for the consent of other countries. Unfortunately, reduction

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of postage touches Article 5 of the principal convention, any alteration in which requires unanimous consent, so that Guatemala could, if she liked, tell Great Britain that she was not to send a letter to Australia for 1d. through intermediate countries. There cannot be much doubt about the correctness of this conclusion, indeed, it must claim the merit of proving a great deal too much, viz.: that any little country may put down her finger and veto a reduction of postage that cannot affect her. It is to be hoped that the next Congress will modify Article 5 in some liberal direction.

By far the most important of the Articles is No. 4, which guarantees the liberty of transit across the entire territory of the Union, each intermediate country charging for the use of its domain at the rate per kilogramme of 2 francs for letters and post cards, and 25 centimes for other matter. This is to include sea conveyance for distances under 300 miles in packets paid for by the transit country. It provides for the payment, according to the nature of the matter, classed as above, of 15 francs and 1 franc per kilogramme for voyages of more than 300 miles, unless previous arrangements allow only 5 francs and 50 centimes, in which case the lower rates are to be maintained. The 5 francs and the 50 centimes rates are for Mediterranean and North American traffic; the 15 francs and 1 franc for longer voyages. To the land transit rate of 2 francs and 25 centimes there are three exceptions, more highly paid: those for the routes between New York and San Francisco, between Colon and Panama, and by the fast Indian mail between Calais and Brindisi, connecting with the Friday evening mail from London and that arriving in London on Sunday. From the letter rate fixed by the Union—15 grammes (½oz.)—one can in these days of agitation about foreign postal rates calculate for one's self what the real additional cost of the transmission of a letter abroad, over and above that incurred in the countries of posting and delivery, actually amounts to under existing treaty. Letters weighing each 15 grammes go 67 to the kilogramme. Suppose a letter has to cross another country to get to its destination it incurs a cost of 2 francs÷67=3 centimes; but as it is evident that most letters must be well under the weight of 15 grammes, the cost of transit across each intermediate country may be fairly taken as under 3 centimes, in fact at about ¼d. If 1d. pays for the internal postage for posting in one country and delivery in another, as it pays for posting and delivery in the same country the actual expense incurred in carrying it across several others must be under 1¼d., 1½d., 1¾d., &c., according to the number of countries traversed; if it crosses the Atlantic between

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Europe and the States, or if it crosses the Mediterranean about ½d. is incurred, while a long voyage requires about 2d. On the other hand, between co-terminous states there can be no transit country intervening, so that no transit charge whatever has to be paid, and between states separated only by sea the packets only have to be paid for. It may, therefore, be accepted as an axiom that any two co-terminous states can afford, if they like to arrange it so, to *correspond with each other at their own internal rates.* Also, taking the inland expenses of a foreign letter and its reply at ·63d., as there is then ·37d. to spare out of a penny postage on a ½oz. letter, and therefore 11·84d. at least to spare out of each pound weight of letters in bulk, it may be taken as another axiom that where the sea intervenes *a letter can be carried directly to any country beyond it for 1d.* without loss, whenever it costs not more than 11d. per pound to carry letters. Whenever the sea has to be crossed, steamship companies, with their present usually extortionate charges for letters, have of course to be paid, and form a considerable addition to the expense. Art. 5 fixes the postage of letters at 25 centimes per 15 grammes, 10 centimes for a post card, and 5 centimes per 50 grammes for newspapers, books, and samples, with permission to surcharge up to double these rates for matter conveyed by long sea voyages. This surcharge is rapidly becoming extinct. Arts. 6, 7, and 8 concern registered letters. The registration fee is not to exceed 25 centimes, and there is to be an arrangement in certain countries for the delivery of them only on cash down, the proceeds to be transmitted by money order to the place of posting. Indemnity up to 50 francs is to be paid for the loss of a registered letter. Art. 9 provides for the withdrawal or re-direction of a letter during transit in those countries whose internal legislation permits such a proceeding. Art. 10 fixes the necessary monetary equivalents in those countries that do not possess the franc as their unit. Art. 11 lays down that prepayment, when made, is to be in the stamps of the country of posting. Art. 12 simplifies the machinery of the Union by abolishing international accounts for mail-matter. Art. 13 deals with express letters, and Art. 14 provides free re-direction. Arts. 15 and 17 are purely technical, and would have no interest for the general reader. Art. 16 enumerates the different kinds of forbidden matter such as "live or dead animals." This provision is not so unnecessary as may be supposed. I have more than once seen a dead rat sent through the post, and on one occasion a packet appeared with the superscription "take care of this, for it contains five live scorpions." They were once no doubt alive, but four were dead when the packet came to hand, and the fifth appeared so ill that it would

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have been difficult for it to sting. Its presence was nevertheless objectionable. Art. 18 binds the different Union states together to use all means to detect the fraudulent manufacture of new, or use of old, postage stamps.

Art. 19 lays down the nature of the matters of secondary postal importance that do not come within the scope of the general or obligatory convention, but on which special voluntary conventions may be framed. The subjects of them have been enumerated above, and we shall see further on the principal provisions of them.

Arts. 20, 22, and 23-29 concern the political constitution of the Union. It erects a tribunal to determine all disputes between adherent states, and a department for the purpose of issuing information useful to the public on postal subjects, in the shape of the International Universal Postal Union Office at Berne, under the supervision of the Swiss post office officials. The Swiss, then, are, so to speak, the postmasters-general of nearly the whole world. This office could probably be in no better hands. Congresses are to be held at intervals of five years at the longest. The expenses of the International office are not to exceed 125,000 francs per annum, exclusive of the special expenses of congresses. It is rated on different countries in seven different classes in order of importance.

After the principal convention come the minor conventions or arrangements, of which the first to be noticed is that on the parcel post. Like all the minor conventions, this one is voluntary for such as like to take it up. It has not been entered into by all the states.

The limit of weight of a postal parcel is fixed at 5 kilogrammes (11lb.). The value of it may be declared for the purposes of insurance, and it may be sent on the cash-on-delivery system. Any country, however, has the option of limiting the weight to 3 kilogrammes (nearly 7lb.), and of declining to enter into the cash-on-delivery or insurance arrangement. For insurance each country may fix the limit, which is not to be below 500 francs; and, whatever it is, is to consist of the lower of the two values fixed by two countries that may have adopted different ones. Even in cases in which a parcel is not insured compensation for loss is to be paid up to 15 francs for a parcel under 3 kilogrammes in weight and up to 25 francs for one over that weight.

The great feature in the parcel post convention is the invariable transit rate of 50 centimes per parcel for each country crossed, whatever expenses it may have been actually put to for conveying it. Similarly for a sea voyage it pays the country that subsidises the packet 25 centimes for freight for less than 500 miles, 50 centimes for 500 to 1000, 1 franc for 1000 to 3000, 2 francs for 3000 to 6000, and 3 francs for any longer distance.

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The arrangements for insurance are similar to those for insured letters, to which we shall come presently. Prepayment is compulsory. For collecting the value of the parcel on delivery a tax of 20 centimes per 20 francs is levied. An acknowledgment of delivery of a parcel can be had on payment of 25 centimes. A parcel may be delivered by "express" where such delivery is provided, or at least a notice may be sent "express" informing the addressee of the arrival of it. This extra service is taxed according to the tariff in force in the country of destination. Of course customs dues have to be paid, but there is a valuable clause in the convention enabling the sender to pay them himself. In those cases in which Government does not carry on a parcel post as part of its functions it may arrange with some capable enterprise, such as a railway or steamboat company to conduct it on its behalf.

The details of the parcel post convention seem too complicated. There are too many little taxes, first for one thing and then for another, and too much liberty given to each country to go its own way. The allowance for sea freight is reasonable enough; but what about letters now? If an allowanee of 3 francs is enough for 3 or 4 kilogrammes for any distance for a parcel, why are 45 to 60 francs, fifteen times as much, necessary for the same weight of letters?

The next convention, or rather "arrangement" as it is called, is for the exchange of money orders between such states as have signed the treaty. It must be understood that it does not at all follow that it is impossible to exchange money orders or parcels, or in fact to enter into any postal arrangement with a foreign country, without signing a postal union arrangement, because in fact we have both a money order system and a parcel post actively at work with most foreign countries. The value of the money order arrangement, as adopted by the Postal Union, consists in its uniform mode of treating the subject, most especially in the great perfection of the form of money order that it has adopted. It is the very best of all the different modes of transmitting money. It is what is known as the "mandat-carte," or money order card, a type that combines great safety in transit with payment by postman at the address of the person in whose favour it is drawn, a system long since adopted by the principal states that have given in their adhesion to it, and now declared to the world, as it were, as the standard form of money order. It consists of a card about 5 inches square. On the left is a strip or coupon, which the payee may retain, bearing the amount of the order and the name of the sender of it. In the centre, under the heading "Mandat de Poste International," is another statement of the amount with the address

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of the payee, and space for certain official formulæ, such as date stamp; and on the back is the form of receipt to be filled up by payee. It is absolutely safe in transmission. Nobody will steal it while going through the post, because it is nothing on which money can be raised by the bearer.

In an international money order system the monetary standard question crops up of course. The principal declared for by the Union is that of payment in the metallic currency of the country of destination, the country of origin fixing its own rate of exchange in order to determine what the sender will have to pay. Between two countries having a gold standard all this is easy enough, because it is capable of being fixed for all time; rates of exchange rarely varying more than 1 per cent. from the theoretical pars of exchange measured by the gold in the coins of the different states; but when it comes to exchanging between a gold and a silver using country or between a metal and a paper one, frequent tedious revisions of the rates of exchange have to be resorted to. The Italian official "Indicatore Postale Telegrafico" is obliged to inform its readers that money orders drawn in Italy or British India vary in amount owing to the frequent differences in exchange. It is certainly a step in civilisation to have an international money order system at all, and it would be another to know universally how much any amount paid in at one end would come out at the other.

The next arrangement is for the transmission of insured letters and boxes; letters for containing paper valuables, and boxes for material ones such as bullion and jewellery, current coin being forbidden. The regulations on the subject are curious. The envelope of a letter must be sealed with fine wax. The postage stamps must have a little space between them, and must not be folded over the edge of the envelope, so that they may not conceal slits in it. Boxes must be tied with a cross of strong packthread without knots, of which the two ends must be sealed down. Seals similar to one another must also be placed on the four lateral faces of the box. The upper and under sides must be covered with white paper to receive the address and declaration of value. Before dispatch, the office that has received an insured letter or box must state on it the exact weight in grammes, in order that any abstraction on the way may be noticed by the receiving office. The cash-on-delivery system in countries where it exists is applicable to insured letters and boxes up to 500 francs. The maximum amount of insurance capable of being effected must not be less than 10,000 francs. The country of origin has to pay 50 centimes for each letter or box, together with an insurance

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premium of 5 centimes per 300 francs by land, and 10 centimes per 300 francs by sea, to each country whose territory it enters or crosses or by whose packet service it is conveyed. The maximum premium charged for each insurance, apart from postage, is not to exceed one-half per cent. on the value, though that recommended by the convention is much less, from one-third to five-sixths per mille.

This business is at present done in London in a very small way by marine insurance companies. For an occasional transaction, one per mille seems the usual premium, and for regular ones, one-half per mille, or 1s. in the £100. They make you call twice about it. For a post office it is a lucrative business. Taking all the countries that do it, the average of the declared value on each letter or box is rather over 1000 francs, and this at one-half per mille gives just over 50 centimes, or just about 5d. This is, of course, over and above the postage. The numbers of letters and boxes sent run to about half those of the registered letters, so that our own share of inland and foreign would be about 6,000,000 per annum. It is difficult to quite fix the portion of the 5d. which would be consumed in expenses, but I certainly believe that 2½d. would provide for cool and careful dealing by responsible officials who knew what they were about, so that there would be a margin of 2½d. profit on each letter or box, or £62,500 altogether, less any compensation paid for loss, which would be insignificant, as is proved by the statistics of the Union. So that improvement does not always mean cash out of the treasury, but sometimes £50,000 or £60,000 per annum profit. There can be no doubt that this system must before long get to be pretty universally adopted. There is no great difficulty about it: it wants more care than anything else. It will not admit of any kind of shuffle in the treatment of the articles of value it refers to. If a letter or box be marked with a declared value of £200 or £300 it is obvious that it will never do to let it pass through an office in which the registration is conducted otherwise than by plain signature, legally valid, for each letter by each official through whose hands it passes. Make-believe short cuts to this necessarily toilsome process had better be laid aside, if a country in which they are practised wishes to join this particular arrangement of the Union.

Another arrangement is for procuring the payment of bills of exchange, or other paper drawing on a creditor of which the amount does not exceed 1000 francs. The amount of the bill has to be expressed in terms of the money of the country of collection. If a bill be not paid immediately on presentation, it is detained for a week at the post office, so as to give the debtor an opportunity

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yet to pay, unless the creditor wishes it to be returned at once or passed on to another.

Another arrangement refers to subscription to newspapers and periodical magazines through the post. It is, however, not by any means generally signed, and seems the least in favour of all.

The sixth and last minor convention, or arrangement, consists in the establishment of certificates of identity, *livrets d'identité*, for the purpose of removing any difficulties felt by travellers in obtaining letters or the payment of money orders, owing to their being unknown in the places in which they may for the time be sojourning. The back of the cover of the *livret* has bound on to it with ribbon, sealed officially at the ends, a photograph of its rightful owner with his signature on it. Another ribbon, bearing the national colours of his country, binds together the leaves, one of which contains a description of him, while the remaining ones consist of spaces for signature, with counterfoils. On the presentation of the *livret* at any Post Office in the contracting countries, and on the applicant signing one of the blank spaces and its counterfoil, the postmaster is bound to deliver up to him all mail-matter for him. The price of a *livret* is to be not more than a franc, exclusive of the cost of the photograph. Each *livret* is to remain in force for three years. This arrangement is not very generally adopted by the countries of the Union.

It is quite a mistake to suppose that the Universal Postal Union lays down a set of hard and fast rules incumbent on every member of it. The principal convention lays down a minimum of rules for admittance, and enacts some valuable and salutary laws for postal affairs; but scattered up and down all the conventions are numerous clauses providing for the liberty of all such countries as may be coterminous, or for which it may be convenient to correspond directly with one another, to make their own terms with their neighbours; and the privilege of forming narrower or independent unions within the Universal one, supplementing it locally while obeying it generally, has been freely used. The United States and Canada, the United States and Mexico, Germany and Austria, Spain and Portugal, France and Tunisia exchange correspondence severally with one another, as though each pair of countries formed but one for postal purposes. Other neighbouring countries avail themselves partially of the privilege. In Belgium and Holland the postage on periodicals sent from any place in the one country to any in the other, is only half what it is for the Postal Union generally. Germany and Switzerland, and Germany and Denmark form two unions for the purpose of postal parcels; these articles up to the weight of 5 kilogrammes passing from any place in Germany

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to any place in Switzerland or in Denmark, or the reverse way, for a franc or its equivalent.

Perhaps the most useful publication of the Universal Postal Union is its Statistical Table. The highest gross revenue taken in 1890 by the Post Office, excluding telegraphs of any state, was that taken by Germany, whose revenue amounted to 317,426,567 francs. Next follows the United States with 315,451,285; next, Great Britain with 246,276,950; next, France with 202,063,117. After those four States, which may be said to be in "the running," comes a wide gap, the fifth on the list being Austria-Hungary with 109,898,580; and the sixth, Russia with 81,641,260. Next comes Italy with 45,420,387; British India with 33,881,274; Switzerland with 24,180,020; Spain with 22,315,773; and Canada with 16,440,435 francs. It need hardly be said that every country does not make a profit on its Post Office. The following are gainers in the order in which placed: Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Belgium, Holland, British India, Switzerland, Roumania, Turkey, Norway and Sweden, Egypt, Denmark, Peru.

The following are losers in order: the United States, the Argentine Republic, Canada, Japan, the French colonies collectively, the Dutch colonies collectively, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, Paraquay, Siam, Tunisia, Luxemburg. The Argentine Republic, Italy, and Russia state their receipts for postal work, but mix up their expenses for postal and telegraph work, so that they profess to be unable to give balances. Of course, this is only an excuse. It is quite certain that if the balance be on the right side, which is very doubtful, it is a very small one in Italy and Russia, while Argentina is a heavy loser. As far as proportion of profits to receipts is concerned the highest success is shown by Spain, whose 10,137,185 francs net profit amounts to 50 per cent. of her takings. In contrast to the profits made by Spain it may be instructive to know why her neighbour Portugal, so similarly placed, with a population of closely equal letter-writing capacity, between five and six letters per inhabitant per annum on the average, and in the same minor postal union, managed to lose 835,635 francs. The reason for this is evident. Portugal has four times as many post offices in proportion to population, and six times as many in proportion to area as Spain has. The Portuguese are also given to posting twice as many newspapers per head as Spaniards are, in other words contributing each twice as much of the losing business of a post office. The "unspeakable Turk" is a successful post-office financier. His people do not post anything like one letter or newspaper a piece per annum. He gives very

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little in the way of office accommodation; but he gets a profit of 1,044,187 francs, or 38 per cent. on gross revenue.

In the race to see which can lose the most the United States comes out first, with a dead loss of 26,158,649 francs. The Argentine Republic is no doubt a very good second, though for reasons given above it cannot be said with precision what her loss is. Argentina's joint postal and telegraph expenses, as stated to the International Office at Berne, amount to more than three times as much as her takings from postal business only, and that among a people whose letter-writing power is fairly high, nearly seventeen per inhabitant per annum, nearly three times that of Italians, and twelve times that of Russians; while Italy and Russia just about make both ends meet, at least do not lose like Argentina. It costs Russia for both postal and telegraph work 15,389 francs annually for each of her post offices and the mails despatched from it, and Italy only 7149, whereas Argentina manages to spend 17,879, although her offices do not lie so far apart, that is their mails do not have to travel so far as Russia's, Argentina having an office to every 2134 square kilomètres, while Russia has only one to 3603. These little considerations I beg very respectfully to recommend to the notice of the various committees of bondholders sitting in London, Antwerp, and elsewhere, who would like to know from time to time how Argentina is getting on financially. My own very humble opinion of her post office is that there is room for retrenchment in it, probably to the extent of some seven or eight million francs on the figures of 1890. Of all large countries the Argentine Republic gives the most meagre information to the world about her postal expenditure, but quite enough to show that it wants looking after.

Besides considerations on the business proper to postal administration, a study of the ways of the Union brings into prominence two economical problems of wider scope than its own dominion. One is the decimal system of weights, if not of money also. The other is that of a fixed monetary standard. I do not necessarily mean similar coinage like that of the Latin Union, but the settlement of some kind of standard, whether mono-metallic or bi-metallic. Little matters like the weight of a letter or the drawing a money order bring these deeper questions to the popular touch.

In conclusion, I may state that all who wish to study International postal matters for themselves can obtain the necessary publications, at a very moderate cost, on application to the International Office of the Universal Postal Union at Berne.

C. J. WILLDEY.

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TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT OF THE MOUNTED SOLDIER.

By "A. P."

If there is one subject about which we English think ourselves more fitted than others to give an opinion, it is horsemanship and horses, and all that pertain to them. The English hunting man and his horse have, during many decades, been looked upon by foreigners with wonder and admiration. In everything, in fact, that concerns horses in civil life we lead the way. Why is it, then, that in Military equitation and the training of horses we are behind the principal continental nations? The chief reason that the training of our young horses and recruits is not carried out on plain common-sense English lines is, that it is not in the hands of those who have had practical experience of horses. It is, in fact, usually left to the riding-masters—most worthy, hard-working, and conscientious men. They are not, however, horsemen or horse-masters, and are ignorant of what is required of cavalry in the field. Until the training of recruits and remounts is placed directly in the hands of squadron and battery Commanders, and actually carried out by the combatant officers under them, and a radical change made in the system of equitation taught at Canterbury, there can be no material improvement in the riding and manœuvring of the mounted services. With us, riding-drill is taught as if one of the greatest attainments in a mounted soldier were to do *follow-my-leader* on his horse in a small riding-school, making certain turns and bends mechanically and consecutively, as they occur in the drill-book. To such a pitch is this now carried, that it has been found that words of command can be dispensed with, the changes in a tune being sufficient guide for men and horses. I refer to the *Musical Ride*, now a popular institution at all Military Exhibitions. From a theatrical point of view, it is most effective and charming; but as a test of military training, quite valueless. Among the many things wrongly taught in the riding-school, is dressing, when on the move, by turning head and eyes to the flank. By doing this, one naturally inclines to that flank, and consequently steady movement straight to the front is then impossible. What is once learnt in the school by a recruit is difficult to unlearn afterwards on the drill-field. Reining back,

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and the bending lesson are, I think, very much overdone: they teach men and horses bad habits when practised to such an extent as at present; they prevent horses from standing perfectly still when first halted; and, greatest evil of all, they spoil the paces of a horse, and the hands and seat of the rider.

In fact, instead of riding in the school being merely a preparation, and if properly carried out, a very necessary and useful preparation for, first of all drill, and then marching and fighting, it is at present looked upon as a great end and object for the glorification of the riding-master and the delectation of the inspecting officer. The only proper *raison d' être* of the riding-school is for teaching recruits and young horses. During inclement weather, and very occasionally at other times, trained soldiers and horses may be drilled there.

When men sit correctly without using the reins as a support in the saddle; when the horses stand steady after being halted; when there are no gaps in the ranks during a forward movement and no crowding, every horse stepping out freely straight to the front; when the men can use their weapons easily and correctly, the horses being at full speed, over rough and broken ground;—then, has the instruction of men and horses been properly carried out. The system described herein will, I believe, ensure this end.

Side by side with drill go clothing and equipment. Few will deny that in the case of the British mounted soldier these latter are more fitted for peace-time reviews in fine weather than for the rough work and vicissitudes of climate during a campaign. We must abolish sheepskins, pipeclay, unnecessary ornaments and heavy grotesque headdresses. Everything must be strong and simple, easily cleaned and put on or removed.

The following shows somewhat in detail my recommendations for horse equipment. The headstall at present in use is very good, but it ought to be made stronger so that it will not break when the horse is tied up by it on the picket lines in camp. I would abolish the bridoon and use only a curb bit made something like a driving angle bit, the lower part of the cheeks having a bend in them to prevent the horse getting them between his teeth. Three points of attachment for the reins, so that they can be buckled into the "cheek," the "middle bar," or the "lower bar." The bits to be made in several sizes and with different descriptions of mouth-pieces: some with high ports, some with low ones, others with plain mouthpieces, either straight or curved, fixed or movable. No bosses or ornaments on the bit. For training recruits and young horses, and for exercising, the bit would be used as a snaffle without curb chain. Saddles of every description with iron and steel

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arches have been tried, but all have failed as they eventually open, causing galls on the horses' backs. For this reason I would revert to a wooden arched saddle, made something like the Nolan saddle, which was used successfully for many years in the British service, and with some slight modifications, such as wider side bars, would prove a most serviceable saddle again.

The high cantle was an advantage in that it allowed the kit to be strapped well up off the horse's back, and enabled the dragoon and R.H.A. gunner to mount and dismount with ease.

I would discard panels, and use a good strong, thick, soft blanket, about 8ft. square and at least 8lbs. in weight, without a numnah. The hunting breastplate lately introduced, and recommended by Nolan nearly forty years ago, with the number of the regiment on a breast boss, is very good. I am an advocate for the short, split girths, with a V attachment, which is now being tried. The wallets on the front of the saddle ought to be made large enough to hold all the kit; nothing should be strapped outside them. The near wallet contains the cleaning traps and surcingle pad, and in a pocket sewn on to the back, on the inside, a pair of horse shoes and nails. The off wallet holds a change of linen, housewife, and emergency ration. The cloak is much better carried rolled up in rear of the saddle instead of in front, where it is difficult to pack neatly and quickly, and, when there, interferes with the rider's bridle hand. The sword, in a frog, and the nose-bag should be strapped round the rear arch of the saddle on the near side; the carbine in its bucket, with picketing peg, and the mess-tin on the off side. The head rope should be of brown hemp. This makes up a dead weight of about six stone, which must be carried by the troop-horse in service marching order, and I do not see how it can be further lightened.

I now come to what the mounted man wears on his person.

The Cavalry and Artillery soldier should be simply, but well and smartly dressed, with as little lace and other "fripperies" as possible. These all weigh a certain amount where every ounce is of importance, are easily torn off when scrambling through hedges, &c., and require constant sewing and cleaning to keep them in order. No dress is more soldierlike or useful than a blue tunic unlined and single-breasted—made loose enough for a waiscoat with sleeves to be worn underneath. Collar, shoulder-straps, cuffs, and slashings at the skirts might be of the special regimental facings. Lancers might have double-breasted tunics with seam pipings, and Hussars worsted braid shoulder-straps. Dragoons might wear red tunics, and all should have the number of the regiment on the collar, where it is more visible than on the shoulder-straps. When "walking out"

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and on full-dress parades, a coloured worsted girdle could be worn in place of the belt.

For duties on foot I prefer pantaloons, ankle boots, and cloth gaiters, the latter buttoned tight to the legs from just below the knee to the ankle. For mounted work, the pantaloons should be strapped with cloth from the seat downwards, with black leather knee patches over all; leather gaiters shaped to fit over the foot, with a strap underneath to prevent them working up, steel strips running down the outer sides under the leather, and fastening top and bottom, one into the other, by merely bending them.

I would thus secure in the soldiers' dress the great advantages of utility and simplicity combined with economy; there being only one description of coat in place of the three which a cavalryman now has, trousers being abolished, and pantaloons and gaiters taking their place on all occasions.

Officers should, I consider, wear the present pattern braided patrol jacket on active service and on all ordinary duties and parades, with the addition of *chevrons*, according to rank, in gold tracing on the cuffs; and for full dress, a tunic similar to the men's, but with gold shoulder-cords and gold *chevrons* on the cuffs.

I would place the badges of rank on the collar, where I consider they are more easily distinguished than on the shoulders. A white linen collar showing above the tunic or patrol collar is cleanly and looks well, and might with advantage be introduced for officers who will, of course, continue to wear knee-boots for mounted duties. The sword-belt without sabre-tasche, which must be discarded, will be worn under the tunic and patrol-jacket, a gold lace girdle being worn with the tunic.

The question of a head-dress is a most difficult one, but I have come to the conclusion that helmets, busbies, and such like are nowadays useless, and that the most suitable form is a large cloth cap with peak, made bigger at the top than at the head, something like that in which the explorer, Stanley, is usually depicted. There should be a coloured band round it, with regimental badge in front, and officers should have gold tracing, according to rank, with an ornamental top.

It should have a waterproof cover with fall at the back for wet weather, and a wadded cotton cover for use in a hot sun. The gloves should be of black cloth for wear in cold weather, and white gloves should be discarded, except for officers in full dress.

The waistbelt should consist of a wide, black leather strap with large brass double-tongued buckle, having a sliding frog for the sword when carried on the person, and two ammunition pouches in front for men armed with the carbine; one for those carrying a

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revolver, which with lanyard should be in a holster on the right side of belt. An enamelled iron water bottle covered with felt, the haversack with a division in it, and two pockets made of brown waterproof flax are carried over the shoulders, should complete the equipment.

The regulation cavalry cloak could not be improved upon, but instead of the large cape I would have a hood and small cape just large enough to throw the rain off the shoulders.

As to the training of re-mounts, an operation which should always occupy at least three months, I would choose good riders from the squadron, who should keep to their own horses and train them from the commencement. For the first month the lessons should be about half-an-hour in the morning and the same in the afternoon, the young horses being first taught to stand still when being mounted and dismounted, the elements of the bending lesson taught with the men on foot, and the horses ridden at the trot and walk independently about the school. During the second month the canter might be learnt, and the horses lunged over some small fences, without riders at the commencement. Towards the end of the second month the horses will be gradually accustomed to carbine firing, until, eventually, by continued practice, they take no notice of the noise, and do the drill just as quietly while it is going on as when there is no powder being burnt. The third month's instruction should complete the training of most horses; they should have the curb chains on the bits, the men wearing spurs and swords, and, eventually, full marching-order kit. Drill should be at close interval, sword exercise at all paces, firing from their backs, and movements performed with lead horses.

Recruits might commence riding in the school on well-trained, steady old horses, equipped with stripped saddles and stirrups, as soon as possible after they join, and be formed in rides of not more than ten men, which is the utmost that one instructor can teach properly. The greatest latitude, under proper supervision, ought to be permitted to the instructors, who should, as far as possible, keep their own squads until they have completed their course; men of about the same capacity and capabilities being put together in one squad, any showing special ability being pushed on into a more advanced lot, and not kept back for the less apt pupils. As the men will probably have foot drill and gymnasium to attend, one hour a day will be found sufficient for the first two months, after which they might have an extra hour a day out of doors. As a guide, the following seems a suitable course for ordinary recruits :—

First week.—Mounting and dismounting, both with and without stirrups. Extension and balance motions at the halt. Moving

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round the school at open distances of about a horse's length, which should be the usual distance to be maintained from one horse to another in the school, so as to get each man to ride his own horse as far as possible, and not merely to follow the leading file, who, by the way, should also be constantly changed. Dressing at the halt, the same as now taught.

Second week.—Continue as during the first week. Turning across the school and dressing when moving, by looking straight to the front at markers placed 8ft. high and 8ft. apart on the walls.

Heads on no account to be turned to the right or left, the men will merely occasionally glance the eyes to the dressing point.

Third week.—The previous work to be repeated at the trot, both sitting down and rising in the stirrups.

Fourth week.—Shouldering-in and the bending lesson generally will be taught, also riding without stirrups.

Fifth week.—Mounting and dismounting at the walk from both off and near side.

Sixth week.—Riding over small fences. Extension motions at the trot and cantering.

Seventh week.—Horses to be ridden with the curb.

Eighth week.—The men may wear spurs and swords.

Ninth week.—The men will now be quite fit to ride for an extra hour each day outdoors' and at open intervals at the walk and trot, the men taking turns to be in front of the squad in the position of a troop leader.

Tenth, eleventh, and twelfth weeks.—The previous instruction to be repeated, and in addition, movements at close intervals and by fours will be practised. After that, marching past in single files, by sections, &c. Rising in the stirrups is to be the invariable practice, except when marching past. The present method adopted in this country of "sitting down," is ruination to men's chests and horse's backs, wears out clothing and equipment, and is a relic of by-gone ages. It has been discontinued in India, and should certainly be so at home.

Such are my views on the elementary training of the mounted soldier in equitation; and what I would again draw attention to is, that all training should lead up to and be a preparation for war. Anything in the education of a soldier which is not of a warlike nature is useless, and a waste of time. His equipment and dress must be such as to appear as neat and smart as possible, while it is also workmanlike, comfortable, and suited to the rough work of active service in the field.

A. P.

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THE RE-PARTITION OF AFRICA.

By EDWARD BOND.

WHATEVER Sir Gerald Portal may be doing just now in Equatorial Africa—whether he be engaged hoisting our flag and declaring a protectorate throughout Uganda, or simply keeping himself dark in that particularly fine but distant country, till the home government is in a position to formulate a Central-African policy—is of little consequence to Lord Rosebery. What we have to do chiefly, if we are so impotent in thought and action as not to see our way through the present dilemma, is to follow the example of our poorer and weaker neighbours, and hold on to what we have got, and what our treaties have conferred on us. We have made treaties with the native chiefs and with the chief European nations, for the demarcation of our spheres of influence.

We have Germany on the south; the Free States of the Congo—which are now, to all intents and purposes, Belgian—on the west; the mountainous lands of Abyssinia on the east, and the brave tribes of the Mahdi on our northern borders. The latter, perhaps, we could very well do without, but must be content in knowing that they are a very long way off, and will hardly trouble, but rather be very glad to meet, any trade that we can foster. As at present arranged, Abyssinia is under the protection of our good friend Italy, all the way from Suakin on the Red Sea to Kismaya on the Indian Ocean. On our northern borders, for a distance of six hundred miles along the parallel of ten, or even eleven, degrees north, we must be content to have the fanatic followers of the new prophet; but our first point of occupation will be near the lakes, six hundred miles from the southern "coasts" of those doughty warriors, or even a thousand miles from their head-quarters of Khartum. To the timorous, who hesitate at the name of Soudan, it may be said that the frontiers of these black fanatics run conterminous with the protectorate of Italy, and it is only reasonable to suppose that when they do go on a warlike expedition against the Christian, it will be against their next-door neighbour, Italy, as she stands at this day responsible for the good government of Abyssinia.

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The latest telegrams and rumours are, that our Commissioner has put up the British Flag throughout Equatorial Africa, and that the only serious difficulties to be encountered from the natives is a sort of religious war, which Captain F. D. Lugard had effectually disposed of previous to March, 1891 :—to have, in fact, so settled it as to feel himself at liberty to leave the country in charge of one of his subordinate officers.

In his extended journeys of inspection west or south-west, Captain Lugard appears to have had no difficulty in securing the goodwill of the chiefs and their people, in whose country he found all the conditions of a peaceful industry and a stable administration. He found some thousands of the followers of Emin Pasha—who had elected to stay behind when Mr. Stanley took Emin away—living in peace and comfort.

During the end of 1891, Captain Lugard returned to his head-quarters in Uganda, and discovered that the religious differences had again broken out, but was able to again restore peace to all parties, before leaving in the summer of 1892, for England.

Whatever report may be sent home by Sir Gerald Portal—a communication which may now be expected daily—there can be no question of Great Britain throwing up the sponge! She must do, at least, what such countries as Germany, Belgium, and Italy are doing on all sides of her:—never mind how great or how little that is. If Captain Lugard cannot be sent out, to carry through the good work which he so ably began, it is surely possible for our present Commissioner, Sir Gerald Portal, to maintain the condition of things as he took them over from the able officers of the East African Company, who recently determined to abandon their administration of the country, from lack of funds.

As far as we in England are aware, everything connected with the present expedition is going on favourably ; such, at least, may be gathered from the only communication which has come from it, and there are but few difficulties to apprehend. If they turn out to be formidable, or very serious, it will then be time enough to adopt the policy of "scuttle," which, under a given condition of things African, is perfectly permissible.

Captain Lugard converted the country from an unsettled state to one of peace and order, although his whole force, including camp followers, only mustered 300 men. He found Mwanga in the hands of the "French party of disorder," but within a few days of his arrival, induced that king to sign a treaty acknowledging the supremacy of the East African Company.

The facts appear to be that, although Mwanga may be a savage despot—like most other African chiefs—he is not only amenable to

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law and order, but quite ready to transfer his allegiance to whoever is able to coerce him, as Captain Lugard so successfully did with a very small force. Doubtless, Mwanga is ready to make over his fortunes and his country to any power strong enough to keep him in order, and to subsidise him, personally, with a few fine clothes and a reasonable supply of creature comforts. The mere fact, however, that Mwanga fled from before Captain Lugard and his party, supported as they were by a large section of his own Protestant subjects, shows him to be a mere savage poltroon at the mercy of the four winds of heaven.

The administration of this country by the Government does not mean, or should not mean, the expenditure of large sums of money. By treaties made with Germany in 1886 and 1890, we have the southern boundaries assured to us; by an understanding with Belgium, we know our western boundaries; and by our agreements with Italy, a line of demarcation has been fixed on all along its eastern limits. In such circumstances, we need not fear those treaty lines being obliterated by our non-occupation, for be it observed, every one of them are nothing more than imaginary lines existing on paper, but eminently useful and important in showing where the spheres of influence of each nation begin and end. In the present partition of Africa it is the only thing to be done at this moment, and for the next half century. What will follow, in the way of settlement, must be left to the endeavours of the owners as they carry out, in their own good time, their individual efforts of actual occupation?

It was time that England should have asserted her authority in this great scramble for land in Africa, thereby paving the way for her growing commerce, and for the expansion of her race.

From the time we first occupied Cape Colony, even to twenty years ago, we had the finest opportunity of opening out a vast empire in Africa, which might have extended from Cape Agalhas up to the tenth degree of south latitude, or even further. It is the argument of indolent minds and incapable understandings to say, "You cannot take up lands without occupation"; if that is so, how has the whole of Africa been lately parcelled out by the European nations, without occupation?

Twenty years ago Germany had not a square mile of land in Africa; and as for France, though she could, of course, have objected, it should have been done either when she occupied Algeria, or during her first protectorate of Tunis.

What does Commander Cameron say?—"During the time I was travelling from the east to the west coasts, I frequently wrote home, pointing out the advantages both to the Africans and

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ourselves, by entering into possession, which might have been secured by the mere act of hoisting the flag. France, not yet recovered from the struggle of 1870, had abandoned many of her stations on the west coast; Portuguese and Spaniards were dormant; the Dutch had just lately sold what they had; and throughout tropical and southern Africa, the only nation alive was England."

The fact is, by virtue of discovery, two-thirds of the great continent should have been ours for the taking. One hundred years ago we founded our first colonies on the west coast, and a few years later captured the Cape from the Dutch, whose possession was generally supposed to extend to the latitude of Whalefish Bay. Soon after this, Mungo Park carried our flag into the western Soudan, and discovered the upper reaches of the Niger. After Waterloo, we sent an expedition to explore the Congo Basin, and about the same time, another British company of explorers surveyed the east coast from Cape Gardafui to Delagoa Bay, when the British flag was first hoisted at Mombasa.

Denham and Clapperton, our African travellers, discovered Lake Chad, to which remote point on the continent the French have now, by treaty, extended their dominions. After that, Dr. Bartle followed up the quest, and made treaties with the native kings beyond any point at present occupied in the eastern valleys of the Niger, and for twenty-three years, Livingstone appears to have had the whole of Central Africa nearly at his own disposal. Tanganyika, to whose fertile hills the Germans are now addressing their energies, was discovered by Burton; Uganda and the inland sea of Victoria Nyanza, by Speke and Grant. Sir Samuel Baker gave us the Albert Nyanza and the extensive country lying south of the White Nile, while Stanley, Cameron, and a legion of others of our own countrymen, could have given us for the asking—in fact, begged us to take, by virtue of their treaties—not only the present Free State of the Congo, but the whole of what is now German East Africa. It is utter nonsense to say that much of this land could not have been taken up by a nation like Great Britain, when we find the King of the Belgians, single-handed, taking possession of territories on the upper reaches of the Congo, bigger than England and France and Germany together. By the Congo he, now, has ready access to the sea, and to the main stream of that noble highway run thousands of tributaries from nearly all parts of the great State.

We pride ourselves on the position and the existence of an empire upon which the sun never sets, but where would that noble empire have been, had our ancestors been as dilatory as our

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ministers and merchants, and people generally, have been in regard to settlements in Africa?

Twenty years ago we thought no power on earth could question our possession of Namaqualand and Damaraland, which appeared to be as much a part of Cape Colony as Wales is of England; but the Berlin Chamber of Commerce, and Bismarck at its back, informed us that we had no treaty with the native tribes, although those same tribes had many a time and oft, all but gone down on their knees to beg us to take them.

Bismarck has, since, in regard to German East Africa, thrown down his trump card, *das Hinterland*, whose virtue we duly bowed to with somewhat blank faces, but, all the same, totally forgot to bring forward in the question of Damaraland, which is as much the *Hinterland* of Cape Colony as Tanganyika is of the present German possessions.

The Cameroons, and Damaraland in South-west Africa, were obligingly handed over to Germany by, as has been said, a "Ministry that was not ashamed of Khartum or Majuba Hill; that dishonoured us in the eyes of the world; that abandoned Gordon; disgracefully surrendered to the Boers; caused more war and bloodshed in Africa than can be well ascertained, and in the end had nothing to show for it."

The history of Whalefish Bay must ever be a source of annoyance and shame to all loyal British subjects. Some Germans in the pay of an English Mission Society, settled near there, purchased ground for a few trinkets from the native chiefs, and very naturally hoisted the flag of their country. Sir Bartle Frere, who was Governor of the Cape, hearing of this, expressed his fears as to the results, but the German movement was ridiculed at home by a class of people who did not know, and apparently did not want to be troubled with, anything about our Colonies. It was enough for them to ridicule, draw their salaries, leisurely read the *Times*, and attend the wearisome and often badly-cooked dinners of "society" in town.

The Governor of the Cape then urged that the coasts of Damara and Namaqualand, up to the Portuguese possessions at Great-Fish Bay, should be formally annexed to Great Britain, but the Ministry of Lord Beaconsfield, thus urged, simply contented itself by formally annexing fifteen miles of coast around Whalefish Bay.

Following this, the German missionaries, who were our traders, complained to the Cape of annoyances from the natives, but the Cape Government were obliged to confess that they had no power over the natives, beyond fifteen miles limit of the Bay.

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The traders now wrote home to Berlin, asking for protection, when in reply to Bismarck, Lord Granville, then at the Foreign Office, repudiated all responsibility north of the Orange River—except the small dot at Whalefish Bay, which, by the way, was thus made in Africa what Goa is now, on the Coast of Malabar.

Here was a direct invitation for Germany to step in; which, though given by Lord Granville, he may not have been totally responsible for, but he ought to have resigned rather than have offered it, had he been a true statesman with a clear eye for the future.

The dream, in the minds of some, of a united empire in South Africa, from Agulhas to the Zambesi, never appears to have entered the heads of Liberals or Conservatives, nor of any of the parrot chatterers who were then sifting their miserable political "cinder heaps" on the floor of the House, up to the time, but no longer, than when the reporter of the *Times* closed his book for the night. They could talk, in stereotype fashion, about the grand empire ready made, but had no clear idea of increasing its area.

To quote Mr. Keltie in his admirable work, "The Partition of Africa":—up to the final moment when the German flag was raised on the coast of South-west Africa, neither at Westminster nor at Cape Town did anybody apprehend that the letters which had been passing for a quarter of a century between London and Berlin would result in annexation by Germany. Whatever was expected by the Ministers of our two Governments which had never taken the trouble to understand our colonial policy, that annexation took place, as any reasonable schoolboy might have expected, and thus ended the last and great opportunity of founding a South-African empire, stretching nobly from sea to sea.

Of the opportunities which the fortunes of war and commerce again cast at our feet, the limits of space forbid consideration; but still there yet appears to be another rift in the heavy canopy of leaden clouds—and that is, the recent failure of the British East Africa Company.

The directors of that enterprise appear to have failed, in some measure, owing to an unreasonable attempt at carrying a railway of six-hundred miles in length, to Uganda.

Without stopping to argue that a costly undertaking like a railway should grow by degrees, or in sections of ten miles, with the expansion of the country it traverses, why not at this juncture decide to hold on to what we have got, and confer with our European neighbours in regard to future movements?

It is a question for Lord Rosebery chiefly to consider, and will do much to stamp his administration with the seal of true statesmanship.

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The present partition of Africa could hardly have been more ill-assorted if the various spheres of influence had been put into a dice box and thrown out, at random, on the latest map of Africa.

Given the existence of an open-minded spirit of conciliation in Europe, it is still possible for us to get out of Uganda—if we must needs go—with honour and with profit, by having a fresh deal of African territory, with our European neighbours.

We are all more or less dissatisfied—Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the Congo, and Italy. England would prefer her old heritage of the Cape; Germany has her empire divided by an extensive country and by distant seas; France is hankering after an Algerian empire, which, though extensive, is still not large enough for her ambitious spirit; Portugal is still chafing under the compulsion of a great division forced on her by the vital interest of our race; the Congo Free States appear to have seized more than they can digest; and Italy has set her heart not only on Abyssinia, but also on the possession of Tripoli. Under such circumstances, why not have a fresh deal?—a re-partition of Africa and a re-arrangement of those lines which, so far, have hardly extended beyond the latest maps of Mr. Stanford.

Provided the natives are agreeable, the thing is as good as done, already.

First, let England give up, at the proper time, the whole of British East Africa to Germany, in exchange for German South-West Africa, on condition that Germany withdraws her southern boundary to the latitude of 8deg. south, and gives up all her other possessions on the south-west coast. Secondly, let England give up her protectorate of British Central Africa to Portugal, on condition that the latter advances her northern limits up to those of Germany, on the eighth parallel, and gives up her southern boundary to the latitude of 17deg. south on the Zambesi river, which line shall reach across the continent and connect with her present southern limits of Angola on the Atlantic. This will give Portugal what she has so long desired:—a zone of territory from ocean to ocean, having rights on the Zambesi river and owning all lands north of that river, extending to its mouth.

As for the Congo Free State, it appears to have advanced its boundaries very much too far south, and should be requested to withdraw them, in order to take advantage of a more valuable country north of the Congo river, between the meridians of 16deg. and 24deg. east. Upon what authority Congo advanced her southern limits so far beyond the parallel of 8deg., which separates her from Angola, is not known.

Those advances were not made by treaty with the European

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

SUGGESTED RE-PARTITION OF AFRICA.

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States, nor was that further advance eastward, which she made after the Convention of May, 1887. France would thus obtain much more than she already possesses; for, by giving up her place on the Congo, she would assume the sovereignty of that extensive sea-board reaching from Cape Blanco, to her present position near Grand Bassam. Spain should be given the protectorate over Morocco, and assume the possession of that country when the present decaying empire is dead. In regard to France, it would be expected that by her putting her hand to such an agreement, she gave up her rights on the French shore in Newfoundland, secured her protectorate over Tunis, and kept a civil tongue in her head as to our protectorate of Egypt.

In such an arrangement thus roughly sketched out for a working base, Great Britain would simply have what she deserves by right of conquest, of discovery, or exploration:—this is to say, the whole of South Africa—excepting the Transvaal and Orange Free States—south of the Zambesi, and separated from the Portuguese possessions west of that river by the 17th degree of latitude, as above named, extending eastward till it touches the Zambesi near the 24th meridian. The coast and *Hinterland* of Tripoli, extending to the Sahara in the south, and to Egypt in the east, would, of course, go to Italy.

Spain, Germany, Congo, and England would all immensely profit by such a re-partition, as well as France, while Portugal would have her anxious aspirations satisfied.

The German merchants who are settled in Damaraland, the French who are settled in French Congo, the British who hold estates about the shores of Tanganyika, or the Portuguese and others who are settled elsewhere, would, of course, have their rights, their trade, and their lands respected, if electing to remain under the flag of another power.

By a firmly-understood and honourable agreement, these new lines of demarcation would be as binding as agreements could possibly make them; and when each government recognised this, there would then be no necessary hurry in occupying land in the far interior, in order to assume possession; and particularly need there be no anxiety in constructing a railway over hundreds of miles of country whose inhabitants could be ill depended on, in leaving it from molestation.

The only feasible plan of carrying a railway through Africa, is by a system of gradual advance, in which the people become accustomed to its existence, and willingly constitute themselves its best protectors, by reaping advantages out of its existence.

EDWARD BOND.

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THE VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT UNDER PITT.

By Lieutenant A. L. Morant, H.A.C.

Surfeited with glory and victory won by the 180,000 veteran troops of the Monarchy under the able leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Directory turned a covetous glance upon the white cliffs of England, and forthwith set about preparations for its invasion. The idea of invasion had been prominent in the councils of France ever since the year 1782, at any rate. In that year the disaffection which prevailed in Ireland manifested itself in the formation of the Volunteer force of that kingdom, which was followed in England by the tentative circular forwarded by Lord Shelburne to the Lords-Lieutenant of the English Counties. This circular contained proposals for the formation of Volunteer Corps for the internal defence of the land; but nothing of importance was done until the year 1794, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought in a Bill for the encouragement and disciplining of such corps and companies as should voluntarily enroll themselves. This was only to apply to special corps raised for the protection of the coast line, and not to a general arming throughout the whole country.

The conditions to which the enrolment authorised in the Bill before the House was to be subject, were as follows:—The Volunteers to be subject to martial law whenever they should be called out, and this embodiment might take place "on something short of an invasion"; persons enrolled to be exempt from the Militia ballot during service in a lawfully authorised corps; and all courts martial to be composed of Volunteer officers only. Other clauses provided for the billeting of the sergeants, corporals, and drummers, which was to be effected in accordance with the practice observed in the Militia. A reservation of His Majesty's right to call in the arms was also inserted. The Bill, said Mr. Pitt, in answer to a question from Mr. Sheridan, would contain no power to compel the corps to march, even when called upon; it was, he thought, sufficient to trust to the spirit of Englishmen and to their sense of the cause for which they were enrolled. A curious

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explanation of the omission of a power which the Government ought certainly to have retained; but at that period it was not sufficiently clear to either friends or foes of the force that the spirit of the English people would not disdain to trammel itself with obligations necessary for the defence of their hearths and homes.

The liability commenced, however, if they did march, and then they would be considered on active service, receive pay, and be subject to military discipline. And later on, after the Committee stage, it was settled that they could only be called upon—in no case could they be compelled—to march on "appearance of invasion." This expression certainly bears a very broad interpretation, and one Member justly remarked that the Volunteers might be kept under arms until the end of the then war. The Bill, however, became law.

The military discipline and patriotic enthusiasm of these early Volunteers is shown in the following account of a local scare, occasioned by two French frigates, a corvette, and a lugger, appearing off the east coast of Pembrokeshire on the 22nd February, 1797. It was reported that their intention was to destroy Ilfracombe, accordingly the colonel of the North Devon Volunteers at once ordered his men to parade at the battalion rendezvous, which was Bideford. In some cases, this was fifteen miles from home, and yet, at the appointed hour every officer and man was on parade, silent, orderly, and sober. Such was the spirit of these men, and in most cases their discipline was equal to their courage, although their knowledge of drill, and *à fortiori* of tactics, was necessarily limited. By way of encouraging these "associations," as they were called in 1795, in spite of the dearth of money, a Bill was passed, exempting Volunteers from paying horse duty, when on service or exercising.

In proposing his Bill for the national defence in 1796, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Pitt, suggested that bodies of men should be enrolled, who, from their dexterity in handling firearms, might be very useful in harassing the enemy after landing. He added that the honourable gentlemen would easily guess he was alluding to the gamekeepers of the kingdom. He suggested that everyone who took out a license to carry a gun or shoot game, should either serve himself, or provide a substitute. This measure, he calculated, would produce a force of 7,000 men.

In 1798 the Directory of France had acquired an immense prestige through the glory won by the arms of its forces under General Bonaparte. This leader had reunited under him the old disbanded veterans of the Royal Army of France, and with these—"for it was neither the volunteers nor the recruits

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which saved the Republic"—had subjugated Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. Replete with the self-confidence engendered by uninterrupted success, and bent upon the free and universal exercise of a despotic power, the Directory saw in England a foe to Republican principles which must be annihilated. The state of England at this time was critical to the last degree. The pestilential principles of the Revolution had taken root, however, in shallow soil, and had borne a noxious crop of "corresponding societies," whose object was the spread of sedition. The discontent in Ireland, where the arms of the Volunteers had fallen into the hands of the "Whiteboys," gave grave cause for anxiety to the Government, who had had a solemn warning, by the attempted landing of French troops brought over in Hoche's fleet, that the shores of Ireland were peculiarly vulnerable to a hostile landing. Building upon these hopes, preparations for the embarkation of troops and munitions of war, were commenced in the ports of Normandy, Flanders, and Holland, under the direct supervision of Bonaparte himself. The Ministers, among whom a grave inquietude reigned, advised the King to issue an address to the Commons, warning them of the impending danger.

There existed at this time in England a means, sanctioned by the Common Law, of compelling every man of able body to provide himself with a weapon, and to turn out at the command of the King to resist a landing. There also existed, and now exists, a power in each sheriff of a county to call out the *posse comitatus*, or power of the county, and this latter right was exercised by William Clavell, Sheriff of Dorset. On the rumours of invasion becoming substantiated he issued a proclamation that every able-bodied man between the ages of fifteen and sixty, should provide himself with a musket or pike, or with whatever weapons he might have at hand, and give explicit obedience to the sheriff's commands, under pain of fine and imprisonment. A further notice stated that certain of the levies would be appointed, and the Lord-Lieutenant afterwards nominated these persons, either: (*a*) Chief commanders of pikemen or others; or (*b*) Directors of removal of stock—of waggons and horses required for service—of fuel, forage, and provisions—and of finding suitable accommodation for the *posse* when actually called out.

This proceeding was universally applauded throughout the kingdom, and cited as a most laudable example for others to follow; but a circular, sent round to Lords-Lieutenant by the Government, asking them to set subscriptions on foot for the public defence, was deemed unconstitutional, one noble Lord saying that the King's prerogative might compel him to take his pike or

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shoulder his musket, but he could not be made to pay one penny, otherwise than by the will of Parliament. The *Times*, of this year, contains a notice that the Bishop of Winchester had sanctioned the taking up arms by all his clergy, or their doing what they thought best for their country's defence.

The first public recognition of this great movement took place on the 4th June, 1799, when several thousands of the Metropolitan Volunteers took part in the great review held by his Majesty King George III., in Hyde Park. It was then made clear to the foes of England that a vast force of determined men, armed with muskets as good as those of any regular troops of the period, were prepared to resist any landing which should be made. These men, too, were disciplined, and certainly possessed a larger amount of training than do the Volunteers of to-day. To quote from a periodical of the time: "At no time during this reign was the anniversary of his Majesty's birth celebrated with more splendid demonstrations of joy, and no part of those demonstrations was more gratifying to the heart than the assembly of so many thousand Volunteers under arms, who from the purest patriotism have formed themselves into military associations, and learned the military art for the most honourable purpose, that of defending the independence of their country."

No less than 8200 men out of the 15,000 men, forming the Metropolitan contingent of the Volunteer army, paraded before his Majesty.

A magazine called the *British Volunteer* gives sundry hints on military etiquette and drill for the benefit of the Volunteers, and also describes some of the corps, and their rules. For instance, dealing with officers commanding Volunteer corps, the writer says: "They require an accurate local knowledge of the district in which they may be called upon to act," and he advises that "the uniform, arms, and accoutrements of gentlemen serving in Volunteer corps should ever be kept contiguous to their beds, that they may be armed and assembled at the shortest notice or alarm." Again, the rules of the Loyal Pimlico Volunteers lay down that each subscribing member shall provide his own uniform, and attend two drills in every week, "and at other times when summoned by the beat of drum." A circular letter from the War Office, dated 10th December, 1798, orders that three hours are to constitute one day's exercise.

Each company was divided up into "divisions," one of which was assigned to each subaltern officer, who, having the address of the members of his division, would be expected to forward all orders relating to drill to his address. In case of emergency the

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orders sent are not to be allowed to transpire, nor should any gentleman quit the district without informing his commanding officer by letter of the time he may be absent and also of his return. Another feature of this London corps was a fire-engine, which was worked by the "artificers" specially enrolled for that purpose.

During the years which followed, Napoleon had become the sole ruler of France, a Monarch under the title of Consul, for with him rested the prerogative of waging war, and he maintained a species of state which required little to develop it into kingly splendour. In the midst of his power he was much annoyed, indeed, at times, enraged by the scurrilous attacks made upon him by the English press; and the refusal of the English Government to deliver up the Vendean leader, Georges Cadoudal, as well as the Bourbon princes and other *emigrés*, was the cause of additional vexation. These acts provoked him to insult the British ambassador, and among other causes the seizure of the English travelling or resident in France brought about a declaration of war in 1803.

The First Consul's preliminary movements on the Continent were followed by the new preparations for the invasion of England, and the edict against commerce with the British ports was followed by the new preparations on a vast scale for the invasion of England.

The idea found a universal acceptance throughout France, and subscriptions for cannon, ships, and warlike stores came in from all departments and towns. The most terrible peril, since Hastings now arose against England, and but for the Navy, must have proved overwhelming. Forty million French, said Napoleon, must crush 15,000,000 English. Thousands of flat-bottomed boats were commenced, all along the northern littoral of France, which stealthily crept along the coasts, when completed, to their rendezvous at Boulogne. The "Army of England," under Napoleon, consisted of 160,000 men, and was under the following Generals of Division: Soult, Marmont, Davoust, Ney, Junot, and Mortier.

Meanwhile, the English nation was rising in arms, and the second great phase of the Volunteer movement was commenced. At no time in our history was the agitation so great, the dangers to be apprehended so apparent, or the spirit and energy of the English people so pre-eminently displayed. Every hamlet had its corps for defence, armed with weapons, be they pikes or muskets; every man prepared to receive the masses of France with the utmost courage and determination. The army at this time numbered some 60,000 men, unsurpassed in quality and discipline,

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besides a Militia force numbering 80,000 men, and the Volunteers, who in December, 1803, were returned as consisting of no less than 460,000 men, including 380,000 Englishmen.

In July, 1803, the Government brought in a measure for the Regulation of the Volunteers, which was vigorously opposed by (among others) Mr. Windham, whose language concerning the force was at times positively insulting, and whose sarcasms outstripped the sentiments of his party in their condemnation of the movement. The idea of paying for a force "merely a levy in mass, moulded into the form and known under the name of Volunteer Corps," was to him, in the last degree, repugnant. In support of his opposition he adduced the following singular arguments: "All the world would agree that to talk of giving to citizens and householders, to men engaged in professions and callings, who were compelled to live in one spot, were tied down by the cares of family, who rejected military control, and were officered by persons of their own choosing—that to talk of giving such men the character of regular soldiers, was the greatest of all absurdities."

He further referred to the difficulties of a general who had some pressing duty to be carried out, which required men of steady and tried capacity, having to deliberate upon the respective capabilities of corps under him whose respective powers and composition he perhaps knew nothing. The Volunteers hindered recruiting; they had a detrimental effect on the character and conduct of the army; and they were most objectionable "as infringing the just claims, as violating the reasonable feelings, of military men, by confounding those distinctions, which they had hitherto enjoyed exclusively, and effecting thereby a general depreciation of military titles and honours"; and this sapient critic of Mr. Pitt's new organisation launches a final bolt by saying that they would "become a great political danger, as being armed men over whom there was no military control."

As a proof of their want of proper discipline he quoted an instance arising in London corps. Their constitution provided that they should be governed by committees, and not by officers appointed by his Majesty, and these were so constituted that the most important questions might be decided by a quorum in which there could be six privates to one officer.

The latter objection did actually arise, for in 1803 the Southwark Volunteers came into conflict with their colonel on his nominating a stranger for a vacant commission. They held that as originally they elected their own officers, the privilege was to continue in subsequent cases, and they passed resolutions to the above

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effect, which were submitted to his Majesty. However, the King settled the point once and for all by directing Lords-Lieutenant to nominate all candidates for commissions, at the same time he relied on their consulting the commanding officer before sending in the names. The companies (the Light Company and No. 3) who still objected were directed to be dismissed. They meanwhile deposited their weapons in their captain's house, "it being their determination not to disband if possible, but to hold themselves in readiness for any call the country might make upon them." With the exception of this single instance, which was of slight consequence and promptly dealt with, no indiscipline of any kind occurred. As to the system hindering recruiting, according to Mr. Windham himself the class of men forming the bulk of its members would not under any conceivable circumstances enlist! It is difficult to imagine how the adoption of military titles by Volunteers could have prejudiced the regular officers, when peers of the realm bore commissions in the force and the majority of the officers were gentlemen of property, and when the excellent discipline and soldier-like conduct of all ranks impressed all who witnessed their parades.

A circular letter from the War Office, under date the 3rd August, 1803, and addressed to Lords-Lieutenant, lays down that Volunteer corps of infantry established under 43 Geo. III., c. 96, should draw the following allowances, namely:—Twenty shillings for clothing per man, once in three years; and one shilling per day for twenty days' exercise every year. Each association raised in any county is to be at least six times the number of the Militia in the county.

The regulations accompanying this circular lay down that a Volunteer regiment was not to consist of more than twelve companies, nor less than eight; a battalion not to exceed seven companies, but not less than four. Each company to number sixty to 100 men.

Another paragraph lays down the pay for "a corps or any part of a corps which shall be called upon to act in cases of riots or disturbances, the pay for such services to be from one shilling for a private to nine shillings and sixpence for a field officer or captain per diem." It very often occurred that volunteers were called out to assist the civil power. During the elections for the county of Middlesex in 1804, after a fifteen days' poll, there occurred a riot, a frequent consequence of the polling in those days. The Grenadier Company of the St. James's Volunteers, which was returning from exercising under Lord Amherst, were called in to quell the disturbance. This fact

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disposes of Mr. Windham's argument as to the danger of placing arms in the hands of the people.

The cloth of which the uniforms of the Volunteers were made was, in the case of infantry, red; artillery, blue; rifles, green. Their arms consisted of muskets complete with accoutrements, and drummers swords, drums with sticks, spears for sergeants, and pikes were issued to any extent. The Fraserburgh Volunteers were armed entirely with pikes. The scarcity of suitable weapons for Volunteers, and the discouraging attitude of the War Office, appears in a letter from Dr. Samuel Wilberforce to Henry Bankes, Esq. He writes: "The Army of Reserve Bill passed . . In several places no answers have been received to most liberal offers of Volunteer service; or that there has been so much delay that the Volunteers have been tired of waiting, have been tampered with, and have withdrawn their offer. Government acknowledges that there is an utter lack of firearms, yet a strange lack of energy prevails as to increasing the supply. Even the Thames defence is incomplete."

Sheridan, in an able speech, moved that the thanks of the House of Commons be given to the Volunteer and Yeomanry corps for the zeal and promptitude with which they associated for the defence of the country "in this important and dangerous crisis." In addition, a return was ordered to be made on the journals of the names and numbers of the Volunteer corps, who from that moment until the next meeting of Parliament should enrol themselves, and be accepted by his Majesty, in order that "their patriotic example might be handed down to animate their latest posterity." Among the privileges of the Volunteers of the period was their exemption from the payment of duty on hair powder, horse duty, and the militia ballot, as well as from the *levée en masse*, which an Act passed in July, 1803, made all persons between seventeen and forty-five liable to. Apprentices might join the training, and enroll themselves at no risk of forfeiting their indentures.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Pitt, pre-eminently distinguished himself in the movement. He raised the corps called the Cinque Ports Volunteers. The regiment consisted of three battalions, numbering 3,000 men. He was Colonel-in-Chief, and his residence being Walmer Castle, he was able to be instantly among them. A funny story is related of him by Earl Stanhope, in which he exhibits his extreme enthusiasm and wit. A corps which he was raising sent him their draft rules, in which the words "except in case of actual invasion" were of constant occurrence. At length Pitt came to a clause in which the cautious committee

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had stated absolutely that they were not to be sent out of the country; but his patience had been exhausted, and, seizing a pen, he appended the words "except in case of actual invasion."

Among the corps formed during the year were two which are now called the training schools for officers of Volunteers, namely, those of Oxford and Cambridge. The latter University, a short time after the great Volunteer reviews in Hyde Park, in October, authorised by a Latin grace, the raising of a corps among the students. It was to drill at twelve every day, being a time which should not interfere with the lectures; but no military uniform was to be worn during drill. The University of Cambridge was to defray any expenses which might arise, and this magnanimity will be understood when we read that the tutors considered the exercise to be so beneficial that they desired drill to become part of the curriculum. It appears, however, that a modified military garb was worn, consisting of a short blue jacket, black pantaloons, black gaiters, and a handkerchief. This sober dress was well-befitting the quiet shades of *Alma Mater;* but it is difficult to conceive the military use which a handkerchief could be put to. The command was exercised "by a sort of centurion," who was appointed to each division until he got thoroughly versed in his duties, when he was superseded by another young man, who apparently knew nothing of his work; and it must have been trying for the squads to be the subject of these successive centurion's attempts, while each centurion had to fall in with the rest when a fresh man came out.

That the Volunteers had an actual apprehension that invasion would in all probability take place is shown by their regimental orders, and by the books of instruction constantly published by way of a guide in the event of mobilization. The Edinburgh Volunteers received most minute instructions from their Lieutenant-Colonel which are worth a reference. He gives as necessary equipment for actual service:—One worsted or flannel nightcap to tie under the chin; two flannel under-waistcoats; one pair of worsted gloves; one good warm blanket (one blanket covers two men); comb, brush, and implements for shaving; piece of pipe-clay, and blacking ball, a few needles, worsted and thread.

Strict discipline appears to have existed in this regiment, for officers "cannot be permitted to have any indulgence beyond the privates. They must therefore march with their whole baggage on their backs, of which the Lieutenant-Colonel will set the example, never mounting his horse except for command."

He further directs each gentleman to bring his ordinary coat, as the blanket does away with the necessity for watchcoats;

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4½lb. of biscuits or bread in their haversacks, which article, with canteens, camp kettles, and billhooks would be served out of the King's stores. The Regimental fund would furnish the knapsacks. Particular care was to be taken by each gentleman not to lie down to sleep while warm or with wet feet. Perhaps a warning so detailed as the foregoing might have saved the Bromley Volunteer, who while going through platoon firing had one of his hands shattered by the bursting of his gun, which also overthrew two others. It appeared that the piece contained six cartridges. The experiment was also tried of brigading the Volunteer corps under officers of the line. A regular officer writing about this time, advises brigadiers to remember that they are not commanding enlisted soldiers, but men, some of whom are as "talented or more so than himself," and that he should teach them something higher than that acquired on an ordinary parade, or else they will be offended. It sounds curious that at this period when exactness in barrack-yard drill was thought the *sine qua non* of a soldier, this officer should say "that even in the regulars men are recognising that minute dressing is not, nor can be necessary, especially in the case of volunteers." He also recommended doubling in manœuvring, and asks whether any officer ever saw volley firing kept up for more than a couple of rounds in the face of the enemy, two points which have recently been embodied in our own "Infantry Drill." Another proposition of his is that meetings of officers commanding Volunteer Corps should be convened for the purpose of discussing principles of defence under the General Officer commanding districts.

In October, 1803, no less than sixty battalions of Volunteer Infantry, consisting of 27,000 men, and with them 1,500 Cavalry, all equipped at their own expense, besides the Honourable Artillery Company, with their field-pieces, marched past His Majesty in Hyde Park. A truly magnificent and unwonted sight, which raised the enthusiasm of the people to a high pitch, and elicited a general order couched in most flattering terms to the King. A number of the French royal princes, with their military *suites*, were on the ground during the reviews. Some of the regiments were up all night making preparations for the following day, the parade being at seven o'clock. The reviews were preceded by a general fast day, when every church in the metropolis was filled with the citizen soldiers, who marched to church "headed by pioneers and bands," and all took the oath of allegiance after service, six at a time. A singular corps, undoubtedly the first of its kind, which has been revived to-day in the form of Cadet Battalions, was the "Cecil

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Street Infant Association," which paraded seventy strong, under Captain Bradley, at the church of St. Clement Danes.

The following year Mr. Pitt brought in a Volunteer Regulation Bill, which was to make Volunteers go on permanent duty for one week or even three, a bounty of seven shillings a man to be paid each week. The different corps were to draw up regulations, which each member was to subscribe, imposing penalties on defaulters, rendering inattention on parades a cause of arrest and detention until tried by a magistrate, who might change the fine for two or three days' imprisonment. The reason for these stringent clauses was the increase of the danger threatening the country about this time, for no less than 1,000 transports were said to be at Boulogne, besides others in Helvoet, the Texel, and Brest; indeed Napoleon himself stated that between Etaples and Ambleteuse he had 1,800 gun vessels capable of carrying 120,000 troops and 10,000 horses. At the end of 1803, in a return presented to Parliament in December, it appears that no less than 463,134 men were under arms, including 82,941 Irish—these included 15,492 officers and 14,787 sergeants, all enrolled on various terms of service. For example, we find certain regiments enrolled for "Great Britain in case of invasion," "under defence acts," "where wanted," and the term which should elapse between their enrolment and "peace." Others gave their services in a more limited way, confining themselves to "military district," "county," "county and ten miles," thus reducing the total force available at a given point considerably.

On the advent to power of Mr. Windham's party, in 1806, this gentleman found himself in a position to strike a fatal blow at the force, and brought in what was called "his military measures," these containing sundry proposals which were to effect his desire, "to relax their discipline, and retrench their allowance." Bearing in mind that on a previous occasion Mr. Windham had proposed a general arming, and the avoidance of any drilling in connection with the numbers thus armed, it will be easy to appreciate his intentions with regard to his onslaught on Volunteer discipline. How he hoped to check the advance of 180,000 French soldiers, who were afterwards to conquer at Austerlitz and Jena, guided by the Master hand, which could at the same time crush out opposition in Germany, while dictating plans of campaign to his marshals in Spain. Napier, in his "History of the Peninsula War," shows how little the guerilla bands of the Spaniards, which at one time numbered 30,000 men, could effect in face of even half their number of disciplined troops, and that they never seriously affected the operations of a single *corps d'armée*. Mr. Windham's plan was actually to reduce the term of training to twenty-six

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instead of eighty-five days, to abolish the posts of inspecting field-officers, allowing their duties to be executed by the Lords Lieutenant *or the civil officers* under them. Further, no Volunteer was to hold a higher rank than captain, and no regular captain was to be commanded by a Volunteer officer of whatever rank. He considered their rank as a scandal and injurious to the regular Army; and the same with regard to the peasantry, artisans, and so forth, whom he wished to have trained as irregulars, and to wear no particular military dress. The poor opinion which Mr. Windham held of the Volunteer force has not been altogether endorsed by other authorities, notably, the Duke of Wellington, who speaks of voluntary associations for defence thus:

"The people should be taught to rely more upon themselves, and less upon the Government in their own defence. It was this that formed and kept up the national character. While everyone was accustomed to rely upon the Government, upon a sort of commutation for what they had paid to it, personal energy went to sleep and this would lead to supineness and apathy as to public exertion, which would in the end ruin us."

I will conclude by stating without much fear of contradiction, that it is in great measure due to this heroic movement of our forefathers, that we are able to say to-day, in the words of an eminent statesman of the present time, "that for a hundred Englishmen that sleep dead in France, there is but one Frenchman that sleeps dead in England."

A. L. MORANT.

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A RECRUITING GROUND FOR THE NAVY.

By Commander the Hon. H. N. Shore, R.N. (Retired).

In an article contributed to this Magazine in March last* I gave some account of the excellent results attained at Stornoway, in the Outer Hebrides, in the training of the reserve for the Fleet. A connection extending over several years with this remote and little known corner of the realm, not un-naturally drew the author's attention to its importance as a recruiting ground for the Navy.

Writing shortly after the loss of H.M.S. *Lively* off Stornoway, while conveying the members of the Royal Commission for inquiring into the condition of the Crofters, I remarked that the occasion afforded a fitting opportunity for calling attention to the importance of the issues involved from the point of view of naval efficiency. "The fact," I observed, "that the finest body of reserve men in the kingdom is drawn from those very districts where at the present time the distress is most acute (though not generally known), imparts an interest to the inquiry now in progress which, from a naval standpoint, might otherwise be lacking. . . . From what has been elicited so far, it is evident that a most valuable recruiting ground, both for the Army and Navy, is practically unworked. So far as the Navy is concerned, it is believed that, with the exception of the second class reserve men, enrolled at the Stornoway Battery, who, moreover, are drawn from a comparatively circumscribed area, a candidate for the Naval service is almost unknown. And yet what finer material could be desired, in the raw state, than that afforded by the inhabitants of the Highlands and Islands of the west coast of Scotland? Brave, hardy, temperate, inured to danger and exposure in all seasons, and accustomed to the sea from childhood, here, surely, is the very field from which we should desire to recruit lads for the Navy. As a matter of fact, however, this magnificent recruiting ground is entirely neglected. A man of war is rarely seen on the coast, north of the Clyde, and parents would as soon think of shipping their sons off to the Antipodes as entering them for the Navy, for the simple reason that, knowing nothing about the service, they would never expect to see their offspring again. To neglect this recruiting-

* "The Naval Reserve in the Hebrides."

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ground is surely a mistake. A leaven of hardy, well-developed Highland lads amongst the seamen of the Fleet would prove most advantageous.

"What is required in the first instance is to familiarise the people with the sight of a man of war and with men-of-war's men, and to try and popularise the service by showing to them what it has to offer to steady, well conducted lads in the shape of a career. We should advocate, in the next place, the establishment of a training ship at some central point on the coast—such as Oban, for instance, from whence a large district could be tapped, and from whence the boys could be conveniently distributed to their homes for the holidays. Such a locality would, moreover, offer every facility for exercises in boats, to say nothing of more extended cruises in brigs; while, owing to the proverbial mildness of the climate, the various evolutions could be carried out here with but little interruption throughout the year."

The views thus expressed by the writer in 1883 were confirmed shortly afterwards by the report of the Royal Commissioners, in which surprise was expressed that the districts named did not contribute more largely to the Army and Navy, with a recommendation that a training ship should be appropriated to the Highlands and Islands.

Without going deeply into the vexed question of the land which has caused so much tension of feeling in the Highlands of late years, and has led, as everyone knows, to government interference, it may be remarked that during the first half of the present century a tendency was observable in many parts of the Highlands to decrease the number of small holdings by augmenting the size of the sheep farms, thus driving the inhabitants down to the sea coast and less fertile parts; and this policy, mistaken as it undoubtedly was in many respects, together with an ever increasing population, brought on a crisis which at one time almost seemed to be drifting into a revolution. The remedy proposed was emigration; but in the absence of the necessary means, and with unoccupied land at their own doors, the cry arose, naturally enough, for a division of the sheep runs, *versus* the alternative of enforced emigration. Whether this was wise is another matter. There are not wanting intelligent observers, who declare that the land is already overburdened, and that to increase the size of the crofts is only to stave off the evil day. Certainly the conditions under which the greater part of these poor people drag out an existence are not particularly inviting, and one cannot but think that the younger ones might improve their lot by taking their energies further afield. The day, however, is gone by when whole

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districts could be cleared of inhabitants at the fiat of an individual, or of government, and the question resolves itself, as it has been tersely put, into "men *versus* sheep" And certainly, from a national, as well as an economic point of view, there are limits beyond which, the depopulation of a country for the sake of the increased profits of the individual, supposing such a thing to be possible nowadays, might call for state interference, as tending to impoverish the kindom, and to weaken it for purposes of defence. For this reason the public would view the conversion of any further portions of the Highlands and the Islands into deer forests or sheep farms, and the enforced migration of the inhabitants, as little short of a calamity.

On the other hand, the lot of the proprietor, whose land is burdened with a large and increasing pauper population, is not an enviable one, and he can scarcely be expected to look favourably on schemes for augmenting still further the burdens and responsibilities of his position. The island of Lewis may be instanced as a case in point. Here, during the last fifty or sixty years, the population has increased from five thousand to over twenty-five thousand, and this notwithstanding the fact that the fruits of their own industry have never been sufficient to support the inhabitants, who, but for the frequent and generous help of the proprietor of the island, would have died long ago of starvation. The highest conception of duty as citizens which these poor people seem to have attained, according to their own admission, is to bring children into the world as fast as nature will permit, leaving the question of their maintenance for time and the unfortunate landlord to solve.

The problem, therefore, which the government is face to face with, and on the solution of which so much depends, is by no means a simple one. The nation can hardly be expected to maintain a large pauper population for an indefinite period, but before driving such splendid material out of the kingdom, it would surely be worth while trying if some means of preserving the population cannot be discovered.

Of the value of this fine race to the kingdom many competent observers have borne testimony. Thus, addressing a large meeting at Glasgow, some time ago, Sheriff Black, of Stornoway, declared that "the people of the Lewis were about the most magnificent race, physically and morally, he had ever come across." Adding, that the men were in great request for their physical qualities. While another speaker said, "Sheriff Black does justice to the high moral qualities and splendid physique of the men of the Lewis. I know them well, and know them unsurpassed in these respects . . . . and surely the loss of such a noble race must

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be admitted on all hands to be a national calamity. . . . . Had this view prevailed in the past, what a reserve of strength and virtue were at the back of the nation in the glens and straths of old Caledonia, now, alas, lying waste. The nation always needed such men. She needs them now in greater numbers than exist, and is most likely to need them in the future as much as ever."

For some reason or other the Highlanders of Scotland and the adjacent Isles have never been attracted in any great numbers into the Naval service, and are therefore not associated with our naval triumphs in the same degree as with those of the sister service. And yet, high as, is the reputation borne by the Highland regiments—has not the fame of their achievements reached to the uttermost parts of the earth?—few people, even now, have any adequate idea of the giant share which the inhabitants of the north and west of Scotland have borne in building up our world-empire. Some idea of their achievements in this direction may be gathered from a statement of the muscle and intellect contributed by one small and barren island to the fighting strength of the nation during the Napoleonic wars. Speaking of the "tacksmen," who in the early part of the century formed a most important class throughout the Highlands, Dr. Norman McCleod, than whom no higher authority can be quoted, tells us that they were the very men whose families had heretofore supplied the Highlands with clergy, physicians, and lawyers, and the Army and Navy with many of their officers. And he goes on to say that there was a hill-top, from whence, in his youth, he could look down on farms which during our wars with Napoleon had contributed upwards of sixty officers to the British Army and Navy. And, moreover, that since the beginning of the last wars of the French Revolution, the one island of Skye had sent forth from her wild shores twenty-one lieutenant-generals and major-generals, forty-eight lieutenant-colonels, 600 commissioned soldiers, 10,000 soldiers, four governors of colonies, one governor-general, one adjutant-general, one chief baron of England, and one judge of the Supreme Court of Scotland.

"Not a bad contribution from one isle to the general brains and sinews of the group," as a writer very justly remarks.

"I sought for merit wherever it was to be found," said the great Pitt. "It is my boast that I was the first Minister who looked for it and found it among the mountains of the north. I called it forth, and drew into your service a hardy and intrepid race of men, who fought and conquered for you in every part of the world."

How is the falling off of late years in this splendid contribution of brain and sinew to be accounted for? "For one thing," says the writer quoted above, "military ardour no longer receives

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such substantial encouragement as it did in the early part of the present century, when, in 1803, Lord Dundonald apportioned his crofts among such families as had sent a son into the Army, whereas the men of peace, who objected to be enlisted, were rejected from the favoured list."

There is a mistaken notion abroad, due, no doubt, in some measure to such books as "Westward Ho!" and other works of a popular character, that the west of England is the chief and most productive nursery for British seamen. And even many naval officers hold to the belief that all our best seamen come from the west-country ports. Now, it is quite possible that the presence of the training ships on the south coast may have been the means of attracting an undue proportion of west-country lads into the service of late years, but that the opinions concerning their superiority as seamen over those from other parts of the kingdom do not coincide with the views entertained on this subject by some of the most experienced and capable officers in the early part of the century is shown by a statement in Brenton's "Naval History." Writing with the experiences of the great war fresh in his mind, this able officer observes: "Our best seamen are from Scotland and the north of England; from these the non-commissioned officers and leading men are generally selected."

Without casting any disparagement on the west-country, which, doubtless, produces as good seamen as it ever did, we must keep in view the fact that the great centres of industry and of commerce have shown a tendency to migrate northwards since the wars of the Napoleonic era, and as shipping follows commerce it may be safely affirmed that a far larger proportion of seamen now hail from the northern ports than from the south-west of England. Nor have the north-countrymen anything to lose in a comparison with the mariners of the west: no finer seaman indeed can be found anywhere than those hailing from the ports of Durham and Northumberland. While, to go further north, what better school of seamanship, or what finer physical training could be desired than the whale fishery, which draws its seamen from Leith, Dundee, Aberdeen, Banff, and Peterhead?

So high was the reputation borne by the sailors employed in the whale fishery in the olden days that great efforts were made to impress them into the ships of the Fleet, though with but little success. As a matter of fact, these men were protected on the outward voyage and could only be taken on their return. "Ships of war and tenders were sometimes sent to intercept them," says Brenton, "but they rarely allowed themselves to be boarded or brought to: they frequently fired at the boats which approached

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them, and often taking the whale boats forcibly from their ships, they have been seen to pull away in the wind's eye and make their escape. And yet, when it happened they were taken, these daring and intrepid mariners have been found the most tractable and obedient, as well as the most skilful of our crews."

With such striking testimony to the fine qualities of the north-country seamen, it must seem strange that so little effort should have been made to utilise this fine material by attracting the youngsters into the Navy. Happily, a change has come over the the policy which has obtained for so many years past, of confining the attractions of the training service to the southern ports. In the autumn of 1891, the step advocated long ago in the Royal Commission, was at length taken. H.M.S. *Caledonia* was fitted for service as a boys' training ship, and is now permanently located in the Firth of Forth, where no doubt she will be the means of drawing many hardy Norsemen into Her Majesty's Fleet.

The sentiments expressed in the following words apropos of the above will commend themselves to all well-wishers of the British Navy: "The result of this step," observed a writer, recently, "will without doubt prove that the Admiralty are acting wisely in the matter. That the over-populated districts will benefit by having their surplus youth carried off to new fields of industry is certain, while, for 'our boys' themselves the change will be highly advantageous both morally and physically. They will be rapidly transformed from ill-clad, half-starved fisher lads into smart, comfortably-clad, and well-fed blue-jackets. Above all, the service will by this means benefit by having in a few years in its ranks a proportionately increased number of men of splendid physique, well able to maintain and even enhance its credit."

The ignorance of the people in the more remote parts of the Highlands and Islands concerning the Navy might well be deemed incredible were it not a fact. In the Island of Lewis, for example, with its population of 25,000, and all the paraphernalia of churches and school-boards, the mass of the people are as ignorant of the outside world as they are of astronomy, and consequently as intolerant of change as the Chinese. As an example of the darkness that hovers over the land the following incident is worth quoting. On the occasion of one of the periodic tours of the Channel Fleet round the coast, the ships were timed to reach Stornoway on a Sunday afternoon. This, in the opinion of the rigid sectarians who keep watch and ward over the morals of the Islanders, was a desecration of the Sabbath too flagrant to be passed over without notice. Accordingly, being unable to prevent it, one of the shepherds availed himself of the occasion of his

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Sunday morning discourse to caution his flock against having lot or part in the offence, telling them that even looking at the ships was a desecration of the blessed Sabbath; they were not even to think of them.

It would be unreasonable to expect the sheep to be more enlightened than the shepherd. But how far these guides are to be depended on for the safe pilotage of their flocks through the shoals and quicksands of life must be left to the judgment of the intelligent reader.

After what has been stated, the reader will no longer wonder at the crude ideas current amongst the islanders on the subject of the Navy, or at the difficulty in getting the people to allow their sturdy offspring to join it. Even the presence in their midst of the Naval Reserve Battery with its staff of instructors, and the attractive advertisements displayed in the town of Stornoway, to say nothing of the walking advertisements in the shape of real live bluejackets, availed nothing towards weakening their prejudices. Even the persuasive eloquence of the popular and widely respected battery officer fell on deaf ears, "charm he never so wisely," and for a long time all his efforts were unavailing, the parents in every case manifesting the utmost abhorrence at the idea of parting with their sons.

Even if the boys were themselves willing to go—and many were really anxious to seek pastures new—their parents would hold them back, saying it was just the same as selling them, allowing them to join the Army or Navy.

As a matter of fact, however beautiful this display of parental affection may appear to the reader, the feeling was as much due to selfishness as anything else. The real cause of this reluctance on the part of the "old folks at home" to part with their offspring—so, at least, I was assured by those who knew the islanders—was a desire to keep them at home as long as possible with a view to the money they might earn. And this insinuation would seem to be borne out by the objection they were accustomed to advance against education;—that if the youngsters were taught too much they would go away and leave them.

This is all very sad, and the consequence is that rather than let their children seek a wider and more promising sphere for their energies the parents keep them hanging about at home in a state of semi-starvation, with the idea of getting all they can out of them while young.

Can we wonder at discontent, or that agitators find here a fine field for the dissemination of their doctrines for the benefit of the world in general, and themselves in particular?

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On more than one occasion, after the parents had actually given their consent, they have relented at the last moment and dragged their sons back from the ship's side. Nor is petticoat influence altogether absent. It has been whispered that the young ladies are averse to parting with their prospective husbands; and we all know that the silken cords of love are often stronger than a cart rope.

However, as time went on, and the British Bluejacket became a common object of the sea-shore hereabouts, while the pinch of poverty grew sharper, the Chief Officer at last succeeded in getting a boy dispatched to the training ship, and when the lad came home for his first holiday he told everyone that he had never had such good times in his life, and that if the boys in the Lewis only knew how well they were treated in the training ship there would not be one of them left at home.

The spell having been broken, others followed, and it is believed that the old dread of going south has pretty well disappeared.

So far as the writer remembers, the first boy was enrolled somewhere about the year 1883; at the present time the average is understood to be about thirty a year, and, physically, these Hebridean lads compare more than favourably with those from other parts.

The statesman who, when the clash of war resounds over the British Isles, remembering the proud boast of the great Pitt, succeeds in drawing once more into the Naval service, the hardy and intrepid race who drag out a joyless existence along the bleak and storm-swept shores of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland will deserve well of his country.

H. N. SHORE.

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FRANCE AND SIAM. A RETROSPECT.

By Major-General A. R. MacMahon
(Formerly H.M. Political Agent at the Court of Ava).

A LULL having occurred in the acute interest evinced in regard to recent events in Siam and their possible development, it has struck me that a brief narrative of the times of old when, in the Siamese Revolution of 1688, the French were turned out of Siam, and by a seemingly trivial incident a hundred years ago, missed founding an empire in Indo-China, may just now be acceptable.

Although foreign rule has been established at various periods during the past three hundred years in various countries collectively known as Farther India, all the nationalities in this region could boast of Home Rule at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1825, however, the English took over the Arakan and Tenasserim maritime provinces of Burma, in 1852 made themselves masters of the ancient Talaing Kingdom of Pegu, and in 1885 annexed Burma Proper, thus coming into possession of the whole of the Burmese Empire. The French having failed to take advantage of the splendid opportunity for acquiring an Oriental Empire, offered them by the policy of Bishop Adran, of which more anon, seemingly abandoned, till a comparatively recent period, the idea of dominion in the East, which was then so alluring. Impelled, however, by the earth hunger which, more or less, has exercised several other European nations, especially since the opening of the Suez Canal—an event which removed the hitherto impracticable barrier to direct commercial enterprise between the Occident and the Orient—they have again revived the old idea in the hope of successfully rivalling the English in this region. In earnest of this change of policy, they have obtained the nucleus of a new empire in Cochin China, Cambodia, Annam, and Tonking, lately adding thereto a portion of Siam.

Among European States the Portuguese were the first to establish intercourse with Siam. The intimacy begun in 1511 lasted over a century. They were gradually supplanted in the seventeenth century by the Dutch whose connection covered a similar period. The latter, 'tis said, left few traces of their occupation, unlike their predecessors, who made their mark in the regions they occupied more distinctly than other peoples. The

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English, who also then began to trade in Siam, were granted many privileges, and much appreciated the hospitality of the Siamese. They were also favourably impressed with the resources of the country and especially with the grandeur of "Sia," the capital, which they declared was "as great a city as London." The French probably visited the country about the same period, judging by an anonymous but very interesting pamphlet, compiled from various letters written in 1668-9, published at Stationers' Hall, London, in 1690, and entitled:

"A Full and True Relation of the Great and Wonderful Revolution that happened lately in the Kingdom of Siam, in the East Indies. Giving a particular account of the Seizing and Death of the late King, and the setting up of a New One. As also of the putting to Death of the King's only Daughter; his adopted Son, who was a Christian; his two Brothers; and of Monsieur Constance, his great Minister of State, and Favourer of the French; and of the Expulsion of the Jesuits, Missionary Priests, Officers and Soldiers of the French Nation out of the Kingdom, and endeavoured to bring it under the French Domination."

During the French occupancy a Cephalonian adventurer, named Constantine Faulcon, then a prominent figure in Siamese politics, owing to his having acquired a very great influence over Phra Narain, King of Siam, acknowledged by his contemporaries as the greatest potentate that ever reigned in that country. His Majesty who was distinguished for his pleasant and engaging manners, especially with strangers, was at the same time an enemy to sloth and laziness, and in this respect, unlike most Eastern Princes, seduously employed himself in looking after his kingdom and people, whom he dearly loved, spending his leisure in active exercise, especially in elephant hunting and other field sports. With great abilities and a decided thirst for knowledge of every kind, he thoroughly mastered every subject that interested him. "By the sharpness of his wit" he is said to have discovered the errors of Buddhism, the religion of his ancestors, for it is related of him that he disbelieved in an annihilated God, "Who, weary of governing the Heavens, plunges Himself into repose, and for ever buries Himself in the forgetfulness of what passes in the world." On the contrary, "he believed that God is eternal, that His providence continually governs the world and disposes of all things. Of the truth of this there is a most illustrious monument in the never-enough-to-be-forgotten speech of his to Monsieur Constance in answer to the French Ambassador's memorial, when he pressed him much to become a Christian." It is "a matter of astonish-

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ment to me," he declared, "that the King of France, my good friend, should so much concern himself in an affair that relates to God, wherein it would seem that God does not at all interest Himself, but leaves it wholly to our discretion. Ought not one to think that the true God takes as great pleasure to be honoured by different worships and ceremonies as to be glorified by a prodigious number of creatures that praise Him every one in their own way? Would that beauty and variety which we admire in the order of nature be less admirable in the supernatural order, or less beseeming in the order of God?"

In 1667, we learn that an Embassy was despatched to Siam by Louis XIV. of France, accompanied by "twelve Jesuit priests, all Mathematicians, to teach the Christian religion and the Mathematical sciences," escorted by a considerable body of officers and soldiers sent by the French King to serve his Majesty of Siam. The latter, as a mark of special favour, selected a portion of these troops to form a body-guard to his royal person, while so great was his Majesty's confidence in his Gallic friends that he permitted them to build and man strong fortresses at Bankok and Morgen in order to command the river approaches to his kingdom. As if this were not enough, he even condescended so far as to allow them to dictate to him the choice of his royal successor, in the person of a young nobleman who had embraced Christianity under Jesuitical teaching.

The Ministers of State were by no means so accommodating as his Majesty. On the contrary, they were incensed at what they considered highly pernicious intrigues on the part of the Jesuits. At the same time they could not help coming to the conclusion that the large contingent of French soldiers in evidence, provided with arms, ammunition, and an abundant supply of war *materiel* was far in excess of the strength requisite for the adequate protection of French commerce, which then, as now, compared unfavourably with that of other trading nations. The valuable presents continually arriving from France, also led to much searching of hearts, as they felt convinced that their despatch was in subservience to a tortuous policy concealing a deep-laid scheme for the ruin of their country under the cloak of Christian philanthropy. The officials were the more angered because the priests had the effrontery to endeavour to impose on their credulity by declaring that the sole motive which induced them to incur the fatigues and dangers incidental to a long voyage to Siam, and residence therein, was the strong desire to promote their temporal and spiritual welfare. Their ire did not, however, arrive at the culminating point till the missionaries blandly assured them that they

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"exercised amongst them Arts and Sciences that are best understood and practised in Europe, such as Physick, Surgery, Asstronomy and the Mathematicks, by the means whereof they hoped to render them capable of being taught the way to Heaven."

Sternly resolved though the Ministers were to rid themselves of the detested Jesuit yoke, swayed nevertheless by fervent loyalty to their beloved sovereign, they agreed to postpone a project tantamount to revolution, till after his Majesty's demise. The King, however, suddenly fell very ill. This precipitated the crisis. With it also arose the man capable of coping with it on the pre-arranged lines, in the person of one of the chief ministers of State named Pitrachard, dignified with the title of Opra, the highest honour attainable in Siam. The King being *hors de combat* and quite unable to attend to State affairs, Pitrachard promptly assumed the reins of power in view to seizing the Crown in the event of his Majesty's death. He first sent for Constantine Faulcon, the supposed tool of the Jesuits, and subjected him to severe torture in order to disclose the name of his accomplices in the Jesuit intrigue for making the King a Christian. The unfortunate man proving obdurate, his persecutor endeavoured unsuccessfully to achieve his purpose by causing the King's adopted son to be brought before him, "his head to be cut off immediately, and a string to be run through it and then to be hung about Monsieur Constance his neck in the manner of European cravats." This inhuman proceeding continued for two days, after which the victim died. This Faulcon, it may be remarked *en passant*, was the son of an innkeeper, who, beginning life in a humble capacity in the English East India Company's service, rose by a singular freak of destiny to the post of Foreign Minister of Siam. Commenting on his carreer, Voltaire justly remarks that it affords a striking example of the intellectual superiority of the European over the other races of men. After this, Pitrachard caused the King's brothers next in succession to the throne and all their adherents to be murdered, thus making a clean sweep of all who stood in his way.

Before attempting to administer the country seriously, Pitrachard was determined to get rid of all the Christians. The English and Portuguese being few in number and living apart from other nationalities were, comparatively speaking, easily disposed of, so, having been plundered of all their possessions, they were cast into prison. The French, on the other hand, residing near the royal cities of Siam and Louvo, were much too numerous to be treated in this drastic fashion. By diabolical chicanery, however, he also got them into his power, and treated them outrageously; his myrmidons stripping

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them naked and fastening them to the tails of their horses, made them, amid the jeers of the populace, march to Louvo jail, where they were chained in pairs by the neck, the Jesuits and missionary priests being subjected to nameless horrors suggested by maglignant ingenuity.

The usurper, at an early stage of the revolution, arrived at the conclusion that the most serious obstacle to his success was the presence of strong and well-disciplined bodies of French troops in various strategetical positions in the country. Nothing, he knew, could be done till the King's European Life Guards, numbering 150 troopers, and commanded by French officers, were disposed of. This he managed by sending them to his Majesty's country house, where they were surrounded by large bodies of Siamese troops and thus rendered powerless. Then he had to deal with the Bankok and Morgen Forts, manned by French soldiers and commanded by very capable officers. Pitrachard, by specious falsehoods and other devices, endeavoured to entrap them, but they were too wary to be so deceived. He accordingly had to resort to force which was equally unavailing. Bankok Fort, with 300 resolute defenders, and Morgen, with fifty, it is related, were impregnable against 60,000 and 12,000 assailants respectively. Just then it was officially announced that the King of Siam was dead, but when, where, or how he died was not divulged. Suffice it to say, Pitrachard succeeded to the sovereignty without opposition and was crowned with great pomp.

One of the first acts of the new King was to conclude a treaty with the French, by which it was arranged that the latter should surrender Bankok and leave the country, taking with them two frigates belonging to the French company, a French man-of-war, and a Siamese seventy-four gun ship placed at the disposal of the Commander of the Bankok Fort for the transport of himself and garrison. The French colony accordingly took its departure, one individual only, in the person of the widow of the unfortunate Faulcon, being left behind in compliance with a scheme of the Jesuits for marrying her to the usurper's son, and thus, perhaps, paving the way for their own return to Siam under more favourable auspices.

Priestly influence was again in the ascendant in this region a century afterwards, as we learn from the interesting narrative published in the "Lettres edifiantes et curieuses," by a missionary named Adran, who styled himself the Apostolic Vicar of Cochin China. The tale of his adventurous career is rather a romantic idyl than a matter of fact record of the prosaic life of a Christian

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teacher. During his residence in this region a rebellion took place in Cochin China, wherein the King was murdered by his brother, who unsurped the sovereignty. Padrè Adran was much attached to the defunct monarch, who reciprocated his affection, and had such implicit confidence in the missionary's honour that, though himself a strict Buddhist, he had no scruple in placing under his care and tuition his only son and heir to the throne. On the first burst or the revolution, Adran carried off this young man with his wife and infant son, and concealed them in a forest at a considerable distance from the capital. In this refuge, for many months, the young King of Cochin China, like Charles I. of England, hid himself in the shady branches of a big tree. The usurper having discovered his Majesty's retreat, resolved to send people to effect his capture, but the latter, duly warned, escaped to Siam, and threw himself on the protection of the king of that country. Owing to some misunderstanding, however, the exiled monarch left Siam, and took up his abode in an island, which he fortified.

Adran, meanwhile, having ascertained that the people in Southern Cochin China were still loyal to their legitimate sovereign, and dissatisfied with the usurper, conceived the idea of applying for aid to Louis XVI., of France, to enable the former to regain his rights, and secure at the same time substantial rights for France. The king being then a pauper, and without commissariat for his soldiers, excepting the roots they dug in the jungles, jumped at the idea, and had no hesitation in confiding his son to Adran's care, beseeching him to continue the same policy on behalf of his heir in the case of any accident befalling himself.

Adran, accordingly, lost no time in proceeding to Paris, accompanied by the young Prince who, on being presented at Court, was treated with respect and attention. The project of the missionary was so highly approved that a treaty was drawn up and concluded between Louis XVI. and the King of Cochin China, which reads like the imaginings of the hero of a fairy tale rather than the outcome of the sober deliberations of Ministers of a great European Power. It will suffice to quote the first two of the two dozen clauses which compose this precious document between one of the richest, most civilised, and powerful sovereigns in the world, with a penniless titular king, a vagabond on the face of the earth, surrounded by a few ragamuffin soldiers.

1. "There shall be an offensive and defensive alliance between the Kings of France and Cochin China. They do hereby agree mutually to afford assistance to each other against all those who make war upon either of the two contracting parties.

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2. "To accomplish this purpose there shall be put under the orders of the King of Cochin China a squadron of twenty French ships of war, of such size and force as shall be deemed sufficient for the demands of his service."

Adran was promoted to the episcopal see under the title of Bishop of Cochin China and Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of that country. On his passage out he called at the Isle of France, where he found several French men-of-war and transports and also four or five thousand available troops. He ordered the ships to be equipped with all possible despatch and the troops to be in readiness for embarkation so soon as he should send word from Pondicherry that he required their services.

This programme, of such momentous interest to France, was never carried out, owing chiefly to the caprice of a jealous and spiteful woman, and not a little to the want of tact and temper on the part of the otherwise astute envoy, a mistake of which the most ordinary man-of-the-world would never have been guilty. Just then there resided in that settlement a celebrated beauty, wife of a French official, who, if rumour erred not, was unduly intimate with the Governor, over whom she possessed considerable influence. This lady was decidedly a leading figure in the local society, which found it convenient and, perhaps, prudent to ignore her alleged eccentricity. As the Bishop had paid his respects to all the other principal women of the colony, it was suggested that, in a diplomatic point of view, it was imprudent to make an exception in her case. He, however, not only resented this interference, but went out of his way to publicly reprobate her conduct as well as that of the Governor, an indiscretion, which was, as a matter of course, duly reported to the persons concerned. Both were furious at what they considered sacerdotal impertinence, especially the enraged beauty, who found in the Governor a willing confederate for making things extremely unpleasant to the episcopal Ambassador; for, with little pressing, she induced him to despatch to Mauritius a swift sailing vessel, conveying orders to countermand the expedition which, as already explained, was held in readiness for an expedition to Indo-China. Shortly after this the great Revolution broke out in France, an event which, causing exclusive attention to home affairs, nipped in the bud the ambitious projects of the French in the Far East, which, if then successful, would have seriously affected our possessions in India, our trade between that continent and China, and excluded any notion, on our part, of conquest in Farther India, which, of course, would long ago have been absorbed by the French.

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The scope of this paper being simply a retrospect, an elaborate discussion of recent events in Siam and the conclusions to be derived therefrom are unnecessary, and indeed impossible, till we are in possession of full and reliable information on the subject. It may not be out of place, however, to glance at the parallel which has been drawn by some imaginative writers, and lately immortalised by *Mr. Punch* in one of his famous cartoons, between the Franco-Siamese dispute and the ancient fable of the wolf and the lamb. The metaphor, it is suggested, appears somewhat halting, inasmuch as we all know that Æsop's wolf gobbled up the lamb then and there, whereas the French wolf has been content to devour only a portion of its prey, leaving the remainder for future disposal. The French Government, as well as the moderate party in France, incline to Lord Dalhousie's policy as regards Upper and Lower Burma, while the Chauvinists and other irreconcileables in the French Chamber agree with Sir Henry Durand in declaring one should not take two bites of a cherry.

Mr. Curzon, representing the Members of the Opposition Bench in the House of Commons, on the 2nd August, said: The House could not be indifferent to the high-handed manner in which France has conducted this business, and to the scant consideration shown to their unhappy victim. He commented severely on the policy of France, which had pledged itself to respect the integrity and independence of Siam, and had yet seized a territory covering 36,000 square miles on the Upper Mē-kong, together with one-half of the State of Luang Prabang and other territory up to the Chinese frontier, besides permanently occupying the second port in the kingdom, and prohibiting Siam from keeping an armed force in some of her own provinces. If this country, in the early part of the year, had intimated to France that we considered the integrity of Siam as vital to ourselves, the whole, or a considerable portion of the subsequent crisis might have been averted. He hoped that the Government would obtain from France an assurance that no further encroachments were contemplated by France upon the integrity of Siam.

Mr. Balfour, at the same time, declared: "We cannot regard with perfect equanimity the stripping of Siam of so large a portion of territory, a proceeding which may have the result of wiping Siam out of the map as an independent kingdom. If an autonomous Siam has not been hitherto a British interest, I think recent events have almost made it so. I earnestly trust that the Government, if they are not prepared to make any declaration on the point, will not, either in the negotiations now going on or in any future arrangements, lose sight of the great embarrassments

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and difficulties which must ensue if the ultimate result of what has occurred should be the absorption of the Kingdom of Siam in any other foreign State, however friendly."

France has long been possessed of a reckless ambition to recoup herself for her great disappointment in not having been able to secure the whole of Indo-China. Not content with her actual acquirements (already enumerated) she indulged in the hope of annexing Upper Burma, the Chinese and Burmese Shan States, as well as Siam. As regards the first, she was checkmated by England, who forestalled this ambitious move by promptly taking over that country, which she would otherwise have allowed to "stew in its own grease" till the time was ripe for accepting the inevitable responsibility. With our predominating influence over the Shan States, we felt no anxiety in that quarter; and had we responded to the Siamese proclivity for seeking the protection of England in the event of her being coerced by her Gallic neighbours, the same might have been said in connection with their country. The dark cloud, moreover, which for some time obscured that portion of the political horizon, might have gradually disappeared. Siam, however, trusting to active sympathy from Britain, leant, alas! on a broken reed; consequently, when menaced by France and deserted by England, she was forced to submit to the most extravagant demands on the part of the French, which not only have gravely impaired her autonomy, but at the same time compromised British prestige in the far East.

The dismantled ruins of the Siamese Empire, or Siam Proper, constitute the only country in Farther India which still preserves its national independence. At the *fin du siècle* will she still be able to boast of this unique privilege? I trow not; for, hemmed in by the English and French, as well as a "neutral zone" placed between them, which only enthusiasts expect will prevent their going at the throats of each other on provocation, it resolves itself into the old story of the clay vessel between two iron pots and the lesson to be derived therefrom. Granted, say we, for the sake of argument, an ambitious French Consul at an outlying station, with more zeal than discretion in dealing with the natives; the death of a French subject by misadventure or otherwise, which by a stretch of heated imagination can be twisted into an insult to France; an English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs inclined to give the French a free hand in everything outside the limit of British interest, and then, as Mr. Balfour pungently puts it, Siam will be "wiped out."

A. R. MacMahon.

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THE TRAINING AND ORGANISATION OF A COMPANY OF INFANTRY.

By Bt.-Major Hon. A. Hardinge, *Royal Scots Fusiliers.*

Since the company is the basis of all infantry organisation, on the necessarily intimate connection between its officers and the men they command depends mainly the fighting value of the individual soldier.

During the eighteen days allowed in the infantry during the year for field training, the personal relations existing between the company officers and their men are brought into play far more than at any other time. Through their being thrown so much together the captain becomes closely identified with his men, he comes to know every individual soldier and his peculiar characteristics in the most intimate manner, and the soldier on his part is aware that his captain so knows him.

It has become an accepted fact that the battle formations of the modern battle not only tend to individualise the fight, but give greatly increased power, superintendence, and responsibility to the captain, since the fire fight now resolves itself into nothing more than a combat between the company leaders and the opposing enemy.

Owing to this peculiar development the increased importance of the company as a tactical unit is at once apparent, and the responsibility of every captain for the training, well-being, and discipline of his men has proportionately increased.

In our army, however, with the exception of the periods allowed for field training and the annual musketry course, and one day per month for musketry drill, the captain, unless the regiment be employed at some manœuvres or camp of exercise, has no hand in the drilling or tactical tuition of his men. The high standard of efficiency to which they may have been raised during the Field Training, their fitness to perform long marches, and their aptitude to perform the requisite duties in the field are soon lost. The men become ignorant of the most essential parts of their

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profession and want of initiative, and inability to strike out a line for themselves if left without a leader becomes too apparent in all ranks.

At present, under the everyday routine of regimental soldiering, the captain only occasionally sees his company in any strength. It is nothing strange for him to go on parade and find his company consist of two to three files, the remainder all being employed, or detailed for some other duty. Hence, the impossibility for him even to take part in the independent handling or tuition of his men.

I have noticed that a company on the completion of its annual course of military training, is in far better condition, both physically and professionally, than before.

If this is so, after only eighteen days' work, how much more might the soldier be improved by constant work of this sort? Some people may say that such constant work would have a tendency to make the service unpopular, and to retard recruiting. My experience, however, is quite the reverse. I have carefully noticed the manners and characters of different men during the ordinary regimental routine and the military training periods, and I am inclined to think that during the latter there is a diminution of crime, and the men appreciate exercises of an interesting and practical nature, even though they last from three to four hours, far more than one hour's ordinary parade drill. I do not wish to imply that it is unnecessary to have any steady or battalion drills, but rather that the soldier soon becomes stale, and loses all interest in drill, unless it is varied with exercises of an exciting nature, or with work which he knows will be useful to him, if he should find himself suddenly embarked on a campaign.

It is therefore in the interests of the country and service at large, that some scheme should be adopted for the training of the soldier, so that on an emergency he may be equal to performing, with that regularity which is born of custom, his various duties in the field.

Under the present system the company is only drilled by its actual leader on an average, throughout the year, of one day in twenty; and it is in order to try and remedy this defect in our organisation that I suggest the following as a substitute.

In order to give each company-commander greater latitude and scope in the exercising of his men, I am inclined to think that it might be so arranged that all regimental duties, such as guards, piquets, and fatigues, should be furnished by the different companies day about. Thus, on the off days the field strength of the company would be available for any physical or tactical training that might be thought requisite.

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Of course this would not in any way interfere with the battalion parades, or any work that the officer commanding the regiment might think essential for the efficiency of the battalion.

In order not to allow any laxity or falling off in steady drill, certain days should be given up in the week to the performance of these drills; the lack, however, of something to interest men, and to make them think for themselves, only tends to make them discontented with their position; whereas, if the monotony of the drill ground was continually varied by the performance of some interesting military work in which the individual intelligence of the soldier would be developed, they would be more likely to take a keen interest in their profession, and would be better prepared for what might be expected of them in the field.

I would suggest that, on the arrival of recruits at either depôt or regiment, they should be in the hands of the regimental or depôt instructors for not less than two months. They could then take their place in the ranks, and all backward men might have an extra hour's drill in the afternoon, until considered well grounded in squad and company drill.

I have found that the recruits of the present day are in no condition for running. Now the power of running has become an important factor in modern tactics; insomuch as the crossing of the fire-swept zone in the shortest possible time has become of such vital importance.

I would therefore suggest that, in order to get men accustomed to doubling over these areas, running drill should be more extensively practised; also, in order to increase the muscular development of these growing recruits, each company should undergo, weekly, one hour's gymnastic exercise, so as to practise jumping, climbing, escalading, &c.

A system of lectures might with advantage be instituted in each regiment, and at these lectures everyone should attend. I have always found that the relation of experiences of battles and the reasons of either victory or defeat are listened to with more than usual interest by both non-commissioned officers and men. This also tends to make men aspire to imitate such deeds, and to long to be able to take advantage of the opportunity, if such should ever be offered to them.

In order to encourage the soldier to make himself proficient, I would suggest that some reward be given to each man who should pass an examination on military subjects to his commanding officer's satisfaction. This reward might be some distinctive trophy, which would be worn by the soldier as an honour.

Again, in those stations where the facilities of ranges and

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ground do not entail any extra expenditure for transport of troops and travelling expenses, &c., the annual musketry course of the trained soldier might be improved with advantage if the number of rounds now allowed were distributed over the entire year, instead of being fired by the company in a single week, specially set apart for that purpose. I cannot but think that if it became a recognised fact that the soldier shot on certain days throughout the year, that it would add greatly to his proficiency, owing to a more constant practise, besides the fact that the importance of acquiring a proficiency in that art would be brought more continually home to him.

The relative merits of strong and weak companies have been often discussed, and the tendency seems to adhere to an organisation that gives a large number of regimental officers to control the widely extended lines of modern fight. Without, however, reducing the number of officers, I am inclined to think that for a proper chain of responsibility, and for better administration of the interior economy of a company, four double companies would be preferable to the present eight companies in a battalion. The squadron system has been lately adopted in the cavalry, and with great success. There is no reason why a similar organisation should not be adopted in the infantry, without any increase of expenditure.

Instead of, however, eight colour sergeants in a battalion, I would suggest the substitution of four company sergeant-majors, and four company quartermaster-sergeants, as is the present system in the cavalry.

The company sergeant-major, with pay at 4s. per diem, would superintend the training of the company in all drill, &c., under supervision of the company officers; and would also be responsible for discipline, &c.

The company quartermaster-sergeant, with pay at 3s. 6d. per diem, would do all clerical work in the company, and be responsible to the captain in all matters of pay, clothing, &c.

If it is necessary in the cavalry to have a squadron sergeant-major and squadron quartermaster-sergeant where the men on enlistment are older and better set up, how much more so is it necessary in the infantry, where the recruit is younger and certainly wants more personal attention?

This division of labour must commend itself, insomuch as each non-commissioned officer is free to do his legitimate work. The company sergeant-major is also free to supervise closely all matters of detail, drill, and discipline. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated in an army where the non-commissioned officers and men alike are so young.

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Under the present *régime*, the great majority of young and inexperienced colour-sergeants are placed in a false position, for they are suddenly put in charge of books, &c., for which they neither have the aptitude nor training. To this latter want may, nearly in every case, be traced the collapse of many good and steady sergeants on their promotion to colour-sergeant.

The promotion to this rank should be by selection, and should only be given to the best non-commissioned officers in the regiment, and to those non-commissioned officers who would inspire respect and confidence in the men under them. If such a system were recognised generally, I am inclined to think that you would not only see a marked improvement in the education of the non-commissioned officers in the army, but a keenness to acquire tactical knowledge, and to make themselves better fitted for the requirements of the service.

The company quartermaster-sergeant should be selected for his clerical abilities and integrity. This appointment in an infantry company would not only be the means of obtaining increased efficiency of the soldier, by releasing the company's sergeant-major from work which only tends to retard progress, but it would allow an increased accuracy of accounts, &c., and thereby lighten the clerical labour in departments connected with regiments for pay, clothing, &c. This scheme would also allow promotion to be obtained by men who as drills would be failures, but as clerks are invaluable.

Before being selected for this rank, a non-commissioned officer should be forced to prepare himself by a probationary period under one of the company quartermaster-sergeants. This tuition, however, would have to be combined with the performance of the ordinary duties of his rank. This latter course would prevent any incompetent non-commissioned officer succeeding to these posts, and would always give the commanding officer and captain commanding the company a good field for selection.

I feel sure that if such a system were adopted there would be fewer instances of non-commissioned officers coming to grief, through no wilful premeditation on their part, but simply owing to a system which has placed them in a position of trust and responsibility without the necessary experience to carry out the duties.

The sergeants of the company should be attached to certain sections. Their duties would be to assist the subaltern section commander, and show, by their example and bearing, to the men of their sections that to obtain that position is not only a credit, but an honour to which all men should aspire.

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I certainly think that in all barracks sufficient accommodation for single sergeants should be provided (say two to one room), for it does not add to the position of sergeant that they should be continually in the barrack rooms. A sergeant is also bound to lose control over his men through too close association with them. Besides, unless you are prepared to make the position worth striving for, and to carry with it certain advantages, one cannot expect to acquire the best material for these posts.

Finally, I think the privilege of permanent passes might be extended with advantage to all non-commissioned officers, no matter what the grade, since, as I have already said, you cannot hold out too many inducements in the shape of privileges, in order to attract the best men for positions of trust and responsibility.

A. S. HARDINGE.

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THE BLOOD TAX IN FRANCE AND GERMANY.

By Lieutenant-Colonel J. Adye, R.A.

A recently published work on Artillery has stated that a limit has at last been reached in regard to the thickness of armour carried by war-ships, and the weight of metal in heavy ordnance; and we are assured that no further development in thickness of armour or in weight of armament is now likely.

And it would seem that at least two of the great military nations of the world have now reached the limit to which they can stretch the numbers of their armies, and this for the excellent reason that they have no more able-bodied men to pass into their ranks.

France seems to have been the first to reach this limit by means of her Military Law of 1889, and now Germany, with her new Army Bill, is about to arrive, or very nearly arrive, at the same limit.

Thus, both in weight of material and in quantity of personnel, the leading armies of Europe seem to approach finality, and further developments must in both cases be expected rather in regard to quality than quantity.

In all armies recruited by compulsory service there are three main factors which must ultimately determine their strength. These factors are—first, the number of able-bodied men annually attaining the age of incorporation in the ranks; second, the number of men at which the peace establishment is fixed; and third, the period each man spends with the colours. The two last-named determine the number of men compulsorily taken each year for the army, and this number has hitherto invariably been below the number of young men eligible for the ranks; that is, the supply of men has invariably exceeded the demand.

But it would seem that the French law of 1889 by reducing the term of years to be spent in the ranks, and by increasing the numbers to be maintained in these ranks in peace, raised the demand for men until it practically equals the supply.

The numbers incorporated in the ranks of the French army in

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1890, 1891, and 1892 were respectively 193,473, 185,837, and 179,142, giving a total for the three years of 558,452, and a yearly average of 186,150.

And since this number just about represents the number France can produce when the physically, morally, and mentally unfit, and those exempted from other causes are deducted, it is evident that she has reached the limit of her resources in men, and can only increase her peace strength by accepting men physically or mentally unfit—thereby impairing the quality of her army; or by lengthening the period spent in the ranks—thereby diminishing her reserve, and, therefore, reducing her war strength.

But Germany—thanks to her much larger number of men annually reaching the age of enlistment—has not hitherto found that the demand comes up to the supply. For the same three years 1890, 1891, and 1892 she incorporated respectively 159,270, 182,836, and 172,515 men in her ranks, or a total of 514,621, and a yearly average of 171,540.

And besides these men she passed direct into her Ersatz Reserve in these three years 102,013, 85,383, and 87,421 men respectively, or a total of 274,817, and a yearly average of 91,606.

These numbers do not include those passed into the 1st Ban of the Landsturm as not in every way physically fitted for the active army.

While, therefore, France since 1889 has yearly incorporated in her ranks more men than Germany has taken, she has only done so by taking every man physically fit for the ranks; while Germany has each year had a considerable surplus—more or less approximately represented by the men entering the Ersatz Reserve—and which, if absorbed in the active army, would far more than counterbalance the slight excess of France.

It is to make use of this former waste that the new German law has been framed.

There were two ways by which these surplus men could be added to the ranks; either by simply raising the peace strength, or by reducing the period of service.

It was decided to partly employ both expedients.

The peace establishment of the German army has hitherto been 66,952 non-commissioned officers and 420,031 private soldiers—a total of 486,983 men.

The original Bill proposed to increase these numbers to 78,776 non-commissioned officers and 492,068 privates, or a total of 570,844 men; but the reduction since made in the Bill has brought the final numbers down to 77,864 non-commissioned officers and 479,229 privates.

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These, with 22,458 officers, and some medical, veterinary, pay, and other details, amount to a total peace establishment of all ranks of 584,452 in place of a former one of 511,885, an increase of 72,567, or of 59,198 privates alone.

At the same time that the establishment has been raised the length of service in all corps save the Cavalry and Horse Artillery has been reduced from three to two years.

The original estimate of the increased number of recruits thus rendered necessary was 60,000 per annum, but this has now been reduced to 54,000—so that where formerly some 175,000 recruits were yearly incorporated some 229,000 will in future be taken. This does not include about 9,000 one-year volunteers. This increased strength will be utilised by creating 173 half-battalions of infantry, sixty field batteries, and six battalions of foot artillery; three pioneer and two railway battalions.

The 173 half-battalions, each of two companies, will be made use of as cadres or nuclei, from which to form on mobilization the new units rendered necessary by the return to the ranks of the masses of infantry reserve men. No cadres of this nature formerly existed in peace, and the full battalions thus formed will in future become on mobilization the fourth battalions of their respective regiments. Another use to which these half-battalions will be put is to relieve the other three battalions in peace of the training of the *nach-Ersatz* and one-year volunteers, &c., thus leaving the three complete battalions a freer hand for the training of the ordinary recruits, which will be all the more wanted now that the period of service has been reduced from three to two years.

As to the cost of this increase in strength, the initial, and only once occurring expense, amounts in round numbers to about three millions sterling, of which about £2,175,500 is Prussia's share. Of this all but £594,500 will be included in the 1893-94 budget. The additional annual expenditure will amount to £2,745,000, of which £2,141,000 will be paid by Prussia.

It remains to consider the aggregate number of men Germany will be able to put in the field when these measures have had time to exercise their full effect. If every year 229,000 recruits, plus 9,000 one-year volunteers, are added to the army, it is a matter of calculation that—after allowing 25 per cent. of loss on the whole period—the twenty-four yearly classes, of which the German army on a war footing is composed, will yield something like a total of 4,275,000 men.

Formerly the average number of recruits was something like 175,000 a year, which, under similar conditions, gives about 3,312,000 men for war.

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It is, therefore, apparent that the new organisation, by passing some 54,000 more men into the army every year, will eventually result in an increase to the war strength of some 960,000 men. Many of these men will, of course, be rather old for active service, seeing that they remain liable for service up to forty-four or forty-five years of age; but it must not be forgotten that by increasing the yearly contingent of recruits the average age for a given total of men is diminished.

Thus, under the old system, to obtain some 3,312,000 men the whole of the twenty-four yearly classes had to be called out; but it has been calculated that to obtain that number of men under the new system only nineteen-and-a-half classes need be called out, and thus the oldest four-and-a-half classes need not take the field. The average age of the 3,312,000 men, as well as their maximum age, will consequently be considerably diminished.

From calculations made, it appears that six classes will in future produce as many men as seven formerly did, ten as many as twelve, thirteen as sixteen, sixteen as twenty, and nineteen-and-a-half as twenty-four.

Thus, if the whole are called up, there will be a large increase in quantity without any corresponding increase in age, while if a given number be called up it can be obtained by fewer and younger classes, and thus be improved in quality.

In either respect the new system is, of course, an advance on the old.

It is pointed out by a French writer that this advance has long been contemplated, and is no new departure. In support of this statement he instances former increases in non-commissioned and commissioned officers which were designed to supply the additional numbers now necessary for the increased numbers of private soldiers; and he also mentions recent developments in the Landwehr districts. These preparatory measures, he says, enabled Count Caprivi to state in July last that the new re-inforcements would have immediate effect, and that a month after the adoption of the law, Germany could enter on a campaign under quite different conditions from those imposed by the old system.

Whether this increase has long been planned or not, it is not to be wondered at that France looks with jealous eyes upon such an accession of strength to her rival, especially since she has no possibility of increasing her forces by similar measures.

She can of course increase her peace strength if she will, by lengthening the period of service in the ranks, but she cannot do so by taking each year more recruits, because she already takes all that are available. It is true that the effects of the war

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of 1870-71 on the birth-rate of France are being felt just now as regards the numbers of men attaining the age of enlistment, but as a French writer—Captain Molard—points out, this decrease, although rather exceptional, is not entirely to be attributed to *l'année terrible*, but is part of a regular movement extending over many years.

In the nine years, 1863 to 1871, there were, he says, 4,475,630 male children born in France, an average of 497,292 per annum. In the next nine years, 1872 to 1880, the number was 4,360,404, or an annual average of 484,489; and in the next period of nine years, from 1881 to 1889, the numbers fell to 4,219,054, or a yearly average of 468,784.

These figures, which he gives on the authority of *L'Annuaire Statistique de la France*, are sufficiently startling in themselves, and are more so when compared with the German figures. Not being able to get exactly similar figures for Germany for the first of the above three periods, he contents himself with those for the last two. From 1872 to 1880, 7,866,503 male children were born in Germany, or a yearly average of 874,056, and from 1881 to 1889, 7,980,097, or a yearly average of 886,677.

The difference between the yearly average of the two nations for the first period was 389,567, and for the second period 417,893 in favour of Germany.

It may, therefore, at once be seen how much universal service, if pushed to its farthest limit, must advantage Germany with a larger population and a higher birth-rate. And that this birth-rate has been and still is much higher in Germany than in France, in proportion to the population, the writer shows.

The births per 1000 of inhabitants for the period of 1865 to 1883 were in Germany 38.8 per annum, and in France 25.2; while the rate in the last-named country has fallen in 1890 to 21.8 per 1000. It is not necessary to enquire into the causes of this low birth-rate; the fact is sufficient for the purpose of this article.

It seems, therefore, that in the race for monster armaments France has reached the goal first only because her resources in men have been first exhausted. She has in fact reached her maximum and can go no higher. Like a gambler ever increasing his stake against that of his opponent, she has come to her last louis, whilst Germany has still many a coin left.

The result is that, without unduly straining her resources, Germany will shortly be able either to put a larger number of men in the field than France, or—putting man for man—can produce a more youthful, and therefore, more vigorous and more recently trained army than that of her neighbour.

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The blood tax tells less heavily on her because she has a larger population, and each succeeding year as it increases the difference between the two populations decreases correspondingly the strain that German manhood has to bear as compared with that borne by the manhood of France.

The latest move in the game was made on October 1st, 1893, by Germany, and from that date her army, hitherto inferior in numbers to that of her rival, commenced to grow at a more rapid rate, and in a short time will have passed the strength of France. It is true that quantity is not everything, but into the more debateable and less conclusive question of quality I do not propose now to enter.

The foregoing article does not profess to be more than a compilation from various foreign sources, and is based on no special information. The figures may therefore not be absolutely accurate, but there seems no reason to doubt their general accuracy or the truth of the deductions drawn from them. The works consulted are :—"The text of the German Military Law of 1893"; "*Compte Rendu sur le recrutement de l'Armée*, 1892"; "*Revue Militaire de l'Etranger* for July, 1893"; "*Spectateur Militaire* for August 15th, 1893"; and "Appendix to "*Puissance Militaire des Etats de l'Europe*," by Captain J. Molard.

JOHN ADYE.

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PRESENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

By H. Lawrence Swinburne.

"The vessels available for actual service are insufficient to give training to the officers and seamen, unequal to the present necessities of the Government, and unworthy of a great and prosperous maritime state."—*Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1883.

"The progress by which the United States has emerged from its condition of helplessness at sea, and by the employment of its own resources has distanced its more experienced competitors, marks an epoch in the naval development not only of this country but also of the world."—*Report of the Secretary of the Navy*, 1892.

In the September issue of this Review I endeavoured, in a paper entitled "The Growth of the United States as a Naval Power," to estimate the capabilities the United States possesses for the creation of a modern war navy. In these pages I purpose to show to what use those capabilities have been put by placing before my readers a sketch of the effective fleet of the United States as it exists to-day. To save monotonous reiteration of dimensions, &c., I have grouped the whole of the vessels built, or authorized, into three divisions, viz.: armour-clads other than cruisers, cruisers, and miscellaneous craft; and have embodied in separate tables the main characteristics of the ships composing each group. The old Navy I have entirely eliminated from consideration, as out of the whole fleet possessed by the United States in 1883—the year in which the keel of the first steel warship was laid—not a single ship can be to-day reckoned effective in the modern sense of the term, with the exception of a few armour-clad monitors, and these are in effect new ships, having been entirely reconstructed. Thus in the creation of her Navy the United States started with a clean sheet, and in considering its value we will not be hampered by having to gauge how much obsoleteness in one or other essential effects the value of a ship, or group of ships, inasmuch as the whole

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effective fleet only comprises ships constructed within the last two years.*

The Policy Board, as it was called, which submitted its report at the end of 1889, recommended that the naval force of the country should be constituted at a strength of 226 vessels (including first-class torpedo boats), a recommendation which necessitated an addition of 192 ships to the force of thirty-four effective vessels then constructed or authorized; and it recommended also that this fleet, which we may take as the standard of naval strength to which the nation aspires, should be composed of the types summarized as follows:—

	Built or Authorized.	Recommended by Board.	Total Strength.
Battleships (about 10,000 tons)	Nil.	10	10
,, (6000 to 10,000 tons)	2	25	27
Monitors (Harbour-defence)	6	Nil.	6
,, (Cruising)	(a)	Nil.	Nil.
Rams (Harbour-defence)	1	10	11
Torpedo-depôt Ships (about 5000 tons)	Nil.	3	3
Dynamite Cruisers (pneumatic guns)	1(b)	Nil.	1
Torpedo Gunboats (about 900 tons)	Nil.	15	15
,, Boats (first-class)	1	100	101
Cruisers (armoured)	1	9	10
,, (about 7500 tons)	Nil.	4	4
,, (about 5500 tons)	1	9	10
,, (3000 to 4500 tons)	10	2	12
,, (1700 to 3000 tons)	6	Nil.	6
Gun-vessels and Dispatch vessels	5	5	10
	34	192	226

(a) A cruising monitor had been sanctioned by the Bill of March 2nd, 1889, but in June, 1891, its authorization was repealed, and the appropriation withdrawn.

(b) A second dynamite cruiser had been sanctioned by the Bill of March 2nd, 1889, but its construction has never been undertaken, though appropriation is still available.

This force the Policy Board considered to be sufficient "in case of war to completely destroy, at its outbreak, every base of supplies belonging to our enemy which should be in proximity to our country, and at the same time to protect the converging highways of our commerce, both foreign and coastwise." Towards achieving the result aimed at she has to-day advanced to the extent that she has commissioned, building, or authorized a fleet of forty-eight vessels, which I have summarised in Table I.

* In all the tables the following abbreviations are used: B.L.R., breech-loading; Q.F., quick-firing; M., machine; and H., Hotchkiss revolving cannon. Under heading "Construction" B. signifies ships still on the slips; L. signifies launched and completing afloat; and C. signifies ships completed, or which have actually undergone trial. Where possible the I.H.P. and speed actually attained have been given, in other cases the estimated or contract power and speed. Where bunker capacity is fractionally expressed the upper figures denote normal capacity, the lower actual quantity that can be stowed. Where armour thicknesses are fractionally expressed, the upper figures refer to protection of main ordnance, the lower to protection of largest calibre guns of secondary battery. Names of single screw ships are italicized.

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TABLE I.—Effective Strength of the American Navy.

Date of Authorization.	Sea-going.									Coast-defence.					Grand Total.
	Battleships.		Cruisers.				Gun and Despatch Vessels.	Torpedo Gunboats.	Total.	Monitors.	Rams.	Dynamite Cruisers.	Torpedo Boats.	Total.	
	Over 10,000 tons.	Under 10,000 tons.	Armoured.	Over 5000 tons.	3000 to 5000 tons.	1700 to 3000 tons.									
March 3rd, 1883	—	—	—	—	3	—	1	—	4	5	—	—	—	5	9
„ 31d, 1885	—	—	—	—	2	1	1	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	4
August 3rd, 1886	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	1	—	1	4
March 3rd, 1887	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	4	1	—	—	1	2	6
September 7th, 1888..	—	—	1	1	2	3	1	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	8
March 2nd, 1889	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	1	1	—	2	4
June 30th, 1890.....	3	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	5	—	—	—	1	1	6
March 2nd, 1891	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
July 19th, 1892	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
March 3rd, 1893	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	3	—	—	—	1	1	4
Totals	4	2	2	3	10	6	8	1	36	6	1	2	3	12	48

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In this table the ships have been arranged according to the Appropriation Bills authorizing their construction, and it will be seen that from 1883 to 1889 energy was principally devoted to the construction of cruisers and coast-defence tonnage. In fact all the construction of this period would seem to have been undertaken under the influence of the First Advisory Board which had reported in 1881, and while pointing out that "iron-clads (*i.e.*, battleships) are absolutely needed for the defence of the country in time of war," had confined its recommendations to the class of ships it deemed best suited to meet "the more pressing exigencies of the Navy," and these it considered to be cruisers and coast-defence ships. From that period, however, up to the present, marked attention has been given to battleship construction, though other sea-going types have not been neglected. This is the outcome of the report of the Policy Board which emphasised the necessity of a powerful offensive force on the ground "that a policy of protection without the power to act offensively, even to carrying war to the very doors of an enemy, would, at the present time, double the force with which we would have to contend. For an enemy knowing it was possible for such a fleet to appear upon its own coast would be obliged to assign a superior force for its protection thus greatly diminishing that to be sent against us." Thus the decade that America has taken to create the naval force she to-day possesses, may be divided into two periods. Two-thirds of this time she has devoted entirely to the creation of defensive power, and the latter third to the creation of an offensive defence.

Having thus summarized what we may call the "evolution" of her naval power, let us proceed to consider her fleet in its details, commencing with the group of ships we have in Table I., classed as "coast-defence." Of these, the Appropriation Bill of March 3rd, 1883, sanctioned the construction of five, or, to be more correct, sanctioned the complete reconstruction and modernization of five double-turreted monitors laid down originally as part of the old Navy. These are the *Puritan*, *Miantonomoh*, *Amphitrite*, *Terror*, and *Monadnock*, and they are the only iron-built ships of the new Navy. Iron construction is, however, the only mark of obsoleteness they possess, as they carry thoroughly modern b.l.r. and q.f. ordnance, and have American manufactured, all-steel armour, with the exception of the *Miantonomoh*, which has on her turrets and conning tower compound plates manufactured in England. In these ships, again with the exception of the *Miantonomoh*, an important improvement on the earlier monitor designs has been made. In lieu of a flying deck, there has been built up between

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TABLE II.—Coast-Defence Armour-clads.

Construction.	Keel Laid.	Class and Name.		Hull.				Engines.		Ordnance.								Maximum Armour.			
										B.L.R.		Q.F.				M.					
				Length.	Beam.	Draught.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	12in.	10in.	4in.	6pr.	3pr.	1pr.	37 mm. H.	Gatlings.	Belt.	Barbette.	Turret.	Deck.
				Ft.	Ft.	Ft.	Tons.		Kts.									In.	In.	In.	In.
L	1875	Monitors	Puritan	290	60	18	6160	3700	12.4	4	—	6	2	4	—	4	4	14	14	8	3
C	1889	Monitors	Monterey	256	59	15	4138	5400	16	2	2	—	6	—	4	—	2	13	$\frac{14}{11\frac{1}{2}}$	$\frac{8}{7\frac{1}{2}}$	3
L	1874	Monitors	Monadnock					3000	14.5	—	4	2	2	2	—	2	2	9	$11\frac{1}{2}$	$7\frac{1}{2}$	3
L	1874	Monitors	Amphitrite	260	56	$14\frac{1}{2}$	3990	1600	12												
L	1874	Monitors	Terror					1600	12	—	4	—	2	2	—	2	2	7	—	$11\frac{1}{2}$	2
C	1874	Monitors	Miantonomoh					1426	10.5												
L	1891	Ram	Katahdin	251	$43\frac{1}{2}$	15	2183	4800	17	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	3

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the fore and aft gun positions a commodious superstructure which not only greatly increases the extent and comfort of the accommodation afforded, but in the case of the *Puritan* has been utilised as a means of protection for a portion of the secondary battery, 4in. steel sponsons having been built in, one on each beam, in which are mounted two of the 4in. q.f., the others being carried at the angles of the superstructure and shield protected. All are modern as to engines, electric installations, ventilation, &c., and all resemble the *Puritan* in general design, with some differences of detail. All carry their main armament in pairs within fore and aft turrets, but in the *Puritan*, *Amphitrite*, and *Monadnock* the turret protection to the guns is super-imposed on fixed barbettes, whereas the *Terror* and *Miantonomoh* are fitted with the ordinary roller-base turrets. The next step in coast-defence construction was the designing of a novel type, unprotected by armour and small in size, but of great speed and carrying pneumatic guns for the discharge of aërial torpedoes. One such vessel, the *Vesuvius*, was constructed under the Authorization Bill of 1886, and the Bill of 1889 appropriated for a second. On the whole, the design has not been a success. Speed trials gave excellent results, and the guns in themselves have fairly answered expectations, but as a ship apart from a floating gun platform she is a failure, and this would seem to be officially admitted, as the appropriation for her consort, though available, has not up to now been utilized, and the Policy Board speaks of her "as being of uncertain value in naval warfare." Her length and scanty beam render her unhandy in turning, a fatal defect in a ship which can only train her guns by her own movement. Again, whether acting against ships or land fortifications, she would come within range of an enemy's projectiles for some time before she could effectually use her own aërial torpedoes, a risky proceeding considering that even a medium calibre shell would probably annihilate her if it struck anywhere within the vicinity of her magazine filled, as it would be, with large quantities of high explosive. Following the *Vesuvius* came another double-turreted monitor, the *Monterey*, and a harbour-defence ram, the *Katahdin*, which, if we add a couple of first-class torpedo boats and a submarine boat now under consideration, closes the category of coast-defence ships. The *Monterey* differs from the *Puritan* in being smaller, of steel throughout, both in hull and armour, and in possessing a considerably higher rate of speed. A novel feature is that she can, by the admission of water-ballast, increase her normal displacement by some 500 tons, and thus bring down her freeboard to about a foot. She is brought down to this fighting trim by means of fifteen 9in. Kingston valves placed one in each transverse water-tight compartment of her

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double bottom. Like the *Puritan* she has her main ordnance located in barbette-turrets, and has also the same commodious superstructure between the turrets. The *Katahdin* is of quite a different type, being a ram pure and simple, akin, in fact, to our *Polyphemus*, but differing from her in that she is not fitted for the discharge of torpedoes. She is afforded protection by a steel over-all turtle-back, 2in. on flats, and terminating at the sides in a 6in. steel belt. Under ordinary service conditions this belt is about on a level with the water-line, but when going into action she can, like the *Monterey*, be submerged until the flat of the deck is almost flush with the water, the only protuberances being smoke-stack, conning-tower, protected by 18in. of steel, and two light barbettes fore and aft, on which the six-pounders are mounted in pairs. Her ram is 11ft. thick on the water-line and strengthened by 15ft. of heavy backing, and the ship is the design of Rear-Admiral Ammen, an officer of much experience in the Civil War.

Turning from coast-defence craft to cruisers, a reference to Table I. will show that in the earlier of the two periods into which we have divided the construction of the new Navy, the fleet was strengthened by the addition of eighteen vessels of this class, six being "unprotected," three "partially protected," eight "protected," and one "armoured." The Bill of 1883 sanctioned three partially-protected cruisers—the *Chicago*, and the sister-ships *Atalanta* and *Boston*—and these, though fairly powerful ships, compare disadvantageously with similar ships built in Europe at a corresponding date as will be seen from the following particulars:—

	American. *Chicago.*	British. *Mersey.*	French. *Sfax.*	American. *Atalanta.*	Italian. *Bausan.*	Chilian. *Esmeralda.*
Date of Launch ..	1885	1885	1884	1884	1883	1884
Displacement. tons	4500	4050	4500	3189	2860.	3050
Deck-Protection ..	Partial	Complete	Complete	Partial	Complete	Complete
Armament	4, 8"; 8, 6"	2, 8"; 10, 6"	6, 16cm.; 10, 14cm	2, 8"; 6, 6"	2, 10"; 6, 6"	2, 10"; 6, 6"
I.H.P.	5084	6000	6520	4030	6083	6555
Speed, kts.	15.3	17	16.7	15.6	18.3	17.9

The battery design of the *Chicago* is on the same lines as in the *Mersey*, the heavy guns being carried on sponsons on the spar deck and the broadside guns on the deck below, but the lower deck battery is better arranged as under poop and forecastle are carried two bow, and two stern, chasers, the stern guns being of 5in. calibre. In the *Atalanta* and *Boston* the 6in. battery is within a superstructure on the upper deck, three guns on each broadside, and so arranged that the forward starboard gun can be trained direct ahead and the aft-port gun direct astern. The 8in. guns

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are on the upper deck at the forward and aft angles of the superstructure, and are mounted on light barbettes 3ft. above the deck plane, the port one forward. It is, however, doubtful whether the forward or aft guns of the 6in. battery could be engaged in line of keel at the same time as the corresponding 8in. gun, as their blast would probably affect the gun's crews of the latter pieces. These two ships and the *Charleston*, sanctioned by the next Appropriation Bill, are the only low freeboard cruisers the United States has constructed. The plans for this latter ship were purchased from the Elswick firm who had already built on the same lines the *Esmeralda* for Chili, the *Bausan* for Italy, and the *Naniwa Kan* and *Takachiho*, for Japan. All of these vessels carried two 10-in. guns mounted as bow and stern chasers, with a central battery of six 6in. b.l.r., within a superstructure built up between the main gun positions. In the American ship 8in. guns have been substituted for 10in., the central battery remaining unaltered. The class in fact may almost be described as the well known "Rendel" gunboat evolved into a sea-going ship, and for countries whose navies have but one *raison d'être*, namely coast defence, the type is a useful one, but for cruisers intended in the main for commerce protection or commerce raiding they are a mistake, as the armament is above requirements and the low freeboard necessary to give the heavy guns a complete arc of fire must tell against them in a seaway. Four other deck-protected cruisers were authorised between 1885 and 1887, the *Newark*, *Baltimore*, *Philadelphia*, and *San Francisco*. The former is a high freeboard cruiser carrying her whole armament on a flush upper deck, and so arranged that the two forward and two aft guns on each broadside have direct fire in line of keel. The other three are all of the poop, forecastle, and waist type so common in our own Navy. In the waist battery the guns are mounted in sponsons, and the forward and aft guns have direct fire ahead and astern respectively, and in each ship two chase guns are mounted both on poop and forecastle. The waist battery of the *Baltimore* has only three guns on each broadside, instead of four as in the *Philadelphia* and *San Francisco*, but her poop and forecastle guns are 8in. in lieu of 6in. With our *Apollo* and *Astræa* classes direct bow or stern fire in line of keel is limited to one gun, and if a lucky shot should put this piece out of action they would, in chase or retreat, have to yaw, and thus lose distance at every shot, if their enemy kept direct ahead or astern. In all of the American cruisers, except the *Charleston*, *Atalanta*, *Boston*, *Yorktown*, *Bennington*, and *Concord*, three, and in most cases four guns would have to be disabled before they would lose the power of fire in line of keel. The last

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TABLE III.—CRUISERS.

Construction.	Keel Laid.	Class and Name.		Hull. Length.	Hull. Beam.	Hull. Draught.	Hull. Displacement.	Engines. I.H.P.	Engines. Speed.	Engines. Bunker Capacity.	Armament. B.L.R. 8-in.	B.L.R. 6-in.	B.L.R. 5-in.	Q.F. 6-in.	Q.F. 5-in.	Q.F. 4-in.	Q.F. 6-pr.	Q.F. 3-pr.	Q.F. 1-pr.	M. 47 mm H.	M. 37 mm H.	M. Gatling.	Max. Deck-protection.
				Ft.	Ft.	Ft.	Tons.	—	Kts.	Tons.													In.
B	1893	Armoured.	Brooklyn	400½	65	24	9,186	16,500	21	900/1650	8	—	—	—	12	—	12	—	4	—	—	4	6
C	1890	Armoured.	New York	380½	65	23¼	8,150	16,500	21.1	750/1150	6	—	—	—	—	12	8	—	4	—	—	4	6
C	1890	Protected.	Columbia ..	412	58	22½	7,350	21,000	21	750/2000	1	2	—	—	—	8	12	—	4	—	—	4	4
L	1891	Protected.	Minneapolis ..																				
L	1890	Protected.	Olympia	340	53	21½	5,500	13,500	20	1300	4	4	—	—	10	—	14	—	6	—	—	4	4½
C	1887	Protected.	Baltimore	327½	48½	20½	4,600	10,064	19.6	900	4	6	—	—	—	—	4	2	2	—	4	2	4
C	1888	Protected.	Philadelphia	327½	48½	19½	4 324	8,815	19.7	850	—	12	—	—	—	—	4	4	2	—	3	—	4
C	1887	Protected.	Newark	310	49	18½	4,0\3	8,869	19	850	—	12	—	—	—	—	4	4	2	—	3	—	3
C	1888	Protected.	San Francisco	310	49	18½	4,083	10,400	20.2	850	—	12	—	—	—	—	4	4	2	—	3	—	3
C	1887	Protected.	Charleston	312	46	19½	4,040	6,666	18.2	800	2	6	—	—	—	—	4	2	2	—	4	—	3
L	1889	Protected.	Raleigh	300	42	18	3,183	10,000	19	400/550	—	—	—	1	10	—	8	—	4	—	—	2	2½
L	1890	Protected.	Cincinnatti ..																				
C	1883	Partially Protected.	Chicago	325	48	19	4,500	5,084	15.3	940	4	8	2	—	—	—	2	—	2	4	2	—	1½
C	1883	Partially Protected.	*Atalanta*	270¼	42	17	3,189	4,030	15.6	400/780	2	6	—	—	—	—	2	2	2	2	2	2	1½
C	1883	Partially Protected.	*Boston*																				
L	1890	Unprotected.	Montgomery ..	257	37	14½	2,000	5,400	17	200/430	—	—	—	2	8	—	6	—	2	—	—	2	—
C	1890	Unprotected.	Detroit					(?)	18.7														
L	1890	Unprotected.	Marblehead ..					5,400	17														
C	1887	Unprotected.	Yorktown ..	230	36	14	1,700	3,660	16.7	400	—	6	—	—	—	—	2	2	1	—	2	2	—
C	1888	Unprotected.	Concord					3,405	16.8														
C	1888	Unprotected.	Bennington ..					3,436	17.5														

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three named were also built in this period and need but little description as they are almost identical in size, speed, and armament with our *Archer* class. They are useful scouts, but overweighted with armament, especially forward, and would in consequence pitch heavily and lose speed considerably in a seaway.

The year 1888 saw the most varied and powerful cruiser programme Congress had ever sanctioned in one appropriation, comprising the armour-clad *New York*, the deck-protected ships *Olympia*, *Cincinatti*, and *Raleigh*, and three unprotected vessels, the *Montgomery*, *Detroit*, and *Marblehead*. The three last are light handy craft, sister ships, with a powerful battery of q.f. guns, if anything indeed a little over-armed. The 5in. battery is carried in sponsons in the waist, four on each broadside, the two forward and two aft guns firing in line of keel, and protected by 2½in. plating, while the 6in. guns are mounted as bow and stern chasers. The *Detroit* is an excellent sea-boat, and has averaged 18.71 knots on trial, and the class will be useful scouts, and would have been still more so had 4in. and 5in. guns replaced the 5in. and 6in., and the weight saved been given to increase of coal capacity and engine power. The sisters, *Cincinnatti* and *Raleigh*, are somewhat similar ships on a larger scale and with full deck-protection. In them the sponson protection is 4in., and the 6in. gun on the poop is replaced by two 5in. The most noticeable point about hem is their sharpness forward, and it is probable that in a heavy sea they would bury themselves so deeply as to considerably check their speed. All these ships are of comparatively small size, but the *Olympia* and *New York* are the two largest cruisers the United States laid down during the earlier period of construction. It is true that the *Maine* was originally authorized as "armoured cruiser No. 1," but she is now officially recognised as a lightly armoured second-class battleship, and the *New York* may be taken as the first *bonâ fide* armoured cruiser the United States has built. In her design are embodied both French and English ideas, as she has the heavily armoured steel deck, so popular with our constructors, in conjunction with a partial but wide belt of light vertical steel plating as applied in the French cruisers of the *Dupuy-de-Lome* type. This belt, which is of 4in. steel, protects the hull in wake of machinery space, and extends in depth from the main to the protective deck, and there is behind it a cellulose belt of the same depth and 3½ft. thick, which runs right throughout the ship. The main armament is arranged in quadrilateral on the upper deck, two 8in. guns being mounted forward, two aft, and one on each beam amidships, all at a height of 25ft. above water. The

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fore and aft pairs are enclosed within 5½in. steel turrets superimposed on 10in. steel barbettes, and the beam guns, though not within turrets have heavy shield protection, and are also mounted on 10in. barbettes. The 4in. battery is carried on the deck below, at a height of 16½ft. above water, and so arranged that all the guns can fire in line of keel, either ahead or astern. This arrangement has been effected, not so much by mounting the guns in very projecting sponsons, but by running the ship's lines fine and spacing the guns largely. The sponsons are all plated to same thickness as belt. In the *Olympia* the type is quite different. There is no vertical protection to hull, though she is heavily deck-protected, but both main and secondary batteries are lightly armoured. The four 8in. guns are mounted in pairs in fore and aft barbette-turrets, the plating being 4½in. on the barbettes and 1in. less on the turret. The 5in. battery is carried in a superstructure between the barbettes, mounted in sponsons plated with 4in. steel, and so arranged that the fire of four guns can be brought to bear in line of keel, either direct ahead or direct astern. These guns are 18ft. above the water-line, the heavy guns 26ft., and her freeboard both forward and aft about 17ft. A point in her which has received special attention is the supply of ample accommodation, so that she could if necessary be utilized as a swift transport. The *New York* also is an exceptionally "roomy" ship, admirably ventilated, and the berth deck fitted with Wilson air-ports having a 25in. opening and a 12in. light. The *Olympia* has not yet had her trials, which are to be of a very exhaustive character, but the *New York* has recently passed through her's most successfully, the results giving a mean of 21.07 knots. I have invariably heard United States' naval officers speak of both these ships in the highest terms of praise, and I believe I am expressing naval opinion in the States when I say that they consider that in them they have obtained better value for displacement than in any ships of their class in the world.

Of the more recent construction a large amount of displacement has gone to three powerful cruisers—the deck-protected sisters, *Columbia* and *Minneapolis*, and the armour-clad *Brooklyn*, a vessel much on the lines of the *New York*. This latter has a thousand tons greater displacement and twenty feet greater length than her prototype, but the arrangement of offensive and defensive power is much the same, with the exception that the beam barbettes each carry a pair of, instead of a single, 8in. guns, and the secondary battery has 5in. instead of 4in. quick-firers. In the *Columbia* and *Minneapolis* we have the most *fin-de-siècle* type of ships for commerce-raiding. Their *rôle* is to be that of commerce destroyers pure and simple, and to enable them to more effectually

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disguise their vicious propensities they are built with a superficial resemblance to ordinary liners, their sides having few projections, and those but slight, and their pole masts being without fighting tops. Protection is afforded by a heavy steel deck and a belt of cellular space filled amidships with patent fibrous fuel, and forward and abaft of engines with water-excluding material. The heavy guns are mounted on the upper deck as chasers, with heavy shield protection, and the 4in. battery is on the main deck, four on each beam, protected by 4in. plating worked into hull, which is slightly sponsoned abeam of each gun, and all give fire in line of keel, four ahead and four astern. The most novel feature about these ships is the principle of triplicated engine power. The screw or screws not required for use can be disconnected and allowed to revolve freely, and with the single screw alone at work a speed of fifteen knots can be maintained; using the twin screws alone they can steam at eighteen-and-a-half knots; and at a recent full-power trial the *Columbia* attained a speed of twenty-one-and-a-half knots.

This completes the list of cruisers which the United States possesses, but, before considering her battleships, I wish to draw attention to one or two features which appertain not only to her cruisers, but to a certain extent to all her warships. A glance at the Tables will show the reader that coal endurance is a strong point not only in her cruisers, but also in her battle-ships. This was a factor that entered very largely into the consideration of the Policy Board, which urgently insisted on a proportion of the ships "having the power to remain at sea during a long period, and to attack points on the other side of the Atlantic." Another feature in many of the American ships is worth noticing, and that is the method by which the officer conning the ship in action would communicate his orders to his subordinates. As typical I will take the telephonic communications in the *New York*. All telephones in the ship communicate direct with the dynamo-room, which is situated under the armoured deck right forward. This compartment is, in fact, a central telephone station, and with it the officer commanding can communicate by voice-tube from bridge or tower, the receiver passing on the order to the necessary quarter, or, if he wishes to speak direct to any part, he can at once be put in direct communication with such part. The simplicity and usefulness of the arrangement needs no comment, and there is, of course, also alternative direct communication with the various parts of the ship.

Passing on to the most important class of warships we find that though the United States has not a single battleship yet completed,

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TABLE IV.—Battleships.

Construction.	Keel Laid.	Class and Name.		Hull.				Engines.			Ordnance.											Maximum Armour.			
											B.L.R.					Q.F.				M.					
				Length.	Beam.	Draught.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Bunker Capacity.	13in.	12in.	10in.	8in.	6in.	4in.	6pr.	3pr.	1pr.	37 mm. H.	Gatlings.	Belt.	Barbette.	Turret.	Deck.
																						in.	in.	in.	in.
B	1893	First Class.	Iowa	310	72¼	24	11,296	11,000	16	625/2000	—	4	—	8	—	6	20	—	4	—	4	14	15/8	14/6	3
L	1891	First Class.	Indiana ..	348	69¼	24	10,200	9,000	15	400/1800	4	—	—	8	4	—	20	—	4	—	4	18	17/8	15/6	3
L	1891	First Class.	Massachusetts																						
L	1891	First Class.	Oregon ..																						
L	1888	Second Class.	Maine	318	57	21½	6,648	9,000	17	850	—	—	4	—	6	—	12	—	6	—	4	12	12	8	2
L	1889	Second Class.	Texas	301	64	22½	6,300	8,000	17	500/950	—	2	—	—	6	—	12	—	4	4	2	12	—	12	3

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she has five all approaching completion, and the keel of a sixth has just been laid in Cramp's yard at Philadelphia. The delay in completing all the armour-clad ships has been in a great measure due to the difficulties that have stood in the way of delivery of armour plate. It must be remembered that ten years ago no such thing as armour-plate industry existed within the States, and yet, with the exception of the *Miantonomoh*, the steel armour of every warship the nation possesses is of home manufacture. To build up such an industry requires not only the investment of enormous capital in costly plant, but requires also the services of skilled metallurgists and artisans, possessed of a knowledge that can only be acquired by years of study and experience. Under the circumstances, the marvel is, not that the new Navy possesses so few ships of this class, but that, in the time at her disposal, and in spite of the obstacles in her way, she has, by her own efforts and withont extraneous aid, created as many powerful armour-clads as she now possesses. The two first sea-going armour-clads were sanctioned as far back as August, 1886, but it was not till two years later the keel of the first, the *Maine*, was laid. In both this ship and the *Texas*, laid down the year after, the main object appears to have been to combine great offensive power with small displacement, and in both the attempt has been made to effect the purpose by the adoption of the *en échelon* arrangement of the main ordnance. It is true that this arrangement permits of full concentration of the main armament fire both direct ahead and direct astern, but only at the expense of several disadvantages. There is an increased propensity to roll, the blast when the heavy guns are fired in line of keel is likely to be injurious to superstructure and deck, and finally it is very difficult to satisfactorily arrange the position of the secondary battery. Both Italy and England embraced the system only to discard it, and it is not likely that the experiment will be repeated in future American construction. In the *Texas* the heavy guns are mounted singly in turrets enclosed within a redoubt, armoured to same thickness as belt, and running diagonally across the line of keel. In height it extends from the main to the upper deck, but the hull between the main and belt decks is unarmoured, a weak point, as there is no protection against shell entering and exploding under turret bases and machinery, though of course tube protection is afforded to the ammunition hoists. The secondary battery is so arranged that the fire of three 6in. guns can be brought to bear on any point of the compass, and are placed two forward and two aft of the redoubt on the main deck, within lightly-armoured sponsons, and two fore and aft within the superstructure on the upper deck. The latter two are in positions which

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bring them dangerously near the blast of the main ordnance when engaged in line of keel, and to protect them as much as possible that portion of the superstructure flanking them is constructed of triple plating spaced wide apart, and the cellular divisions thus formed can be packed or utilised as hammock netting. In the *Maine* there is no redoubt, but each turret is enclosed in a separate oval-shaped barbette, heavily armoured, and the guns are mounted in pairs, instead of singly. A narrow superstructure runs throughout the length of the ship, its continuity being broken abeam of each turret, so as to allow each pair of guns a range of fire of 57deg. on the opposite beam, and within and on this superstructure the secondary battery is mounted, two in recessed bow ports under forward superstructure, two similarly placed in quarter ports, and two in broadside above central superstructure. Both ships are partially belted in association with a steel armoured deck.

During the later period of construction four battleships, all of the first class, have been sanctioned. Three of these, the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Oregon* are now launched and approaching completion. In armour protection and disposition of main armament they are on very similar lines to our battleships of the Hamilton programme, differing, however, from them in having inclined turrets and also in the disposition of the secondary armament, which is of an entirely novel character. The partial belt is 198ft. in length, and is in association with a steel armoured deck 2½in. above belt, and 3in. at ends. From the belt to the main deck the mid-ship portion of the hull is protected by 5in. steel plating, and there is a 10in. conning tower with communications protected by a 7in. tube. For the protection both of the 13in. and 8in. guns there are revolving inclined turrets superimposed on fixed barbettes. Between the fore and aft heavy gun positions is a superstructure in, and on, which the secondary battery is carried. This superstructure is hexagonal in shape, and within it, at each of the beam angles, are the 6in. guns mounted in 6in. sponsons giving them direct fire in line of keel. The 8in. battery is mounted in pairs in four turrets, two flanking the fore, and two the aft barbette, the guns having a very wide arc of fire and elevated so that they can train across and fire over the main ordnance turrets. The height of the battery above water is, 6in. guns, 14ft. 10in.; 13in. guns, 17ft. 8in.; and 8in. guns, 24ft. 9in. The auxiliary battery is excellently disposed for resisting torpedo-boat attack from any quarter, and the pieces are protected, either by plating worked into hull, or by shields, according to position. The *Iowa*, the keel of which has just been laid, is in the main similar to the ships of the *Indiana* class, but differs somewhat in

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detail. She will have lighter but equally resistive armour, as it will be of the latest Harveyed type, and her main ordnance is to be 12in. in lieu of 13in. In the secondary battery also, six 4in. q.f. replace the four 6in. b.l.r. of the older ships, and will be mounted, two forward and two amidships, protected by sponsons, and two at the after end of the superstructure shield protected.

The remaining ships may be very briefly dealt with. The *Dolphin* is but little more than a fairly fast steam yacht. As a warship she may be regarded as a *quantité negligéable*, as she has vertical engines with absolutely no protection to those parts above the water-line, and has only six watertight compartments. The *Bancroft* is a handy little gun-vessel, with an admirable quick-firing armament for a ship of her class. She was built primarily for the use of the Naval Cadet Academy at Annapolis as a practise cruiser and gunnery ship. The *Petrel* is of a type corresponding to our *Plover* and *Magpie* classes, and was originally designed for a speed of thirteen knots. She was, however, accepted after getting 11.79 knots on trial, as, in the opinion of the Bureau of Engineering, "the failure to get the contract power was due entirely to the inexperience of the contractors in forced-draught trials and to their lack of appreciation for the necessity of a skilled gun-room force"—a fact sufficiently patent considering that she commenced with 1473 i.h.p. and a speed of fourteen knots, but before the trial was over had run down to 540 i.h.p. and a speed of only nine-and-a-half knots. Two powerful gun vessels, the *Machias* and *Castine*, have also been built, of which the former has on trial made fifteen-and-a-half knots. Rather a striking contrast to our *Alert* and *Torch*, which are to attain the magnificent maximum of 13.25 knots! Gunboats Nos. 7, 8, and 9, now being contracted for, will resemble the *Machias* on slightly greater displacement; and as they are mainly intended for service in Chinese waters are to be of very light draught. The torpedo-boat flotilla at present consists of only two first-class boats, the *Cushing*, and a more powerful boat, the *Ericsson*, just launched. Each of these carries three tubes for the discharge of 18in. Whitehead torpedoes. Designs are also now under consideration for a submarine torpedo-boat, for which £40,000 was appropriated last session. Finally, appropriations are available for a second dynamite cruiser and a torpedo gunboat, but these ships are as yet embryos in the womb of the Bureau of Construction.

This, then, is the stage to which the United States has to-day reached in the creation of a war navy, and, in conclusion, I will touch briefly on the question of the necessity that exists for the United States to possess a Navy. I do this because one

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TABLE V.—Miscellaneous Craft.

Construction.	Keel Laid.	Class and Name.		Hull. Length.	Hull. Beam.	Hull. Draught.	Hull. Displacement.	Engines. I.H.P.	Engines. Speed.	Engines. Bunker Capacity.	Ordnance. 15in. Pneumatic.	Ordnance. 6in. B.L.R.	Ordnance. Q.F. 4in.	Ordnance. Q.F. 6pr.	Ordnance. Q.F. 3pr.	Ordnance. Q.F. 1pr.	Ordnance. M. 47 mm. H.	Ordnance. M. 37 mm. H.	Ordnance. M. Gatling.
C	1883	Despatch Vessel.	*Dolphin*	240	32	14¼	1485	2240	15.5	310	—	—	2	2	—	—	4	—	2
B	1893	Gun Vessels.	No. 7	?	?	?	1200	?	15	?	—	—	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
B	1893		No. 8																
B	1893		No. 9																
C	1891		Machias	190	32	12	1050	?	15.5	170/250	—	—	8	4	—	4	—	—	2
L	1891		Castine					1600	14										
C	1887		*Petrel*	176	31	11½	890	1095	11.8	160	—	4	—	—	2	1	—	2	2
C	1891		Bancroft	187	32	11½	838	1300 ?	14.4	140/200	—	—	4	3	2	1	—	1	1
C	1887	Dynamite Cruisers.	Vesuvius	252	26½	10¾	930	3795	22.5	150	3	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—
—	?		No. 2	Appropriated for but not yet commenced.															
—	?	Torpedo Gunboat.	No. 1																
L	1892	Torpedo Boats.	Ensign	150	15¼	4¾	120	1800	22.4	?	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
C	1889		Cushing	139	14¼	5¼	116	1720	22.5	?	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—
B	1893		Submarine Boat ..	Appropriated for, but design still under consideration.															

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hears the question asked: "Why do the United States want a Navy? They have got along without one very well for a considerable number of years, why should they now devote large expenditure, which could be better utilized, to creating a great Naval force? Although throughout the United States there is a deep and strong conviction that it is necessary for the Republic to hold a high place amongst the Naval Powers of the world, there is a small minority who maintain that there is no necessity for a Navy as no cause of trouble with any great Power is likely to arise that could not be settled by arbitration. It is true that the principles which underlie the whole of the foreign relations of the United States are not such as are likely to embroil the nation with any Power; but causes of friction have arisen, and will again arise, and as illustrative I need only quote such recent cases as the lynching of Italian subjects at New Orleans in 1891, and the trouble with Chili in the same year. I purposely say nothing with regard to any difference that has, or could, arise between the United States and this country, as I believe that under no conditions at all probable would the public feeling of either country permit of any international dispute being settled by other means than arbitration.

While recognising that absolute abstention from active interference in European complications is a fundamental feature of her foreign policy, we must also recognise that the international relations of the United States are also governed by another principle which guides the foreign policy of *all* American parties. This is vigorous and unbending opposition to any attempt at the introductions of European systems of government, or to the effort of any European Power to obtain territorial control or political influence over any portion of the American continent from the Canadian boundary to the Straits of Magellan. When, in 1823, the "Holy Alliance" of Russia, Austria, and Prussia showed a decided inclination to aid Spain in reducing to obedience her revolted colonies, President Monroe, in his message to Congress, said, "We could not view an interposition for oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European Power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States," thus laying down in no uncertain terms the celebrated Monroe doctrine which, it is well to remember, was enuntiated with regard to South American States. A good illustration of its bearing was given in the case of the French occupation of Mexico "when the tone of American complaint at the continued presence of French soldiers in Mexico grew more emphatic as the success of the war became assured; and, at the end of the war, significant

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movements of troops to the Mexican frontier led the French Emperor to withdraw his support of Maximilian." Thus while her international relations are of such a kind as to make war improbable, they still bring it "within the region of practical politics," and that such a war could be waged with terrible effect against a navyless United States needs but little demonstration. A glance at the map will show not only the enormous extent of seaboard, on two oceans, which she has to defend, but also the close contiguity to her seaboard of the most populous, wealthy, and important of her industrial centres; and to prove the injury that a comparatively weak power could inflict on her by a *guerre-de-course* it is only necessary to say that her mercantile marine aggregates almost a million tons, and is inferior only to that of France—which it almost equals—Germany, and Great Britain, while her sea-borne commerce, valued at nearly three hundred millions, overtops that of every other country in the world, with the exception of the little isle from whose loins she has sprung. The United States well knows that to be ready for war is not a declaration of hostilities, and wisely takes for her motto, "*Si vis pacem, para bellum.*"

H. LAWRENCE SWINBURNE.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

PROGRESSIVE MARCHING.

To the Editor of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

SIR,—I have had more than one remonstrance concerning less what I said about route marching in the current number of Magazine than what I am supposed to have said. Nowhere did I say or hint that the practice of marching is altogether neglected at any station. What I did say, and beg leave to repeat, is that it is too much neglected at all stations. According to the "Queen's Regulations," which I did not quote, because I assumed every reader to be acquainted with them, marches are to be at least weekly, they are to be "not less than eight or ten miles," but, alas! they cannot be much more if the strict letter of the "Regulations" is to be followed, since the time allotted is from nine o'clock till the regular dinner hour. Ten miles is good enough as a beginning, but the marching that is needed to inure men to their principal war work, which is not fighting but marching, is progressive marching, going up to twenty and even five-and-twenty miles a day. In some districts, under some generals, something has been done to act up to the spirit of the training I advocate. In the Cork district General Davies tells me he "insisted on every regiment being trained during the winter to be able to march twenty miles in marching order," which is certainly "better than anything done at Aldershot." Not only did the troops of the district march in the summers to and from the manœuvres which General Davies so successfully carried out at Kilworth till the money was refused by the authorities for any more of them, but in winter several regiments of the command marched in pretty full strength distances approximating to the maximum distance I spoke of. For example, on Feb. 23rd, 25th, and 28th last, detachments marched, two over eighteen and one over sixteen miles. On March 3rd about half a battalion Seaforth Highlanders, the whole battalion 1st Royal Irish Rifles, half a battalion 2nd Shropshire L. I., and a battalion 1st York and Lancaster marched over twenty-one miles, on the 6th the 1st Essex marched the same distance with about two-thirds of its strength, and on the 9th five small bodies marched sixteen or seventeen miles. Now, be it observed that these exceptionally good marches were carried out "by order of the Major-General commanding." They are the best that have been done in a district exceptionally well looked after in respect of

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marching. The return includes the best marches of eight battalions. What better proof do I need that, even in the Cork district, the men are not practised in the sort of marching that would be required of them in war?

Careful enquiries have shown me that I might have made my remarks on this subject stronger than they were, and one very distinguished Staff Officer who, when he had a battalion command, assiduously practised long route marching, has gone the length of saying that the Regulations on the subject are "habitually neglected," and are "seldom carried out." If my observations on this important subject should have the effect of calling the attention of generals commanding districts, and officers commanding battalions, to this most important item of a soldier's training, I am sure that one more step will have been taken to properly prepare our troops for work in the field. Mere neglect is the sole cause of the inefficiency in this respect, not calculated indifference. A word in season is sure to be enough in these days of hearty devotion to, and self-sacrifice in, the interests of the Service. Yours truly,

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

October 12th.

NOTICES OF BOOKS, ETC.

These notices give a brief abstract of the general scope of the volumes referred to, and, without reviewing them at length, call attention to their most striking points.

A History of Marlborough College during Fifty Years, from its Foundation to the Present Time. By A. G. BRADLEY, A. C. CHAMPNEYS, and J. W. BAMES. London: John Murray. 1893.

The authors deemed the Jubilee Celebration of Marlborough College a suitable time to record its history during the first fifty years of its existence, and the desire to do has resulted in a very interesting story, extensively illustrated, of the old school and its neighbourhood. To any one interested in these great public schools which have furnished so many brilliant men for the service of the State in so many and such varied capacities, all such school histories are of value, but one of this character, entering as it does into matters of personal and domestic history, must be especially so to all those who have had the pleasure and honour of passing their early days of education within its walls.

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The vicissitudes of the school and the difficulties it has had to surmount in its upgrowth are instructive, showing as they do the gradual change in the manners and customs of the time. It is somewhat odd to read in regard to the Cricket-History of Marlborough that "so long as a bowler, at any rate a recognised performer in that line, kept his balls straight, it was hardly considered etiquette to hit him, and there were accordingly no men placed in the long-field; the accepted practice being to play rather into the slips or by the draw."

All the school sports are referred to, as well as the formation of the Natural History Society and the Cadet Volunteer Corps.

Brown's "South Africa." A Practical and Complete Guide for the Use of Tourists, Sportsmen, Invalids, and Settlers. London: Sampson Low, Marston, & Co. 1893.

A valuable and handy book of reference of 230 pages, giving very tersely excellent advice as to lines of steamers, notes of places touched at, hints to travellers, advice as to clothing, railways, rent, &c., the nature and locality of the game, large and small, and lastly—divided into routes—short accounts of the places of interest. There are many clear outline maps and a good index. A most valuable handbook of South African travel.

I. *The Earl of Auckland.* By Captain L. J. TROTTER. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1893.

II. *The Marquess Wellesley, K.B.* By the Rev. W. H. HULTON, M.A. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1893.

In the Clarendon Press series of Indian Historical Retrospects these two volumes are numbered the sixteenth and tenth of the "Rulers of India" group. Like the remainder of the series they are well got up, indexed, and illustrated with maps and portraits. The first mentioned is of special interest, as dealing essentially with the policy which resulted in the first Afghan War of 1838-42. It is curious to notice the revulsion of feeling with regard to Russia that had taken place by that time. For long after the termination of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 there had been gratitude for help then rendered, rather than anxiety about aggression as regards Russia. But after the Russian successes in the Balkhan Peninsula and Persia in 1828, the feeling of security or indifference was changed to one of mistrust of Russian intrigues. Little by little it increased. Russian envoys appeared at Kabul. English "commercial missions" were sent to the Amir. Russophobia began to reign supreme in the minds of Indian officials.

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How Lord Auckland was then gradually induced to take active opposition to Dost Muhammad Captain Trotter fully explains, and the result of this premature attempt at a forward policy, which resulted in the massacre of Jagdalak and indirectly to the return of the Governor-General home, "broken in health and spirits by the disastrous issues of his Afghan policy."

II. "Warren Hastings," says Mr. Hulton, "alone, among his predecessors, can claim to be" the equal of the Marquess Wellesley. This is high praise, but the author fairly makes his claim good in the 208 pages he has devoted to his subject. He tracks the Conquest of Mysore, the conduct of affairs in the Karnatic, Tanjore, and Oudh, and the greatly criticised treaty with the Maratha power with clearness and lucidity; but he recognises to some extent "the comparative failure of his life," though he adopts Mr. Torrens' designation of him as the "Great Proconsul." This he certainly was, and "in India his work remains uneffaced and uneffaceable."

The Historical Records of the Royal Marines. Vol. I., 1664-1701. Compiled and edited by Major L. EDYE, Royal Marine Light Infantry; Barrister-at-Law, Middle Temple. London: Harrison and Sons. 1893.

Major Edye has taken upon himself a very onerous task, one that he recognises in his preface, and which is emphasised by the fact that only thirty-seven years are covered by this handsome, well illustrated, and well indexed volume of 600 pages of matter and forty-five of appendices.

In the history of a force distinguished both by its antiquity and the varied and continuous nature of its services, both on sea and land, it is, perhaps, not merely difficult, but almost impossible, to avoid what with a less important branch of our armed strength might be thought prolixity. Major Edye has in a very modest preface laid out for himself the line he thinks best fitted for the story he has to tell; but the only dread a sympathetic reader might have would be that if the elementary stage occupy so much space, the later and more modern history, more full of incident and adventure as the years roll on, might exceed the bounds that necessarily limit any such record. There need be no feeling of want of appreciation of the author's painstaking desire to do his duty by his subject with all loving care in making the above remarks. There is so much evidence of extreme earnestness to leave no one fact unrelated, to make the new regimental history—unlike its predecessors—complete, that hypercriticism is the last feeling a reviewer would care to display. Major Edye's aim seems to devote more

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attention to "such important matters as origin, internal administration and economy, and biography," and in principle he is right; but in writing the "family history" of a service that has so long shared in the naval and military glories of the Empire, there is a danger lest it become too ponderous. There are details—of domestic interest certainly, if time and space had not to be taken into account—such as the succession of officers, noted on page 227 and elsewhere, of courts-martial like that referred to on page 233, which, dating as they do as far back as 1679, are of little vital interest now. No doubt they are all facts the history of the corps; but all facts are not always worth recording, lest, in the mass of such detail, the general story be lost.

No one can accuse the author of want of zeal in his work, nor need he think it necessary to say that "to produce a piece of literature has been beyond his modest aim." All books are "pieces of literature," and Major Edye has no reason to be ashamed of his literary offspring; the only dread a reviewer could possibly have is that, dealing so minutely with his subjects as he does, it would take more than one life to bring the history to a completion. One is struck, in going through the book, with the great and earnest labour bestowed on it; and wishing to know more of what the Royal Marines have done one only dreads that so much time must (on the present lines) elapse, before the more recent exploits of the gallant corps can be recorded.

There is one thing also to be remembered, and that is, that the account of recent campaigns, or wars within the past fifty years, can better be dealt with now while many of the actors are living than a few years hence when many of them will have necessarily passed away. Recorded matter can always be compiled. Personal narratives and experience can only be written, and revised, while such campaigns are fresh in the memory of those who took part in them.

These remarks are in no sense designed to discourage the author of a well got-up, admirably illustrated volume, which, from title page to finis, bears full evidence of care. Major Edye must only bear in mind that life is short, and that he has still 292 more stirring years of which to tell the work of the Royal Marines.

"*Clear Round!*" *or, Seeds of Story from other Countries; being a Chronicle of Links and Rivets in this World's Girdle.* By E. A. GORDON. London: Sampson Low, Marston, & Co. 1893.

A very readable account of a voyage round the world, in which the writer visits the Far East by way of Canada and returns to the

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West by way of India and Egypt. The route is too well known, and has been too often described for us to expect much new or novel information regarding it; but the "Twice told tale" is as interesting as ever, and Mr. Gordon has described his adventures pleasantly. His reference to the rough life of the pioneer colonist in the North-West is rather startling to those "young fellows who fail to pass 'Exams' in England and will not *work*," but who "fancy it is 'awfully jolly' to come out and lead a life like Buffalo Bill's cowboys in the Wild West." Far from being a life of sporting ease, the daily programme is "to rise about 4.30, light the fire, prepare breakfast, put the house in order. . . . There is wood to be split and chopped; clothes to wash, darn, and mend; food to cook; bread to make; to ride around and tend the stock in daylight hours, and then the long, lonely evenings. Salt-pork from barrels is the staple food, with potatoes," and so on. One of these cowboys said he would thankfully take £100 to live in the old country, and strongly advocated that all boys should, as do the princes of the German Imperial House, learn a trade. The description of his stay in Japan is good.

Voyages of the Elizabethan Seamen to America: Select Narratives from the "Principal Navigation" of Hakluyt. Edited by E. J. PAYNE, M.A. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1893.

In the year of American Jubilee anything that relates to the early colonisation of the Continent is interesting, and Mr. Payne tells briefly the stories of the three greatest seamen of the Elizabethan era—Hawkins, Frobisher, and Drake—in their efforts to find the North-West Passage, to explore the West Indies, or to circumnavigate the globe. The introduction deals with the "Life and Works of Hakluyt," the history of the early discoverer of the Spaniards, and of the wealth of Polosi and Peru, "which gave the first effective stimulus to projects for securing a share in American enterprise to the English." Polosi was the most important factor in the process. The other factor was supplied by the French rovers.

There is much quaint information of these half slave-trading, half fillibustering worthies who helped to make the English name respected and feared, and the strong religious sentiment that underlay their rough and often cruel work is strongly shown in the "Articles and Orders to be observed for the Fleet" of "Captain Frobisher, General"; while in the "Directions for taking a prize" the men are warned that "if there be either young women or aged men, use them nobly, which is ever the nature of a generous disposition."

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Reminiscences of Seventy Years' Life, Travel, and Adventure, Military and Civil, Scientific and Literary. By a Retired Officer of Her Majesty's Civil Service. Vol. I. "Soldiering in India." London: Elliot Stock. 1893.

The writer, who does not give his name, invites criticism by stating in his preface that he "had literary predilections even at an early age," that as regards missions to the Mahommedans "they have come and are coming in in thousands," and that he has sometimes "poured forth my own soul in song as I journied." Not unnaturally, therefore, one turns to the first volume of his Reminiscences, numbering 558 pages—and not indexed—with the feeling that a somewhat grave task lies before one.

It has been often said that if every man noted down the events of his life, either personal or derived from the experience of others, such a volume would command attention. In this case the author, having passed his seventieth year, ought to have much to tell us; the only question is whether practically much of it has not been already told. There is not much that is new apparently, but the author has keen powers of observation, and nothing seems to have escaped his notice from the details of native life to the geology of the Himalayas. The book is readable, and to those entirely ignorant of Eastern life contains much that is interesting.

Leaves from a Sportsman's Diary. By PARKER GILMORE (Ubique) London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1893.

In a pleasant, very readable book of 341 pages, Mr. Gilmore has given a sportsman's account of his experiences and told it well. In his preface, too, he makes the rare observation that, "although it will be learned that I have made heavy bags, I have never done so unless the game could be utilised as food; for unnecessary slaughter, to my ideas, is one of the greatest wickednesses that the human family can be guilty of." All true sportsmen will cordially agree with this view and read his book with all the more kindly interest. He tells his story, not so much in a series of chapters, as in a series of brief incidents which deal with big game as well as small, with fish as well as "feather and fur," and in which tiger stories and the ferocity of eagles, "Two Salmon in One Cast," "Gun-shy Dogs," "Black Bas," and "Ignition in Gun-barrel" show the varied nature of the writer's experience and the notes he has printed. The book is a collection of personal anecdotes well described.

Australian Commonwealth (New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, West Australia, South Australia, Queensland, and New Zealand). By GREVILLE TREGARTHEN. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1893.

In "The Story of the Nations" series this volume ranks the

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thirty-fifth. Mr. Tregarthen tells, in thirty-three well-written chapters, the up-growth of England's greatest colony in the Pacific, beginning with the early discoverers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the departure of the "first fleet" under Phillip to the Maori Wars in New Zealand. Each colony is dealt with separately, and in each case the history is clearly, if briefly, told. The last chapter deals with the much vexed question of federation, which has, the writer thinks, "been regarded by the great bulk of the population with singular apathy." The volume is provided with maps, and well indexed, but the illustrations are by no means clear.

The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders (79th Regiment). By Lieutenant-Colonel PERCY GROVER, and illustrated by HARRY PAYNE. Edinburgh and London: W. & A. K. Johnston. 1893.

This is the third volume of "Johnston's Illustrated Histories of the Scotch Regiments," and is fully up to those of the Black Watch and Scotch Greys which have already appeared. It is excellently illustrated with sketches of the tartan, the uniform at various times, the death of Colonel Phillip Cameron at Fuentes d'Onor, &c., and its marvellously cheap price brings it within the reach of all who care to know the glorious records of the regimental past.

Particulars of the Warships of the World. Extracted from Lloyd s Register Book, 1893-94. Office: 2, White Lion Court, Cornhill, London. 1893.

This small quarto volume gives statistics of merchant shipping, a list of fast merchant steamers, and a list of dry and wet docks in all parts of the world, as well as a list with complete details of the warships of the world. For convenience of reference the edge of the book is coloured red, white, and blue, denoting the sections into which the work is divided. The information about each warship comprises signal letters, material of hull, screws, register, where built, when launched, displacement, dimensions, armour, armament, h.p., coal capacity, and speed. It is a very useful book of reference.

Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon-General of the Marine Hospital Service of the United States, for the fiscal year 1892. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1893.

A careful and interesting report of the work done by the Medical Service of the United States, with rules of the precautions taken to prevent the introduction and spread of cholera, the suppression of small-pox epidemics in Georgia, &c., a careful report on the disinfection of wooden vessels for yellow fever, and brief reports of fatal cases.

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LIST OF BOOKS, ETC., RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

Rulers of India: Lord Auckland, by Capt. L. J. Trotter. Clarendon Press.

Leaves from a Sportsman's Diary, by Parker Gillmore. W. H. Allen & Co., Ltd.

Lord Wellesley: The Rulers of India, by W. H. Hutton.

The House of Lords and the Bengal Cadastral Survey.

Financial Causes of the French Revolution, and their present bearing upon India.

A. B. C. Logarithms, by C. J. Woodward. E. and F. N. Spon.

A System of Free Gymnastics and Light Dumb-bell Drill, by Sergt.-Major S. G. Noakes.

History of Marlborough College, by A. G. Bradley, A. C. Champneys, and J. W. Baines. John Murray.

China and Her Neighbours, by R. S. Gundry. Chapman & Hall.

Die Riechswehr. Vienna.

South Africa, by B. G. Brown. Sampson Low & Co.

The River Powers in Central Asia, by Popowski. Constable & Co.

Johnston's Illustrated Histories of the Scottish Regiments, by Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Groves. W. & A. K. Johnston.

Australian Commonwealth, by Greville Tregarthen. T. Fisher Unwin.

German Field Artillery, by Captain McBean. Eyre & Spottiswoode.

Elizabethan Seamen, by Edward John Payne. Clarendon Press.

British East Africa, or Ibea, by P. L. McDermott. Chapman & Hall.

Reminiscences of Seventy Years' Life, Travel, and Adventure, Soldiering in India. Elliot Stock.

Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon-General of the Marine Hospital of the United States. New York.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India. Simla.

Travel and Adventure in South Africa, by Frederick C. Selous, C.M.Z.S. Rowland Ward & Co.

History of the French in India, by Colonel C. B. Malleson. W. H. Allen & Co.

The Zambesi Basin and Nyassaland, by Daniel J. Rankin, F.R.S. Blackwood & Sons.

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

Plan to accompany Article on "The Matibili and Their War Dance."- UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, December, 1893.

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THE

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THE MATIBILI AND THEIR WAR DANCE.

BY CAPTAIN W. SITWELL, *1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.*

RECENT events have brought the name of Lobengula, king of the Matibili, so prominently before the public, that an account of a visit to that powerful but somewhat inaccessible monarch, may be of interest to those who have friends in the forces which have been lately gathered together for his destruction.

On the 18th January, 1892, accompanied by one young officer Sub-Lieutenant Ashley Williams, the Regimental Sergeant-Major —now Sub-Lieutenant Drury—and Trooper Rae, all of the Bechuanaland Border Police, of which corps I was then Adjutant, I set out on a reconnaissance which was intended to reach Buluwayo, the Matibili capital, and obtain as much information as possible about the Big Dance, and all things connected with the armed strength of the country. We were all mounted on salted horses, with one pack horse for emergency, and a Scotch cart, drawn by six oxen, carried our blankets and food for three weeks.

A reconnaissance made three months before had found a practicable road along the line of the River Semokwi, the most important tributary of the Shashi, and it was proposed to follow the same route, and hit off the main road Tati-Buluwayo at a point believed to be much nearer our objective than it afterwards proved to be.

Two days' marching, with heavy rain at night, brought us to Sunday Camp, a well known halting place on the right bank of the

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Shashi; and at daybreak on the following day we prepared to in-span, hoping to effect a crossing at Cartridge Camp, ten miles further up the river. Judge then of our dismay on going down to fill our "Billys" for coffee to perceive a heavy white line stretching across the bed of the great sand river and bearing down upon us.

At this point the Shashi is some 600 yards across, but widens to half a mile a little higher up. For the greater part of the year, except where the bed rock outcrops and there are pools, a narrow ribbon of water, four feet wide and scarcely one inch deep, represents the stream, and even this frequently disappears altogether. The late rains had increased the volume of water to quite a respectable brook, almost ankle deep, but we now were about to see the river really come down. There certainly was no wall of water such as we had heard stories of, but rather a line of thick yellow scum and foam which spread laterally quicker than it advanced.

It did not appear to travel very rapidly either; indeed, it did enter our heads to throw saddles and everything into the cart and make a dash across; nevertheless, in a few moments, the water stretched from bank to bank, and in less than half an hour the huge flood was rolling twelve feet deep at the river's brink, and roaring like a thousand cataracts.

For ten miles we "trekked" along the margin, and, except for one capsize of the cart, reached Cartridge Camp without incident. A pleasant camping ground on a green haugh, with excellent grazing for the animals, and well concealed by a chain of kopjes: a single cartridge dropped by the administrator's escort, in 1887, and picked up by the reconnaissance, in 1891, is the origin of the name. The old Grobelar's Road crosses the Shashi here by a drift not more than 200 yards across, but the river was still rising and neither man nor horse could face it. As it was, one horse fell in while knee-haltered, and had not the head collar broken must certainly have perished.

The Semokwi joins the Shashi half a mile above Cartridge Camp, and next day we prospected far up stream in hopes of finding a passage. Trooper Rae and I did swim across, but only learnt a severe lesson thereby, for we essayed to cross the angle between the two rivers bare-footed. It was then noon, with the sun almost vertical overhead, and the hot sand burned intolerably. We were soon running at top speed, and happily reached a tree with shade enough to give us relief; even then, it was only by tying weeds and withies sandal-wise across our unfortunate feet, that we dared attempt the journey back, and we were badly blistered then.

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Yet another day of weary waiting, and though the river was undoubtedly falling, a new element of risk appeared in the shape of crocodiles; they appear to take advantage of a flood, and go up stream like salmon. One monster we saw travelling at a great pace in the shallows on the opposite side, but we were in no mood to delay longer. On the morning of the fourth day, crocodile or no crocodile, we swam the drift, and presently, with infinite pains, waded along a spit of sand, which had silted up diagonally across the river. The deepest part was only four feet, and the hither bank looked easy enough, so with great joy we broke up camp and started; but the bank, as viewed from the main channel and from dry land, were two very different things. Deep backwaters and horrible quagmires, unperceived before, intervened, and soon we were fairly in them. The oxen behaved as usual under trying circumstances, and it needed four long hours of loading, off-loading, flogging, and unremitting work before we found ourselves and all belonging to us on the other side.

We pushed on at once through the defile of Semokwi Point, and hit the Semokwi again at Wart Hog Bend, nine miles further on in a difficult country. Now, at last, we were fairly in Matibililand, and very, very tired. At sunset the animals were all tied up, our frugal rations cooked and eaten, and our blankets prepared for rest, when suddenly a human voice came faintly on the night wind, then another and another, and we heard a song being chanted, rising and falling with the breeze. We decided that if we had been seen, it was too late to run away, and so we slept and prepared to fight if need be at day-break. Again it rained all night, and we were thankful when the time came to saddle up and quit our miserable bivouac. We never saw a creature, and learnt afterwards that some harmless bushmen, and not a raiding party of the Matibili, had been the cause of our night alarm.

And so we marched on day by day, verifying the old landmarks one by one, and sticking closely to the river, for the veldt was very thick, and the bush in full leaf. Night after night, heavy thunderstorms drenched us through and through, and our blankets were rarely dry; indeed, the large buck sail we carried, which stretched over the cart, made a very tolerable shelter, became at length so leaky, that more than once we elected to lie outside in falling rain rather than endure the odious drip, which, though slower, was bound to wet us through before morning.

The altered appearance of the country since the last reconnaissance and the swollen rivers, caused us to mistake a tributary, not inappropriately named "Unknown Tributary," for the Semokwi itself, and our new course fairly puzzled us for a couple of days;

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however, we reached the hills at last, and the first night amongst them, fortunately, was clear and fine. Some observations of stars for latitude fixed our position tolerably accurately, and next morning we struck an old, but unmistakable, waggon track. It led us through a wonderful region of granite monoliths, solid lumps of rock like inverted tea cups, fringed with green where the rain had collected in clefts and fissures; most of them we found to be very easy to climb, and some of them practicable even for horses. Eventually we struck the main road, such as it is or was, at Lee's House, a ruined structure of green brick, and roofless, but still perfectly defensible. Mealies and water-melons were growing wild in what had been the garden, and marked the place as once having been lived in by man.

We had now reached the Inner Gate of Matibililand, *i.e.*, the Manyami Defile, a very short one, only half a mile, and it would require a good deal of forcing if held by an active enemy; but it cannot be compared to the Outer Gate, a ghastly pass, known as the Makobi Defile, some eighteen miles nearer Tati. In it the road is merely a rotten track alongside the bed of a river, absolutely impassable for wheeled transport in wet weather, and commanded on both sides for four miles. On the further side of the Manyami Defile we knew there was a strong military kraal, the head-quarters of the "Black" Regiment, and it behoved us to approach it with caution, for we had heard many tales of the reception given to strangers, especially white men, at these out-lying stations of Lobengula's warriors. We slipped past it in the night, and presently entered upon a minature Switzerland, a land literally flowing with milk and honey, and, what we thought a great deal more important, vegetables, all of which were brought to us in abundance by Makalakas, the slave race of the Matibili. Here and there we could just perceive the tops of their extraordinary little huts, perched on the top of inaccessible kopjes, for constant raiding has turned the Makalaka into something very like the cony of the Scriptures, and his dwelling place is entirely amongst the rocks. How he manages to drive his flocks and herds up into his caves and strongholds is a problem which must be seen to be believed. The rich cultivation, the green grass and flowers, and the innumerable little rills and mountain streams, which we now behold on every side, furnished a most refreshing landscape, after the hundreds of miles of Mapani wilderness, and the long stretches of thirst, to which we had grown accustomed in the Protectorate.

The ascent of the Dwala or Nek, a rise of 1,000ft. in about four miles, we accomplished without difficulty, and then we found ourselves on the High Veldt at last, a rolling, open country, with

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a definite horizon many miles distant, where a horse could really gallop, and a white man swing his arms freely, and feel what it was to live.

On February 1st, 1892, we marched into Buluwayo, the white man's portion of it, that is to say, for the Small Dance held at the new moon on January 29th was just over, the king had gone away, and the city was closed to the outer world until his return for the Big Dance at the full moon still twelve days distant. The Royal city of Buluwayo is not a city at all, but simply a Royal kraal surrounded by a "scar'em," or thorn fence. In the fence itself are some huts, and here and there patches of mealies and Kaffir corn, but nowhere a town in the sense implied by a "statt" in Khama's country or the Southern Protectorate. But the glory of the place is the King's Brick House, and the commanding nature of the position. For a position it is a magnificent one; a lofty plateau in an angle between two rivers, sloping gradually away for half a mile and more from the Royal dwelling, and finally dropping precipitously into the rivers beyond, a position whence it would be difficult to dislodge blacks, and absolutely impregnable if held with rifle fire.

The King meanwhile was in seclusion at one of his country seats some four miles off, and thither I went in due course, and enjoyed an audience.

The road to Umvootcha crosses the Umguza, or White Man's River, by a difficult and very rocky drift, deep water, and large rolling boulders, whilst a few yards further down stream is the famous pool of executions, an ill-favoured hole filled with crocodiles, from which there is no escape. It is not long ago that one of the king's waggons, laden with ivory, stuck in this drift, and a flood swept it away half an hour afterwards. The driver was ordered into the water next day to go and look for the waggon, but neither he nor the waggon have since been seen or heard of.

Arrived at the gate of Umvootcha Kraal, our interpreter—on this occasion a Colony Kaffir—commenced a long and high-flown harangue, giving the King all his titles, and informing him that soldiers of the Great Queen, who had come from far lands, were at his gate.

His Majesty was seated on a wooden chair, underneath a canvas sail which was stretched across two waggons to form an awning. Within the gate, sitting with their backs against the fence, were about thirty Indunas and others, the former distinguished from the rest by leopard-skin aprons, but all unarmed and all awaiting justice or else to be summoned in council.

We approached the great man in good order, saluted him as Ho Kumala," which means "O Lion," and sat down on the pole

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of one of his waggons. After a very short palaver, during which the monarch expectorated freely, and informed his nearest Induna confidentially that without doubt we were "the shining ones" come back again, by which it is presumed he alluded to the small detachment of the Blues which accompanied Sir John Willoughby on a former visit to Buluwayo, His Majesty ordered beer for the entire company, and this order was received with acclamation by his subjects; the King then proceeded to perform some elaborate ablutions, using real Pears' soap, which was the most English-looking thing we had seen for a long time.

It is not etiquette to address the presence unless first spoken to, and by the time we had got through about half a gallon of beer per man, proferred to us on bended knee by an enormously fat slave—the King's beer woman—who tasted it first to show that there was no poison, conversation flagged a good deal. It also began to rain, so, finishing the beer with a supreme effort, we once more saluted and took our leave.

Two mornings afterwards I had an opportunity of further conversation, which was much more satisfactory. In the first place I bade the interpreter tell the Lion, the son of the Black Cow, that the soldiers of the Great Queen were not pleased with the welcome of the Lion, for, though we had drunk his beer, no permission had been given to remain near his kraal and see the Big Dance, to which he grunted, "How do you know there is a dance, and why should you see it?" "O, Hippopotamus," replied I, "every white man knows that the children of the Lion dance before eating the first fruits of the year. We are captains of the Great Queen and have seen impis in many countries, yet we would fain view the warriors of the defender, whose fame has reached the ears of the Great Queen."

The King merely replied, "You are welcome," and ordered beef and beer for our refreshment. I then informed His Majesty that there was a kraal in England built very like Buluwayo,* but that there was no Veldt round it, and that the impis quartered there had no room for either dancing or fighting. "I know well," said the King, "that your country is all lands—*i.e.*, much cultivated—for your men go all over the world to find room." After a little further conversation on the subject of hunting dogs as presents fit for a king, the interview came to an end, though not before we witnessed the killing of an ox which was required to replenish the Royal larder.

The oxen were driven into a cattle kraal, and the King's chief cook stalked them as though they were wild beasts, one thrust

* Shorncliffe Camp.

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with a lance through the lungs, and in half a minute the beast lay dead.

Two days after the dialogue just reported, an incident occurred which shook the equanimity of the white residents at Buluwayo very considerably. It appears that immediately after our interview, the King's chief cook—he who slew the ox—told His Majesty that the white Induna—meaning me—had drawn a devil gun, or revolver, and pointed it at the Royal person behind the Royal back. The devil gun in question was my leather pipe-case, which certainly is shaped very like a miniature pistol holster, but I little realised how much mischief so harmless an article of equipment was about to produce. The King sent for Mr. Colembrander, the local agent for the Chartered Company, and demanded instant explanation in great anger. Happily that gentleman was a *persona grata* at court, and the offending pipe-case was produced and explained itself.

But no amount of explanation could suppress the public feeling, nor make up for the disappointment to the Body Guard Regiment, which had already paraded for the express purpose of bringing every white man in the place into the presence as prisoners of war.

During the remainder of our visit "slaves and spies" were the politest salutations we received from the people, though being unacquainted with the language, these civil speeches affected us but little; and the following day Lobengula ordered five regiments to leave the place at once, and go guard his Eastern frontier, for he was surrounded by enemies. This order naturally was displeasing to those concerned, for the Big Dance is also the occasion for big drink and much feasting. The King's command ended, however, with the suggestive sentence that "ants should feed on the ears of those who were slow to hear the King's word," so the five regiments marched off in quick time.

This incident put an end to the idea we had of returning to Macloutsie at once. Indeed, to have asked the King for "the road," as it is called, without waiting for the dance, would have been an admission that we had only come to spy out the land, and was not to be thought of. Moreover, our daily movements were perfectly well-known, and a moonlight flitting which we did think of, and which we eventually carried out, would at that time have brought a pursuing impi after us.

During the interval which still remained before the day of the dance, we scoured the country pretty well in all directions within a radius of twelve miles. From the top of Ndabizenduna or the Induna Hill—so called because twelve Indunas were executed

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thereon by Lobengula's order for treason—I was fortunate enough to secure some good sights for observation, and also got a capital view of the Insoogamini Regiment marching in from its kraals 100 miles distant.

They march by squads of twenty to thirty in single file, the warriors in feathers in front, and young soldiers and slaves following in rear carrying the great war shields. Attached to every two or three squads came a party of women, also in single file, carrying beer and refreshments for the troops.

From the same hill-top one can get a noble view: northward, the great forest land; east, the high veldt, stretching like a natural causeway into Mashonaland; westward, the river valleys sink down to the basin of the Zambezi and disappear in a faint blue horizon almost like the sea; and to the south are the mountain ranges, with the Buluwayo position standing out clear and unmistakable twelve miles off. The smoke of a thousand cooking fires hung over it like a delicate cloud, and as the strings of soldiers, filing through the wooded veldt beneath, caught sight of their rendezvous each company chanted its war song, and I realised that an army was gathering, the like of which I had never seen before.

And so the days sped by, each day stronger and stronger bodies of troops arriving to take over quarters in the grass huts which encircled the Royal city; and night after night an ever-increasing glare of watch-fires under the moonlight, and wonderful melodies and choruses till early morning in praise of the sun, and moon, and the harvest, and the high mightiness of my Lord the King who controlled it all.

From what I could learn there is a regular roster kept by the dance doctors of the songs to be sung each night, and once that song has been sung, it is death to repeat it, or even hum the tune. Throughout the intermediate period between the dances, though the white man feasted on new potatoes and vegetables of every kind, all things young and green are forbidden to "the nation," as they call themselves. Moreover the shedding of blood—human blood that is to say—is a capital offence, though this law is slightly relaxed in the case of anyone peculiarly offensive to the King or the aforementioned dance doctors. Every day queens, princes, and princesses of the blood, warriors of distinction, including two Indunas whom I had last seen on an Aldershot field day, the doctors themselves, and many a ring-kop besides, visited the white soldiers' camp, and graciously accepted as gifts any small keepsakes which they could not obtain for themselves by legerdemain or sleight of hand. Nothing came amiss from a yard of limbo to a

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Martini-Henry cartridge, whilst all our pipes and most of our knives disappeared the very first day.

At last, however, the medicine men announced the 17th February to be the Feast of the Waving of the Corn, and we were there to see it. Until the great day itself no weapons are allowed to be carried except sticks, and a staff about four feet long of shiny, yellow, hard wood, called a dance stick, is carried by all ranks. At the "Waving of the Corn," the tail of a wild cat or silver jackall is put on one end of the dance stick, and when some thousands of these are brandished together, they make a fairly realistic picture of a field of Kaffir corn. A great deal of singing, and not much dancing, was the order of the day, but we inadvertently got in the way of the final rush which ended the rehearsal. The dancers ran to the gate of the King's enclosure, and there broke and dispersed. Then began a very unpleasant quarter of an hour as we forced our way through the broken ranks in order to reach the King's house, though, to their honour be it said, the ring-kops protected us like men, and welted the young soldiers severely whenever there was the least attempt to hustle.

Indeed the attitude of all the real warriors and senior officers towards us during the whole of our stay in the country left nothing to be desired. On one occasion whilst riding round the various camps, Makwékwi, the Governor of Buluwayo and Commandant at head-quarters, and the Commander-in-Chief, who was with him, both advanced and very courteously pointed out that the direction in which we were riding would shortly bring us across the path of a regiment which was expected to march in immediately. Both these veterans carried on arms and chest the marks of lions killed by them in single combat with assegais, in addition to other scars gained in action.

Before daybreak on the 18th February, the entire population of Buluwayo turned out for bathing parade, and at 11 a.m. we took post in the Royal enclosure, and having saluted the King, who was seated in a Bath chair, prepared to watch the troops come on to the ground. They arrived by twenties, by hundreds, and by thousands, each party maintaining the same order of march. First, the Majockas, or young soldiers, equipped with shield, two assegais, and the dance stick; next, the warriors who have not yet been promoted ring-kops, in full dance dress, which consists of a kilt of skins cut into long strips, hair armlets, the same at the knee, an enormous tippet of black ostrich feathers, and a head-dress of the same about the height of a hussar's busby, also black, but often with one white feather let in in front, the tippet and head-dress are all made in one piece on a kind of string network, and they are

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very light, seldom weighing as much as two pounds; lastly, in each troop or company come the ring-kops, none of whom may assume the ring till thirty years of age, and not then until they receive it from the King. It is a real badge of knighthood, and respected as such, for to strike a ring-kop is always death. These wore the review order dress of the warriors, but their ox-tail ornaments on arms and knees were longer, and each man had his head-dress thrown back, so as to show the ring, whilst bound tightly to his forehead with a reim of otter skin was one long single crane's feather. They marched on a front of eight and sang a monotonous chant as they moved along, beating time every fourth pace with a slight tap of the dance stick on the shield, and a jump from the left to the right foot; whilst each party as it entered the enclosure, or approached near the King, broke into shrill but irregular whistling in salute.

Each regiment has its place assigned to it for the Big Dance, and this place never alters, though, as years go by, the size of the regiment fluctuates considerably. Sometimes after a raid it is reduced to a few hundreds; at others it may be 2000 or 3000 strong. When a regiment other than the Umbeezo, or Body Guard Regiment, becomes reduced by war or sickness, it is usual to draft the survivors into others, and raise a new corps altogether. For this purpose a body of young troops, called the Mabooto or reserve, is kept mobilised about Buluwayo. A state showing the numbers attending the dance is recorded by each man dropping a stone into a heap; the Indunas then report to their colonel, who reports it to the King. I did not see this register, but estimated the total strength at 11,000 of all ranks.

By now all the fighting men were on the ground, and presented a very handsome appearance indeed, deployed on a semi-oval front of about 1200 yards, and from eight to twelve men deep. This irregularity in their formation was due possibly to error in judging the numbers on parade, for no intervals are allowed, and in forming up the companies marched straight for the gap nearest to their own regiment and then dispersed, the three grades rallying round those of their own rank. In this way it was easy to see at a glance where one regiment left off and the next began, though the shields gave very little idea of distinction.

The proceedings began by a general advance of queens (fifty-eight of them), each one decked with at least a hundred-weight of beads, and distinguished from all other ladies of the court by blue jay feathers stuck into their hair, and floating garments of the brightest yellow. They formed themselves into little squads of from three to ten, and carried with them willow wands about seven

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feet in length. Generally speaking, the stoutest queen would begin by standing on one leg and marking time with the other until a sufficient number of Royal ladies joined her; then bursting into song, away they went in line, marking time at every second step, and beating the air with their wands.

By this time the assembled troops also began to get up steam, and each unit in the different regiments, after relieving their feelings by piercing whistles, began to sing, all singing the same song, but commencing one after the other as the spirit moved them. At every eight bars came a great stamp on the ground with the right foot, while the shield was lowered and all the dance sticks fell forward to the front with a loud swish, in imitation of a sickle cutting through the corn. As soon as the queens had led off, they were closely followed by most of the women in the place, all of them carrying the long willow wand, and some of them with piccaninnies strapped on to their backs. These ladies, I noticed, headed straight for some particular part of the line, and returned without going further up or down the ranks, from which I judged that they danced solely for the benefit of chosen warriors.

The masses of colour all in motion under a sky of the most brilliant blue, the never-ceasing thud of the bare feet, and the cohorts of armed men all moving in rhythm, made up a spectacle never to be forgotten. Nor were there incidents lacking to give life to the foreground of the picture, which was crowded with women and children, boys and slaves. A select part of forty or fifty men performed the duties of military police, and armed with branches of wacht-en-beetee thorn, cleared the ground in front of the King in a surprising way. One boy rushed past me, apparently with his brains running down his face, and his pursuer, turning for one moment to dash a woman to the ground, pressed on in his wild career and laid about him on the spectators' heads with a force and rapidity wonderful to see. In like manner, when forming up for parade, the line was kept perfectly dressed by Indunas, who taking the place of drill sergeants, soundly hammered every head they saw to be out of place.

For two hours the song and dance continued without variation, the King being all the while seated in his "buck kraal," attended only by the two head dance doctors, and with the Governor of Buluwayo at his right hand. Processions of young doctors, and slaves carrying jars of medicine entered the buck kraal from time to time, and as they passed no one was allowed to remain either standing or seated between themselves and the enclosure on their right hand, probably to prevent the shadow of the uninitiated falling on any of the sacred jars.

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Finally there came one tremendous rush from the military police, and the whole of the 11,000 warriors advanced in magnificent array. "Sgee! Sgee! Ha-Ha!!!" was the tune they marched to, with a tremendous double beat on the shield, and a most re-sounding thud of naked feet on the first two words.

As they came on they diminished their front in the most perfect order, and the wings shot out into the two horns, so well known to all who have seen or read about a Zulu Impi. By the time the centre arrived within 100 yards of the buck kraal, the horns had closed in until the chord of the arc was reduced from 1200 yards to 400 yards. Then out from his sanctuary strode Lobengula the King in fullest battle array, and the army halted with a crash of sticks and shields; a moment's pause and then up went all the sticks, and a tremendous cheer rolled out.

The King waved his stick, and the line retired without a sound. Then from both flanks, headed by Makwékwi and the Commander-in-Chief, advanced the Buluwayo regiment and the famous Umbeezo, or Garde du Corps. Once each counter-marched before the saluting point, and then, bursting into a new song, they filed past from right to left by companies, at what the French would call "pas gymnastique."

Thus they led the whole army out by the west gate, and in twenty minutes the great enclosure was empty. The second act of the drama consists in chasing a sacred black bull on the slopes outside the city until he drops from exhaustion. The distance covered is very carefully measured by the doctors and compared with the course run the previous year, which guides them, no doubt, in forecasting the events of the immediate future. This ceremony lasted about one hour and a quarter, and we were very pleased to accept the King's hospitality during the interval. Beef and beer of the best, and plenty of both, in the verandah of the brick palace, the interior of which is filled with the most extraordinary collection of rifles, guns, pictures, packing-cases, and miscellaneous gifts of all kinds, including a Bath chair from Lord Randolph Churchill, and a fine engraving of herself from Her Majesty the Queen. Lobengula's treasure, consisting of good British sovereigns and diamonds, is kept elsewhere, though ivory and lion skins, both of which are Royal perquisites, may be seen lying about rotting in any of the Royal kraals. Hippopotami and crocodiles are sacred animals, which may not be slain, but of elephants killed by white hunters Lobengula claims only the tusk which first touches the ground.

On re-entering the big enclosure, we found that the army had already returned and resumed its former position, but the order of the dance had changed. The original song was still in full swing,

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but the regiments stood at ease from time to time, and as they rested on their shields, the mightiest men of war came out to the front in leaps and bounds and standing jumps. Directly they appeared, the song ceased in their immediate neighbourhood, and a buzz of expectation ran along the line.

The warrior in front then went through an exact pantomime of the several combats he had fought, giving a thrust with his dance stick for every man he had killed. Each thrust was received with loud applause, which turned into jeers if there was least suspicion of the soldier exaggerating. For instance, one doughty man went through the motions of killing eight and was cheered vociferously, whilst another was hooted at the second thrust he made.

Simultaneously with this performance, which is called "keering," the chief captains and high officers of State presented themselves, one by one, at a respectful distance from the gate of the buck kraal, and delivered harangues at considerable length.

These speeches usually began with the King's titles, which of themselves require at least five minutes for effective delivery; they were followed by outbursts of vituperation and abuse. "The son of the Black Cow was a sluggard!" "The lion did nothing but drink beer!" and so forth; but each discourse was based on the same text, and demanded immediate bloodshed. As soon as the "keering" showed signs of becoming slack, the King appeared once more, and once more there took place the splendid advance in review order; but this time the King drew his assegai, and as he held it aloft those of the army flashed out together, and the whole nation yelled for war. Amidst a mighty uproar Lobengula went forth and, escorted by the nearest company, left the city by the eastern gate to throw his assegai in the direction of his enemies. The army waited his return, standing at ease, and relieving their anxiety by prolonged cheering and whistling. Very soon the escort was seen returning, headed by the King, all moving in slow time and singing as they came.

The nearest regiment caught up the song, and the remainder took it up in unison, until the air trembled with the sound. Arrived at the gate of the buck kraal, the king held up his stick, and after two beats of slow time, chanted the first verse of another song, the chorus of which was thundered forth by every person on the ground. After twenty verses or so he disappeared, and the line slowly retired, still singing as they moved. Presently a tall and very striking-looking ring-kop was summoned into the presence, and then received his commission as commander of the impi which was to raid in the course of the next few days.

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On the day after the Big Dance the slaughter of the oxen takes place. The day after that is devoted to cooking and feasting; then comes another huge bathing parade, and then, and not till then, the Matibili nation are at liberty to partake of the first fruits of the year, immediately after which the selected impi goes forth to war. An impi, be it known, is the term applied to an expeditionary force, which may be of any strength from fifty to 10,000 men, the real unit being the regiment.

We had now seen the Big Dance, and the lengthening shadows proclaimed that the hour for disappearing was at hand. We slipped quietly away, but the departure from the Royal enclosure took some little management, for the Matibili were full of the King's beer and very much excited. However, we got away eventually, and reaching our horses, saddled up quietly and were off.

A Matibili rush is estimated at forty miles, and every warrior of the nation is trained to cover this distance in a single night, and fight at cock-crow. Therefore, until we had gained a start equivalent to this charging distance, we could hardly reckon ourselves to be safe from pursuit, even if we escaped impediment on the way.

The journey home was by no means devoid of incident nor accident. Nevertheless, on the fifth day, we reached our outposts, and rode into head-quarters, a distance of 230 miles, after six days and two nights in the saddle, with very little food for horse or man.

Men and horses were on parade next day, which speaks for itself, and the former are not likely to forget what they saw nor the country they marched through.

WILLIAM SITWELL.

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NAMES OF BRITISH MEN-OF-WAR.

By Captain H. Mist, R.N.

The names borne by our "men-of-war" afford a study of great interest to anyone who loves to recall the splendid achievements of the long series of great British Admirals from the Howards, Drakes, and Grenvilles, of Elizabeth's time, to the "Mighty Seaman" who fell in the moment of victory at Trafalgar.

What a glorious history is that of the good old name *Dreadnought*, which figured at the destruction of the Spanish Armada, and, being perpetuated by a long line of successors, appears again in the conquering fleet at Trafalgar and still adorns the Navy List; or her companion the *Swiftsure*, who may inscribe La Hogue and Nile on the list of her battles, as well as the Armada and Trafalgar, the Alpha and Omega of great sea-fights fought under canvas. She too is represented in the Navy of to-day.

It is probable that the *Great Harry*, built by order of Henry VII. in 1488, was the first "King's Ship" in the modern acceptation of the term. She was burnt accidentally sixty-five years later. Her name does not appear again, though Henry VIII. built a *Henri-Grace-à-Dieu* in 1515.

In Elizabeth's time appeared many names which as we have seen are still represented in the Navy List. In addition to the two given above, the *Lion*, *Revenge*, *Swallow*, *Triumph*, and, above all, the *Victory*, shared in the destruction of the Armada, and in many a victory since, and are still on the roll of British warships. Of these, a *Victory* carried the flag of Sir Jno. Hawkins against the great floating castles of the Armada; that of Sir George Rooke at the battle of La Hogue; of Sir Jno. Jervis at St. Vincent; and of Nelson at Trafalgar.

The *Revenge* carried the flag of Sir Francis Drake into the thick of the Armada, and three years later was at Flores, commanded by Sir Richard Grenville, one of a squadron of six ships under Lord Thomas Howard.

A Spanish fleet of fifty-three sail was reported in sight, and the English Admiral ordered his squadron to weigh and each ship to fight her way through, but Grenville had ninety men on shore sick, and, said he,

> I should count myself a coward if I left them, my Lord Howard,
> To these Inquisition dogs and the devildoms of Spain.

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Then ensued the fight which Tennyson has immortalised in his glorious ballad. Grenville brought off his ninety sick men and placed them below on the ballast, and with one hundred fighting men undertook to fight the *Revenge* through the Spanish fleet. All that long summer day and the night which followed, the desperate conflict was maintained. In the morning the powder was almost spent, all the pikes broken, forty of her hundred men killed, and half of the living desperately wounded. Sir Richard himself lay dying, his surgeon killed at his side.

> And the masts and the rigging were lying over the side,
> But Sir Richard cried in his English pride,
> "We have fought such a fight for a day and a night,
> As never may be fought again!
> We have gained great glory, my men!
> And a day less or more
> At sea or on shore
> We die—does it matter when?
> Sink me the ship, Master Gunner, sink her—split her in twain!
> Fall into the hands of God, not into the hands of Spain!"

As Grenville's cousin Raleigh said, "The vast fleet of the Spaniards lying round her like dogs round a dying lion, and wary of approaching him in his last agony." The sinking ship was surrendered, Sir Richard breathing his last on the quarter-deck of the Spanish Admiral; and the *Revenge* herself, "disdaining to survive her commander—like Sampson, buried herself and her 200 prize crew on the rocks of St. Michael's." She had destroyed two ships, had killed or disabled several hundreds of the Spanish seamen and soldiers, and was slowly settling down when she struck her flag. Such an action deserves to be kept in remembrance.

In the time of the Commonwealth, Cromwell's formidable little fleet, under Blake, included many names perpetuated to this day, as the *Triumph*, *Ruby*, *Unicorn*, &c., but besides these were many others more characteristic, introduced under the Protectorate; these were, howerer, speedily changed at the Restoration. The king and the Duke of York, Pepys tells us, directly they came on board altered the names of the *Nazeby* to *Charles*, the *Speaker* to *Mary*, the *Dunbar* to *Henry*, &c. Charles II. also had ships called the *Sweepstakes*, the *Foresight*, the *Nonsuch*, which seem to us grotesque, but many of the ships of that reign bore names already historic, and still represented.

From the beginning of the War of the Succession in 1702, to the close of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the British Navy was always engaged, and the names of the great admirals and captains, from Benbow and Boscawen to Nelson and Collingwood as well as those of the ships which carried their flags and won their victories, are still preserved in the Navy List; and it is curious,

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but none the less true, that no first-rate bearing the name of Nelson has ever been sent to sea.

General actions, as Camperdown, St. Vincent, Nile, Trafalgar, are celebrated by being adopted as names for first-rates; some land battles, as Blenheim, Ramillies, and Waterloo are distinguished in the same manner, and several of the Peninsular Battles have given names to other classes of ships. Cressy, Poictiers, and Agincourt were similarly distinguished for many years, and there seems to be no very obvious reasons for discontinuance.

For many years, and until recently, we had a *Culloden* in the service. She made a conspicuous figure on the 1st June, and at St. Vincent, but, unfortunately, grounded on her way to the attack on the French Fleet at the Nile, but, notwithstanding a brilliant history, no one will regret the disappearance of a name originally brought into notice at the scene of the last conflict on British ground, when British blood was shed in civil war.

The name *Boyne* is wisely discontinued on similar grounds.

It was said that in 1852 the *Waterloo* was brought forward for flagship in the Mediterranean, but that, in consideration of French susceptibilities and the *entente cordiale* the *Britannia* was substituted; yet when the two fleets met at Besika Bay in ours were the *Bellerophon*, which had received Napoleon Bonaparte as a fugitive and had carried him a prisoner to England, not to mention the *Sanspareil* (captured), the *Trafalgar*, the *Rodney*, &c. The French had their *Valmy*, *Jena*, and *Marengo;* but neither of these names, nor even the *Jean Bart*, had any unpleasant historic reminders for us.

There are still a number of names first introduced by capture, as the *Temeraire*, *Sanspareil*, *Espiegle*, *Modeste*, *Immortalité* (the *Himmortalight* on the forecastle), *Imperieuse*, and a few others, but scores of them have been dropped.

At the outbreak of the French Revolution the Directory changed the names of the late king's navy, sometimes adopting most absurd and extravagant titles, such as the *Ça Ira* (captured by the British in 1795); the *Droits de l'homme* (driven on shore and wrecked by the *Indefatigable* and *Amazon*, the latter herself wrecked at the same time); the *Peuple Souverain* (taken at the battle of the Nile); the *Sans Culotte* (which ought surely to have been commanded by Mons. le Capitaine Brian O'Lynn. Another French ship captured at the Nile, the *Franklin*, was celebrated in our service as the *Canopus* throughout the first half of the present century, and served as a model for the best class of sailing two-deckers we ever had in the service; the *Asia*, *Ganges*, &c. It is to be hoped that a *Canopus* may yet re-appear. Another, the *Duquay*

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Trouin, was till quite recently a schoolship in Plymouth, as the *Implacable.*

It seems a pity that we have no representative of any ship taken from the Spanish either at St. Vincent or Trafalgar. The name "San Josef" is certainly worthy of being handed down from generation to generation of British naval officers, as the scene of perhaps the most extraordinary feat ever recorded in naval history. At the battle off Cape St. Vincent, Commodore Horatio Nelson, in the *Captain* (74), which, having been in close action with several of the enemy's ships in succession, had already lost her fore-topmast, was much damaged in her standing and running rigging, and had her wheel shot away, deliberately ran on board the then nearest antagonist, the *San Nicolas* (80), boarded her, and in a few minutes hauled down her colours; and being still annoyed by musketry fire from the *San Josef*, a three-decker of 112 guns, which was foul of the *San Nicolas* on the opposite side from the *Captain*, Nelson exclaimed, "Westminster Abbey, or victory!" and with the assistance of Captain Berry climbed on board the *San Josef* at the head of his boarders who had just taken the *San Nicolas*, and thus actually boarded and took the three-decker from the captured two-decker, and in his own words, "On the quarter-deck of a Spanish first-rate, extravagant as the story may seem, did I receive the swords of the vanquished Spaniards, which as I received I gave to one of my bargemen, William Fearney, who put them with the greatest *sang froid* under his arm." It should be remembered, however, to the credit of the Spaniards, that both of their ships had been severely mauled before the boarding, and that the Spanish Rear-Admiral lay dying of his wounds in the cabin of the *San Josef* when Nelson boarded.

The *San Josef* was a magnificent specimen of naval architecture of her date and was the flagship at Plymouth in 1848, where she was familiarly and irreverently spoken of by the midshipmen of those days as the "Holy Joe."

The practice of placing ships on the list of the captor's Navy in their original names is common to both French and English, and, accordingly, we find that at the battle of Trafalgar there were in the English line a *Temeraire*, a *Tonnant*, and an *Achille;* the French also had an *Achille* and a captured *Swiftsure* in their line, while a new *Swiftsure* fought on the English side. It is satisfactory to relate that before nightfall on that eventful day the French *Swiftsure* was once more under the British flag while the fighting *Temeraire*, the *Tonnant* and the English *Achille* were still in the hands of their captors. The French *Achille* would have taken her place with her namesake on our Navy List but that she was

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accidentally burnt and blew up, after having maintained a desperate fight with five different English ships, including her own namesake, in succession. It was believed, but not absolutely certain, that she had struck to the *Polyphemus*.

Frequently a number of vessels of a certain class are ordered and built at the same time, and the names of these vessels generally have some family resemblance. Thus, one class of brigs was said to have been named after the First Lord's pack of hounds. We still have a *Biter*, *Pincher*, &c., on the list. Another class was so notoriously crank and slow that they, almost all, were captured, or worse, foundered at sea. They were known in the service as the coffins. One group of ships was always spoken of as the "Forty Thieves." Shortly before the Crimean war the *dramatis personæ* of the *Tempest* were impressed, and we had the *Prospero*, *Miranda*, *Ariel*, and *Trinculo*, but by some oversight no Caliban! even in the days of the hideous armoured monstrosities or "floating batteries.

This class nomenclature has been very frequent of late. Thus, the "Gem" class: with not only the historic *Diamonds*, *Rubys*, &c., but such barbarous novelties as *Turquoise*, *Tourmaline*. The "C" class: *Champion*, *Conquest*, &c.; the "Admiral" class: *Anson*, *Howe*, *Rodney*, &c. Last and biggest, the new first-rate battleships which might be called the "R" class: *Ramillies*, *Repulse*, *Revenge*, *Royal Sovereign*, &c., all grand old historic names.

Sometimes names are dropped from the Navy List apparently when connected with some great disaster or disgrace. Thus the *Hermione* has only just re-appeared on the Navy List after an absence of nearly a century. In 1797 the crew of the *Hermione* mutinied, murdered all the officers but three juniors, seized the ship, took her into La Guayra, and gave her over to the Spaniards.

Two years later she was recovered by Captain Hamilton with the boats of the *Surprise*, in the most desperate cutting-out affair in the annals of the British Navy.* The *Hermione* again flew the English flag, but under the name *Retribution*, a name, which as well as *Surprise*, has been deservedly retained.

Avenger has not appeared since the terrible wreck in 1847 of the ship of that name on the Sorelli rocks. The *Captain*, which went down in the Bay of Biscay in 1870, has not been replaced, though it was from the *Captain* that Nelson boarded and took the *San Nicolas* and the *San Josef*.

A name which naval men would not willingly let die is the *Speedy*, though borne by the most ridiculous little rattle-trap that

* Unless the cutting-out of the *Chevrette* be excepted.

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ever carried the British pennant. The capture of *El Gamo*, a Spanish xebec frigate of thirty-two guns, is one of the most wonderful instances in history of what may be accomplished by the combination of amazing audacity with coolness of calculation and fertility of resource which always distinguished the career of Lord Cochrane, the commander of the *Speedy*, in the year 1800.

This amazing specimen of the British man-of-war was a brig of 158 tons, and threw a broadside of seven four-pound shot! The Captain tells us he could carry a whole broadside in his pocket. He obtained two twelve-pounders for bow and stern chasers, but found that there was no room to work them, and that the frames of the brig were too feeble to stand the concussion of such tremendous pieces. He next tried to substitute six-pounders for his fours, but the ports were too small. When he organised a new main yard, the fore-top-gallant yard of a captured French eighty-gun ship was supplied, but proved too large. The *Captain's* cabin was scarcely five feet high, so that "the only practicable method of shaving," says Lord Cochrane, who stood over six feet at seventeen years old, "consisted in removing the sky-light and putting my head through to make a toilet-table of the quarter-deck."

After a variety of adventures off the coast of Italy and Spain, then both under the sway of Napoleon, this wonderful *Speedy*, by her incessant activity in worrying the coasting trade, was specially marked out for the vengeance of the enemy, when one day she saw a large ship coming out of Barcelona and apparently steering for her. The officers of the *Speedy* believed her to be the ship from which they had escaped by a ruse a few days before, and wished to engage her, so Lord Cochrane told them that they should now have a fair fight, and stood towards the stranger, which had hoisted Spanish colours.

The *Speedy* had now only fifty-four officers, men, and boys all told. As they approached, the Spaniard fired two broadsides in succession at her pigmy antagonist, but failed to touch her, and Lord Cochrane, fearing that another might prove fatal before his own popguns could reach the enemy, ran his brig alongside, so close that the *Gamo's* guns were actually so high above the *Speedy* that they could not touch her hull, though they soon cut her riggings and sails to pieces. The Spaniards now attempted to board, but were foiled by the brig sheering off enough to prevent them from leaping on board. Twice the attempt was made and twice the little brig dodged, when Lord Cochrane, who had now two men killed and three wounded of his small crew, determined on boarding in his turn. The doctor took the helm and cleverly laid the brig alongside, and the captain, at the head of his forty-

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eight men, leaped on board, leaving the doctor in charge of the brig, the only living unwounded man on board.

Lord Cochrane never forgot to avail himself of every chance in his favour however apparently minute, or of any weakness or foible in the enemy's character however apparently absurd. "Calculating," he says, "on the superstitious wonder which forms an element in the Spanish character, a portion of the crew were ordered to blacken their faces," and thus disguised were ordered to board by the head. "The greater portion of the Spaniard's crew was prepared to repel boarders in that direction, but stood for a few moments, as it were transfixed to the deck by the apparition of so many diabolical-looking figures emerging from the white smoke of the bow guns, whilst our other men, who boarded by the waist, rushed on them from behind, before they could recover themselves from the surprise at the unexpected phenomenon." James ("Nav. Hist.") relates how Lord Cochrane, finding his little band hard pressed by overwhelming numbers, went to the gangway and shouted into his empty brig, "Send fifty more men immediately," which the Spaniards understood, and were proportionately discouraged. However, observing the Spanish colours still flying, Cochrane sent one of his own men and hauled them down, when the Spanish crew believing it to be the act of their own officers, gave in, and the *Speedy* was in possession of the *Gamo* frigate of thirty-two heavy guns, and 319 men!

In the broadside fight before boarding, the guns of the *Gamo*, as we have seen, could not touch the hull of the *Speedy*, whilst the four-pounders of the latter double-shotted, fired close against the frigate's side, and at extreme elevation passed through the side and burst up the deck under the feet of the men working her guns. The loss of the *Gamo* was fifteen killed, amongst whom was the captain, and forty-one wounded, a number exceeding the whole force of the *Speedy*, her loss being three killed and eight wounded. With a total of forty-two men left to him, Lord Cochrane somehow managed to control his 263 unhurt prisoners and to take both ships into Port Mahon, then a British possession.

The preposterous, almost incredible disparity of these two combatants the following figures may show:—Tonnage: *El Gamo*, 600; *Speedy*, 158. Number of crew: *El Gamo*, 319; *Speedy*, 54. Number of guns: *El Gamo*, 32; *Speedy*, 14. Broadside weight of shot: *El Gamo*, 190lbs.; *Speedy*, 28lbs.

The career of the *Speedy* was brought to a close by her capture, after three hours' chase by three French line-of-battle ships, when the French Captain to whom Lord Cochrane surrendered returned him his sword, with the remark that he "would not accept the sword

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of an officer who had for so many hours struggled against an impossibility."

During a cruise of thirteen months the *Speedy* had taken or retaken upwards of fifty vessels, 122 guns, and 534 prisoners. Her active and energetic commander was not long a prisoner, being soon released by exchange. In a former cruise, under Captain Brenton, the little *Speedy* had also done good work.

The present *Speedy* is a first-class gun-boat of 810 tons and 4,500 h.-p.

Discovery and *Resolution* are names honourable in the annals of exploration from the time of Hudson to Cook and Nares.

The *Foudroyant*, of which so much has been heard lately, carried Nelson's flag for a short time in the interval between the victory at Aboukir and his return to England. Only once was the *Foudroyant* engaged when Nelson was on board. A French squadron, consisting of the *Genereux* (74), a frigate, some small craft, and transports attempted to enter Malta, then blockaded by Lord Keith, Nelson being second in command and in charge of the inshore squadron.

The French, with 3000 troops and a quantity of stores and provisions for the relief of Malta, attempted to run the blockade, but were brought to action by the *Foudroyant*, *Alexander*, and *Northumberland*, and frigate *Success*, and to this overwhelming force surrendered, not, however, before the gallant French Rear-Admiral Perrée was killed, the only fatal casualty on board the *Genereux*.

A month afterwards Nelson, worn out in body and mind, hauled down his flag in the *Foudroyant*, and returned to England.

Only a few days later and the *Guillaume Tell*, the last line-of-battle ship of the French fleet at the Nile, attempted to escape from Malta, but was immediately seen and chased, first by the frigate *Penelope* (35), soon afterwards by the *Lion* (64), though with only two-thirds of her complement on board, and lastly, the *Foudroyant*, with Nelson's old flag-captain, Sir Edward Berry, came up and took the brunt of the action. Against these three the *Guillaume Tell*, under the gallant Rear-Admiral Decres and Captain Sautorier, made such a desperate resistance that when she hauled down her colours she had lost her three lower masts, their wreck disabling her port broadside, and the ship was lying an unmanageable log on the water, rolling so that she had to close her lower deck ports ; the English frigate was close under her bows, the *Lion* and *Foudroyant* one on either side, and she had 200 men killed or wounded.

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The French may well be proud of the *Guillaume Tell*, for though somewhat superior in force to the *Foudroyant* singly, or to the other two together, she was fought with such skill as well as courage that, of her three opponents, the frigate *Penelope* alone was in fit condition to take her in tow, the *Lion* and *Foudroyant* being too much disabled in masts and rigging.

The *Guillaume Tell* was added to the British navy as the *Malta*, and proved to be, with one exception (the *Tonnant*, also a capture), the finest two-decker in the service.

Many other names of ships which have contributed to the honour and fame of the British Navy are, or ought to be, perpetuated; enough has been said to justify the assertion that the naming of our men-of-war is not without importance as well as interest.

One suggestion to conclude. Ought not the histories of our celebrated warships to be carefully compiled and supplied by the Admiralty to every ship as she is commissioned? The editor of the "Royal Navy List" has done much in this direction; but much more remains to be done, as, *e.g.*, an account of the circumstances attending the capture of every ship now on our Navy List in her original and foreign name. The archives, as it were, of every successive possessor of celebrated ships' names should be always within reach of officers and seamen; while the great battles, in which any individual name has taken part, should be emblazoned in some suitable place in each ship.

H. MIST.

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FORGOTTEN VOLUNTEERS.

By Owen E. Wheeler

(Late Captain, Leicestershire Regiment).

Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona
Multi; sed omnes illacrimabiles
Urgentur ignotique longa
Nocte, carent quia vate sacro.—Hor. Car. IV. 9.

EVERYONE knows that not only in England and Scotland, but also in Ireland, there were Volunteers long before the present movement was started in 1859. But it may fairly be doubted whether more than one or two at most per cent. of latter-day citizen soldiers have any clear and comprehensive idea of the circumstances in which those pioneers of the present organization came to the front, and made their mark in English, sometimes in European, history. Exception may possibly be taken to this calculation on the ground that the annals of the Honourable Artillery Company of London, which claims to have been a mediæval fore-runner of nineteenth century Volunteering, have been opened up to a large circle of readers by the conscientious industry of its historian, Major Raikes. But, although unquestionably citizen soldiers, the members of the Honourable Artillery Company formed, until quite recently, a very close corporation, distinct in many respects from the Volunteer movements which the Company preceded, and with which it has been contemporary. Their original charter, granted to them by Henry VIII. in 1537, described them as the "Fraternity or Guylde of St. George: Maistars and Rulars of the said Science of Artillary as aforesaid rehearsed for Long-Bowes, Cross-Bowes, and Hand-Gunnes." And it was, perhaps, rather as a local guild than as Volunteers in the broad modern sense that the Company took the side of Parliament in the Civil War of 1642-8, and subsequently, in 1780, drove the Gordon rioters from the precincts of the Bank of England. Little more than a local guild, too, could have been that quaint relic of the Pilgrim Fathers, the "Antient and Honorable Artillery Company of Massachusetts," which was founded in 1668 on the model of its London prototype. But, apart from these two venerable institutions, there have been other Volunteers who have in their time come forward precisely as did

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the originators of the present movement, and are now well-nigh, if not quite, forgotten, *carent quia vate sacro.* I do not pretend to be by any means a *sacer vates*, but the following few notes which I have collected may, perhaps, be acceptable to others who do not want the trouble of separating details concerning this particular subject from a large mass of general historical reading.

Prior to the establishment of the Yeomanry by Lord Chatham in 1761, and the subsequent enrolment of Volunteers on a grand scale in 1798 and 1803, it is difficult to find, outside the annals of the Honourable Artillery Company, any but sporadic and rather unsatisfactory accounts of early attempts to form either in England or Scotland a citizen soldiery. Here and there, however, some interesting details are to be gleaned, as from the "Autobiography of the Rev. Dr. Carlyle" (Blackwood, 1860), a worthy minister of Inveresk, who was as a youth connected with a body of Volunteers in 1745 during the period of alarm created by the early successes of the Young Pretender. Carlyle's father had himself been a Volunteer in the end of Queen Anne's reign, when it had been rumoured that the elder Pretender was coming, and good citizens had hastened to learn their drill in malt-barns by candle-light in the hope of increasing the warmth of his reception. Carlyle *père* had taught his son the manual exercise, so the latter was not entirely a novice when the prevailing excitement drove him under the hands of an Edinburgh drill-sergeant in September, 1745. The corps joined by young Carlyle was one four hundred strong, which had been hastily embodied for the defence of Edinburgh on receipt of the tidings that Charles Edward had evaded Sir John Cope and was marching on the Scottish capital. The events leading to the capture of Edinburgh, and to the battle of Prestonpans, are too well known to need recapitulation, and are, moreover, not particularly pleasant reading. Where so many older soldiers lost their heads it is not surprising that the Volunteers should not have distinguished themselves, more especially as they seem to have received very little encouragement. Even when marching out through the town they were jeered at by the ladies, and pathetically implored by the Clergy to desist from their rash enterprise, which, coupled with the openly talked-of Jacobite sympathies of the Provost, was quite sufficient to prevent Volunteer ardour from effectually hindering the ignoble surrender of the capital to the Highland army. But it is pleasant to be able to add that even when the surrender had been decided upon, and the Volunteers had given up their arms at the Castle in anticipation of the enemy's entry, Carlyle and a few more bold spirits contrived to leave Edinburgh and join Sir John Cope, to whom, with commendable zeal, they applied for fresh

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weapons. The application was refused, but the Volunteers were freely employed for purposes of reconnaissance, and Carlyle, at any rate, may be credited with having taken a worthy, if not very warlike part, in the battle of Prestonpans. When the fight was over the young Divinity student offered his assistance to the victors in the tending of the wounded, but he does not seem to have taken advantage of the Pretender's subsequent proclamation allowing "all the Volunteers of Edinburgh" three weeks during which they might pay their court to him at the Abbey and receive a free pardon.

The Irish Volunteer movement of 1778 can be traced in a variety of accessible publications, of which, perhaps, Froude's "English in Ireland" is the one which will most readily suggest itself to the general reader. But a singularly graphic and well-focussed account is also to be found in Lecky's "England in the Eighteenth Century," in which, by the way, it is pointed out that on more than one occasion before 1778 Irish Volunteers had come forward and done good service. Notably was this the case in 1760, when Thurot had effected a landing on the Irish coast, and more than 2,000 of the northern peasantry, armed with scythes, had assembled round Belfast, formed themselves into regular bodies, chosen their own officers, and, without the smallest tumult or riot or drunkennesss, organized the defence of the town. Again in the Whiteboy agitation, during the Government of Lord Harcourt, Volunteers had been found extremely useful in pacifying the disturbed districts and hunting down the marauders. But the movement of 1778 naturally transcended these earlier exhibitions of the Volunteer spirit in that the circumstances were of an infinitely more serious nature. A French descent upon the Irish coasts was almost daily expected, the Presbyterians of the north were known to be in sympathy with the American demonstration against England, the Catholics of the other provinces were supposed to have a decided leaning towards France, and the English Government had left the Irish Protestants well-nigh defenceless. Internal anarchy seemed the only alternative to foreign invasion, and even the formation of an adequate militia was financially impossible. Accordingly the leading gentry took the matter into their own hands and, with the reluctant sanction of the Lord Lieutenant, commenced the formation all along the coast of associations for self-defence. The idea was taken up with the utmost enthusiasm, and within a few months the Volunteers numbered over 40,000 men, amongst whom 16,000 stand of militia arms had been distributed, and who were rapidly acquiring an excellent imitation of Regular discipline. Even the northern Presbyterians and the Catholics were seized with the

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contagion, the latter, in gratitude for the Relief Bill of 1778, assisting the movement first by the formation of independent companies, which were officially discouraged, and later by munificent money subscriptions. Volunteering, in a word, became the order of the day, Volunteer rank was given precedence in society, and "the command of a well-appointed corps was reckoned the highest distinction of an Irish gentleman." When the Irish Parliament met, votes thanking the Volunteers for "their spirited and necessary exertions" for the defence of the country were carried unanimously in the Commons, and with only two dissentient voices in the Lords, and in the beginning of 1780 arrangements were made for Volunteers of many districts to be assembled together at a number of reviews to be held during the ensuing summer with a view to accustoming them to movements in great masses.

But it was not long before this rapid formation of a great citizen army, wholly beyond the control and even the influence of Government, began to wear a very serious political aspect. In describing the condition of the country at the time Hussey Burgh passionately exclaimed to the members of the Irish Parliament in which he was Prime Sergeant, "Talk not to me of peace—it is not peace, but smothered war. England has sown her laws in dragons' teeth, and they have sprung up in armed men." Vigorous as the metaphor was, it was not wholly unjustifiable. But the sober historical student will probably prefer Lecky's cooler judgment to the effect that, during four years of extreme peril the Irish Volunteer movement "maintained the country in perfect peace, and made it so strong that no invasion was attempted; but at the same time, while proclaiming and proving its full loyalty to the connection, it exacted an entire removal of the restrictions that bound Irish trade, and a complete recognition of the legislative independence of the Irish Parliament." In other words, the Irish Volunteers not only became a great political power, but also demonstrated with much clearness that they were fully aware of the fact. Upon the political contingencies of these results it is not necessary to expatiate here. It is sufficient to note that when Lord Temple assumed the Viceroyalty in September, 1782, he declared in a confidential letter to a friend that no Government existed. "Those," he wrote, "to whom the people look up with confidence are not the Parliament, but a body of armed men composed chiefly of the middling and lower orders, influenced by no one, but leading those who affect to guide them," and, in another letter, "The country is too wild for reflection, and until you can oppose Parliament successfully to the Volunteers nothing can be done." In March, 1783, we find a provincial meeting of Volunteers

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at Cork engaged in passing purely political resolutions, and in the following November things had come to such a pitch that a great Volunteer Convention was held at Dublin with a view to discussing not questions affecting the discipline or the constitution of the Force, but a comprehensive plan of franchise reform which was subsequently offered to and rejected by the Irish Parliament, and which takes its place in the constitutional history of Ireland as the Volunteer Reform Bill. The refusal of Parliament to entertain this remarkable measure marked the turning-point in the political progress of the Irish Volunteers, who had indeed some time previously showed signs of degeneration. As Temple had noted in his letters, the high-class element of which the Force in its early days had been mainly composed, had largely yielded to an infusion of riff-raff anxious to secure arms and greedy of political influence, and although it seems that in 1784 there were more than 70,000 men still enrolled, the quality left much to be desired, and the beginning of the end had come. In 1785 the Government resolved, with the support of Grattan, to organise a militia chiefly for the purpose of rendering the Volunteer force unnecessary—a measure which, however, was not effectually carried out until some eight years later—and in 1790 the Volunteers were so dwindled in numbers, so generally discountenanced by the better classes, that their suppression by proclamation in 1793 was not only a measure rendered imperative by the glamour cast over Ireland by the French Revolution, but one practicable without any sort of dangerous opposition.

The English Volunteer movement of 1798 may be studied in detail in the pages of the "Annual Register," but a more accessible account of at any rate its inception is to be found in Chapter XXV. of "Alison's History of Europe," from which one may well, in passing, transcribe a useful comparison of the Volunteer movement in England and the corresponding institution of National Guards in France. As Alison points out, the evils arising from the latter were wholly absent from the former, because in the case of England the crisis was a national one, while in that of France it was purely social. "It is generally safe to intrust arms to the people when their national feelings are roused: it is always perilous to do so when their social passions are excited and they see their real or supposed enemies in a particular class in their own country." And the argument is fortified by the contrast between the unanimity of Great Britain during the latter period of the war with Napoleon and the convulsions of France and Germany after the dethronement of Louis Philippe in 1848. Moreover, it is to be noticed in connection with the Volunteer movement of 1798 that it not only inflamed patriotic ardour, but was also largely instrumental in expelling

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disaffection which had previously been decidedly prevalent, more especially in the big manufacturing towns. In its inception the movement was due not so much to actual fear as to uncertainty, the doubtful destination of the great armaments preparing in the harbours of the Channel and the Mediterranean being naturally a source of intense anxiety to a country the entire Regular army of which numbered only 109,000, with some 63,000 militia. The idea of supplementing the latter by Volunteers was taken up with special vigour by Dundas, then Secretary for War, and in the "Annual Register" for 1798 will be found a very business-like minute by that statesman giving an outline of the measures he proposed should be taken in this direction. In May a Bill was brought in to permit the militia to volunteer to go to Ireland, and to provide for the raising of Volunteer corps in every part of the kingdom, and within a few weeks one hundred and fifty thousand citizen soldiers were under arms. In December, 1798, Parliament granted half-a-million towards the expenses of Volunteer corps, both cavalry and infantry, and in the middle of the following year several important reviews were held before the King. At one of these, held in Hyde Park in June, upwards of 8,000 men were distributed in 65 corps—companies were then, generally speaking, independent—at another, in July, 2,300 Surrey Volunteers paraded on Wimbledon Common; and at a third, in August, 5,000 Volunteers of Kent. A yet bigger review was held in Hyde Park on June 4, 1800, at which 12,000 metropolitan Volunteers were present, and a muster of nearly 5,000 is noted in the "Annual Register" as having been held on July 22, 1801.

The unsatisfactory nature of the negotiations which succeeded the Treaty of Amiens, and the consequent renewal of the war with France in May, 1803, are matters with which all schoolboys and most grown-up people are familiar. But no historical work with which the writer is acquainted gives a really satisfactory account of the extraordinary hurry, worry, bustle, confusion, and uncertainty which must have been simply continuous during those stirring times, and have rendered it difficult indeed for average Englishmen to keep their heads. Keep their heads, however, they did to some purpose, and in no direction more conspicuously than in that of setting themselves to resist the invasion for which the First Consul lost no time in making portentous preparations at Boulogne. The lively imagination of M. Thiers describes these preparations as inspiring *un frisson de terreur* through every rank of English society, but the *frisson* was either curiously short-lived or directly productive of a singularly alert and business-like condition of the national nerves. For it was not anticipated even by Napoleon

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himself that the vast fleet of flat-bottomed transports which was being constructed at Boulogne would be ready until autumn was well advanced, and yet by the end of summer we have Addington calculating that, on our side of the Channel, upwards of 300,000 Volunteers had been accepted and enrolled under a special Act passed in July. Prominent among those who came forward at this juncture was William Pitt, in whose Life, by Lord Stanhope, appear many most interesting details illustrative of the general course of the movement, as well as of the part taken in it by Pitt, then Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, who very soon succeeded in forming an excellent Volunteer regiment of three battalions, each a thousand strong. This corps he never tired of drilling, although he had much else to occupy his thoughts, and his constitution must by this time have been seriously impaired. Right willingly, too, he seems to have lent his aid in the formation of other corps, on one occasion giving vent to a pleasantry which certainly deserves reproduction in this sketch. It seems, says Stanhope, that one battalion which he was forming, or in the formation of which he was being consulted, sent to Pitt some draft rules which were full of cautions and reservations. In particular, the words "except in case of actual invasion" were constantly recurring. At length came a clause that at no time, and on no account whatever, was this precious corps to be sent out of the country, to which Pitt, losing patience with such cautious patriots, maliciously affixed the previously oft repeated words, "except in case of actual invasion!"*

In October, 1803, the king twice reviewed the Volunteers in Hyde Park, the number present on the two days being estimated at upwards of 27,000. The familiar appellation of the Inns of Court Volunteers is said to date from one of these reviews, for when the Temple Companies had marched past before him, the king inquired of Erskine, who commanded them as Lieutenant-colonel, what was the composition of the corps, to which Erskine replied that they were all lawyers. "What! what!" exclaimed his Majesty, who was in high spirits, "all lawyers? all lawyers? Call them the Devil's Own—call them the Devil's Own!" In the following December Pitt made a memorable speech in the House of Commons with reference to the Army Estimates, in the course of which he partly anticipated a recent suggestion by proposing that in addition to the adjutant, and, of course, its own officers, each Volunteer battalion should have a field officer of the Regular

* The above was written some weeks before I had the pleasure of reading Lieut. Morant's able article on "The Volunteer Movement under Pitt," in the *United Service Magazine* for November.

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Army attached to it. He subsequently explained that he by no means desired the latter to have any control over the Colonel Commandant of the Corps to whom, on the contrary, he would be subordinate. "My sole and great object was to afford the commandants of corps the benefit of the assistance and advice of officers, not their superiors but from experience competent to aid them." Now that we are being somewhat frequently urged to appoint paid ex-officers of the Regular Army to the command of Volunteer corps, Pitt's suggestion, which at the time found little favour, may possibly be thought to be of practical as well as historical value.

Leaving the English Volunteer movement of 1803 to gradually die a natural death after the failure of the Boulogne experiment, and the battle of Trafalgar, we may now turn to Scotland which *tali tempore iniquo* was not wanting in a similarly brilliant display of patriotic sentiment coupled possibly with a specially well-ordered regard for its own exposed position in the event of an invasion. As early as 1794 a regiment of Edinburgh Volunteers had been formed consisting of ten companies the captains of which were all retired military officers resident in the city. In his "History of the Edinburgh Rifle Volunteers" Stephens tells us that the uniform of the corps consisted of a blue coat with black velvet collar, gold epaulet, white kerseymere vest and breeches, the buttons engraved with the words "Edinburgh Volunteers" and with the arms; also a round hat with cockade and feathers—a *tout ensemble* which for showy unserviceableness would surely be bad to beat. This resplendent regiment was soon afterwards made a Royal one by special favour of George III. but was disembodied on the declaration of the Peace of Amiens. On the renewal of war in 1803 it was again called out as the 1st Regiment, Royal Edinburgh Volunteers, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Hope, Lord Advocate and afterwards Lord Justice Clerk, whose famous Regimental Orders issued on the 18th October, and containing elaborate instructions on a variety of subjects from the reception of cavalry to the use of flannel night-caps, afford a delightful combination of excellent good sense and flaming enthusiasm. Of the warlike effervescence in Edinburgh at this period a vivid and entertaining account is to be found in "Memorials of His Time, by Henry Cockburn" (Adam and Charles Black), which was published by Lord Cockburn's executors in 1856. The Scottish capital is described as having become like every other large town a camp, and as continuing so until the peace in 1814. "We were all soldiers, one way or other. Professors wheeled in the College area; the side arms and the

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uniforms peeped from behind the gown at the bar, and even on the bench; and the parade and the review formed the staple of men's talk and thoughts." Brougham, Jeffrey, Francis Horner, and others of light and leading, are mentioned as figuring among the "soldiers," Cockburn himself being the proud captain of the left flank company of the "Western Battalion of Midlothian Volunteers." Officers were forthcoming in plenty, and an excellent inducement to join the ranks was provided by terror of the Militia ballot which involved those whom it hit in military service during the whole war. In a word the movement was a *furore*, and "any able-bodied man of whatever rank who was *not* either a Volunteer or a local militiaman had to explain or apologise for his singularity." It is interesting to add that Cockburn himself had a judicially clear perception of the utter incapacity of these same Volunteers, so far as *immediate* service was concerned. Wanting in field-training and equipment even the "Foot Gentlemen," as the "swagger" Edinburgh corps was called, are denounced as useless except as police, their very drilling being "universally vitiated by the essential and obvious defect of their not being moved in large masses."

Particular interest is attached to Lord Cockburn's account of the zeal displayed at this juncture by Walter Scott, in whose Life by Lockhart there occur numerous allusions to the movement and his own part therein. As yet unknown, except as a *bon camarade* and the author of a few slight pieces in the Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border—the Lay of the Last Minstrel was not published until 1805—the future Wizard of the North was, according to Cockburn, one of the most pronounced citizen soldiers of his day. "It was not a duty with him, or a necessity, or a pastime, but an absolute passion, indulgence in which gratified his feudal taste for war and his jovial sociableness. He drilled, and drank, and made songs with a hearty conscientious earnestness which inspired everybody within the attraction." He belonged to a corps of a Volunteer Light Horse, the formation of which he himself suggested, and this fact prompted no doubt the sympathetic allusion to the Glenallan Yeomanry in "The Antiquary." Everyone will remember the amusing description in the same romance of Baillie Littlejohn of Fairport in his character of a perfervid Volunteer and will recognise as scarcely less entertaining a picture which Lord Cockburn draws of Scott himself as a Light Horseman, and which is truly worthy of reproduction on canvas. Scott's troop "used to practise, individually, with the sabre at a turnip, which was stuck on the top of a staff, to represent a Frenchman, in front

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of the line. Every other trooper, when he set forward in his turn, was far less concerned about the success of his aim at the turnip than about how he was to tumble. But Walter pricked forward gallantly, saying to himself, 'Cut them down, the villains, cut them down!' and made his blow, which from his lameness was often an awkward one, cordially muttering curses all the while at the detested enemy."

The Edinburgh Volunteer regiments were all disbanded after the Peace of Paris, but the 1st R.E.V. were again heard of during the so-called "Radical War" of 1819-20, and for some time furnished a daily guard of 100 men at the Castle, thus disengaging the Regulars. For this they duly received the official thanks of Major-General Sir Thomas Bradford, who, by a pleasant co-incidence, we find to have been himself an old English Volunteer, he having, in 1793, according to the *Doncaster Volunteer Almanac*, raised the "Doncaster Rangers," an independent company of a hundred men, and subsequently received a Commission in the Regular Army in recognition, presumably, of this good service.

Some curious and valuable memorials of early Volunteering in England, Scotland, and Ireland are to be found illustrated in Chap. xiii. of Tancred's "Historical Record of Medals and Honourable Distinctions" (London: Spink and Son). Many of these decorations were given as prizes for skill in marksmanship, but several are purely commemorative of the existence of individual corps, notably one having reference to an association of a hundred Irish gentlemen equipped at their own expense and under the command of the "Honourable Colonel Cavendish." This association was known as the Cork True Blues, the medal, on the obverse, showing the Company in review order, with the date Nov. 4, 1745, and on the reverse Pallas spearing the rebellious Titans. That the practice of issuing medals in connection with Volunteer corps was a pretty general one may be gathered from the fact that there are medals extant of regiments from London, Edinburgh, Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Nottinghamshire, Rutlandshire, Surrey, Nithsdale, Wicklow, Tyrone, and a variety of other scattered shires and centres.

To these instances of pre-'59 Volunteering in Great Britain and Ireland an interesting addition can be made by consulting a little work published only this year and entitled "Volunteering in India," by John Tulloch Nash (London: Philip and Son). Although not professing to give a complete account of what was done by Volunteers during the Sepoy War, Mr. Nash furnishes a useful as well as fairly readable record of the services of the Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry Regiment, which was formed at Calcutta by order of the Governor-General in July 1857, and which under

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command of Col. Richardson, C.B., subsequently did excellent service in the disturbed districts of Upper India. This corps, of which Mr. Nash was a member, sprang into existence within a week of the Governor-General's order, and mustered at its first parade two hundred and fifty-eight sabres. The *personnel* was composed of young military officers recently landed or left idle through the mutiny of their regiments, clerks in the Government and mercantile offices, midshipmen belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental and other companies' ships, indigo planters, and various unemployed Europeans and Eurasians. The uniform consisted of brown corduroy breeches over which were drawn jack-boots reaching above the knees, loose blue flannel blouses, and grey felt helmets enveloped in huge white pugarees. The horses were young and serviceable, and the arms a heavy sabre, light carbine, and revolver. The troopers of this workmanlike regiment were engaged in fourteen actions, in all of which they displayed the utmost gallantry and good discipline, their conduct throughout the long marches, exposure, fatigue and harassing patrol and picket duties which fell to their lot forming the subject of a special notification issued at the close of the Mutiny by the Viceroy, Lord Canning. The Corps was disbanded early in 1859, thus bringing it almost in touch with yet a new Volunteer movement more solid and enduring than any of its predecessors, a movement which through good report and evil report has at least gone forward, and which, although still open to criticism as not displaying a uniform standard of unexceptionable efficiency, contains tens of thousands of men *omnium consensu* able, willing, and trained to make a good stand against the best troops that could be brought to face them.

OWEN E. WHEELER.

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BATTALION ORGANIZATION.

By a Captain of Infantry.

THE tenacity with which the cavalry arm clung to the troop system long after it had become an indisputable anomaly encourages a belief that the reluctance of many officers to reconsider the organization of infantry is due in a great measure to that dislike to change, which is so deep-rooted in the English Army.

It is in this belief that I venture to plead for the rehearing of a proposal often mooted: the formation of the battalion into four companies.

The arguments for and against such a change naturally divide themselves under two headings, (1) the effect on the peace training of the troops, (2) the tactical requirements of war. As however it is under the latter heading that I anticipate the most opposition, I hasten to get to close quarters with it at once, with the hope that the arguments under the first heading may afterwards be the more easily listened to.

The tactical considerations which have been urged against the adoption of a four-company battalion are, I take it, three in number:

(a) That in civilized warfare the small company unit postpones the inevitable moment in the fight, when the control of the infantry firing-line passes from the company commander to the section or group leader.

(b) That the small company is especially suitable to the tactical requirements of our minor expeditions in uncivilized countries.

(c) That a change from our present organization will entail a diminution of the number of officers with a battalion, thereby weakening the morale of the men in action.

Let us take the points seriatim:—

(a) To conjecture what the next campaign between civilized troops will really be like is an extremely difficult matter.

The magazine small bore rifle, smokeless powder, and the great improvements in artillery will almost certainly produce as marked a change in the method of solving battle problems as did the breechloader in 1866 and 1870, and until such problems can once more be worked out with bullets and shrapnel, the matter is not one on which any man can have the assurance to dogmatize.

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Yet, if an appeal is to be made to the most recent experiences of war, it is a fact difficult to surmount that every nation in Europe, which has taken part in the four great campaigns since the Crimean, has adopted the larger company unit. No doubt, it is not unfrequently urged that the real reasons of the adherence of France and Germany to their present organization are the difficulty and expense of maintaining more officers; but such an argument implies that the two greatest military powers in Europe are deliberately sacrificing the efficiency of their principal arm to mere numbers, a proposition very difficult to accept by any who consider the immense self-devotion with which they have laboured to attain such efficiency. Further, too, if the tactical leading of infantry be thought out, it does not appear at all clear what special advantage the small company unit ensures for the battalion. The experience of the past has resulted in such organization of the large tactical bodies that the commander of each has in the main not more than four principal combatant units under his immediate orders; thus an army corps comprises (leaving out accessory units), three divisions and the corps artillery; a division of cavalry, two brigades of cavalry, its horse artillery, and mounted infantry; a division of infantry, two brigades, and the divisional artillery; a brigade of infantry, four battalions; a company of infantry, four sections; and the battery, it is now generally held, should be reduced to four instead of six guns. It appears, in fact, to be an accepted principle that four is the greatest number of units which one man can effectively command. On what possible grounds then is a battalion excepted from this rule? Some twenty-two years ago, when the facts of the 1870 campaign were but imperfectly known, and its tactical lessons but partially apprehended, a curious opinion arose that the battalion commander was no longer of any importance, the control of infantry action having passed from him to the company leaders; but the most casual student of military history and recent tactical ideas should now be aware that though battalions and brigades can no longer be manœuvred in action by the voice of one man, yet the intelligent direction of higher authority is more than ever necessary to success in battle, and that, since such tactical cohesion is infinitely more difficult to maintain under the modern conditions of the fight, its requirements must be primarily considered in all questions of organization.

Thus, while it mattered little how many companies a battalion was split up into, when tactically such sub-division was merely nominal and the battalion in the most crucial moments of the fight lay, as it were, in the hollow of its colonel's hand, nowadays it is a very material question whether the orders and intentions of the

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battalion commander cannot be more easily imparted to, and more thoroughly comprehended by, four company commanders than by eight. The fewer the number of units, the more probable will be an intelligent execution of the commanding officer's orders, and the closer the compensation between the units themselves; in a word, the influence of higher authority will be the longer maintained.

But let us consider for a moment the details of our present system of attack. Taking the general directions of the drill-book, it is clear that a mingling of companies is quite unavoidable. Thus we are told that the attack may often be developed from the screen covering the front of the battalion. As this screen consists of men extended at very considerable intervals, they will almost certainly be too engrossed with watching and firing at the enemy to clear the front, and will thus become hopelessly mixed with the true firing line, and will know their own company leader no more.

Again, the book lays down that each company in the firing line is to furnish its own support, such support being pushed up into the gaps as required. It is, of course, meant that the gaps should be the gaps of its own company. By careful practice on the barrack square, the two firing line sections may be taught to close in on their inner flanks, as casualties are dropped, and then leave room for the two supporting sections to come up. But, except as a pretty show for the annual inspection, all such elaborate drill is a waste of time, and a violation of the tactical principle, that the support must be used to give a fresh impetus to the front line by filling up the gaps made by the enemy's fire. If the defence be well handled, its fire will be concentrated on that portion of the line from whence the main attack appears developing, and the gaps thus made must be filled by a converging of the supports, without regard to the mixture of company units. Such mixture is inevitable. Again, so long as it is possible to subordinate the mere animal instinct of fighting to the requirements of the tactical situation, that is almost up to the supreme moment of the assault, each commander of a unit should aim at a general control of the whole unit rather than at a personal leadership of any one part to the neglect of the other; and since the captain cannot be in the first stage of the attack with both firing line and supports at once, such general control even with small companies is then only possible for him. The adoption, therefore, of large companies would not alter the nature of the control during the first part of the attack, while it would certainly largely increase the probability of its continuance after the reinforcement by the re-union of the supports with a portion of the fighting line belonging to their own company.

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(*b*) It is difficult to precisely fix the organization most suitable for service so varying in character as that of our small wars; but it is indisputable that any system which gives to the company leader the actual command and discipline of his men in quarters will lead to good results, when companies are detached in the field. The splitting up of battalions, and the formation of mixed bodies for special service, is a notorious feature of our small expeditions; in truth, such a practice (though, perhaps, at times more frequently adopted than was absolutely necessary) is often unavoidable. Under our present system an officer who has been taught for twenty years that the discipline of his company rests in the hands of the colonel, its instruction in drill with the adjutant, and that its food, clothing, ammunition, and transport are matters which Providence, acting through the medium of the quartermaster, may be fully trusted to provide, is suddenly thrown on his own resources in a hostile and strange country. That Chards, Bromheads, and Grants have been found forthcoming in the hour of need speaks volumes for the natural self-reliance of the Anglo-Saxon gentleman, but it does not alter the fact that our present battalion organization trains officers to a perpetual looking to others for orders and assistance, gives them no chance of acquiring the habit of facing responsibilities, and ignores the truth that the leadership of men in war and their organization in peace time are two questions which cannot with safety be separated. Is it then unfair to partly attribute to the teaching of so faulty a system the mistakes in organization and tactical leading, which a study of the Laing's Nek, the Majuba, the Isandwhana, and some of the Soudan fights reveals?

But, apart from such considerations, it does not seem clear why in savage warfare, wherein the old-fashioned close formations have been found to be the most effective, and the personal control of the battalion commander remains paramount in action, it should be necessary to cling to a smaller company-unit than that which all other armies adopt for use in civilized warfare, where extension is unavoidable.

(*c*) The third and last objection is not easy to be understood. Our present number of officers are either necessary or unnecessary. If they are necessary, surely the War Office is not such an absolute slave of the Treasury that a change in organization, with a view to efficiency, must involve such suicidal cheese-paring. If they are not necessary, *cadit quæstio*; but if they are, the example of Lord Randolph Churchill's fate will probably deter any future Chancellor of the Exchequer from outraging common sense on a question so closely affecting the national safety.

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Such then seem roughly to be the tactical pros. and cons. as to the proposal of this paper, and I am in hopes that it may be realised that even looking merely at this side of the case there are many points, which cannot be ignored, in favour of a larger company.

Let us pass on to the other aspect. No infantry in Europe has greater reason to be proud of their record than that of the English Army. That at the greatest of all military epochs they should have been pronounced by one of Napoleon's marshals as the finest infantry in the world speaks volumes for the excellence of that regimental system which covered our colours with so many glorious honours. Now the success of that system was in the main due to two causes: first, the *esprit de corps* which it fostered, and, secondly, its suitability to the tactical conditions of the day. When Crawford, at Busaco, "with a shrill tone," ordered the 43rd and 52nd to charge, they moved like one man, led by their own lieutenant-colonels; it was the regimental commanding officers who formed and held together the battalion squares against Kellerman's charges all that long afternoon at Quatre Bras; it was the regimental commanding officers who formed up and dressed the thin red line on the further bank of the Alma; it was at the order of its lieutenant-colonel that that Highland regiment at Balaclava received in line the Russian cavalry. Regiments of infantry in those glorious actions lay at the supreme moment in the grasp of their commanding officer. Well was it for them that that grip was not only firm but familiar; well was it that the officer upon whom, in the moment of danger, the soldier knew his life and hope of victory hung, was he whom in peace time he had learnt to regard as his protector and leader, the supreme controller of his professional destinies.

But tactical conditions have altered. No longer is it possible for the lieutenant-colonel to handle with his own voice his battalion in action. On him it still rests to plan, to control, to launch into the fight the units of the battalion, but the execution of his orders he must entrust to others, and it is to the captain or perhaps even to the group-leader that the soldier must look for guidance in action. To continue then, the old system whereby the commanding officer was a demi-god to the men, and the captain an ornamental subordinate is to put new wine into old bottles with a vengeance. And yet the system still continues to this day, the colonel commands the battalion in every detail, almost the entire work of the regiment is done by adjutant and quartermaster, and the captain, except during musketry and field-training, is but a cypher. He issues his men's pay, he sees their kits are complete

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and rooms clean, he stands by the colonel's side at the orderly room with open defaulter book, and inspects some half a dozen files on parade afterwards; but what work is this for a man of fifteen to twenty years' service, older than Wellington at Assaye or Napoleon at Marengo. He sees his contemporaries entrusted with grave responsibilities both in Church and State, while he himself has no more authority, no higher sphere of work, than twenty years ago when, as a young lad, he was given command of a company during his first leave season with the regiment. Is not the endurance of such a system for ten months out of the twelve utterly disheartening to any good soldier? Do not the best men take any billet rather than be content with the utter want of scope afforded by company work in quarters to any man who takes an intelligent interest in his profession? Do not mistake me. I am not making any sluggard's protest against the irksomeness of attending to details, of seeing that the men's boots fit, and that their messing is well cared for. All this every decent soldier does gladly, but it is the want of something more, or some little share in higher responsibilities that makes him fear that if he should ever attain command, his moral energies will have become too cramped by long years of bondage to permit of his regaining the power of independent action.

And yet no one will deny that it is essential for the efficiency of the Army that the best and keenest officers should remain with their battalions. The days are gone by when perfunctory performance of regimental duty would suffice. Heaven delivers the Army from the spread of democratic ideas, yet the fact cannot be ignored that officers, in common with all others in authority, must expect criticism; and the criticism of the sergeants' mess and the barrack-room is none the less keen and shrewd because it cannot be proclaimed on the house tops. Further, too, there has been proof of late that the officers cannot depute their responsibilities to non-commissioned officers without discipline being sooner or later endangered. Thus it is that the very best men are now more than ever needed for regimental duty.

Yet it is not from want of realisation on the part of the authorities of the altered conditions of regimental life, and of the higher and more soldier-like aspirations of the regimental officer, that the system remains unchanged. They themselves have deliberately created these aspirations. Professional examinations have removed from the Army those who despised all study of the rudiments of their profession, while the loafers, who would like a regiment to consist only of mess and band, are now few and far between. Aldershot, the Staff college, tactical societies, and tactical literature, the outside pressure

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of the growing public interest in military matters have all, too, been powerful factors. The infantry officer of to-day aims not only at being the gentleman and good all-round sportsman his father was before him, but also at making himself a thorough master of his profession.

Recognising this, the authorities have with most beneficial results entrusted company commanders with the field-training and musketry instruction of their men, and have even lately added to their authority by slightly increasing their very limited powers of punishment.

And yet, notwithstanding all this, the regimental machine is not merely furnished with motive power from the orderly-room, but is still entirely controlled and guided by that bureau of central authority.

It is not that commanding officers have not loyally accepted these changes, but that the changes themselves do not go far enough. What is needed is that the instruction and discipline of his men throughout the year should be freely entrusted to the company commander, that his recruits should be trained under his orders, that all parades not actually commanding officer's drills should be under him, that he should deal with all offences not requiring an award of imprisonment or trial by court martial, and that promotion up to the rank of corporal should be a pure company matter. Some such system as this would establish the company commander in the same relative position in quarters as the tactical conditions of war will inevitably place him in on the field of battle. Common sense calls loudly for such a change, but the present organization of the battalion renders it impossible. Before such real authority can be safely entrusted to the company leader, there must be a certain continuity of command in that unit, that is, if the company commander goes on leave, or otherwise becomes ineffective, there must be always another officer in the company fit and available to assume the reins of power. To ensure this with our present organization is not practicable. Every leave season the most junior second lieutenants are unavoidably placed in charge of companies, and it is thus essential that the company command in quarters should at present be limited to such pure routine responsibilities, as with close orderly-room supervision any young lad of six months' standing can be safely trusted to carry out. But with a four-company battalion this difficulty would disappear. Let that "fifth wheel in the coach," the second in command, be done away with, and a major, captain, and three subalterns be allotted to each company, and each company unit would be certain to always have one of its own officers of sufficient experience available for its

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command, while the wretched system of pitch-forking subalterns from company to company would cease altogether.

I write in full expectation of a severe scolding from a certain excellent newspaper which last year raised a pitiful cry that the squadron system in the cavalry was taking the discipline of the regiment out of the hands of the colonel and adjutant. But my readers, whose military knowledge is more in touch with the present time, will need no reminder that under no imaginable system would the final responsibility for the discipline of the regiment rest on other shoulders than that of its colonel. To the commanding officer will fall the onerous task of selecting for the approval of the highest authorities, those officers fit for the duties of company commanders, and upon the commanding officer will continually rest the responsibility of seeing that the officers so selected prove by the results they produce that they are fit to continue in that position. No longer hampered with petty details unworthy of his rank and seniority, the colonel will be able to devote his entire energies to a higher, and far more beneficial, interpretation of the true functions of supreme command. Surely only a writer who would advocate that an "adjutant's regiment" is an ideal one, could argue that such a system leaves the colonel a nonentity.

One more point: To the infantry officer who believes in the premiership of his own arm, there are few things more annoying than to see how unfavourably its subalterns contrast professionally with those of a sister branch of the service. This superiority, I believe, is entirely due to the splendid training secured by officers of the Royal Artillery in the definite responsibilities for the subdivisions which are handed over to them as soon as they join a battery. Now it is quite true that in theory the same system exists in the infantry, and that a great many battalions honestly attempt to carry it out, but the results are most unsatisfactory. In the first place, there are only twelve subalterns for a home battalion (and one of them is assistant-adjutant) to place in charge of sixteen half-companies; and, secondly, the perpetual taking away of subalterns to command companies, renders it almost impossible that they should be considered really responsible for the efficiency of their half-companies. The system, excellent in theory, in practice becomes a dead-letter, and the subalterns relapse into an existence most admirably calculated to imbue them with the notion that the profession of arms demands the exercise of neither brains nor energy.

Larger companies would meet the difficulty. With four officers, besides a commander to each company, two could be allotted to each half company, so that during the leave season one would be

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always with the regiment and responsible for it; while the training of non-commissioned officers and men, and the instruction especially of recruits, would make considerable demands on the time and energy of the officers, and be an excellent test of their efficiency and ability. Nor need such a system interfere with that love for manly sport which characterises the English officer. Aldershot generals, staff-officers, and adjutants figure often enough in the hunting-field, and are in no danger of being metamorphised by field-days and office work from English gentlemen into German drill-sergeants; but loafing in the ante-room would be lessened, the running up to town or to this and that race meeting would be diminished, and the hour for breakfast on non-duty days made a little earlier. A little grumbling there would be at first, but the majority in their inmost hearts would welcome the change, provided it were sensibly worked.

One other advantage in conclusion. Every commissioned officer and adjutant knows how difficult it now is to find colour-sergeants possessing the double qualification of being good disciplinarians and good accountants. Adopt the four-company system and the difficulty (as it has in the squadron) would cease. The smart man and good drill becomes the colour-sergeant, and the steady trustworthy clerk the pay-sergeant.

Such, then, are the chief advantages which I venture to think the organization of a battalion in four companies would effect. The change could be carried out on the lines I have indicated without costing the country a penny. It would bring the interior economy of a battalion into harmony with the tactical conditions of modern wars; it would greatly increase efficiency, and would give renewed energy and zeal to those upon whom the sound condition of the infantry mainly depends—the company commanders.

A CAPTAIN OF INFANTRY.

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MACMAHON AND VON KAMEKÉ.

By Captain Markham Rose, R.M.A.

October, 1893 has seen pass away, within a few days of one another, two of the leading actors in a most eventful day of French history—the 6th of August, 1870.

On that day France received and Germany delivered the "two crushing blows" of Woerth and Spicheren. Both MacMahon and Von Kameké performed many and varied services, in war and peace, both before and after, for their respective countries; but to no other part of their illustrious careers has so much interest been turned, or so much criticism attached, as this 6th of August.

Of course MacMahon did better known work, possibly at Sevastopol, at Magenta, in Algeria, or during his long government of a reviving country. Yet from a military point of view I think Woerth is as important as any of these. At Woerth he stands out in history, as he stood out on the spur below Elsasshausen, as the representative of an enthusiastic confident France changed in one day to a downcast, flying nation hunted by the tireless steps of what was to become United Germany. And of this coming Empire, with its eagerness to test against the Gaul the lessons of the offensive learnt in its struggles of 1866, Von Kameké in his impulsive move forward to arrest Frossard at Spicheren is also a fitting image. His eager, over-hasty initiative is a fair example of the method of onslaught exemplified by Von Kirchbach's Corps at Woerth, and of the whole tactics of the First Army till the reorganisation after Gravelotte.

In twenty-three years death has caused many a gap in the ranks of the leaders of the Franco-German war; the Emperor, the King, Moltké, Bazaine and the Prussian Princes; and after the departure of each, more and more distinct has grown the reading between the lines of the history of that eventful year. But the two generals I am referring to have never lacked their share of hostile criticism. MacMahon will descend to posterity chiefly as a brave soldier, not a great one. Certainly his generalship at Woerth cannot be highly praised, though it is possible that it has been too much condemned by disappointed patriots or political opponents. That some 40,000 French soldiers were driven back in confusion by almost three times their numbers cannot count as a disgraceful

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defeat, especially when the proportionate losses on either side are considered. Yet, that the French numbers were so inferior must, in the first place, be considered partly MacMahon's fault, for De Failly's Corps had been placed under the Marshal's command at his own request on August 5th, and the two leading divisions of this corps were round Bitsche, only some twenty miles from Woerth, on that date. Now, although MacMahon had telegraphed to De Failly "join me at once," yet he weakened that message by another sent shortly after, "Where and on what day will you join me?"; and had been apparently contented with the promise that Lespart's division should march from Bitsche at 6 a.m. on the 6th to Philipsberg. The fact of the matter is, that MacMahon was suffering at that time from the universal French complaint of over-confidence. His exclamation, when the Emperor had placed the 5th and 7th Corps under his orders, of "Messieurs les Prussiens, je vous tiens!" (if he really uttered it, for now that "J'y suis, j'y reste" is asserted to be a myth, some doubt will surely be thrown on this expression also) fairly indicates his feelings. There can be little doubt from his letter to the Emperor on the morning of the 5th that he still contemplated taking the offensive; and that he did not expect to be attacked on the 6th is equally clear from all his actions previous to the main German onslaught. When Ducrôt informed him at 7 a.m. that the enemy was attacking, he declared that it must be merely a demonstration, for the Germans could not be so far advanced! There is this excuse for him that his experiences in the Crimea, Algeria, and Italy had been confined to campaigns in which the French arms were in the main victorious; and he had serving under him those African troops which formed the very *élite* of the army, troops which were superior to the Imperial Guard itself. The cries of "à Berlin" were still ringing in his ears. Yet a very few minutes' cold calculation should have told him that the German forces victorious at Weissemberg on the 4th must be near at hand, and prisoners captured there and his own scouts told him that these foes numbered some 100,000 men.

His confidence was never shaken, he did not order his troops to entrench, feeling that French soldiers needed no earth-works to repel the Germans; or possibly on account of his preconceived determination to take the offensive. So little had he grasped the actual situation that he wrote to De Failly on the 6th, suggesting that the 5th Corps should take the enemy in flank. It is curious that his "idée fixe" placed the encounter for the 7th, and that the Crown Prince also did not intend to fight till that day.

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I will not waste space here in venturing to describe the French position. Though good, it was not so strong but that fortification would not have improved it, and there was a better one in front and a better behind, in the defiles of the Vosges. The alternating spurs and re-entrants, though good in the eyes of the French tacticians of that day, were not suited to the dawning tactics following on the introduction of rifled weapons. The spurs were to be swept throughout the day by the relentless iron of Kirchbach's long line of guns (for which there was so good a position on the opposite slope); while the French had no fitting place for their own artillery, already sufficiently handicapped by deficient "material."

MacMahon's left was weak, in that the woods gave cover to turning troops, but the trees denied artillery positions to the assaulting Bavarians, and for various reasons the 4th Bavarian Division could never pass the clearing between the Langensulzbach and Froeschwiller Woods. On the right the position might possibly have been improved had the clearing in the Niederwald been similarly utilised. As it was, the wood, though not in itself a source of weakness, hid from the Marshal, Von Bose's turning movement, which decided the fortune of the day. In fact, MacMahon, with his eyes ever turned to the frontal attack, must be accused of having greatly neglected that part of the line, both in his dispositions and preparations before the battle and also during its progress. The 11th Corps, utterly disorganised by its passage through the Niederwald, might have been long prevented from debouching by the employment of a larger part of the reserves, yet these, to the extent of ten battalions and the artillery reserve, were kept opposite the centre, to be pushed forward at length in desperate frontal counter-strokes, intended to retrieve the fortunes of the day. It was in this last work we get another glimpse of the character of the man. Never thinking to save his army by an early retreat, under cover of his intact left and reserves, he threw his last battalion into the fight, following a Napoleonic maxim, which contains more than a grain of truth. These fresh troops, pushed forward on an attacking foe perfectly spent in the very moment of success, might have turned the balance; and De Failly's troops advancing with ardour, instead of with "military precautions," might have come on the flank, and Blucher like, have pressed a flying invader across the frontier.

Remember how Desaix, coming to a beaten Bonaparte at Marengo, so changed the fortune of that battle that the fresh arriving troops conduced to a second conquest of Italy.

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Perhaps the cases are scarcely parallel, since one of the greatest defects of the Froeschwiller position was its unsuitability for a counter-stroke; there were no issues to the front. Yet a real counter-stroke made by a fresh division should undoubtedly have inflicted such a serious check on the Prussians that MacMahon could have withdrawn quietly to defend the defiles of the Vosges. The Crown Prince's army was really paralysed by its losses in success. The 5th Corps was incapable of further effort having lost nearly 6,000 in the struggle, the 11th was so disorganised that the 1st Algerian rifles were able to drive them back to the Niederwald, and it needed the arrival at 4 p.m. of the Wurtemburg division (coming up without orders) to give a fresh impulse for the *coup de grace*—the capture of Froeschwiller. This was certainly MacMahon's best chance of checking the invasion—if Lespart's division had only arrived in time. Seventeen miles is a long march, but the guns had been audible most of the way, and the railway was to a certain extent available. On the other hand, the Marshal sent no word to hasten them, and has said that they could not have arrived in time. He trusted to himself alone, yet his last bid for victory was the attack of Maire's Brigade on Woerth at 1.30 p.m. It was bravely launched, but the guns—this never-to-be-too-much-praised Prussian Artillery—swept away the gallantly advancing French, and the battle was irretrievably lost. From this time the 1st Corps had to front two ways, and was crushed beneath overwhelming numerical superiority.

Doubtless MacMahon would have done better not to have attempted this counter-stroke on Woerth, but saved his whole available troops for one extricating effort later on—but it is so easy to be wise after the event. Yet much French strength on this day was wasted in partial offensive returns—a style of combat which showed the African troops to the best advantage.

The attack on Froeschwiller showed that it was absolutely necessary to withdraw the left, which had so gloriously held in check the Bavarians throughout the fight; and this division (Ducrôt's) was the only portion of MacMahon's force able to withdraw in order; it alone was able to check the not too vigorous pursuit of the exhausted Germans, till they stumbled on Lespart at Niederbronn, taking his last "precaution" in arriving just too late for the battle!

Now for MacMahon succeeded the weary days of disorderly retreat on Chalons, and his torture-time of unwilling march to ruin and Sedan!

What glimpse in this his day of trial do we get of the military character of the man?

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The disaster was in part due to the bad administration of higher authorities than he, and to the French ideas and training of the time; thus regarded, MacMahon's faults were not too glaring, nor scarcely more numerous than those of his opponents. Had he been victorious how different each one would have appeared!

His gallant rejection of De Failly's help, his noble confidence in his tried African troops with their ever-glorious bayonet assaults on the disordered, ill-led Germans, and his excellent firmness in risking his last battalion to gain this most celebrated of French victories! How lightly would have been treated his disregard of the change in armament shown by his choice of position, his neglect to entrench, and his launch of cavalry in attack over difficult ground against unbroken infantry!

However, taking things as they were, the responsibility of the defeat hangs on his shoulders—he made more mistakes than the Germans, in that he allowed his army to be crushed, and thus it is permissible for a Frenchman to write of him that he passed for a warrior in that he wrapped a great military mediocrity in reserve and clever silence!

So be it. He committed errors at Magenta, was too firm at Woerth, too vacillating on the march to Sedan, too "something else" to the end of all time!

"I come to bury Cæsar, not to praise him."

Let us turn to the pleasanter task of lauding German initiative.

We have seen how MacMahon played his game; Von Kameké's, though equally rash, was very different. If MacMahon had confidence, gained from previous French history, Von Kameké was pushed on by Moltké's plan of strategy, which almost enjoined that the enemy was to be attacked wherever met. So that when he heard that Frossard had retired from the Saarbrucken ridges it was quite in accordance with the Prussian spirit of that time that he should request permission to occupy them. And further, when he found that the peaceful possession of them was incompatible with the French occupation of the Rotherberg, it was not altogether singular that he should send forward his leading brigade to the attack of that commanding bluff. I say not singular, for in the commencement of the war it was rather the fashion than otherwise for advanced guard leaders to commence actions of serious importance on their individual responsibility—a fashion which has its disadvantages. Yet his movement brought success to the German arms on this field as well—such a success that no further resistance was offered to the invasion of Lorraine till the first of the battles round Metz, eight days later.

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Still Von Kameké's successful action has probably been submitted to as much hostile criticism as MacMahon's failure, whether rightly or wrongly is doubtful; but in the early afternoon it is certain that a bold counter-stroke by the French 2nd Corps would have found few troops opposed to it, and should have been successful.

As late as 2.30 p.m. (the action commenced at noon) the 14th Division was disposed somewhat as follows:—Von Kameké's rear brigade (the 28th) just coming up, had been ordered along the railway and into the Saarbrucken forest to act against the French left, and so was not available to support the 27th Brigade, the last man of which was pushed into the first line. On the Prussian left were only two-and-a-half battalions about the Rotherberg and the Gifertwald—entirely isolated and opposed to a whole French division—the nearest fresh German troops coming up were at least three miles away.

If Frossard had been watching the action closely, and had made a resolute counter-stroke here, he could scarcely have failed. He was, however, still at Forbach, and had not grasped the situation.

It may have been the very audacity of Von Kameké's action which saved him from defeat; yet seeing the situation as he first saw it, was it such great audacity? Perceiving scarcely any troops in front of him, and hearing such strongly confirmed reports that the French were retiring, it is not altogether strange that he came to the conclusion that he had only a rear-guard in front of him. The cavalry which had been out in front had not told him of the French camps about Stiring and Forbach, and the camp at Spicheren was invisible from the Saarbrucken heights.

It has been suggested that in this state of ignorance, and seeing how much of the ground to the front was veiled by thick woods, his proper step would have been to make a reconnaissance in force, but is this course to be recommended to a side superior in numbers, and eager to seize the initiative? A reconnaissance in force is right when directed from Alexandria with a view to deceive newspaper correspondents and a partly-educated opponent like Arabi; is right when troops have learnt caution by years of struggle with one another, and where the ranks know its exact intention as in the American Civil war; but can it be said to be suited to the first encounters of two nations locked in a death struggle for very existence? The drawing of first blood is vital to the "moral" of the ranks!

An advanced-guard leader has much responsibility attached to his office, and it is as much to his discredit to be greatly delayed

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by a small force, as, on the contrary, the securing of the outlet of an important defile would redound to his lasting credit. Frossard made a mistake in not resisting the passage of the Saar, and Von Kameké rapidly took advantage of it. That in seizing this opportunity he too committed the fault of over precipitation cannot be denied, but he had been assured of the support of troops in rear; and it was this same constant eagerness of the Prussians to engage at the earliest opportunity which ended by demoralising the French, leaders and men alike. In that Moltké's plans were somewhat upset by this course of action, it deserved his reproof, and in agreement with his gentle wording, criticism might well end.

If it has been decided that MacMahon's actions were faulty since they brought disaster on France, it is refreshing to find that Von Kameké was also wrong, though contributing to the German success. The root of the matter is plain; it is an old enough truth that the successful general is he who makes the fewest mistakes, or in other words that the best of leaders makes many mistakes. For twenty-three years military writers have concentrated their attention on every detail of the war, and have picked out these mistakes, for the instruction of the soldier, until history, merit, and gallantry are almost lost beneath their number. Searching under them we shall see much to be praised in almost every leader, and of this substratum of merit both the great generals treated of deserve their share.

J. M. Rose.

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MISS DANIELL'S SOLDIERS' HOMES.

By Miss E. L. De Butts.

"What sort of place is a Soldiers' Home?

What do you do there?"

Such lately was the gist of an inquiry, not this time from the vague standpoint of some civilians to whom soldier-life is naturally "an unknown quality," but from a general officer who in his service days had carefully considered the welfare of his men.

"What sort of place do *you* suppose it is?" It was thus his own question was turned back upon himself to answer first.

"My idea of a Soldiers' Home," he promptly responded, in words to this effect, "is a place where well-meaning ladies succeed in *thoroughly spoiling the men!*"

"Very unlike Miss Daniell!" was the equally prompt return, and in another moment he had confessed that his conclusions were not even drawn from representation, *or* misrepresentation, of any section of any work, or of any workers whatsoever, but were simply and purely the inventive outcome of his own imagination. Then, upon hearing something of what Miss Daniell's Soldiers' Homes are, and of what they are not, he at once "gave in," and has since continued a wiser man.

This last autumn marks the thirtieth anniversary of the first Soldiers' Home. At one time a small institute had existed at Woolwich, and subsequently Miss Papillon, a lady at Sandgate, had opened a reading-room for the benefit of the Shorncliffe Camp; but "it takes a woman to make a home," and it was Mrs. Daniell, the widow of an officer, who, in the year of 1862, came to see what she could do for the soldiers at Aldershot, a place described in those days as "unique in wickedness." Against the surrounding difficulties Mrs. Daniell worked her way, determined, as in a simile used by herself at the time, to act like the man who seeing a vessel wrecked upon the coast persisted in his apparently fruitless attempts to rescue the men clinging to the rigging, and who to all dissuasions and taunts had but one reply, "I see nothing but the men in the rigging."

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In order to accede to a request from the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, and attempt a sketch of these Soldiers' Homes, shall we call it six o'clock in the evening and suppose ourselves to be starting from where a notice board at the gates of the East Cavalry Barracks at Aldershot directs the way to the Mission Hall and Soldiers' Home a few paces further on?

On arriving at the entrance, we find posted handbills, illustrated in pen and ink, announcing the name of the speaker at the evening meeting—his rank varying, as it may happen, from a general down to a "regiment-less" mister. A few steps further on would bring us to the door of the bar, where, from 5 a.m. to 11 p.m., refreshments are served to soldier and civilian. But for the present we will pass through the open gates and glance up for a moment at the grey-gabled house standing back a little from the road in its own enclosure, overhung by Virginian creeper. All the windows are mullioned, and those on the upper storey belong to the private part of the house.

On the walls of the outer hall hang further notices and pictures, and a sheet almanack, drawn by a R.A. officer, showing Miss Daniell's Seven Soldiers' Homes—in Chatham, Colchester, Plymouth, Windsor, Manchester, and London, besides this, the first, at Aldershot.

Looking through the glass door to the left, it is a cheery sight in winter to see a cluster of "red coats" gathered round a brightly burning fire—one of their number, perhaps, playing the piano (as he would call it) in this nook, while some—still in their caps and great coats—stand looking on, and the rest have settled down by the fireside to talk or smoke, or to combine both. This is the game and smoking-room.

On the tables of the reading-room are an array of newspapers, daily, weekly, and illustrated. Armchairs and window lounges are ready to assist the enjoyment of the reader.

The only person privileged to come in and out at will in these rooms is Miss Daniell's Scripture Reader or missionary, an old soldier himself, one who makes them all welcome and befriends them warmly on every occasion. He it is who is the main connecting link between the barrack rooms and the Soldiers' Homes, for Miss Daniell and her lady workers do not go into barracks except, and only, to visit the women in the married quarters.

After six o'clock one of the ladies is to be found in the library, a small room with two sides of glass. Here are upwards of 600 volumes for lending, and here too are kept the books with their various registries—the banking book, the pledge book, the members' book, and others. The Home is free to all, but those

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who use it are encouraged to enroll themselves as members, paying the low nominal charge of one penny monthly. All these little transactions are often opportunities for a talk *à deux*.

Let us walk up the back way—the soldiers' staircase—to the room where the school is held.

"Very incongruous!" was the disapproving remark once made by the uncle of one of the helpers at night-school. "Young ladies teaching soldiers" being the point of the incongruity. A very natural objection, too, we cannot help thinking when viewed merely from the outside, and considered in the light of the *convenances* of another generation, but quite as workable and *comme il faut* in everyday practice as any other branch of mission influence and benefit among the working classes helped by ladies.

And the ladies in these Homes find it comes very simply and naturally to be ladies, and yet to give lessons in reading, writing, arithmetic, music, languages—anything that attracts the men night by night into the house, and lends possible opportunities of getting to know them, and to lead them to something more.

Let us look and listen for a while. Here is a man—not so young either—who in solemn earnest desires to learn to read; not at all so infrequent a necessity in the army as some people incredulously suppose. He is really anxious to get on, and, above all, to be able to read the Bible for himself. He has made marked progress before he has got through the first few chapters of St. John's Gospel. Laboriously, but valorously, he also plods through the intricacies of the difference in sound between *Run*, *Rug*, *Bun*, *Mug*. Here, too, is a linesman laying down his cap, and unbuckling his belt, preparatory to applying himself to his sums in the first-class Army certificate book. All three standards are used, so that the lessons may really help those who wish to work up for examinations. Others are writing from two separately dictated books.

Arithmetic is quite the favourite choice. Men say it is easier to get on and understand than in the regimental schools, where, of course, they cannot expect such individual attention.

If some aspiring pupil shows a decided preference for the less useful branch of learning of French or German he is not thwarted, since even if he never does succeed in getting his tongue round the accent, or tires before he makes much hand of the language, it may, perhaps, still be looked upon as a negative good—better be doing this than "passing" his time in a worse way; better have any sort of a link with the Soldiers' Home than none at all.

School is well on before a very tall horse-gunner is able, after "cleaning-up" time, to make his appearance, towering high up in the air above his lady teacher, who inquires from a lowly level

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whether he thinks by this time he quite knows his "lines and spaces." Affirmative monosyllable and flashing smiles descend from the region of his shy, good-looking face, and a scrap of paper, mercilessly folded and refolded, perhaps, in the fashion which seems to be considered the correct thing with people of his class, is pulled out from his coat-sleeve, or from behind his line of shining buttons.

With this last candidate for lessons, "the guard" has to be doubled—a second lady arriving to help. By means of Wallenstein's gigantic music notes, crotchets and quavers are picked out on the harmonium with silent, but marked interest. In consideration of others (to say nothing of the instrument) the heavy-spurred boots are only allowed as an occasional treat to press the pedals. A soundless scale is learnt; the process of turning the big thumb under the second finger in imitation of the smaller hand which shows the way, seems to strike the learner in the light of a quiet, but amusing joke.

For the last remaining ten minutes the Bibles are always brought out, a few verses read round, and a few words spoken about them. Even those men who fail to respond to the suggestion very generally made on breaking up school, that they should come up by-and-by to the evening meeting, have an opportunity of hearing some clear truths at this informal Bible reading. It is something to gain the fixed attention of the ears and eyes of such for even a few moments.

At 7.15 a bell rings, and the Scripture Reader makes a general announcement downstairs that there is going to be a meeting to which all who like to come are welcome. The class-room is large, and has a vaulted ceiling of dark-stained rafters and plenty of windows. One of the ladies plays the harmonium; the others sit near her. If the speaker fails, even though it may be at the last hour, one of them may have to hold herself in readiness to take his place; or occasionally it is so arranged when an outside speaker is hard to find.

Once a week a Royal Horse Artillery officer takes the Bible address. It is very telling when he, or a cavalry quartermaster, who also often comes, "talks shop" to the men, drawing their illustrations from soldiering life; "making clean the outside of the platter" being brought home to the audience by reference to the beautifully *shined-up* bits and harness which meet the eye of the inspecting officer, or the uppermost side of a knife in an inspected kit—all very fine to look upon until the officer demands to see *the other side*, or knowingly runs his finger under the unseen piece of harness.

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After the meeting is over, the library is re-opened downstairs. Those who like to stay for more singing gather round the lady at the harmonium, while sometimes another finds an opportunity for a talk with one of the men alone.

Sometimes on the "Temperance" nights the men who have stood steadfast for a time of probation are allowed to speak a few words, from personal experience, of the advantages of total abstinance. As one after another rises to face the audience—a fine cavalry man, a Highlander, a sapper, a gunner, a man of the line—to an occasional worker each little speech has an original interest, backed by the force of coming fresh from one in the midst of the furnace himself; but to the regular workers these rather appear to be moments of living on "thorns"!

Once a month there is a big temperance tea, at which officers' wives frequently assist. The "straight talk" which follows may very possibly be given by a retired officer. A tea-party, whether by invitation or by sixpenny tickets, proves a "field day" for securing a large and unusual audience.

It is in this downstairs Hall, large enough to seat 600, that the meetings are held on Sunday evenings. Between its lofty Gothic windows the walls are hung with flags and scarlet banners, texts in white letters, showing clearly on their background of red.

While Miss Daniell and all her lady workers are themselves members of the Church of England, it stands amongst the unwritten rules of the Soldiers' Home that none who come in shall hear anything said against the church or denomination to which they belong. Those who attend are Church members, Presbyterians, Baptists, Wesleyans, Roman Catholics. The Soldiers' Home welcomes all alike.

Of course, no part of the work is all *couleur de rose*—where is the true work that is?

The seed falls on all kinds of ground. Some, even though they may deceive themselves, are only too apparently surface-deep; others there are who do indeed seem real, yet who quite possibly may in the most disappointing way go back to their old life of indifference.

And now, shall we for a few moments pass on—this time up the front stairs? We should like to venture to introduce you to a glimpse of the private part of the house. This is the drawing-room—a long room, you see, with wide gabled cross-barred window-frames at either end; plants in pots stand near these. Water-colour sketches hang on the walls, and this portrait is of Mrs. Daniell. As we look upon it and try to picture something of the difficulties which the pioneer in such new "woman's work"

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must have had to face, and then as we turn to this other portrait in water-colours of her daughter, as she was in the days when she first began to help in the work, and think of the *fresh set* of difficulties which the present time brings, we recall the words, with their far-reaching significance, "*I see nothing but the men in the rigging.*"

We must not attempt to word-paint a fresh portrait of the "Lady-in-chief" (to quote, for a moment, Kinglake's term for Miss Nightingale), although we cannot but feel how utterly incomplete an impression any descriptive sketch of these Soldiers' Homes must convey to those unable to "read between the lines," and understand at least a little about this. We can only say as we pass on, "It is a pity if you do not know her."

During the last year or two so much of Miss Daniell's time has been claimed by her last Home at Buckingham Palace Gate that she has been unable, to her great regret, to make more than an occasional acquaintance among the officers' wives at Aldershot. This, the Home at Aldershot, is her headquarters.

We shall not now have time to speak of the mission tents, or iron rooms, which Miss Daniell has, when able, during the summer encampments, both for the regulars and the militia. These are filled by appreciative crowds of men evening by evening; but for the present it must suffice only to quote from a non-commissioned officer, who, on one of these occasions, as the tent was about to be taken down, most gratefully assured Miss Daniell there had been no crime whatever since the regiment came to the spot and no drunkenness, except a case which had been reported that last morning. The testimony of another was to the same effect.

"You know very nearly all the men who attend your tent are just the very men who in Woolwich last year used to be in the public-houses, and some of the lowest too."

The work of the day is carried on in the sitting-room, the head-centre of all the converging lines (too numerous and intricate to attempt to follow here) of the seven Soldiers' Homes. We have not even time now to make a rapid introduction to the series of drawers on either side of the large table round which the workers concentrate their forces. From one only we take up a packet of letters; these contain orders for needlework. Lady —— requires half-a-dozen children's worked frocks of different patterns, and this is her letter of detailed description, which is carefully noted.

We must not now more than barely mention, *àpropos* of "the Band of Hope cupboard" before us, the weekly gathering of from forty to ninety children (mostly soldier's children), nor yet the Mothers' Meeting, attended on Mondays by from sixty to ninety

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women (mostly soldiers' wives). One of the officer's wives sometimes helps in the club part of this last gathering.

Every Tuesday morning the Bible-women, who visit from house to house, come up here to the sitting-room, when a sort of roll-call is read over, and reasons for absence explained, and cases of need and sickness reported. These are carefully attended to, and cod-liver oil, beef-tea, and other necessaries dispensed.

A quantity of needlework is supplied weekly—or oftener during the cold season—to the women in want of help. Good fair prices are paid them. Sales of work take place from time to time, and their proceeds, together with the orders at extra times, are just sufficient to keep this part of the work afloat, but still there are vast piles of things always left unsold. Will not officers' wives remember this way of helping the Mission in its work of mercy towards their own poor women when they receive notice of the sales?

Before we leave the sitting-room, we may glance for a moment at Miss Daniell's own writing-table, overhung with sketches of blue Italian mountains and picturesque village walls. This table is also full of drawers, which, in their turn, are full of meaning. Before one we feel compelled to pause, for it represents a main pillar of the work. It is filled with different sorts and shades of money-bags, and their corresponding account books.

The Editor of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE in inviting a sketch of the Soldiers' Homes, very kindly invited, at the same time, an account of their financial need. We recognise the opportunity while standing before this terribly important drawer. None but those behind the scenes, and only they, in a measure, can ever guess what the weight of this money-burden means, added to all the other cares and responsibilities which daily accumulate round the work.

It requires £60 weekly to meet the mere ordinary current expenses of these seven Soldiers' Homes. Besides this there are, of course, the extra-ordinary claims, such as house repairs—the case this year. Through the death of friends and other causes many sources of help have been cut off.

Knowing that any who wish to become acquainted with the yearly statement of Income and Expenditure have only to ask for a printed Report we will not now trouble them to turn to it.

"A woman's work should be done quietly" is the opinion held by Miss Daniell. So quietly has her work been carried on that this in part may form a plea for some who—even in the Service—fail to realize it.

The life is laid down freely; yet at how great a cost to every

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nerve and faculty only the few can conceive. May we not reasonably appeal to the British officer to see that, according to the measure of influence he has at his command, he will not forget to rally round the colours which, first in the field, have now for thirty years "braved the battle," and which, therefore, in a special sense should surely stir the gratitude of every rank in the Service?

While it is not to be expected that "army men," as a rule, can have it in their power to contribute very largely in money even to an object which ought to have so close a claim upon their sympathy, yet some token of their good wishes from those who have not hitherto given would be most gladly welcomed.*

We forbear to speak of any of the influences, by act or word, which tend to weaken these efforts for the soldier's good. Disparaging words may at times find their way into print, alluding in a general way to Soldiers' Homes managed by ladies; but although such words are felt to be "unchivalrous" by those who have led the way where others follow, we would rather imitate the example of keeping quiet, while simply reminding the Service that to them belongs in a foremost sense the post of strengthening the hands of the workers.

With every officer and his family may we leave these two thoughts—*Responsibility;* and *Noblesse oblige?*

E. L. DE BUTTS.

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* Address:—*Miss Daniell, The Soldiers' Home and Mission Hall, Aldershot;* or, *Miss E. L. De Butts, Glenealy Lodge, co. Wicklow.*

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THE FIRE OF ARTILLERY.

By Major J. J. Henriquez, R.A.

The subject of Artillery Fire has in these pages become a heated battle-field, and, as in many other engagements, the conflict of opinion would appear more the outcome of the love of fighting and glory than of any irreconcilable differences.

If my reading of the vexed question of "concentration and distribution" be correct, the general principles of their respective advocates are not in reality so far asunder as, by the absence of defining boundaries in their application, would appear. With the object of eliciting the views of more experienced soldiers than myself I offer this *précis* of what I conceive to be the limitations in the practical application of these so-called antagonistic principles.

The primary object of Colonel Maurice's lecture, it seems to me, is to show the great importance and scope of concentration of artillery fire, not on a geometrical point, which is absurd, but on a tactical objective. This would appear to be the view taken by the President, Lord Wolseley, in his final remarks. That this leading principle is sound and should never be lost sight of by an Artillery commander does not to my mind imply that it is applicable in all places and at every moment. Captain White, in his "reply," evidently recognises the advantage of concentration on a "tactical point," but at the same time deprecates Colonel Maurice's lucid exposition of the potency of concentration. On the other hand, it is not at all clear how far Colonel Maurice under-estimates the restrictions imposed on concentration by the actualities of war.

To come to details, the limitations to concentration appear to me as follows :—

1. *The technical difficulties of ranging on a point (for ranging must needs be on a point) with any larger force than a battery.* This is due to the fact that observation would become hopelessly confused if shell were fired from all parts of the Artillery line on the ranging point.

2. *Weakness—due to inequality in numbers, position, &c.* While a force of Artillery can only just hold its own against its opponents,

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it would be obviously playing into the enemy's hands to relax its grip of any portion of his effective line.

3. *The risk of being yourself reduced in detail.* This danger cannot well be estimated till the action is in full swing, as it depends so much on topography, moral, and other accidental influences.

4. *Excessive range.* The long ranges at which the Artillery duel often takes place, will, during this stage, render the concentration from the more distant portions of the line less effective, and at times the view will be obstructed by inequalities of local features.

From this it would appear that any disinclination to give full prominence to concentration, by Von Schell and writers of that period, may be put down to this limitation. It was then that the relative ranges of Infantry arms and Artillery had come so near together that artillery was perforce made to give up, to some extent, the concentration tactics of Napoleon, and to fire more or less exclusively on the nearest targets immediately in front. For the future it remains to be seen whether Infantry fire will be found so effective at extreme ranges as to restrict the concentration of Artillery fire in its first positions.

5. *The Uncertainty of Ranging.*—Under certain conditions, the time occupied in ranging and its result are very uncertain. It would hardly be expected (even if for other reason desirable) that the great mass of Artillery should remain all this time "with its hands folded," trusting to one battery to carry out this uncertain experiment, which would be further imperilled by the probable concentration of the whole of the enemy's fire on one battery. For it must be borne in mind that in these days Artillery is frequently so placed that it cannot be discovered till it opens fire, and it would then appear to the enemy that only one battery was in position.

6. *The risk of disclosing prematurely the plan of attack.*—This applies more especially to the subsequent phases of the action, but even during the Artillery duel, its too precipitate action will unduly force the hand of the General Officer commanding. With these limiting features in view, it seems to me essential for the Artillery commander to be ever on the alert to seize the smallest opening for the concentration of an adequate force on that section of the enemy's line, which for the time being is of greatest tactical importance. It is plain that such occasions frequently present themselves during the deployment of large forces, in the form of sudden accessions to the strength of the line, local accidents of position, moral, topography, &c. On the other hand, unbroken distribution

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is justifiable only from necessity. It can but produce slow, indecisive results, and, carried to an extreme, would become an exhilarating stimulus to the enemy.

These considerations point to the following rules in conduct of Artillery first coming into action.

1. Artillery fire should not begin prematurely, *i.e.*, till an adequate force is available, and the other arms are in position to support.

2. Artillery fire should, in the first place, be employed to search and discover as far as possible the extent of the enemy's position and his distribution, and also to harass his deployment. His strong and weak points cannot otherwise be discerned with certainty.

3. Batteries should come into action simultaneously. In the absence of marked tactical features, which can be at once made the objectives, each battery should range at once, and fire upon the section of the opposing line immediately in front. As soon as the range has been established battery commanders should fill in a form, giving the target, range, fuse, and any noteworthy points, and transmit it to officer commanding the Artillery line. In the hands of this officer these data must afford most valuable information as to the enemy's position, and can be turned rapidly to account by concentration on any tactical section, as the occasion presents itself.

J. J. HENRIQUEZ.

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CAVALRY IN THE BERKSHIRE MANŒUVRES.

A Candid Criticism by a "Foreign Officer."

I AM by birth and education an Englishman, but fate and circumstances have made me an officer in the cavalry of a great friendly foreign state. This summer I have obtained leave of absence to visit my relations in England. I took my homeward way *viâ* Strasbourg, Metz, and Eastern France, spending some weeks *en route* to watch the manœuvres of the German and French troops in those parts; and, on my arrival in England, it became my immediate object to attend the recent autumn manœuvres in Berkshire.

To my mind the comparison that I am able thereby to form of the relative efficiency of the German, French, Italian, and British troops is of the greatest interest. But if, in drawing such comparison, I may appear too prone to find fault with the British army I trust I may be forgiven, as I do it entirely in the interest of my native country.

Manœuvres in England, instead of being an annual institution as they are abroad, are only held occasionally, which is—to use the Italian phrase—"like striking matches in the dark," the occasional fitful flare-up only intensifies the darkness, where a steadily-burning taper would tend to show the road. To be of real use manœuvres should be carried on regularly year after year.

They should—as is the case abroad—be progressive in their instruction. This was, it is true, intended by the published programme of the Berkshire manœuvres, but in practice it cannot be said that anybody learnt much more than they could have picked up at Aldershot.

Yet I was told by an officer lately from the manœuvres in Ireland that the instruction given at the Curragh this season was entirely progressive, and that something fresh was practised every day; so that at the end of the training everybody went away feeling that he had learnt many things. Could the same be said for those who returned last week from Berkshire? I think not.

The net result of your combat manœuvres may have impressed you sadly with the idea that you have very few if any good leaders.

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But, believe me, this is what we and our neighbours, the Austrians, have felt too when we gave our leaders only a few days' practise at their work; but bring those same men up again next year, and there will be a great difference, that is if they are, to begin with, sound, practical soldiers. But they must be totally unhampered by theories or conceit. This unfortunately, with us at least and possibly with you, is a rarity in the case of officers who have been trained through a staff-course of instruction. And I believe that many of the right-hand men of the leaders, that is the brigade majors, at your manœuvres were of the trained staff.

In the cavalry their dead weight is especially felt, for with cavalry the only road to success is "dash applied to opportunity."

It may appear presumptuous to offer this axiom to the British Cavalry, who have ever been famed for their dash, but at these manœuvres there is no doubt that dash and enterprise were conspicuously absent.

Yes; the cavalry disappointed those who, like myself, had expected great things of them.

One of your newspapers, actuated by the same feeling, suggests as a remedy that a certain good cavalry leader should be re-called from India to set matters to rights. Heaven save you from more leaders! There were too many *chefs* as it was, and too many *chefs* are apt to spoil the broth. Besides, you have one cavalry leader in England, I am told, who cannot be surpassed, whether you search in India or even in Europe.

One, and perhaps your best, remedy seems to me to adopt the rule that most of us abroad have found necessary, viz., ordain that the divisional general, if he be by education an infantry man, should always consult his cavalry brigadier before giving him direct orders, or, better still, explain to him his general plan and rely on him to aid him as he sees best according to circumstances.

In France the cavalry work slowly, but not so slowly as your cavalry did on the Downs. And yet with all that slowness they did not preserve the cohesion of the German squadrons. But in one point, and that the most important one, your cavalry excel. *They can ride* in a way that no other nation can hope to approach. They are also splendidly mounted, and know how to take care of their horses; but there was one thing that all their care and all their complaints could not prevent, and that was galled sides to horses. They were condemned to it by some gentleman in an office, who had ordered the adoption of a new form of girth-attachment in some regiments. It is a detail, but it tells of misapplied economy.

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One grand piece of equipment used by your cavalry is the galloping machine-gun. By its adoption a real economy in mounted men has been effected; and, worked with tactical skill, it cannot fail to be of the greatest value in war. The Germans and Russians are becoming alive to this fact, and are arming themselves similarly, and I have hopes that we are soon to follow suit.

Your artillery disappointed me—that is, your Horse Artillery. I had always heard high praises of it, and perhaps expected too much. Its officers, men, and horses could not be surpassed, but they are clogged by guns that are too heavy for their work. Guns which cannot keep pace with their cavalry are perfectly useless—and your magnificent *personnel* is therefore wasted. I will not say that the French or Germans are very much better—but they have light guns, and are contemplating even a lighter form—a form of quickfiring gun on a galloping carriage to accompany cavalry. This appears to be a natural development now that light quick-firing guns have been brought to such a degree of perfection.

Of the Field Artillery I have nothing but good to say, and also of the mounted Royal Engineers, and of that splendid and useful force the Mounted Infantry. There, indeed, you have the advantage of all other nations.

Your Infantry, too, agreeably surprised me. I had been led to think that the German Infantry—with the exception, perhaps, of the Alpini and Bersaglieri—was the best in the world. But I now feel that if the rest of the British Infantry is equal in quality to that which I saw on the Berkshire Downs, it fairly excels all others.

The men marched, fought, and fired well—and with great intelligence. Their training and endurance showed a remarkable contrast to some manœuvres I have attended where stragglers covered the zone of operations. Newspaper correspondents there were not allowed to speak of everything that they saw. I was amused, too, to notice that, after a long, heavy day's marching, your men would relax their muscles by playing games of football in the evening. The soldiers appeared to take an interest in what was going on in the battles, but did not, as far as I could learn, receive much explanation of the events from their officers. This seemed strange to me; for, although our men are soldiers by necessity, and not by choice, like yours, we gratify and encourage their taste for military knowledge by explanations in the field and in camp afterwards. I was informed that this was not done as a general rule by your officers, but that it was done in some individual cases, with, naturally, good results.

I had proposed to myself to study the English system of signalling in the field, but little or no signalling was practised.

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Mounted messengers, bicycle orderlies, balloons, &c., were employed as usual; but only on one occasion, I believe, was the field-telegraph utilised for tactical purposes. With us we make more use of heliographs, field-telegraphs, and telephones!

The camps were very luxurious. In France and Italy the soldiers carry their own little tents in portions. In this way camp can be pitched where the day's fighting ends, the men are saved the fatigue of returning to standing camp, and the train of baggage-waggons is considerably reduced. Mobility is thereby gained in two ways. Perhaps later on the system may commend itself to the British War Department.

I heard, too, that the officers are put to enormous expense by going into camp for manœuvres. Is this the case also with officers of the Volunteer force? if so, it is hardly surprising that their numbers should be, as stated by the newspapers, 1,500 below the established strength.

Whatever others may have done I feel that I have learnt largely from these manœuvres, and in thanking them for all their many courtesies and kindnesses, I earnestly commend to my brothers-in-arms of the British Army the experiment of visiting the manœuvres of other countries for purposes of self-instruction and practical comparison.

"FOREIGN OFFICER."

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SUPPRESSION OF REBELLION IN THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES OF CANADA, 1885.

(Continued from page 117.)

II.

BY GENERAL SIR FRED. MIDDLETON.

THE preparations for the march to which I referred in the last number having been completed, we started on the 6th of April at 7 a.m., strength all told 402, including my new levy of scouts. The weather was cold, and the road up the north bank was steep and heavy, and we had to use four horses to get each of our 120 wagons up to the top, and six for each gun and wagon. We marched off with the usual formation, scouts leading. As this was our first regular march I halted after covering about twelve miles over a wet and heavy trail, with a strong wind in our faces, accompanied by occasional flurries of sleet and hail, but the men bore it all wonderfully well.

I am afraid the dress of my Aide-de-camp and myself would have astonished if not horrified an Aldershot General and his Aide-de-camp. We were both clad in short buffalo skin coats, staff pantaloons, fur service caps, and long English shooting-boots, with jack spurs. Swords were worn under, and revolvers over, our coats. The men and officers were in the regular British uniform, supplemented with snow-boots, fur caps and gloves, and most of them with hideous red comforters round their necks.

Towards night it became bitterly cold, the thermometer standing at 10deg. below zero, and we had a hard night of it. Though I lay down dressed, with two blankets and my buffalo coat over me and two blankets under me, I could not get warm and did not sleep much. In the morning we found all our pegs frozen hard in the ground, the thermometer standing at 23deg. below zero. We had eventually to cut the pegs out with axes, and so did not march until 8.30 a.m. We halted after a march of about eighteen miles. The night was cold, though not so cold as the night before. We halted the next day, April 8th, to enable Lieutenant-Colonel Montizambert, with two guns of A Battery, Permanent Force,

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to join us, which they did about 10 a.m., 100 strong and two M. L. 9-pounders. The officers, men, and horses looked wonderfully well and fit, and they appeared none the worse for their long and tedious journey of over 2000 miles by rail and trail including the passage of the gaps. Marched next day, 9th of April, and halted near the Hudson Bay Post at Touchwood, after doing twenty-one miles. Still very cold. Here we received the sad news of the massacre at Frog Lake, a settlement near Fort Pitt. Nine men killed, including the Hudson Bay official and two priests; also two women and several men taken prisoners, all whites. This outrage was committed by Big Bear's people. I received that day more unsatisfactory telegrams from the officer in charge of Battleford. I telegraphed to Major-General Strange, late R.A., who was residing near Gleichen, not far from Calgary, to assume command of the force forming in that district. He had volunteered his services which were gladly accepted, as he was well known in the Dominion, having lately retired from the command of the Artillery including A and B Batteries of the Permanent Force, who owed their efficiency greatly to his care and instruction. He had previously served with distinction in the Indian Mutiny. His orders from me, generally, were to move *viâ* Edmonton on Fort Pitt, where I should meet him and together we should tackle Big Bear.

The next day, 10th of April, after a march of twenty-three miles, we halted and camped during a heavy snowstorm. Here we were joined by forty men of C School, Permanent Force, a smart looking body of well-drilled men, commanded by Major Smith, an officer who proved himself to be as good and reliable in the field as he was in the barracks. Major-General Laurie arrived with this party. He was on half-pay, a Crimean officer, living in Nova Scotia, and had volunteered to serve under me though senior in the Army. Our line of march followed the telegraph line, which, being lightly constructed, was often down. I found that the best operator I had with me was Mr. E. Wood, a bombardier in the Winnipeg Battery, who I made chief telegrapher.

When we halted, the wire was at once tapped, and Mr. Wood's tent became our telegraph office. He would start off sometimes alone to repair a rupture of the wire without fear or hesitation. Riel did not interfere much with the telegraph wire, contenting himself with cutting it between Batoche and Prince Albert. He told me himself he only wanted to cut off Prince Albert, as he thought he might, after defeating me, require to use the wire to communicate with Ottawa and make terms with the Government!

On this march I had an interview, or, as it is termed there, a

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"Pow wow," with an Indian chief, "Day Star," and his people at the Indian Farm. These Indians were supposed to be inclined to be troublesome, but the chief, of course, expressed the greatest loyalty, and received the usual presents of tea, bacon, tobacco, and flour.

Next morning we started at 6 a.m. to make our way across the Salt Plains, which we had heard was a dreadful piece of work. It certainly was not a pleasant march, but not so very dreadful. It was cold and dreary, and the trail was awfully muddy. We had frequent flurries of snow, and had to pass through marshes and several streams, so that the infantry were often up to their knees, and once nearly to their waists in water. It was very cold and, as we had to carry our firewood with us, we could not afford large fires. All the water was strongly impregnated with alkaline salt—hence the term "Salt Plains"—and could only be drunk when made into tea, which did not taste very nice however.

We halted at one of our march stations in the middle of the Salt Plains, after doing twenty miles, the men continuing to march wonderfully well. They were in good spirits, and sang a good deal, principally indulging in plantation songs and Canadian boat songs with rousing choruses.

A dispatch arrived from Irvine, in which he informed me that he had 180 Mounted Police and ninety Prince Albert Volunteers—25,000 rounds of Winchester ammunition, 9,000 of Sneider, besides 5,900 of revolver, and eight shells for mountain gun. Plenty of beef, but only enough flour and other provisions in the country to last a month. He had also three doctors, and added that he had 150 or 200 more men without arms.

I continued, however, to receive such heartrending appeals from Superintendent Morris at Battleford, that I telegraphed that day, 11th of April, to Lieutenant-Colonel Otter, at Swift Current, to leave at once for Battleford with all the troops he had. He left there on the 13th with

	Men and Officers.
B Battery Royal Canadian Artillery, Major Short Commanding—two guns, one gatling	113
Detachment C Company Infantry School Corps, Lieutenant Wadmore Commanding	49
Detachment Government General's Foot Guards, Captain Todd Commanding	51
Queen's Own Rifles (two Regiments), Lieutenant-Colonel Miller Commanding	274
North-West Mounted Police, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Herckmer Commanding	50
Scouts	6
Total	543

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Lieutenant-Colonel Otter belonged to the Permanent Force, and had been in command of C Company School of Infantry at Toronto, and I knew him to be an excellent officer. My orders to him were to push on with all speed, hold Battleford, and wait my arrival there.

The march made by this force after crossing the river at Saskatchewan landing was a remarkably good one, though the infantry were carried in wagons. The distance covered was over 160 miles, and it was done in five and a half days, with a long train, as they had to carry twenty-five days' rations, twenty days' oats, ten days' hay, and four days' wood, besides the infantry.

We started next morning at 7 a.m., and in an hour and a half got clear out of the Salt Plains, which, luckily for us, had held the winter frost, so that in the muddy and marshy places, a few inches below the mud, the bottoms were quite hard, otherwise we should have been days crossing them. Halted after a twenty-mile march.

Next day, the 13th April, we halted at Humboldt after doing twenty-one miles. The trail bifurcates here, one going direct to Batoche or Prince Albert, the other to Clark's Crossing. There was a telegraph station and two or three houses.

Hitherto I had only had one picquet mounted at night, but now I thought it advisable to mount two. While at Fort Qu'appelle, I was told by an old hunter that he did not think I was ever likely to be attacked at night, as the Indians believe that if killed after dark they will be for ever blind in their "Happy Hunting Grounds" —their Elysium—and he added that many of the half-breeds were as superstitious as the Indians. As a matter of fact, we never were attacked at night. Still, I was very particular during the whole campaign about our outposts, visiting them myself, or sending Melgund, or going together every night, as I found it gave confidence to my raw troops. Major-General Laurie left us that day for Swift Current, I having, with his concurrence, appointed him commandant at the base which I had determined to establish at that point.

Swift Current was about twenty-five miles from the "Landing" on the south branch of the Saskatchewan River, which I hoped would soon be high enough, on account of the melting snow, to permit of the steamers communicating with me at Clark's Crossing. There was also a direct trail from the Landing to Battleford. I still kept Qu'appelle as a secondary base, being excellently well served there by Captain Swinford as commissariat officer, and Major Bell as transport officer. The duties of commandant at

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Swift Current became onerous and complicated, but they were well and ably carried out by Major-General Laurie.

Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine in his communications with me at this time was very urgent that I should pass by Batoche and march direct to Prince Albert, as he considered our forces ought to be united before attacking Riel. This plan I did not feel at all inclined to adopt, as it would be bad strategy, would encourage Riel to think we were afraid of him, and cause the Indians to join him, and I made up my mind to attack Batoche and direct Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine to move out with some 150 Mounted Police and co-operate on the west side of the river. Captain Bedson and Mr. Macdowall volunteered to carry my orders to Colonel Irvine, and I felt constrained to accept their offer, though some of the couriers from Prince Albert had thrilling stories to relate of their hairbreadth escapes from fierce and wily Indians. I knew my two gallant volunteers could take good care of themselves, and it was important that Irvine should be clearly informed of my intentions, which it was not advisable to put on paper. In my message I told Colonel Irvine that I believed Riel's force was much over-rated, and I proposed attacking him on the following Saturday, the 25th of April; that I wished him to take steps to cut off fugitives that would probably cross the river; that I might not be able to attack until Sunday, or I might attack before Saturday; that I supposed he could keep himself almost daily acquainted with my movements by his scouts, and act accordingly; that he was to take all the men he could safely withdraw from Prince Albert, but not his mountain gun.

We had now marched 124 miles from Fort Qu'appelle* in eight days, including a day's halt, over a bad trail, in worse weather, which was good work for untrained men. We had little or no sickness, plenty of supplies, tea, tobacco, canned meats, bacon, and capital biscuits—called by the men "hard tack"—and the whole force was in good heart.

We halted the next day, the 14th, and I took out French's scouts for a reconnaissance towards Batoche, but saw nobody.

Captain Haig, Royal Engineers, joined the camp that day. He was stationed at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and had offered his services, which I was very glad to have. I made him Assistant Quarter-Master-General, in which capacity he was most energetic and useful during the campaign, besides acting on my personal staff during the two engagements with great coolness and pluck.

* Our men marched without packs.

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After a cold, wet, and blowy night, we started next day, April 15th, at 7 a.m., and halted after a twenty-three mile march, the day remaining windy and very cold. We were now within thirty-six miles of Clarke's Crossing, and, with a view of anticipating the enemy, I determined to push on there next morning with a small party, leaving the rest of my force to make it in two marches. Accordingly next morning I started with my Aide-de-camp and a party consisting of one gun under Captain Drury, forty men of C School Company in waggons under Major Smith, and twenty of French's scouts. We had a terrible march, in the face of a regular blizzard of wind and hail the whole way, with not a tree or a bush to break the force of the wind. It was fearfully cold, and we had constantly to dismount and walk to restore our circulation. We halted half-way, but could not make a fire, and so had to do without our hot tea.

We reached the Crossing at about 4 p.m., and found it all safe, not having been troubled by the rebels. There were a few houses on our side of the river, one of them being inhabited by a Mr. Clarke and his wife. He had been in charge of the ferry, which took its name from him. On the other side of the river was the telegraph station, the wire being carried over the river by means of tall spars, one on each side.

The south branch of the Saskatchewan is here about 200 yards broad with a powerful current running at the rate of about four miles an hour, high banks, and a wide, deep border of the thickest and stickiest of mud on each side, in which were embedded large boulders and huge blocks of ice.

We found the scow* half sunk, and the wire rope in possession of Mr. Clarke, he having taken it down for safety.

After a Spartan supper, we passed the night as best we could on the floor of Mr. Clarke's kitchen—my Aide-de-camp, Major Smith, Captains Drury, Scott, and myself. There was barely room for us to lay down, but the crowding made us all the warmer, which was what we wanted.

The men were placed in two stone-built houses close by.

A small infantry picquet was posted, and three or four mounted scouts patrolled the neighbourhood all night. The main body camped about fourteen miles off, after a hard and disagreeable march.

The next day, the 17th of April, the main body arrived about 11 a.m., and I inspected Boulton's scouts, who had joined it the day before. They were armed with Winchester repeating rifles and

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A roughly built flat-bottomed ferry-boat, large enough to carry horses and carts as well as men.

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were suitably clothed, being mounted on wiry, serviceable horses, some of them having English saddles, and the men looked, as they proved to be, very fit.

Our camp was on high ground on a sort of plateau running back for miles from the high bank of the river, almost to Humboldt. The ground on the west side was similar, but higher than on our side.

The next day it snowed and was very cold. I sent Melgund out with Boulton and his scouts to reconnoitre, with French as a guide, as he knew something of the country about. Not long after, a scout came back for a wagon to bring in three Indian prisoners they had captured.

The wagon was sent, and in due time the party arrived. The Indians, in war paint, looked rather scared and comical as they swayed and bobbed about to the jolting of their chariot, and they reminded me a good deal of fifth of November guys. It appeared that when sighted they had taken cover in some thick brush which covered the high sloping river bank for miles, along which they ran, the scouts riding along the top of the slope. At last the fugitives, finding themselves blown, made a stand back to back in a gully. Melgund was unwilling to shoot them if he could help it, and two or three of the scouts who could speak a little Indian volunteered to go down to them. The Indians declined, however, to surrender, and Melgund was going to take strong measures, when French pluckily walked down unarmed, and, in spite of their covering him with their rifles, insisted on shaking hands with them. They then smoked a pipe together, and finally walked up with French, and surrendered themselves to Melgund and his party. One of them carried a Winchester repeating rifle and the other two had shot-guns loaded with ball. They proved to be the two sons and brother-in-law of "White Cap," a Sioux chief, whose reserve was near Saskatoon, a settlement some miles up the river, and who had joined Riel, as they said, by compulsion. The prisoners stated that they had been to their reserve, and were returning to Batoche when captured. They told us that Riel had 500 half-breeds and 250 Indians at Batoche. The three prisoners were handed over to Boulton's care. I afterwards sent one of these men back to Batoche, giving him several copies of a proclamation in French to the effect that any "Metis"—"French half-breed"—or Indian abandoning Riel would be protected and pardoned, and that we were only warring against Riel, his council, and principal accomplices. It was explained to the savage that he was to scatter these about, and that if he returned with information, especially about the white prisoners Riel was known to have at Batoche, he

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

Plan to accompany "Suppression of Rebellion in the North-West Territories of Canada," Part II.—UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, December, 1893.

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would be rewarded. I did not expect much good from this proceeding, but thought it worth trying. I may add that the man never did return, and on the taking of Batoche, his body was about the first we came across, lying on his back in full war-paint, with a bullet through his head, whether shot by us or Riel I cannot say.

Late this evening a telegram arrived *viâ* Humboldt from Irvine, dated the 15th, stating that he had received information that a war party of 300 hostile Battleford Indians, all mounted, was approaching me or going to Batoche from the North; also again warning me of what good shots and prairie fighters I had to contend with, adding that that was not all, as the Indians were rising all about us, and fairly well armed. He also reiterated his opinion that our forces were too small to act separately.

I sent over the news about the Indian braves to Melgund, telling him to be on the alert. As for myself, I considered it was only another "Norwester," and after visiting the outposts I retired calmly to my blankets and was not disturbed.

The 10th Regiment Royal Grenadiers, a Toronto city regiment, 250 strong, one of the best in the Canadian Militia, joined us during the day, the 18th of April, having, with a few extra wagons to assist the men in marching, covered the distance from Qu'appelle, 198 miles, over a wet and heavy trail, in nine days, including one day's halt. This was a highly creditable performance for men quite unaccustomed to long marching. This regiment was one of those that had undergone the great hardships in crossing the gaps in the Canadian Pacific Railway already alluded to. It was fortunate enough, among its many good officers, to have two old regulars at its head, viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Grasett, commanding, who had served in the 100th with Boulton, and Major Dawson, who had served in the 47th, both of whom proved themselves to be excellent and reliable officers.

This addition made our force 800 strong in round numbers.

A fatigue party, under Captain Haig, afterwards assisted by Bedson, was engaged putting the ferry in order; and here I had another proof of the great handiness and skill of some of my militia men. The scow had to be repaired, the wire rope straightened, spliced, fastened on both sides of the river, and tightened, for which a platform and rough windlass had to be constructed; a wharf also had to be made, and a road down the steep wooded banks to it. All this had to be, and was done in very cold weather, with no tools except axes and augers.

Late that night, the 19th April, Capt. Bedson and Mr. Macdowall returned from Prince Albert *viâ* Humboldt, having met

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with no adventures on the road, thus confirming me in my suspicions that the stories of couriers who had come with dispatches from Prince Albert about the dangers they had encountered were mostly "Norwesters," and that there were not so many Indians wandering about as Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine seemed to think.

My brother-in-law, Mr. Doucet, of the Canadian Militia, and graduate of the Royal Military College, Kingston, arrived also, having met Bedson and Macdowall at Humboldt, This young officer, who was a civil engineer, gave up his employment and volunteered his services for the campaign, and having joined, I appointed him my second Aide-de-camp.

I had now good reason to believe that Riel had with him certainly not more than 500 half-breeds, the rest being Indians, and that he had men on both sides of the river, so, after some consideration, I determined to divide my force, sending one-half of it across the river under Lieutenant-Colonel Montizambert, with Melgund as Staff Officer, to take the place I had intended for Otter's column.

We commenced early on the 20th crossing the left column, which consisted of:—

	Strength.
The 10th Royal Grenadiers, Lieutenant-Colonel Grasett commanding	250
Two guns, Winnipeg Field Battery, Major Jarvis commanding . .	50
Detachment from A Battery, Lieutenant Rivers commanding . .	23
French's Scouts, Captain French commanding	20
Detachment of Boulton's Scouts, under Sergeant Brown . . .	30
Total .	373

The crossing was not an easy matter, though we had two scows, having procured a second one from Saskatoon, the settlers there cheerfully giving it up for the public service. These scows were worked by means of pulleys, running on the wire rope, the current of the river being the motive power. It was hard work, and each crossing took some time. Melgund superintended the landing and camping on the other side.

Captain Bedson reported to me in writing that Colonel Irvine, after hearing my message, had stated that he considered it unwise to obey my directions to move out of Prince Albert, and this view was concurred in by his Staff Officer and others, the reason given being that they were short of ammunition. It was further stated by him that the Teton Sioux Indians were reported to be in the immediate neighbourhood, and waiting to attack the town if left unprotected.

I had heard before of these Teton Sioux, as Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine mentioned them in his telegram to Mr. Dewdney, which I

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intercepted at Humboldt, but I do not think they ever did much damage to anyone! I now determined to leave the Prince Albert force out of my calculations in forming the plans for attacking Batoche.

We heard during the day that Inspector Dickens of the Mounted Police, with his men, had arrived by boat at Battleford, having evacuated Fort Pitt, and that all the Hudson Bay officials and other whites there, with their wives and children, were prisoners in Big Bear's camp. On the 21st we finished crossing over the left column. My immediate command consisted of the following:—

	Rank and File.
90th Regiment, under Major Mackeand	268
A Battery, R.C.A., under Captain Peters	82
C Company, Permanent Force, under Major Smith	40
Scouts, under Major Boulton	50
Total	440

with Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton as Staff Officer.

During the day we tried a system of signalling between the two columns by bugle notes, long and short, suggested and carried out by Major Jarvis, commanding the Winnipeg Battery, and Captain Peters, commanding A Battery, which proved a perfect success.

Melgund reported that, having gone out with a small party reconnoitring, he had chased two of the enemy's scouts some twelve miles in the direction of Batoche, but they got into a bluff, where a party of their own people were lying, and as his horses were dead beat, and there was evidently a large force opposed to him, he halted and retired, the enemy showing no inclination to follow him.

We were now ready to advance, but we wanted forage, of which we required daily a large amount, having, including our transport teams, over 550 horses to feed. Happily a train with forage, &c., arrived on the 22nd April, and I resolved to push on next morning.

I arranged with Lieutenant-Colonel Montizambert that we were to start at the same hour, marching with the heads of our columns in line, and halting at the same hour. The scow, with a small party and the wire rope on board, would drop down the river between us, keeping in line with the heads of the columns, and towing a small punt we had patched up for the occasion.

The next morning, the 23rd April, we marched as arranged. My advanced guard was formed as follows:—First, a line of Boulton's scouts, covering a front of half a mile; then, about 300 yards in rear, the rest of the scouts on the trail, with a company of

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the 90th 300 yards in rear of them. The head of the main body was again about 400 yards in rear of the advanced guard. I had a small guard with the ammunition waggons, but no rear-guard, as most of the teamsters were armed, and quite able to defend themselves. I marched with my two Aides-de-camp in front of the formed body of scouts under Boulton.

After a march of eighteen miles we camped near a farmhouse belonging to a Mr. Mackintosh, a few settlers' huts being scattered about. I sent Boulton with his scouts to reconnoitre well to the front, while we pitched camp. That evening I posted the picquets myself, and again explained in detail to everyone concerned how their duties were to be carried out, which took me two or three hours.

On getting back to camp I found that Boulton had returned without seeing any of the enemy, but had come across traces of them at an empty house some four miles off, where there was some forage stored, and some carts at the door as though the rebels had been disturbed in an attempt to carry it off. As forage was still scarce with us, Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton had thought it advisable to secure this supply at once, and taking a party of scouts, a few of the 90th, and some carts, he had brought back the whole of the forage without being interfered with. Next morning, the 24th of April, we marched for "Dumont's Ferry." Having been warned that we had a nasty ravine to cross on our way, I directed Boulton to push his advanced scouts farther ahead, and to extend them more. With my two Aides-de-camp and Captain Haig, A.Q.M.G., accompanied by Mr. Macdowall, and followed by my trusty orderly Sergeant Back—who stuck to me like a leech the whole day—I took up my usual post in front of Boulton's formed scouts, Mr. Chambers, one of the war correspondents, riding with him on this occasion. After marching about five miles we met a mounted man who had been sent back to inform me that the scouts on the left of our trail had come across a camping place not long vacated, the fires being still smouldering; that the number of fires and other signs indicated that at least 180 or 200 mounted men had camped there. We immediately galloped to the front, and had scarcely gone 400 yards or 500 yards when two shots rang out, and we saw a party of about fifty mounted men close to a bluff about 500 yards to our left, who fired a volley at us, which, luckily, was aimed too high and rattled over head among the trees. Boulton wheeled his men and charged at once, but the enemy turned and galloped into the ravine on their left, dismounting at the edge of the wood lining it, into which they disappeared. Boulton now sung out to his men

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to dismount, extend, and lie down, but before they could complete these orders the enemy opened fire and two men and horses were hit, and immediately after two more men were wounded. The rest threw themselves down and opened fire on the wood, the wounded men crawling in behind the line. The riderless horses of both sides were now galloping wildly about, some wounded ones laying struggling and kicking on the ground. The advanced scouts had galloped in and reinforced the extended line which gallantly and stubbornly kept the enemy—who had been strongly reinforced — from advancing. One Indian in full war paint, out of bravado, came out dancing and shouting his war cry and was immediately knocked over and fell in the open, where the body remained all the day. Amidst the rattle of the rifles and the pinging of the bullets we could hear the oaths and shouts of the excited "Metis" mingled with the war-whoops of the Indians, the sturdy scouts talking only with their Winchesters. I sent Captain Wise back to hurry up the main body. Just as he left me his horse was shot, but he was soon back on another one. The infantry advanced guard, under Captain Clarke of the 90th, soon arrived, and was extended on the right of the scouts, who remained on the extreme left. When the main body came up, under Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton and Major Mackeand, two more companies were extended to the right. The enemy still kept up a hot fire, wounding Captain Clarke and several men. The two guns now came into action, under command of Captain Peters, but the enemy were too well covered, and after a few rounds I withdrew them. Observing that the enemy was making a movement to our left, I sent a party under Major Boswell to a farmhouse on our left front. Their fire soon crumpled up this movement, and the enemy fell back up the creek and again joined their centre, where, having a series of rifle-pits, they made their principal stand. Our firing line now pushed on to the edge of the bank of the creek. Here we had a good many casualties, owing to the men unduly exposing themselves to get shots at the enemy, whose whereabouts could only be guessed at by the smoke of their rifles when fired, they never showing themselves at all. Lieutenant Ogilvy, of the artillery, ran his gun up by hand, and by depressing it managed to send several shells into the wood at the bottom of the ravine. Both he and his men exposed themselves without the slightest hesitation, but they could not stop the fire from the pits, and one of the gunners was killed. About this time the enemy's fire in our front slackened somewhat, and I suspected a movement was being made to our right. I had previously sent away my two Aides-de-camp with orders to extend three companies

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of the 90th under Captain Buchan and the detachment of C Company under Major Smith on our extreme right, and to post the remainder of the 90th near the extemporised field hospital as a reserve under Major Mackeand. Leaving the left under Major Boswell, who had displayed great coolness throughout, I galloped across to the right, where I could hear heavy firing, and saw large clouds of smoke rising. I found that the enemy, reinforced from their centre, were making a determined attempt to turn our right. They had set fire to the prairie and were advancing firing, under cover of the smoke which was rolling up towards us in thick clouds. I found both my Aides-de-camp in front with the other officers gallantly encouraging the men. One of the Aides-de-camp, Captain Doucet, and several of the men were wounded at this time. The fire was advancing rapidly and had already reached the edge of the wood in which we were extended, the heat preventing our men from advancing. Boulton, with a few of his scouts, and Bedson with some armed teamsters were now brought up to reinforce the right, and, though the enemy was invisible, the whole line kept up a hot fire to their front, the disciplined men of C Company setting a good example by their steadiness. If anything had been required to keep the men steady at this rather critical moment, it would have been found in the extraordinarily composed and cool behaviour of William Buchanan, a little bugler of the 90th, who, while calmly distributing ammunition along the line, kept calling out in his childish shrill voice, "Now, boys, who's for more cartridges?" Some of the teamsters under Bedson's directions had now provided themselves with long sticks, and, after a heavy fire from us which checked the enemy, they advanced and with quiet pluck began to beat out the flames. Our line then pressed steadily forward through the smouldering flames and, splendidly led by Major Smith, Captain Buchan and the other officers, drove the enemy back, bluff by bluff, part of them flying up the ravine and part taking refuge behind a farmhouse. Just at this moment a gun which I ordered up arrived under Captain Drury, who cleverly dropped a shell right into the house, setting it on fire and dislodging the enemy, who bolted after their comrades and were seen no more. I then returned to the right. In passing some open ground we were fired at from the rifle-pits in the centre of the enemy's line, one bullet passing through and seriously damaging my fur service cap, another grazing my horse Sam to his great surprise and disgust, and another wounding Captain Wise's fresh horse which fell, throwing his rider right under my horse's feet. Needless to say we did not linger on that spot. This was not the first time I had been saluted

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from this same spot, and I was afterwards informed by Riel that I owed those delicate attentions to his Commander-in-Chief Gabriel Dumont, who had been good enough to swear he would shoot me. I found the enemy still keeping up a fire from their centre, now become their right. Observing that a good many heads were being bobbed to the pings of the bullets, I explained to those near me that this bobbing looked undignified, and was perfectly useless, as the ping was only heard when the bullet had passed. This remark was transmogrified into the following delicious "bull" in the newspaper accounts, "The General told the boys not to bob at the ping of the bullets, and pointing to his fur cap, which had just been shot through, he exclaimed, "Why, boys, if I had bobbed just now I should have had my brains knocked out!"

About this time Melgund and a party of the 10th Grenadiers under Captain Mason arrived, and were extended on our right centre; and soon the enemy's fire began to slacken considerably and then cease, and they must have most of them retired up the ravine in rear of the wood, as we soon after caught sight of a body of men, part mounted and part on foot, disappearing in the distance in the direction of Batoche. But we soon found to our cost that some were still left in the rifle-pits, as one of our men was wounded by a shot from there.

Captain Peters, commanding the artillery, now asked permission to head a party of volunteers and try to dislodge these troublesome "Pittites," which I granted. The party consisted of a few dismounted artillerymen and some of the 90th under Captain Ruttan. They advanced into the ravine, at the bottom of which they were checked by the fire of the enemy, who, as usual, were invisible. Here they were joined by some more of the 90th under Lieutenant Swinford, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton, who had been sent with orders, and attached himself to the party, and my Aide-de-camp, Captain Wise, who had obtained my leave to go. At the same time another small party advanced in another direction to create a diversion. After making several gallant attempts all had to retire with a loss of three men killed and five wounded, one of the latter being Lieutenant Swinford, who died of his wound. I refused to let them make a second attempt then, and took Captain Drury, with one gun, supported by a part of C Company under Major Smith, across the ravine to the left, to try and take the pits in reverse, but with no apparent effect, as one of the gunners was wounded and Major Boulton, who accompanied me, had his horse shot under him. I brought them back and contented myself with detailing a party, well under cover, to watch the place where the pits were. My

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gallant and ever-ready Aide-de-camp Wise, was now put *hors de combat* by a shot in the ankle, received while trying to ascertain if the enemy had gone.

Though we could not get at the men in the wood we necessarily did great execution among their horses and ponies, which had been fastened in the wood near the rifle-pits, which accounted for the dismounted men we had seen bolting with the mounted party.

By about 3 p.m., with the exception of an occasional shot from the pits, all firing had ceased ; the enemy had fled, and the fight was virtually over. Captain Mason, of the 10th, and some other officers and men were now very anxious to be allowed to again try and rush the rifle-pits, but I had already lost too many of my citizen soldiers, and did not think it advisable, for several reasons, to risk losing more, as we certainly should have done in a second attempt. The tenants of the pits were evidently reduced to a small number, and could do little, if any, more damage. Moreover, I could not help having a feeling of admiration and respect for their stubborn defence when deserted by their comrades, so I refused, and shortly after their fire ceased altogether.

I must now refer to the proceedings of the other column. On hearing the firing on our side Melgund, with the concurrence of Lieutenant-Colonel Montizambert, gave orders to make a secure lager with the wagons, and moved the force down to the river bank, leaving a small party with the wagons. The firing becoming heavier they moved down the river, and as they got nearly opposite the scene of action—which was not visible to them—they saw somebody on our side gesticulating and shouting. Melgund went down to the river-side, and though he could not make out clearly what was said, he rightly concluded that they were wanted to cross, and immediately set to work to do so.* The scow unfortunately was not in its proper position, having been sent early that morning to our camp for forage for the left column. It was then on its way down, and men were sent along the river to hurry it down. When it did arrive it had to be unloaded before the crossing could commence. The unwieldly scow, which could barely hold sixty men, instead of having the assistance of the wire rope and the current, had now to be laboriously propelled with oars roughly improvised and made with axes by men totally unused to such work, the current being an obstruction instead of an aid. Added to this was the difficulty of embarking and disembarking, owing to the deep mud, boulders, and blocks of ice, and to the absence of a wharf and roadways down and up the steep wooded banks some

* We were unfortunately unable to use our bugle signalling, as I could spare neither Captain Peters nor a bugler.

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100 feet high on each side. Yet with all these difficulties to surmount, 250 men and two guns with their waggons fully horsed were crossed over a wide and rapid river without an accident, principally owing to the indomitable energy and determination of the officers and men, and especially of Lord Melgund and Major Jarvis, commanding the guns of the Winnipeg Battery. A force of regulars could not have done better, if so well.

As already stated, the first to arrive was Melgund himself, with a company of the 10th Grenadiers, and Fiennes, of French's scouts, as orderly officer, having been guided to the scene of operations by Captain Haig. In superintending the extension of this company, Melgund was very nearly potted by a shot from a long range rifle, of which the rebels had several, and Fiennes' horse was killed by a shot from the same spot as he was returning from carrying an order.

Later on came more companies of the Grenadiers under Lieutenant-Colonel Grasett, and the two guns under Major Jarvis, who Melgund told me had worked like a Trojan. By that time the affair was virtually over.

At the beginning of the affair Captain Bedson and Mr. Secretan formed a sort of zareba, behind a small wood about 600 yards in the rear, with some of the waggons, where a temporary Field Hospital was established under the direction of Dr. Orton, the senior medical man, who was ably assisted by Assistant-Surgeon Whiteford, of the 90th Regiment, Dr. J. Grant, Artillery, and Dr. Rolston, of the Scouts, in attending to the wounded. The band of the 90th did most excellent service in bringing in the wounded, not hesitating to expose themselves to the fire of the enemy in so doing.

I had intended camping on the spot, but found it was not a suitable one, so sent Melgund and Haig to select a piece of ground as near as possible. They selected one about 400 or 500 yards to our left, near the river, to which the wounded men and the waggons were at once sent. Shortly after, amidst a storm of snow and sleet, the whole force moved off, the Grenadiers remaining extended along the crest of the ravine until we had pitched camp. As they were moving off to the camp, a party of about forty mounted men suddenly showed themselves on the opposite side of the ravine. The 10th faced about and advanced, but the party turned and disappeared, and no more was seen or heard of them. It turned out that they had been sent as a reinforcement, but arrived a little too late.

Thus ended our first brush with the enemy. If not a complete victory, it certainly was not a defeat, and the result did not tend

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to encourage the Indians to hurry on to join Riel. Personally I was fairly satisfied with the affair. My men had borne their baptism of fire well; and if they had not—as was only to be expected—displayed the dash and rapidity of movement of regular troops in their first essay of war, they had clearly evinced great staying power and dogged courage. In fact they had held their own against an attempt at surprise and had driven the enemy, little inferior in number to themselves, and better skilled in the mode of fighting required, out of a position carefully selected and prepared by themselves beforehand. We had under 400 men actually engaged, and the enemy had about 300. Our casualities amounted to fifty, including five officers. Of these, ten, including one officer, were killed or died of their wounds. We afterwards ascertained that the Rebels had eleven killed or died of their wounds, and eighteen wounded, beside three Indians left dead on the field.

FRED. MIDDLETON.

(To be continued.)

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THE TRAINING OF BLUE-JACKETS.

By A Naval Officer.

The question of training seamen for the Royal Navy has always, I think, been considered a difficult one, especially in these days when there is practically no trained reserve from the merchant service to fall back on, which could, if necessary, be pressed into the service of the State; and it has, I venture to think, somewhat puzzled many of our most distinguished officers. Nevertheless, I am bold enough to criticise the present system, and make some suggestions based on a good deal of experience, in the hope that whoever may disagree with me will also give me credit for possessing as much modesty as is consistent for a naval officer who has the good of the Service at heart, and is not afraid of expressing his opinion.

If the English Navy was drawn from the seafaring population, as in France, the question would, I think, be simplified; but nearly all the lads who enter the Service to become Blue-jackets are "landsmen," and practically the Navy never touches the seafaring population; therefore the first question to my mind is to make a seaman from a landsman in the shortest time, so that on this healthy plant the real professional work of gunnery or torpedo may be readily grafted. The present system, which is very good in many ways, being the outcome of much experience, produces, I think, a great many first-rate men, who would compare favourably with the seamen of any nation, although I have heard it questioned by some officers. But we are still, I believe, what is called a seafaring nation, which means in our case that our landsmen as a rule take readily to the sea, and make good sailors. With this hereditary trait to work on, and a most liberal education, I venture to think our men should reach even a higher standard, especially when their length of service is also considered. The Navy is popular, and at present there is no difficulty in getting practically any number of boys of good character and physique to work up; and the system of training must then be responsible for the results obtained. The present system of training up to seaman gunner, or to the time a man has a chance of becoming one, and thus fulfilling his proper destiny, can be shortly stated as follows.

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Not later than the age of fifteen the lads join the harbour training-ships, *St. Vincent*, *Boscawen*, *Impregnable*, *Ganges*, *Lion*, or *Caledonia*, and remain there for about eighteen months, learning the rudiments of their profession; at the end of which time some of them—according to the exigencies of the Service—are sent to the training brigs attached to the establishment for a six weeks' course of practical seamanship. Others are sent direct to sea, to any ship commissioning, re-commissioning, or requiring her complement filled up; so already the element of chance has twice affected their seamen's training. (1) In going or not going to a brig. (2) In the kind of ship he is drafted to, either from her or from the parent training ship. When once in a sea-going ship a boy becomes practically one of the fighting complement, and at, or about, eighteen is rated an ordinary seaman and receives the pay of a man. His further advancement then depends very much on himself, and the smartest boys become A.B.'s, and even occasionally leading seamen in a single commission, besides qualifying in gunnery for trained men, or acting seaman gunner. When the commission is over, all the trained men are sent to the gunnery ship to be converted, if possible, into seamen gunners, and thus complete the training of modern seamen.

This is a brief sketch of a Blue-jacket's training. It is no doubt a most liberal education, and produces also a great many good men, as might be expected, but on the other hand, I am bold enough to say that a great many others become neither good seamen nor good seamen gunners; and, in fact, are in reality neither one nor the other. This is, I know, a serious statement to make, but I venture to think that a great many officers will agree with me; and as there is some doubt at present as to the modern definition of "seamen," I would say that, in my opinion, they are required to be strong, intelligent men, whose nerves, eyes and stomach have been much improved by their seamen's training, and who will therefore be at home in a ship or boat under all conditions.

Now, as to the "seaman's" training, surely it is either necessary or unnecessary; if the former, as I firmly believe, why should any of it be left to chance? It is apparently considered necessary; for large drafts of ordinary seamen, or lately passed boys, are sent every six months to the training squadron, and a sailing ship is kept in the Mediterranean for the same purpose. I have hitherto omitted this part of a seaman's education, for only a small proportion of our men go it, and it is even left more to chance than either of those to which I have referred. I venture to say at once, if the "seaman's" training is not complete, and it seems pretty well allowed by the foregoing statement that it is not,

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why should these mere lads go to either a modern battle-ship or cruiser at all? Why not finish the work so well begun, and make them seamen first, before it is attempted to make them naval artillerists, or torpedoists? In fact, it comes to this in my opinion: Why not complete their education as seamen in either the training squadron or the masted cruisers on foreign stations, and leave out the element of chance altogether? This may be a "large order," but large orders are required for great results, and the men who are to work our guns and torpedoes in the next great naval war must be really good men, with plenty of nerve, and not influenced by any condition of the sea: and how is this to be obtained unless some trouble and pains is taken to convert the landsman into the seaman? There may no doubt be other ways of doing it, but the smartness and quickness of our men, which is so much admired by our sister service is, I believe, allowed to be due to the early seaman's training, and I believe in the system of "masts and yards" to make men self-reliant, quick-eyed, intelligent men, with plenty of nerve. I look upon this training for the young man until he arrives at the period when he should become a highly trained artillerist, or torpedoist, as the best that can be devised as a means to this end; but having gone through this training he should never again be sent to a masted ship unless he volunteers for this part of the training service. In fact, I wish to see him made a seaman first, and a seaman gunner afterwards. This training would, I think, be invaluable, especially if men knew they had not to keep up any knowledge of old-fashioned fittings, and that it was only a means of making the smart, active seamen, who I feel assured are the men required to fight our guns in the present day. The masted ships of the present time on all stations might be called part of the training squadron, through which all drafts from the training ships would pass for ships on that station, and on board of which all examinations for ordinary and able seamen would take place.

At the present time boys, and ordinary seamen passing for higher rates, go through the most varied examinations. In some of the masted cruisers a most exhaustive examination is held; while in battle-ships and modern cruisers a young fellow is only asked to heave the lead and put the helm the right way, and so once again comes this great chance element which appears so often in the training of our men that I feel assured a great many good men never come to the surface at all. The present training squadron is unpopular, principally from this very cause. Men look upon it as a piece of bad luck to be appointed there when they see many others growing sleek and fat in comfortable battle-

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ships and cruisers, which are never very uncomfortable in any condition of weather, and where, from the nature and build of the machine, they are very much out of sight of their officers, and altogether, I venture to say, very much out of place until they have proved themselves capable of working almost any portion of the armament with good effect. It will, I am sure, be urged that this system greatly increases the cost of production, and so no doubt it does; but does not the cost of ships, guns, and mountings also greatly increase almost year by year, to say nothing of the powder charge and steel projectile, the correct and most efficient handling of which on trying occasions is to be absolutely in these men's hands? Our ships are improved in speed, and in offensive and defensive powers at a very rapid rate; but does the training of the men who are to handle them improve as fast? I am still on the subject of the "seaman's" training, and pointing to the necessity, in my opinion, of making them seamen first, and so I shall discuss the gunner's training subsequently, but this I will say: the object to me is to get the best possible seaman-gunner, not one with his head full of "masts and yards" and the rest, with a jingle of gunnery. He should be one who has been taught how to live in a small craft or boat, and who looks back on his sailor's training aloft as a thing done with absolutely, given him as the best means of making him quick-eyed and self-reliant, in order to become a specialist in shooting heavy guns under the trying conditions of a great speed and a moving platform. When his education is complete he is worth any money to the State. If this seaman's training is not worth retaining, as I believe some think, then let it go altogether and start afresh. There is a very good example to be seen in the fine body of marines who do their work well without any nautical training at all, and cost nothing in comparison to the Blue-jackets; but, at the same time, does anyone advocate manning our ships with marines entirely? I don't doubt for a moment that they could do it, but is it the best representative force to work her guns that England can produce? I think not, and believe personally that the only reason this comparison can now be made is because of the want of method in an otherwise magnificent system of nautical education of our men.

It may be urged against this principle of sending boys to sea-going training ships that they are too young and small. This may be true, but in a steamship with light spars when the object is to quicken your men and make them athletic, and not quite seamen of the old class, I don't think it is a serious objection; but if so, the remedy appears to me to not enter boys before the age of fifteen and a half, and then to go steadily on with the seaman training to

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all, until at least the age of eighteen and a half, when the smartest and most intelligent could pass for A.B. and commence their gunnery training as soon as possible; knowing that this, like the harbour training ship was entirely and for ever a thing of the past, unless they preferred to become in the future seamanship instructors. There is only one other point I wish to mention before passing to the system of gunnery training, and this is the physique of our men. Is it as fine as it should be considering that all the boys are picked between fourteen and fifteen, and then well-fed, exercised, and clothed? And once more—to make a comparison—is it as fine as the marines, who do not enter their men until much later? I think a battalion of marines would considerably outweigh the same number of seamen and leave a good deal to be carried over. Our boys, although promising well as a rule, never seem to fulfill their promise in size, and I have been often very much struck with the small difference in point of size between a boys' class and a seaman gunner class standing side by side. This, however, is more of a question for the doctors, and may be due to want of proper shore-going exercise at the growing time, or to sleeping in hammocks, or fifty other causes; but whatever the real cause, I think the result of the expensive training of our men is most disappointing in actual size. Then again, I ask, does our system make the most of the good material so plentifully at command? This may perhaps be answered, and I hope it will by some abler man who, if he recognises the fact, will be able to point to the remedy, if such a thing is needed.

Now, as to the gunnery training of our men. Having been bold enough to criticise somewhat severely the "seaman's" training, the next step is comparatively easy. I pass over the gunnery training of boys and men in sea-going ships without comment, for there, as might be expected, they are taught the use of the weapons at their disposal; and I commence at the time when, having passed for A.B. and trained man in gunnery, a man is sent to one of the gunnery training-ships to complete his education and become a seaman gunner. In my foregoing remarks, I laid especial stress on the necessity of a man being a seaman before the gunner was tacked on to his rating, and now, considering him one, a few lines will give a sketch of how it is done at the present day.

The enormous number and varieties of guns and mountings in the Service make it advisable that our naval artillery men should know something about all of them, although their brothers in the Royal Artillery never attempt so much—and so the men qualifying for seaman gunner are instructed in the following guns, and the consequent drill and manipulation:—

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Breech-loading Guns: 16·25in., 12in., 10in., 9·2in., 8in., 6in., 5in., and 4in.

Muzzle-loading Guns: 10in. and 9in, 9-pounder, 7-pounder.

Quick-firing Guns: 6in., 4·7in., 6-pounder and 3-pounder.

Machine Guns: Nordenfelt, Gardner.

Nor is this anything like all, even in this branch of the subject, for almost every gun has at least three different kinds of mountings, all of which they are supposed to be acquainted with, in addition to the turret and barbette drill, and hydraulic fittings, which now play such an important part in the equipment of our heavy modern ships.

It looks a sufficiently alarming list, and so it is; but then comes the ammunition for these various guns, which is by no means a small subject, and as a seaman gunner is by his charter supposed to be able to impart his knowledge to others if necessary, a great many details have to be learnt often more or less like a parrot. Then comes what is known as field exercise, or soldiering, and rifle practice, all requiring a good deal of attention; cutlass and pistol exercise and field and machine gun drill, all subjects where there is a good deal to learn, and much to forget, before the time for examination, especially when the whole course, including their education in firing heavy guns, rifles and pistols, lasts only five months. At the end of this time, if he passes a sufficiently good examination, he is supposed to be just the man to be crammed with the complicated torpedo training, and off he goes to the torpedo ship to qualify in this subject for a couple of months, at the end of which he is rated a seaman gunner torpedo man, and is paid accordingly.

I have hitherto omitted the important subject of heavy gun firing from the course, although each man qualifying fires about fifteen rounds from guns ranging from the 9.2in. to the smallest nature. All this practice takes place from small gunboats of slow speed at floating targets. The difficulty of attaining a firing range at all at some of our training ports is so great, that the firing cannot be carried out under anything approaching the conditions of service, even if that were possible with the low speed of the gunboats. The firing is, therefore, on the whole, very good; at least, so the results show; but it must be remembered that men are but human, and that in many cases the marking of the shots is done from a small boat anchored in line with the target, very often in a nasty, choppy sea, with the anchor coming home.

The required shooting standard, both of rifle and heavy gun, is so low that it is practically always obtained, and I think the general reader will be somewhat surprised to hear that in the whole

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of this course, at least 75 per cent. obtain first-class certificates, and are thus well acquainted with their duties as seamen gunners.

It seems to me that someone should say what is expected of a seaman gunner? Is he to be a good shot? Is he to be a smart drill? or is he to be only a fair shot with his head full of things which are so mixed up that they are rarely of any practical use to him? This is of course the wrong answer, and I think the general answer is, that he is to be as good a shot as you can make him first, and to have as much general knowledge of the guns and mountings he is likely to come across as can be put into him without cramming and spoiling his shooting. Taking this as the required standard—does our system of gunnery make the most of its material? Again, I think not. Shooting being the most important consideration, is there any system of gradually working men up to use their guns under the conditions of actual service? There is not, for all the practice, with the exception of one day's firing to instruct captain of turrets and turret guns, is carried out from the aforesaid slow gunboats. It is, I feel sure, a most difficult subject to teach, and one which depends very much on the men themselves; but a system can be introduced of eliminating those who are seen to be below the average, and giving the remainder a chance to work themselves up and feel the confidence which each success gives; and for this purpose I would suggest that a position for fixed targets on shore must be found, where markers can remain in safety and mark accurately in presence of an officer, and repair or shift targets rapidly when damaged. A good sand bank would, I think, be the most suitable spot for it. Having got this I would abolish the small gunboats and carry out all the firing from a fast sea-going tender attached to each establishment, at speeds varying gradually from five to fifteen knots. Moreover, I would make the heavy gun instruction the first to be always carried out, and as soon as this was finished, the firing. The men who proved themselves really good shots could go on with a first-class seaman gunner's course, and the remainder with only a modified one, for they would not become first-class men. This would at once eliminate a good many inferior shots, and I venture to say if ever the system was tried, the shooting averages would be seen to be very different from the present ones. It may be urged that I am hard on the men. I don't think so, because first of all we want really to know who can shoot, so that a captain can rely on the men sent to him with first-class certificates, and not have to find out by practical experience, as at present, who are the real artists

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with a tube lanyard. A really good shot in the present day is worth any money, and should be classed accordingly.

It will be urged, I am sure, that the present captains of guns who are put through a special course are good shots, and so some of them no doubt are; but trained in exactly the same way, in the same gunboats at low speed, they would no doubt fail at first, if tried under modern conditions of speed. The firing training of captains of turrets and captains of turret guns, is, I think, the first step in the right direction; these men get the opportunity of firing a turret gun during one run past the Service prize firing target, or in general language the ship steams eight knots past a target distant about 1500 yards, and the man under instruction fires as many rounds as he can in six minutes.

In summing up, I wish to point out that I think there are far too many first-class seamen gunners, and far too few good gun shots in the Service; either a man can or cannot shoot well, and it is unkind to give a man this high-sounding name unless he can. In my opinion, the great principle of training is to get hold of your good men by dropping out the inferior ones; this, if thoroughly done, gives confidence, and if carried out in the "seaman" and in the "gunnery" training thoroughly without much regard to the defaulter's book in the early periods, I feel convinced the standard would be greatly increased. Captains of guns would, in my proposed system, be the pick of the first-class seaman gunners, and would be worth any money, so much so that I am inclined to suggest their being part of the skeleton crew of the ships on the mobilisation list.

In conclusion, I would apologise for possibly appearing rather dogmatic, especially as I have attacked things that "be": however, I can honestly say I have had a good deal of experience in ships, and training establishments, and feel that the changes I advocate are not the result of a single day's reflections, but are the outcome of a certain amount of careful thought over long periods. Though I do not doubt I shall have many who utterly disagree with my principles, yet I feel I have some time ago convinced myself that the modern seaman gunner must be a seaman first of all, and a naval gunner afterwards, or else he ends in being neither one nor the other.

A. N. N. O.

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THE ROYAL MARINE LIGHT INFANTRY.

By Captain J. F. Daniell, R.M.L.I.

There is no branch of Her Majesty's Service the nature, composition, duties, and organisation of which are so little understood by the general or professional public as those of the Royal Marines. The Navy understands its naval side, and the Army, when it has been associated in garrison with the former at the large naval ports, more or less understands the military side; but very few people, naval, military, or other, unless they have made the subject a special study, understand both sides of the duties and organisation of the Marine corps. Hence it is that officers of the Royal Marines often read with a feeling something like despair the things which are from time to time said in Parliament when any question about their Service happens to crop up, and they wonder, as no doubt previous generations of Marine officers have wondered, whether the time will ever come when the country will understand more about a corps to which it owes not a little for the past two or three centuries.

A short time ago the organisation, training, capabilities, and work of the Royal Marine Artillery were fully set forth in an article in this magazine entitled "The Royal Marine Artillery," but there remains something to be said about the 12,000 Infantry who form the remainder of the Royal Marine Corps, in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the whole question.

Twelve thousand men is a very large number; in the Army it would represent twelve line battalions with a number of officers, and a considerable appendage of departments of various kinds, and would be a factor by no means to be passed over lightly, or at all likely to escape notice. As it is, however, the Marines being for the most part, when at home, garrisoned at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, or the depôt at Walmer, are not prominently before the eyes of the general public; while when abroad they are in peace time scattered about in numerous detachments, varying in strength from the corporal and five or six privates of a gunboat, to the major with his two subalterns and large detachment of a flagship, such as the *Royal Sovereign*, and

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thus their identity becomes merged into that of the ship's company to which they belong.

The Marines, however, have an individuality of their own, and one of which they are very tenacious; they have a brilliant record of the past and an individual history which they will never forget, and they have a present record of honest and hard practical work of which they are proud, while they have no desire to be merged into the generic term soldier on the one hand, or sailor on the other. They are Marines, who made themselves a history as Marines, and who are now at the present time striving to keep up their old record as Marines, and Marines they wish ever to be: that is, sea soldiers, inferior to none, they believe, as soldiers and very passable sailors.

To begin at the very beginning of a Marine's career, he is first enlisted either at the depôt, one of the divisional head-quarters, or one of the outlying recruiting stations which are scattered throughout England and Scotland, and are under the command of an officer of the Royal Marines—Artillery or Infantry. The standard at present is 5ft. 6in. for lads from eighteen to twenty, and 5ft. 6½in. over twenty, with a chest measurement of 33in. if under 5ft. 8in.; 34in. if 5ft. 8in. or over, up to 5ft. 10in., and 35in. over 5ft. 10in. Endeavours are made to obtain a good class of recruits, and doubtful characters are not accepted, the result being that as a rule the Marines are a very good class of men both as regards physique and social status.

The recruit on enlistment is sent straight off to the Royal Marine Depôt at Walmer, where he receives his clothing and commences his drill. Here he is thoroughly taught his infantry drill, and is put through courses of gymnastics, musketry, and swimming, and after a period of about eight months he is ready to be transferred to his divisional head-quarters. On arrival at head-quarters, though now actually a trained soldier, he is still regarded as a recruit, as far as his Marine duties are concerned, and is not considered as an old soldier until he has been embarked for twelve months in one of Her Majesty's ships. Before embarking he is put through a further course of musketry at head-quarters, and also through a long and severe period of training at naval gunnery.

Each Marine Infantry Division has a drill battery armed with naval service guns, of all sizes and natures, including machine and quick-firing guns, and here the recruit is trained for about sixty days, working from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. each morning. At the conclusion of his course he is examined, and if he obtains the qualification of V.G. "very good," he receives one penny per diem extra pay. About 70 per cent. of the recruits who go through the battery

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obtain this qualification, but the standard required is sufficiently high to ensure that no one attains to it who does not work really hard and intelligently, and who is not fully competent to take his place at a gun on board ship. Recruit officers have to go through a training of the same duration, and are examined at the end of it as to their practical knowledge of naval gunnery and their capabilities of drilling quarters.*

The recruit who gains his penny a day is allowed to keep it for three years, at the expiration of which time he loses the penny unless he has re-qualified either afloat or ashore, and obtained the qualification of trained man in the former case, and of very good in the latter.

Having completed his gun drill, the Marine recruit is ready to be drafted for service afloat, and takes his turn for the next ship vacant. If it chances to be a harbour ship, he remains there for one year, after which he is disembarked to head-quarters. If, however, he is fortunate enough to be sent to a sea-going ship, he is sent for the whole "commission," which is better for the man and better for the service.

Once embarked, he takes his place in the ship's company, and though primarily his duties are of a military nature, such as guard and "sentry-go," yet actually while on board ship he performs all sorts of duties in addition to those connected with the guard, and he takes his place as a permanent number at the gun to which he is told off. The Infantry Marines on board ship may either have separate guns allotted to them with their own officers in charge, or they may be distributed about among the guns with the seamen, or a combination of the two systems may be adopted. It depends entirely upon local circumstances in each ship; and in point of fact the Marine, when embarked, has to be ready to take any position in the stations of the ship which the captain may determine. However, no matter to what post he may be detailed, the Marine Light Infantryman when he leaves head-quarters for sea is a trained gunner, and, as such, ready to take his place either at the heavy or machine-guns of the ship. Similarly the officer of the same branch is trained and is competent to take charge of the guns allotted to his detachment for drill and practice, and has received a training in naval gun drill, which, though not so elaborate and exhaustive as that of an officer of Marine Artillery, is very good of its kind and is, in my opinion, sufficient for all practical purposes. He can drill and exercise his men at the guns, and has

* A technical term for naval gun drill. When a ship is cleared for action the men "go to quarters."

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a fair knowledge of the theory of artillery, though I do not attempt to assert that he has a thorough and exhaustive knowledge of gunnery to the same degree as one whose principal end and aim is gunnery.

Very many officers of the Light Infantry, however, supplement their knowledge of gunnery acquired in the drill batteries at head-quarters and on board ship by going through the gunnery course in H.M.S. *Excellent*. A class for officers of the Royal Marines, Artillery and Infantry, is formed in H.M.S. *Excellent* annually, and the officers who attend are there put through a very searching and thorough course. At its conclusion they are examined and certificates are awarded, and the gunnery instructors at all the divisions are selected from officers who hold the certificate from H.M.S. *Excellent*. Thus it will be at once clear that the knowledge of naval gunnery in the Light Infantry, as well as in the Artillery, forms a very important factor in the education both of officers and men, and is one upon which great stress is laid. An officer has to revise his gun drill annually with his other drills at head-quarters, while those who have passed through the gunnery school in H.M.S. *Excellent* go back to the school after passing, from time to time, to revise their gunnery there, and to keep abreast of the changes which of late years have been so constant and continuous in the science of naval gunnery.

So much for the naval education of the officers and men of the Marine Light Infantry; but this is not all. It is their pride and aim to keep well up to the modern standard required from the infantry soldier in all respects, and to this end they turn their constant endeavours.

A very large proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers pass through the School of Musketry at Hythe, and, with scarcely an exception, the officers obtain the first class extra certificate: they pass through the gymnastic course at the school at Aldershot and also the Army Signalling School at the same place, while non-commissioned officers and men, up to the numbers laid down by the Admiralty, pass through the Naval Signalling School at Portsmouth, and are employed when afloat as Naval signallers. Officers of the Light Infantry, as well as the Artillery, compete for entrance to the Staff College, and at the present time three Infantry officers on the active list are graduates of the Staff College.

It must be remembered that the conditions of the Royal Marine Service render it rather a difficult matter to gain an entrance to the Staff College, as the change from shore service to service afloat, and the comparatively short time that the officers

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remain in one place, together with the multiplicity of drills they have to revise, render it hard for them to find the time for steady and settled work, beyond their ordinary duties, of a kind sufficient to enable them to succeed in winning a good place at the competitive examination for entry.

All officers of the corps have to pass Riding School before promotion to Field rank; and by a recent, and excellent, order young officers, while probationary second lieutenants, and undergoing their course of instruction at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, have to pass the Riding School at Woolwich.

All the young officers on first entry pass one year at the Royal Naval College, where they are instructed in fortification—field and permanent, and including coast defence—tactics, topography, military history, modern languages, and drawing; while other officers are allowed to attend the Sessions at Greenwich voluntarily for a year to improve their knowledge in these subjects.

Finally, all officers of the Light Infantry have to pass identically the same examinations for promotion as Infantry officers of the Army. So it may be said that the Marine officer receives the same education and has to pass the same professional tests as his brother in the Army, and has also the additional education which specially belongs to his corps. His time is thus fully occupied, and he is kept well up to the mark throughout his service.

Similarly with the non-commissioned officers and men. They pass their service in a continuous state of revising their drills, or in going through various special courses, either at the naval or military schools of instruction. As soon as a non-commissioned officer or man disembarks from a ship he comes again into the hands of the Adjutant, the Gunnery Instructor, and the Musketry Instructor, and is again put through the mill. Of late years, since the introduction of the naval mobilisation scheme, the demands for men are so large for the depôt ships that considerable difficulty is experienced in keeping the men up to their drills when they disembark, as they are so soon required to go afloat again; but the remedy for this is to be found in having a large number of men to draw from, so that each man may have plenty of time to revise all his drills thoroughly on disembarkation, before his turn for sea-service comes again.

The result of this thorough and all-round training which the non-commissioned officers and men receive is well known, as it is due to this, and to the fact that by the conditions of their service they are always ready to be drafted anywhere without delay, that they form the handiest and the most readily available force which we have. To ensure this, however, in view of the

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increased demands of the fleet, it will be necessary to keep the numbers steadily increasing for some years to come, and to this end recent orders and regulations have tended.

There remain one or two points to be noted as to pay, &c., of the Royal Marine Light Infantry. However well a non-commissioned officer or private of the Infantry may qualify in naval gunnery, he can only receive 1d. per diem extra pay, and consequently a private's daily rate of pay is always 2¼d. less than that of a gunner R.M.A., who receives 1s. 5¼d. per diem, while the Infantry man with gunnery pay receives 1s. 3d.; and in the non-commissioned ranks the difference becomes still more marked, while their duties on board ship are very much the same. Again the Marine, blue as well as red, while on shore does not get free rations, though when afloat he does; but when on shore he is stopped 4½d. per diem for bread and meat ration. When this is deducted from the 1s. 2d. daily pay of the Infantry man, supplemented by 1d. beer money, it does not leave him much to spend.

The question of what the Royal Marine Light Infantry do and have done in peace and war is a large one, and far better known than the small details about their organisation and training which it has been the aim of this paper to set out. Suffice it to say that what has been already said in the article previously referred to entitled "the Royal Marine Artillery" may be said with little variation of the Royal Marine Light Infantry. Their service, afloat and ashore in the Crimea, China, Ashanti, Egypt—and indeed almost wherever fighting has had to be done since the beginning of their existence—is a tale thrice told and needs no recapitulation. Their existence to-day needs no apology, and in the words of the old familiar story they have done their duty once, and many more times, and are ready to do it again.

J. F. DANIELL.

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SOUTH-EAST AFRICA.

Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa. F. C. Selous. (London: Rowland Ward and Co., Limtd.,)

INTERESTING as are all Mr. Selous's books, this one is, perhaps, the more so, since as it comes at a time when the despotic rule of the last great South African King, Lo Bengula, is giving way to the prosaic customs of the white man.

Though the hunting stories are told with a freshness, and illustrated in a manner which one is unaccustomed to in the pages of a South African hunter, a reader of *nature* would rather that Mr. Selous had given him less lion and more native. We should like to know the boundaries of the tribes practising certain rites, and whether their customs extend to the eastern coast, or die away as the north is approached. The illustration of a Mashukulumbwi warrior gives features resembling rather an Assyrian bas-relief; and it would be of interest to trace the connection of such a race with an Asiatic stock.

Among the lion stories is a most curious one of the extreme terror caused by the grip of the carnivora. A lion seized a dog by the nape of the neck, carried him off, but apparently dropped him almost immediately on the alarm being raised. The dog, which had never yelped, did not, however, return to camp for twenty-four hours, presumably having hidden himself under the influence of fear. Some fifteen months afterwards another dog, when similarly treated by a leopard, disappeared for over forty hours. Mr. Selous states that terror sometimes causes human beings to act in the same manner. It is much to be regretted he has not related one such case.

To Europeans the homing instinct of the Bush tribes, as instanced on page 110, will seem almost fabulous. Turning to the Matibili raid made in 1883 on Lake Ngami, some Massarwa children were captured and brought back to the Matibili capital—Buluwayo. Some dozen of these children were presented to the King, the eldest not being more than ten years old, the youngest

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mites of five and six. The children were well fed and seemed content with their fate. One morning, however, they were missing and could not be found. The following year the Author, when in the Massarwa country, made inquiries as to the fate of these children. He was assured that they had all, with one exception, reached home in safety. The distance from Buluwayo to Lake Ngami is 400 miles. As part of the Matibili themselves lost their way in this raid, it would appear that homing instinct in the highest degree necessitates a migratory life.

If anything could induce Mr. Selous to give up his adventurous life, his experiences among the Mashukulumbwi in 1888 should have done so. These savages, who, among other peculiarities, have a head-dress some five feet high, had treated the white man and his people with the greatest cordiality up to the night on which they suddenly surrounded and attacked his camp. Mr. Selous thought himself lucky in escaping, in very scanty attire, with his rifle and four cartridges to make for Pandamatenka, over 300 miles distant. After the first long and tedious day's journey he came to a village where he was again treacherously attacked, escaping with the loss of his rifle. Again and again, further on, was he within an ace of being murdered, as he says, on the ground that "dead men tell no tales." He is, however, incorrigible, for no sooner does he and the remnants of his party reach safety than he again starts on a fresh expedition.

Throughout the book Mr. Selous often narrates instances of the bloodthirstiness of the Matabilis, and in Chapter XIV. commences his connection with the events which led to the establishment of the Chartered Company and the present Matabili question.

Lo Bengula has always forbidden the exploiting of his country for gold, and, being astute enough to foresee the inevitable invasion of the whites in such a case, has always endeavoured to keep them at arm's length. He consequently refused leave to the Chartered Company to pass through Matibililand to Mashonaland, and so Mr. Rhodes had to cut his road round the east of Lo Bengula's country.

Whilst the cutting of this road was going on, Lo Bengula mobilised his forces, being probably either under the belief an attack was meant by Mr. Rhodes on the east and the Bechuana Police on the south, or intending to keep his warriors under his eye.

Of the rights and wrongs of the present quarrel Mr. Selous does not treat.

As regards the high plateau of Mashonaland he declares it eminently suited to European colonisation, the temperature varying between 70.5 deg. and 57.5 deg. and the rainfall only 33.84″ in 75 days. European cereals and vegetables are easily cultivated.

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Gold undoubtedly exists in large quantities. The produce of the farms is to be consumed by the gold diggers—a rather Utopian view. That Mashonaland has been visited before now for gold by foreigners of a higher type is undoubted, but that the district was only *visited* and not *colonised* is evident to Mr. Selous himself. Will the English succeed where the Arabians failed? If the problem is to be solved in our favour we may be sure that the necessary energy will be found in Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Selous.

From my personal experience of South Africa I can bear willing testimony to the great value and interest of the story Mr. Selous has so ably told.

J. M. GAWNE.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

NAVAL RATIONS.

To the Editor of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

SIR,—I sent the article on Sailors' Rations in your Magazine for August to the lower deck, saying that if the petty officers liked to give me their opinion I should be glad to have it.

The result was the paper I enclose, written by a seaman petty officer. It may be of interest to your readers as coming from those most interested, and as an instance of how a seaman of the present day can express his views. Yours faithfully,

NAVAL CAPTAIN.

IN the first place, considering the great difference between the two services, their duties and routines in times of peace, &c., no just comparison can be made between them. The statement that the scale of rations at present issued is liberal must be admitted; but it certainly is not varied enough nor popular, and could easily be altered: in one instance, the salt pork could be issued less frequently and a popular ration substituted.

Whether this could be done without much, if any extra, expense to the State is a question for others.

The idea of going to breakfast as early as 5 a.m., and getting no service meal until noon, is considered bad, and certainly forces men to provide food for themselves out of their own pockets, so that the suggestion that a pint of optional issued immediately after turning out, and the recognised breakfast at 8.30 a.m., is considered good.

The question of over-feeding, is considered a matter which each man must decide for himself. It cannot be contended that a man who requires a little supper between the service meal (generally at 5 p.m.) and 9.30 p.m., is a glutton. In considering such a question as stoppage of mess savings, men are apt to enquire, Shall we receive in food the equivalent of these savings? Two ounces of butter each man per day would be enough of that one article; but surely the whole of the savings now made would not be stopped for 2oz. of butter and a pint of cocoa.

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It will then be asked, What else do you require? The answer is that 12oz. of fresh beef is quite sufficient, but vegetables (potatoes in preference) are not now issued in anything like the necessary amount; and even those issued from our own victualling yards are of a most inferior description; so that we would ask that potatoes be part of the ration, viz., 1lb. per man per day. Another thing to be considered is the biscuit at present issued.

Very few men can get enough of this food into their stomachs to satisfy the cravings of hunger. And when it is considered that this biscuit, with a pint of cocoa, is all a man gets for breakfast, how can it be wondered at that canteens are in such demand.

If ships could bake their own bread, and this, with 2oz. of butter, be issued together with *potatoes*, we think the enormous amount yearly expended on canteen gear would be greatly diminished, and such things as salmon, sardines, &c., would fall into their proper category, viz., luxuries.

The following idea for dinner (at sea) is much the same as advanced in the article in question, with a slight alteration in the rotation; so that salt provisions shall be issued on alternate days, and not two days in succession:—First day, pork and pea soup; second day, preserved mutton and rice; third day, salt beef and puddings; fourth day, Chicago beef and soup (desiccated). When fresh provisions are procurable, two issues of mutton per week would certainly vary the monotony of continual issues of beef.

The general opinion seems to be that 7¾d. or thereabouts is not sufficient to supply a man with food for one day. Now if a man is placed on compensation, the service allowance is 1s. 1d. per day. Why not raise the allowance from 7¾d. per day to 10d. per day, and allow the victualling staff afloat a little discretion in purchasing food, which we think might easily be done, and a good variety of food be obtained at almost all ports of call?

The idea is pretty general that, until the service can see its way clear to supply ships with competent cooking staffs, the food, whatever its quality, will never be worth the trouble to obtain it. The cooking accommodation on board our ships for the ship's company is far from being adequate.

The great success that has lately come over the Army in the matter of food is almost entirely due to improved methods of cooking, and last, but not least, competent cooks to superintend the work.

PETTY OFFICER.

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THE TIN SOLDIERS.

THE little tin soldiers standing there,
  With dust on their coats once gay,
Were placed on the shelf by a little wee lad,
  On the night that he went away.

He bade them stand in the corner there,
  Be patient and brave and good,
And ever since as he placed them then,
  Those little tin men have stood.

They have waited and watched for many a day,
  On their shelf in the corner dim,
But never again on earth alas,
  Will they get a command from him.

What wonder their coats are covered with dust,
  And black where they once were blue,
The years have been many, the years have been long,
  Since those little tin men were new.

For an angel fair with wings outspread,
  Came down from Heaven that night,
And carried away that little wee lad
  To live in the realms of light.

Still through the changes the years may bring,
  Faithful and true they stand,
Waiting in vain for their captain's voice,
  And the touch of that baby hand.

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NOTICES OF BOOKS, ETC.

These notices give a brief abstract of the general scope of the volumes referred to, and, without reviewing them at length, call attention to their most striking points.

Sporting Notes in the Levant. By Lieutenant DAYRELL DAVIES, R.N.

A small volume giving a graphic and readable account of sport in the Levant, with a description of the game found at various places, comprising pheasants, partridges, hares, quail, &c. A full list of the game mentioned throughout the book is given at the end, together with the game register at different times. It is interesting and useful to all those who have to service in the Eastern Mediterranean and wish to know what they may hope to shoot there.

A.B.C. Five-figure Logarithm for General Use. By C. J. WOODWARD, B.Sc. London: E. & F. N. Spon. 1893.

This contains, in a very portable form, "Mantissæ of numbers to 10,000, Logs., Sines, Tangents, Cotangents, and Cosines to 10deg. of Arc, together with full explanation and simple exercises showing use of the tables." The author's aim is to simplify the use of logarithm, and his introductory remarks very clearly explain his method by which he hopes "yet to lighten the labours of the thousands of workers who use logarithms in their daily routine of calculation."

Drill Regulations of the German Field Artillery, 1892. Translated for the Intelligence Division, War Office, by Captain W. A. MACBEAN, R.A. London. 1893.

An excellent translation of the German Drill Book of 1892, commencing with a preface by the Emperor, which, in characteristic German fashion, lays down that "we, however, authorise the War Office to order, upon its own responsibility, any modifications necessitated by change of material." The volume contains the usual Drill Diagrams, and, under the head "Battle," some useful notes on the conduct of Artillery in action.

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A History of the Gold Coast of West Africa. By A. B. ELLIS, Lieutenant-Colonel 1st Battalion West India Regiment. London: Chapman & Hall. 1893.

In a well-printed volume of 400 pages, Colonel Ellis gives a very exhaustive history of the Gold Coast, beginning even with the prehistoric traces left of the Phœnician trade. The successive attempts at colonisation by the French—who claim priority of discovery—Portuguese, Dutch, and English are described chronologically, and many chapters are devoted to the history of Ashantee and to the series of wars by which the power of its kings became extended and consolidated. Few military students are aware of the many small skirmishes that have occurred between British officials and the doughty warriors from "Kumassi" from 1818 to 1873, when the most important campaign of the whole group was brought to a successful conclusion. Colonel Ellis's description of this small war is especially interesting, and he points out, when telling the story of the battle of Amoaful, that the losses on the Ashantee side were by no means so great as reported at the time, for only about 130 dead bodies were discovered, "and it is not the custom of that people to carry off their slain, unless they are chiefs."

A Guide to the Training of Infantry Volunteers. By Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. A. MAYHEW. London: W. Clowes & Sons. 1893.

A small *brochure* of forty-eight pages, which suggests how the training of the Volunteer can be rendered more methodical, and therefore more effective, than has obtained hitherto. He claims that "the system has been tried successfully, and the improvement in the drill and musketry of the recruits has been very remarkable."

Report on Horse-breeding in France. By Veterinary-Major MATTHEWS, Royal Horse Guards. London: W. Harrison & Sons. 1893.

A valuable monograph produced under the authority of the Intelligence Department, and provided with an outline map showing the position of the different *haras* depôts, &c., throughout the country. The system of having State breeding establishments in France dates back to 1665, and was more and more developed as its value became more apparent during the strain of the numerous wars that preceded the long peace. The *haras* depôts are twenty-two in number, and are under the control of the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. Their organization is carefully explained in the

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Report, and the pecuniary success of such undertaking is shown by the total difference in favour of exported over imported animals in 1887 being as many as 24,305. The French Remount System is also carefully studied.

The Rival Powers in Central Asia, or the struggle between England and Russia in the East. Translated from the German of JOSEF POPOWSKI by ARTHUR BARING BRABANT, &c. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co. 1893.

It scarcely seems seventeen years since Sir Henry Rawlinson aroused attention by bringing into prominence the possible designs of Russia, and her certain advance towards the frontiers of our Indian Empire. Then, she was far from us on the map; now, her partial occupation of the Pamirs have brought her outposts almost within touch. Popowski's "Antagonismus der Englischen und Russischen interessen in Asien" attracted, two years ago, some attention in Germany, and for those who cannot read it in the original, the translation, being well done, is useful. An interesting "Editorial Introduction," by Mr. C. E. D. Blade, late in charge of the Geographical business of the India Office, brings the modern political condition of things up to date, and emphasises somewhat strongly the loyalty of the present Amir of Afghanistan to the English understanding or alliance. It is to be sincerely hoped that is so, for though there are many diverse opinions as to the value of "buffer States," there can be but one opinion, that if Afghanistan is to remain independent, it would be better she should do so as a friend than a foe. The author has no great opinion of our ability to cope with Russia single-handed. It may be that in crying "Wolf" he may be more anxious to consider the value of England to the Central Alliance—a subject to which he devotes a chapter—than whether the Central Alliance would ever be any good to England. Mr. Popowski is dogmatically certain that Russia aspires to the possession of India; but aspiration and possession are different matters. She may aspire to have an outpost in Berlin, but a good deal would have to be said before that came about. So with India; and few Englishmen would care to entirely accept the author's conclusions in the chapter in which he asks, "Can England arrest Russia's advance in Asia?" if by that he means the peninsula of Hindostan as well the Khanats north of the Hindoo Koosh.

There is no doubt of the colonising or absorbing power over the petty States with which they come in contact that the Russians show; but, as the author points out, their methods are distinct in

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character from our own in dealing with such countries. Russia "endeavours to weaken and undermine them," whereas we "desire to strengthen, civilise, and consolidate them." The latter course he does not think of much practical value, and therefore concludes that "Great Britain is unable to arrest Russia's advance in Central Asia," and "in the future she will be equally powerless to check Russia's progress on the northern frontier of Prussia and Afghanistan." The strategical relations of the States are well argued out, but the author is throughout pessimistic, and considers that in this, as in all other cases, we are at a disadvantage. He cannot expect all his English readers to share his opinion that the "last hour of her power in India seems no longer to loom in immeasurable distance." An excellent map of the north-west frontier is given.

China and her Neighbours: France in Indo-China; Russia and China; India and Thibet. By R. S. GUNDRY. London: Chapman & Hall, 1893.

Mr. Gundry has republished in this volume a series of articles that have already appeared in the press, but the information is brought up to date and maps have been added. Its chief interest lies in the first of the three sections into which the book is divided, viz., France in Indo-China. In this the gradual development of the French possessions in the far East are traced from the occupation of Cochin China, at the end of the last century, to the extensive Annam and Tonquin Protectorates over the country on the left bank of the Meikong, which has been taken from Siam. A desire to still further extend the authority of the French over the Cambodian Peninsula in the direction of Chantabon and Battambong is still hinted at, as well as from Tonking to Luang Prabang, on the 20° parallel of north latitude. Throughout, the volume contains much interesting matter pleasantly told.

Round the Black Man's Garden. By ZÉLIE COLVILE, F.R.G.S. London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1893.

In a well got-up, and well illustrated, volume of 340 pages, Mrs. Colvile tells the story of a voyage, round Africa, beginning with Suez and the Red Sea, and finishing at the west coast. Though there is nothing particularly new either in the voyage or its incidents, the story is very pleasantly and graphically told, and shows a power of keen observation on the part of the writer. The chapters devoted to Madagascar are most interesting, and the description of the Queen and Court during the "Feast of the Bath" is curious.

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With Captain Stairs to Katanga. By JOSEPH A. MOLONEY, L.R.C.P., F.R.G.S. London: Sampson Low, Marston, & Company. 1893.

Doctor Maloney was medical officer of the expedition organised and commanded by the late Captain Stairs until his death at Chinde. It is yet another chapter in the history of African exploration, and much of the ground traversed is already known and been described. The expedition was started by the Katanga Company, "originally founded as an offshoot of the Commercial and Industrial Company of the Congo," to search for and work the gold said to be found in paying quantities in the Katanga district. The place seems rich in mineral wealth—gold, silver, copper, and cinnabar.

Starting from Zanzibar, the expedition marched by Bagamoyo and Uganda, meeting Arab slave caravans crossing Lake Tanganyika at Karema, and so to Bunkeia, the capital of Katanga. Here the usual collision took place between the relative interests of King Msiri and those of the Company, culminating in the death of the King, described as one of Africa's "most detestable tyrants." Coloured potentates who stand in the way of European expeditions generally get a bad name, and too often such a death as Msiri's. The expedition returned across the southern end of Tanganyika to the coast, suffering much hardship, and that without having had the satisfaction of seeing the Katanga gold-field.

The Zambesi Basin and Nyassaland. By DANIEL J. RANKIN, F.R.S.G.S., M.R.A.S. London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1893.

The author deals in a series of chapters with different expeditions in the valley of the river, and with more detailed descriptions of such places as Mombasa, &c. Though there is a great sameness in all books of African adventure, for there is little of historical interest to be discovered in the greater part of the "dark continent," Mr. Rankin gives some interesting information with regard to the Arab races, the Portuguese officials, and the Muzungus, or half-castes. But the key-note of the book is the Author's belief that from the Chinde mouth of the Zambesi to the north end of Lake Mgana (700 miles of navigable communication, "with only one small break") and thence by Tanganyika to the Nile, will run the future highway through Africa, "from Chinde to Alexandria."

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LIST OF BOOKS, ETC., RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

Die Reichswhr. Vienna.

Telling Off and Posting a Piquet, by Lieutenant G. D'Arcy-Evans. Aldershot: Gale & Polden, Ltd.

Attack Drill made Easy, by William Gordon.

Fire Discipline, by Lieut. Stuart Murray.

Neue Preussiche Zeitung. Berlin.

Medical Magazine, the. Southwood, Smith & Co.

Militärische Blätter. G. von Glasenapp.

Cancer and its Complications, by C. E. Jennings, M.D., M.S.

The Black Prince, by the author of "Told in the Verandah." Lawrence and Bullen.

The Order of Field Service of the German Army, by Major J. Gawne and Spencer Wilkinson. Edward Stanford.

Moltke: a Biography, by W. O'Connor Morris. Ward & Downey.

Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London. Chas. T. King.

The Army Book for the British Empire, by Lieut.-Gen. W. Goodenough and Lieut.-Col. J. C. Dalton. Harrison & Sons, St. Martin's Lane.

Globe Laurel. Ive & Lowe.

Revue Militaire Suisse. A. Borgeaud.

Khama, the African Chief, by Mrs. Wyndham Knight-Bruce. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.

Brigade Drill and Ceremonial, by Malton. W. Clowes & Sons.

A Key to Infantry Drill, 1893, by Malton. W. Clowes & Sons.

At the Front, by Wm. Martin. Alexander Gardner.

Notes of Sport in the Levant, by Lieutenant Dayrell Davies, R.N.

When Glory Calls. W. H. Allen & Co.

Militär-wissenschaftlichen-Vereine. Vienna.

Stories Retold. J. Tamblyn.

A Guide to the Training of Infantry Volunteers, by Lieutenant-Colonel Mayhew. William Clowes & Sons.

Signalling Made Easy, by Colonel C. E. B. William Clowes & Sons.

All communications for the Editor should be addressed "THE EDITOR, UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, 15, *York Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C.*," *and, if intended for insertion, should be written on one side of the paper only. The Editor does not undertake to return rejected communications unless accompanied by stamped and addressed envelope.*

Communications concerning subscriptions or the business of the Magazine must be addressed to the Publisher.

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 782.—JANUARY, 1894.

THE RISE OF ALDERSHOT.

BY THE LATE MAJOR-GENERAL T. A. L. MURRAY.

IT is commonly supposed that Aldershot owes its origin to the war of 1854 with Russia, usually called the Crimean War. This is, however, not the case, and the object of this article is to show how Aldershot really originated, for which purpose I shall consider the subject under the three following heads:—The purchase of the land, the erection of the wooden huts, and the construction of the permanent barracks. This division has been made in order to emphasise the fact that when the land was purchased there was no intention of erecting any buildings whatever upon it.

It was the satisfactory result of the camp formed at Chobham in 1853 that led to the purchase of the land at Aldershot, and to His Royal Highness the late Prince Consort the nation is deeply indebted for having suggested its establishment. His Royal Highness was struck by the fact that although the principal foreign European nations annually assembled large bodies of troops in the autumn for the purpose of practising military manœuvres, nothing of the kind had, up to that time, ever been attempted in England. The Prince, probably out of consideration for the advanced age of the Duke of Wellington, then Commander-in-Chief, did not bring forward this suggestion during the Duke's tenure of office because the successful carrying out of such a suggestion required all

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the energies of a much younger man. The Duke of Wellington died in November, 1852, and was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by the late Lord Hardinge, who came into office full of experience acquired in India, and especially on the victorious battle-fields of the Sutlej campaign. To Lord Hardinge, therefore, either late in 1852 or very early in 1853, the Prince Consort proposed the formation of a training camp, and the idea was eagerly adopted and energetically carried out. During February and March, 1853 experienced officers were selected by Lord Hardinge and ordered to inspect and report upon the suitability for the purpose of a large number of heaths and waste lands of which the following are the principal: Barham Downs, Dartford Heath, Bagshot Heath and neighbourhood, Chobham, Bisley, Hartford Bridge Flats, Romping Downs, Aldershot Heath, and Beacon Hill. The ground in the neighbourhood of Bagshot was considered the best; and on the 16th of April, 1853, Chobham was selected and steps were at once taken to obtain the consent of the lord of the manor and of the farmers and commoners possessing rights of grazing, turbary, &c., over the land.

It was hoped that if the first attempt proved successful a similar camp might be formed annually on ground to be hired for the purpose. The method adopted by foreign nations of waiting till the crops are gathered in was considered, but it was found to be inapplicable in this country, partly on account of the enclosed nature of the land, and partly on account of the uncertainty of the climate. The objects proposed to be gained by the establishment of the experimental camp at Chobham were both numerous and important. At one home station only, Dublin, could a brigade of infantry be got together and manœuvred in conjunction with artillery and cavalry, and even in that garrison their sphere of action was extremely limited. At Chobham an excellent opportunity would be afforded to General and Staff officers of studying their profession practically in field operations on a more extended scale. The troops would be accustomed to act in masses, and the various branches of the service, hitherto isolated and detached, would be brought together for combined operations. In addition to these general advantages, Lord Hardinge had four special objects in view.

1. The mode of conveying orders for the movement of each brigade; that laid down in the Regulations and practised in the Phœnix Park, Dublin, being, in his opinion, quite impracticable for field purposes in case of war, and likely to lead to great confusion.

2. The weight to be carried by the soldier. Lord Hardinge was extremely anxious to reduce this from 60lb. to 40lb., anything

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over the latter weight which should be found absolutely necessary was to be carried for and not by the soldier.

3. The method of carrying reserve ball ammunition so as to be in rear of the battalions in any ground and in any weather—which at that time was not laid down in any Regulation.

4. Every encouragement to be given to bring forward attempts for improving the patterns of tents, arms, and equipment.

Lord Seaton was appointed to the command of a division of the Army to be encamped for exercise on Chobham, which was to consist of three brigades of infantry of three battalions each, four weak regiments of cavalry, and four field batteries. Regiments and corps were to be kept there for one month, then to be relieved by the same number and for the same time. This would afford instruction to about 20,000 men in two reliefs of 10,000 each. The camp was formed about June 15th, and broke up on August 25th, 1853. Some anxiety was felt lest the ground might become too much cut up and swampy for a two months' occupation, and on May 7th Aldershot was examined by Lord Seaton as a change from Chobham in case a move should be found necessary.

Towards the latter end of August Lord Hardinge rode over the ground at Aldershot, and found it admirably adapted for the encampment of a division of 10,000 men. The water supply was excellent. Doubtless this inspection was made with the view of hiring the ground for next year's encampment, because it is certain that at that date there was no intention of purchasing the land. But towards the end of September, Lord Hardinge's attention was drawn to an Act of Parliament passed on the 20th of August, 1853, for enclosing twenty-seven waste lands and commons. The Act consisted of but two clauses and a schedule of the lands to be enclosed. The simplicity of this Act, and the rapidity with which it was carried, so alarmed him that on September 26th, he wrote a strong report to the Government, in which he pointed out that the experiment of collecting two divisions of troops in succession at Chobham had been successful, and in a degree which fully justified the recommendation he was about to make, that ground for a permanent camp should be purchased by the Government.

Lord Hardinge also pointed out that it was quite out of the question hiring similar tracts of land from year to year; as, every session, Acts of Parliament were passed enclosing these barren commons. The report set forth that the great deficiency in rendering the British Army as perfect as it could be made, consisted in the extreme difficulty of procuring ground on which a force of

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8000 to 10,000 men could be exercised and instructed during the summer months in divisional evolutions, and the three arms, cavalry, artillery, and infantry worked together, finally that a tract of 8000 to 10,000 acres could be bought for about £70,000 to £80,000.

His Lordship would have selected Reigate, from a strategical point of view, as the best position for such a camp, but land in that locality could not be obtained at a reasonable price. He therefore recommended the extensive heaths of Aldershot, Farnham, and Ash, about thirty miles from Reigate, as admirably adapted for the assembly of a large body of troops in direct communication with Portsmouth, and, for strategical purposes, one of the most important points next to Reigate, with an ample supply of water at all seasons. This report and recommendation of Lord Hardinge's was no doubt supported by the powerful influence of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort, as the former wrote to His Royal Highness on 5th December, 1853, to say that he hoped again very shortly to report progress, "knowing the very deep and successful interest which your Royal Highness takes in this matter, and how much the Army will be indebted to your Royal Highness for this permanent and admirable camp of instruction."

On the 11th of January, 1854, Lord Hardinge reported that the proprietors of Aldershot Heath, 2500 acres in extent, had agreed to sell for £12 an acre, and that the waste lands of Yateley would be sold at the same price; and, therefore, on the 13th of February, 1854, the Treasury approved of a sum of £100,000 being inserted in the Army Estimates 1854-55 for the purchase of land at Aldershot for a camp. This was only a rough approximate estimate. The total sum spent on the purchase of 7000 or 8000 acres of land up to the 31st of March, 1861, was £144,656, which included all the buildings upon it. These were two in number; the only one of any value was originally built for a union workhouse and afterwards converted into a school. It is still standing, and is used as a hospital. The other was a small building occupying a prominent position close to the present club-house, and was a good old-fashioned country roadside inn, called "The Row-barge." The landlord eked out a precarious living by selling beer to the thirsty bargees on the Basingstoke Canal, and by putting up, and acting as guide, to sportsmen who came down from London to shoot snipe on Cove Common, at that time an excellent snipe bog. The landlady, it was said, had been in her early days a distinguished star on the boards of one of the transpontine theatres, and to this early training she was no doubt indebted for the power with which she wielded what is commonly

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called a woman's only weapon—a most effective weapon it is, as many a man can testify. When the camp was formed, this inn, being the only building on the common south of the canal, was seized upon as if by a hostile army of invasion, and became the temporary head-quarters of the General and of every other department. It was the only public-house for miles where a glass of beer could be got, and it consequently drove a roaring trade first with the workmen employed in building the huts, and next with the militia and troops in them, no canteens having been provided until many months after the camp was first occupied. Fortunately for the taxpayer the landlord was only a yearly tenant. Had he possessed a lease it would have taken a large sum to have bought him out. On the completion of the camp the inn was no longer required, and notice to quit was served on the landlord, as it was decided to pull the building down. But the six months' notice expired and still the landlord showed no signs of moving. The commanding Engineer tried the effect of a personal interview with the landlady, but was compelled to beat a rapid retreat by the torrent of the landlady's eloquent tongue. "Come, come, my good lady," observed the retreating officer, "you have not been quite so badly treated as you make out. I am told you drew a barrel of beer in fifty-five minutes, and kept up that rate steadily all day." "Fifty minutes, if you please, sir," replied the landlady, with evident pride at such an unprecedented performance. Finally it was found necessary to send a party of Engineers to take the roof off and cart it away, selecting a good steady wet day for the purpose. This had the desired effect. Empty possession was obtained, and the "Row-barge Inn" was levelled with the ground.

No sooner had the purchase of Aldershot been completed than the Russian War broke out on March 28th, 1854, and the whole of the available forces in Great Britain, as well as some of the regiments stationed in the Mediterranean, were despatched to the East. The strength of the Army at home at that period was 69,000 men, which included 23,000 in Ireland; and as the strength of the Army in the East was 39,000 in September, 1854, it will readily be seen that England was practically denuded of regular troops. In order, therefore, to replace these troops, 50,000 militia were called out and embodied. Eighteen regiments were called out between May and September, many others in December, 1854, and early in 1855. For this purpose an Act of Parliament was passed on May 1, 1854, giving power to the Government to call out the militia in case of war. Previously to that date the militia could only be called out and embodied in case of invasion or imminent danger of invasion, the annual training being, of course, excepted.

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The current report was that the Government intended to quarter the militia in the barracks vacated by the regulars, and at first sight this appeared to be a very natural arrangement. The report may, or may not, have been true; but at all events it soon became evident that all the vacant barracks would be required for housing and training the recruits who flocked in great numbers to the standard under the combined influence of warlike spirit, a £10 cash bounty, and a free kit. Strenuous efforts were made to provide temporary barracks for the militia by hiring and fitting up such premises in the various county towns as should, on inspection, prove suitable, and Engineer officers were employed visiting towns for this purpose. The difficulty of hiring suitable premises on reasonable terms was very great, and the delay in completing the agreements and fitting up the buildings was considerable, while the necessity of providing quarters for the militia was extremely urgent. There was, therefore, no other course available than to put the greater portion into billets. Nothing can be more detrimental to discipline than billeting, added to which the hardship on the licensed victuallers was very great, as no one could foretell how long the war might last.

Great pressure was brought to bear on the Government. Meetings of licensed victuallers were held all over the country to protest against the idea of billeting, and it was pointed out that the Government was straining the powers granted to them under the Billeting Act, which was only intended to apply to troops passing from one station to another. It was therefore decided to erect wooden huts as rapidly as possible for the housing of the militia at various stations, of which Aldershot and the Curragh of Kildare were the most important, 20,000 men being allotted to Aldershot. It was at first intended to place them on both sides of the Farnborough road, but on 26th February, 1855, Lord Hardinge met Colonel Sir Frederic Smith, the Commanding Royal Engineer, by appointment on the ground, and it was decided to place huts for 12,000 men on the east side of the Farnborough road and south side of the canal, and huts for 8,000 men on the north side of the canal, also on the east side of the road. They were arranged in blocks, each capable of accommodating 500 men, which was considered the probable effective strength of each militia regiment. Twelve hundred and sixty in all were required, of which 800 were for twenty-four men each, and the remainder for officers' quarters, mess-rooms, kitchens, hospitals, &c.

Tenders were called for on 23rd of January, 1855, and it was not at first proposed to have any foundations; but brick foundations were subsequently adopted, and the tenders for these were

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called for on 15th of February, 1855. The date fixed for the completion of the contracts for the whole of the huts was the 15th of April, 1855, but there were only 600 huts finished by the 18th of the month. General Knollys, who was designated for the command, but not gazetted until 14th of May, visited the camp on 25th April, 1855, accompanied by Colonel Sir Fred. Smith, C.R.E., when everything was settled for the quartering of 1000 men expected on the 1st of May. At the same time as the huts were being erected a Royal pavilion was built, on ground specially marked out by H.R.H. the Prince Consort. It was fenced in with an oak park-paling and tastefully planted with specimen conifers, rhododendrons, &c., by Messrs. Waterer, of Bagshot. Special detached huts were provided for the Secretary of State for War, the Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General to the Forces, and the General commanding the camp.

General Knollys was gazetted to the command on the 14th May, 1855, and on the 1st of June there were four regiments of militia in camp. On the 10th July, 1855, the Queen held the first review, at which were present one brigade of Guards and seven regiments of militia, some 5000 or 6000 men. Her Majesty ordered Tippoo Sahib's tent to be erected for her use until the pavilion was finished.

By the 11th August, 1855, there were still from 100 to 150 huts wanting to complete. The first idea of providing them for the militia appears to have been that they were to be issued by the Ordnance Store Department, and, in fact, looked upon as wooden tents instead of being dealt with as buildings by the Royal Engineers. The total cost for 50,000 men was estimated by the Ordnance Store Department at £300,000, of which £175,000 were provided in the Army Estimates, 1854-55, and the balance of £125,000 in 1855-56. The first contracts called for were for materials only, and the labour was at first provided by men employed on day work. On the basis of the original estimate huts for 20,000 men ought to have cost £120,000, but the actual cost of the camp at Aldershot, according to a return furnished to Parliament on the 26th July, 1858, was £476,892, which included the cost of the Queen's pavilion, a county police-station, and other incidental expenses. Although the camp was originally constructed for 20,000 men, this was subsequently reduced to 11,426, by reducing the number of men in each hut to twenty-two, and by appropriating soldiers' huts for hospitals, prisons, libraries, and store-houses. At the same time that the camp was constructed the club-house was built by private enterprise. A London wine merchant obtained permission from the War Department to build it, subject to summary resumption of the land at any time if required. His object was no

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doubt to push the sale of his wine, while affording to officers on their arrival in camp the advantages of a club before their own mess could be established in working order. The club-house did useful work in this way in the early days of the camp; but when things began to shake down into their proper places the demand for club-house accommodation fell off, and eventually the War Department bought the building. It is found very useful now for concerts, dances, &c.

Considerable delays were experienced in the erection of the camp. The time for completion fixed by the contracts was two months, the actual time taken was six months. The chief difficulty arose from the want of roads over the actual site. These were made under a separate contract by the War Department, but the contractors for the huts were not allowed to use them, because by the terms of their contracts they were bound to provide their own roads; and if they had been allowed to use the War Department roads these would have been rendered totally useless for the military occupants. The soil is exceedingly soft, and the carting of huge quantities of building material rapidly cut it up into deep ruts, the depth of which was limited only by the height of the cart axles above the ground. When this point was reached a fresh track had to be taken. A great portion of the exercising ground on the west side of the Farnborough Road, now used for field-days, was cut up in this manner, before the Government acquired the land, by the commoners carting turf. These ruts extended over considerable areas, in parallel lines, and were completely concealed by the growth of heather on their edges. Hardly a field-day took place without some mounted officer (there were no artillery or cavalry at the camp in those days) getting a bad fall from this cause. It was found therefore absolutely necessary to level and fill in these ruts, for which purpose military working parties 1000 strong were daily employed for several months. This operation may have given rise to the report prevalent in after days that the heather which originally covered the whole of the ground had been purposely cleared away, the act being condemned, and justly so, if it were true, as barbarous. But there is no truth in the report. Heather will not stand constant traffic, under the effects of which it rapidly disappears. During the winter of 1855-56, the ground round the huts got into a very bad state of mud and slush, and for some time no efforts appear to have been made to remedy this. But just as the *Times* found an able war correspondent to describe the actual state of things in the Crimea, so they found one who periodically visited Aldershot and exposed its shortcomings in able letters signed "An

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Old Quartermaster-General." He pointed out that the drainage was so bad the men could not parade, the mud and slush everywhere being over their boots. They were even obliged to muster in quarters on some occasions. In order to remedy this it was eventually found necessary to subsoil drain—with 2in. agricultural drain-pipes, laid at close intervals, at a depth of 4ft.—the whole area of the South Camp.

The total occupation of Aldershot Camp on the 18th February, 1856, was 14,592, of which 4030 were regulars, 10,040 militia, and 522 3rd Jæger British German Legion. Peace with Russia was proclaimed in March 1856, and on 19th April, 1856, the Queen reviewed the militia prior to their disembodiment, and the Royal pavilion was occupied for the first time, and during her visit Her Majesty met with what may be called a curious adventure. General Knollys, desirous of personally superintending the formation of the militia on the review ground in the Long Valley, did not himself meet the Queen at Farnborough Station, but sent a Staff officer from the Long Valley to conduct the Queen and Royal party to the review ground. This officer took a short cut across Cove Common, evidently ignorant of, or forgetting, the reply of the canny old Scot to his friend who recommended him to take a certain short cut, "Na, na, I've na time for your short cuts the day." The Staff officer's horse got irretrievably bogged, and there was no one to meet the Queen at Farnborough Station; so Her Majesty, accompanied by the late Prince Consort and the Staff from London, mounted their horses, which had been sent to the station, and rode along the road leading to the camp, but no one in the party knew where the troops were drawn up, and they were not visible from the road. Not being required for parade, I had turned out to see the review simply as a spectator, mounted, and in full review order, and took up a position on the Farnborough road between the club-house and the pavilion, as I wanted to see the Queen better than I could expect to do on the parade ground. Presently I saw the Queen and the Royal party approaching, and I drew aside to allow them to pass, but to my utter dismay Her Majesty and the Prince Consort drew up opposite to me, and the Prince said in what struck me as rather a sharp tone, "Where are the troops?" Does it not invariably happen when you ask your way in a strange place that you receive the reply, "I am a stranger here." This is the reply I should have liked to give, as I had only been a fortnight at Aldershot, but of course it would not do, so I pointed in the direction of the Long Valley and answered, "Over there, your Royal Highness." "Which is the way?" asked the Prince. I replied, "You have passed the road, your Royal Highness." The Prince

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turned to the Queen and said, "There, I told you so." It was quite pleasant to hear this homely expression of triumph. "Will you show the way then?" said the Prince. "Certainly, your Royal Highness," I replied, though I felt I had never before been placed in a more awkward position. It struck me I was taken for a Staff officer told off to conduct the Queen, as my uniform somewhat resembled the Staff uniform, especially the cocked hat, and I felt instinctively that I must come to grief. It was not long before the blow came. The Prince asked as I was leading the party, "Which way are the troops facing?" I saw at once the object of the question, and replied, "I don't know, your Royal Highness." "Oh dear, oh dear, will nobody go and see?" said the Prince. "Certainly, your Royal Highness, I shall only be too glad to go." I galloped off, and meeting a Staff officer posted to look out for the arrival of the Royal party, obtained from him the required information, and returned to the Royal party. The following day a review was held at which some 15,000 troops were present; soon after which the militia were disbanded and returned to their homes. The south camp was empty for some time after, and it was a curious sight to see the rats, tamed by hunger, sitting on their haunches by hundreds round all the huts regardless of the passer-by. The Basingstoke Canal most probably was the source of the original supply of these rodents.

Aldershot camp was now turned to account for another most useful purpose. The whole of the troops from the Crimea were brought there on landing at Portsmouth, and were reviewed by the Queen, who came down for the purpose from time to time, residing in the pavilion for three or four days on each occasion. On the 23rd of August, 1856, there were 1,263 officers and 28,181 non-commissioned officers and men at Aldershot, a large portion being under canvas; and this included 265 officers, 5,842 non-commissioned officers and men of the British German Legion, cavalry as well as infantry. In June, 1856, very serious riots occurred between the men of the Rifle Brigade and the men of the German Legion. Our men could not speak German and the Germans could not speak English, but it was said that by means of dumb show our men managed to make the Germans understand that they (the Germans) had done nothing during the war (which was quite true, but not their fault, as the war was over before their services could be made available), while our men had returned covered with medals. Very large piquets of cavalry were therefore daily required to keep the combatants apart, and eventually the German Legion was sent to the Cape and grants of land given to the men.

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The lively interest in Aldershot and everything connected with it evinced by the late Prince Consort, to whom it owes its origin, has been already shown; and foreseeing its great future as a military training ground, he was therefore anxious to secure its permanent retention by the nation. The Prince pointed out to the military authorities the importance of taking steps to ensure the permanent retention of Aldershot, as in the event of a long peace the country might grow impatient of the heavy military expenditure involved, or a Government might come into power pledged to retrenchment, and the land, which would most probably have increased in value, might be sold. The Prince appealed to the history of the last peace for a confirmation of his views, and asked what had become of similar camps established during the last great war? Was it not a fact that the village of Sandgate, for instance, was built of the materials of Shorncliffe Camp sold by the Government? Put permanent buildings on the land, urged the Prince, and the country will never be allowed to sell it. The state of popular feeling engendered by the war (Jingoism in fact, although the expression was not then coined) is such, added the Prince, that now you can ask Parliament for anything you want. Strike while the iron is hot. This advice, supported by the strong personal influence of the Prince, was accordingly acted on, and in a Supplementary Army Estimate for 1854-55 a sum of £10,000 was inserted, and subsequently voted for the erection of barracks at Aldershot. No total estimated cost was furnished to Parliament, nor was any statement made of the number or description of troops the barracks were intended for. The first approximate estimate made was in December, 1854, for three regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and two troops of Royal horse artillery, and it amounted to £243,000. In February, 1857, another approximate estimate was made for three regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and two field batteries, which was the accommodation finally adopted, and its amount was £505,195. The actual cost was £755,587.

On the 22nd of February, 1855, Lord Hardinge forwarded to the Prince a plan showing the ground on which the permanent barracks "are to be erected this summer as agreed upon, behind the ridge on which your Royal Highness rode, and occupying the least possible space of ground set apart for manœuvring." It has often been asked, and the question is a natural one, why, when the Government owned from 7000 to 8000 acres of land, was a site selected on the edge of the property, and in such a situation that the barracks must eventually be hemmed in by public-houses? But the reason was that both the late Prince Consort and the late

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Lord Hardinge were anxious not to encroach upon the exercising ground, and because the best available building site had already been taken up for the hut barracks. No progress with the actual building of the barracks was made in 1854-55. In the Army Estimates 1855-56, a sum of £250,000 was voted for the barracks, but the preparation of the plans and the making of the contract occupied the greater portion of the year. £60,000 only out of this amount was expended by the 31st of March, 1856, in laying down materials on the ground. The actual construction began in April or May, 1856, the whole of the barracks being completed by the autumn of 1860, a very short period considering the magnitude of the works; but a portion of the infantry barracks was occupied in December, 1859. The contractors were Messrs. Geo. Myers and Sons, a well-known London building firm at that time, who laid down, at their own expense, a railway into the barracks, branching off the London and South-Western line to Guildford somewhere near Ash.

The infantry barracks had not been long occupied before they became the scene of a most unfortunate military riot, one, happily, without a parallel in the annals of our military history. Most of our readers are probably acquainted with the leading features of the construction of the permanent barracks at Aldershot, but for the sake of those who are not it may be well to explain that the soldiers' quarters consist of two parallel blocks, three storeys high, about 240ft. long, distant apart about 80ft., the intervening space being roofed over with glass, the object being to obtain a covered drill ground. There are no internal passages or staircases. Access to the rooms on the upper floors is afforded by an external gallery built of wood, 10ft. wide, with a staircase at each end. Although the gallery and staircases are described as external, it must be understood they are covered from the weather by the glass roof.

On Christmas Day, 1859, the south block and part of the north block of the West Infantry Barracks were occupied by the 2nd Battalion — Regiment; and three companies only of the "Blankshire" Militia were quartered in the north block. Readers will please note that real names have been suppressed as military feuds take a long time to die out, and care must be taken not to revive them. The men of both regiments were drinking in the canteen in the evening when a dispute arose as to which regiment had the best Christmas dinner. It was customary in those days for the officers to provide the men's Christmas dinner and a pint of ale per head. *Esprit de corps*, which, being liberally translated, means the art of abusing every regiment but your own, contributed largely to the warmth of the dispute. The quarrel waxed so

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fiercely, that the non-commissioned officer in charge of the canteen ordered the men to their barrack-rooms and locked up the canteen for the night. The riot continued, and for some time war was waged with mops, brooms, &c., lumps of coal being freely used as missiles. Presently a report was spread among the men of the line regiment that the militia were taking to their arms. The report was most unfounded, but the regulars immediately took their rifles, and with the ball ammunition, which in those days formed part of a soldier's kit, opened fire on the militia across the 80ft. space between the two blocks. Major A., in temporary command of the militia, was called when at his dinner by a non-commissioned officer, who told him of the row that was going on. He immediately hastened to the barracks, ordered the assembly to be sounded, and the militia came down from their rooms and formed up on parade. The discipline and behaviour of the men were admirable, and they did not fire a single shot in return, which fact was recorded to their credit by the coroner's jury at the inquest held to inquire into the cause of death of one private in the militia who was killed. Three men were wounded in addition. The 2nd Battalion — Regiment, was afterwards sent away as soon as possible to one of our most distant colonial possessions.

While the description of the construction of the barracks is still fresh in the reader's mind it may be well to relate the origin of the story of the "forgotten staircases." It is possible that in the lapse of some thirty-five or thirty-six years the story has died a natural death, but to my certain knowledge it lived for twenty years, and was most popular at every infantry mess. Its chief, and perhaps its only merit, was its simplicity. It ran thus. The engineers, when not only planning but actually building the barracks, were said to have forgotten the staircases. It was no use pointing to the fact that staircases existed, because they were said to be an after-thought. Now how did this story originate? It arose from an innocent joke in this way. One day a friend of mine, an officer in an infantry regiment at Aldershot, called at my office and asked me to show him over the permanent barracks, then in course of construction. I took him over one infantry barrack, and after a careful inspection, with the help of scaffolding and ladders, he asked "Where are the staircases?" The answer given to a similar question asked by me in my boyhood, and which will be explained further on, immediately flashed across my mind. Pretending to be confused by the question, I said in an hesitating manner, "Staircases; did you say staircases?" "Yes, my dear fellow, I

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said 'staircases,' and I want to know where they are to be." There was no indication whatever of the position of the staircases then because, to save them from damage, the galleries and staircases were left to the last. I replied, "I see you are too sharp for me, so I am going to confide in you, and I hope you wont tell anyone, but I am afraid we have forgotten the staircases." "That is rather awkward," said he, "is it not? What will you do?" "Yes," I replied, "it is decidedly awkward, but we must consider the matter, and I daresay we shall find some way of getting over the difficulty." It need scarcely be added my friend returned to his anteroom full of this delightful story against the engineers, and it rapidly went the round of every mess in the service.

It remains for me to explain how it was I thought of this joke. It had been played on me when a boy by my elder brothers and sisters. My father built an addition to his country house, consisting of a dining-room on the ground floor and a drawing-room over it. But there was no staircase, and when, in later years, after my father's death, I asked why there was no staircase, the answer was, your father forgot the staircase. This was a family joke. The real reason was, my mother refused at the last moment to give up a small bedroom, which was originally intended for the staircase, greatly to my father's delight, as he got off finishing and furnishing the new drawing-room.

The first gymnasium ever built for military training was built at Aldershot permanent barracks. Gymnastics had long formed one of the exercises of the French Army, but up to about 1860 nothing of the kind had ever been introduced into the British Army. A committee of officers was appointed to inquire and report upon the system in use in the French Army, and with the consent of the French Government they proceeded to Paris for this purpose. The design of the building was taken from a gymnasium at Oxford, at that time the best, if not the only, specimen in England. The first married soldiers' quarters ever built were erected in the permanent barracks. They consist of one room 10ft. square for each family. This accommodation is now looked upon as utterly insufficient, modern married quarters consisting of two rooms and a scullery. But it was, nevertheless, a great step in advance, as when I joined the service the married soldier lived with his wife and family in the ordinary barrack-room with the unmarried soldiers, a small portion of which was screened off by a hanging rug or blanket. At Aldershot two rooms are now given to men with families.

Although not strictly within the limits of this article, it may not be considered out of place to give a brief description of the

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transformation now in progress at Aldershot, the cost of which will amount to something over a million. The whole of the old wooden huts are to be swept away, and brick buildings, constructed on the latest approved sanitary principles, are now either erected or in course of erection, to take their place. The soldiers' blocks will all be built on virgin soil; that is soil on which no building has hitherto stood. On the site formerly occupied by the south camp there will be barracks for five infantry regiments, each 800 strong, 1,200 Royal Engineers, 1,000 Army Service Corps, 600 Medical Staff Corps, the Cambridge Hospital for 450 patients, a head-quarter block containing the officers of the General commanding and all the Staff, and St. George's Church to seat 1,000, of which the foundation stone was laid by the Queen. The name south camp is abolished, and Stanhope Lines substituted, the barracks being designated Albuhera, Barrossa, Corunna, Maida, and Mandora.

On the north side of the Basingstoke Canal, when the works are completed, there will be accommodation for five infantry regiments, each 800 strong, which will be designated the Marlborough Lines, the barracks being named Blenheim, Malplaquet, Oudenarde, Ramillies, and Tournay. There will also be barracks for three batteries of field artillery, and a new hospital for about 250 patients. A gymnasium is to be provided, and the exercises will be voluntary, the men being permitted to use it whenever they like. An athletic club, properly fitted up with a running-ground, will be provided by funds privately subscribed, and it will be supported by voluntary subscriptions from regiments, a portion of which will be put aside as a sinking fund to repay the original cost in forty years. The old permanent barracks will be re-named The Wellington Lines, the three infantry barracks being called Badajos, Salamanca, and Talavera. The cavalry and artillery barracks will retain their old original names. For the use of the troops in these lines, a church was built some years ago, called "All Saints'," containing seats for 1,059. In round figures, the total accommodation for soldiers at Aldershot will be 17,000, with hospital beds for 957.

T. A. MURRAY.

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THE MAKING OF SYDNEY.

By W. B. Worsfold.

Fifteen years had elapsed since the landing of Captain Philip before the first echoes of the remote Antipodean settlement reached England in the volumes of Hunter and Collins. Moved by these accounts, Sydney Smith wrote his first essay on Botany Bay. He seems to have been especially struck with the arduous nature of the task in which the settlers were engaged in their endeavours to subjugate the forces of nature; and it is this thought that gives him a philosophic basis for his essay. After all, he reflects, what a lot of time and trouble it takes to make a country. And so he writes, "He who lives among a civilised people may estimate the labour by which society has been brought into such a state by reading, in the annals of Botany Bay, the account of a whole nation exerting itself to new floor the Government House, repair the hospital, or build a wooden receptacle for stores." But of all these accounts of Sydney in its infancy, that of Péron, which appears not to have been known to the essayist, is the most interesting. It forms part of the record of a scientific expedition despatched by the French Government to the South Pacific, and which was published, by order of Napoleon, in 1807. The French naturalist, while regarding the settlement as a social experiment with the keen interest of a man of science, was wholly unbiassed in his opinions, and showed a singular appreciation of the picturesque, both in the material and social surroundings of the place.

Péron stayed at Port Jackson from the 20th of June to the 18th of November, in the year 1802. He found the *ville de Sydney* "situated on the slopes of two neighbouring hills, and completely traversed by a little stream." After mentioning various buildings, the signal-station, the hospital, the prison, store-houses, and others, he describes the residence of the Lieutenant-Governor and the barracks, which occupied the slope of the western hill. There was an open space in front, around which the officers' quarters and other military buildings were grouped. This "grande place" of Sydney, as Péron calls it, was, at this early period, the centre of its social life. Most persons who have visited Sydney in recent years probably have, like myself, experienced the hospitality of one or other of those

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handsome club-houses which, together with the Government offices in the neighbourhood of Macquarie Street, make that quarter of Sydney to-day resemble St. James'. The germ of these clubs—the Union, the Australian, the Athenæum, and the rest—was already in existence at the time of Péron's visit, but it was planted on the western and not on the eastern hill. For he tells us that it was in a little house close to this square that the principal civil and military officers were accustomed to meet. The notion of a club seems to be new to him, for he adds: "It is a kind of café, supported by subscriptions." Among the materials for recreation provided in it, he particularly notices a billiard-table. Behind this group of buildings there was a large square tower, which was used as an observatory by the English officers. At the foot of the tower the foundations of a church had been laid, but, he adds quaintly, "the Government had delayed for the present the completion of an edifice of this kind requiring much expense, labour, and time," as they naturally preferred to transmit to the colony "institutions more immediately indispensable to its existence and prosperity." Mr. Barton, the present Attorney-General of New South Wales, in his recent and exhaustive history of the colony, comments upon the tardiness of the Government in this matter in a very different spirit. From him we learn that, although a chaplain was appointed when the fleet left England at ten shillings a day and his rations, yet no provision was made for the expenses of public worship. It was not until 1793 that the construction of a place of worship was commenced; and even then the expense of its erection was defrayed by the chaplain out of his very moderate salary. The site of this first church, built by Mr. Johnson, is now planted with trees, and forms a welcome breathing-space for the inhabitants of a now crowded locality. The building itself has gone, but on the opposite side of Church Hill, as the place is called, stands St. Philip's Church, a handsome edifice, and remarkable as containing in its vestry the Bible and Prayer-book originally provided for the use of the settlement by the Home Government.

Péron completes his list of the buildings of Western Sydney by the mention of "two fine wind-mills" on the ridge of the hill. In order to reach the eastern hill—a neighbourhood now occupied by the Domain and by the most important official buildings and the clubs—he had to cross the little stream by a wooden bridge. This wooden bridge was, however, replaced by one of stone before his visit terminated; and he mentions the additional fact that the Government had at the same time constructed locks and erected a water-mill. In the Sydney of to-day no trace of this dividing stream, which must have been so considerable a feature in the

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infant town, remains, but the existence of the bridge is still commemorated by the street so-called, Bridge Street. Across the stream Péron found a range of buildings in which were stored all manner of household furniture and tools for the use of settlers, and beyond, the Governor's residence. This latter he describes as built in the Italian style, with a colonnade running round it, while in front a "*très beau jardin*" was in course of formation. In the distance, on the slope of the further hill, now covered by the districts of Paddington and Darlinghurst, was the Government bakery, an establishment able to furnish from 15,000lb. to 18,000lb. of ship's biscuits daily. Still farther away, beyond the western hill on the road to Rose Hill (Paramatta), was a village containing some forty houses, appropriately called Brickfield, where the manufacture of bricks, pottery, and china was carried on. Between this and the town was the burial-ground. Here, to-day, two extensive groups of buildings are to be seen, the Anglican Cathedral of St. Andrew, with the deanery and diocesan offices, and the Town Hall and municipal offices. At the back of the latter a great chamber capable of holding 5000 people has lately been erected. This Centennial Hall, as it is called, together with the Centennial Park, opened by Lord Carrington in 1888, commemorates the completion of the first century of the city's existence. It was formally opened by the Mayor of Sydney in November, 1889. This ceremony was followed by a ball in the evening, at which some thousands of guests were entertained by the same official.

From Péron's account, therefore, it appears that but little change has been subsequently made in the positions of those important public buildings, which were already at this early period in existence, although the buildings themselves have been replaced by more ambitious structures. The Italian villa has been replaced by the Gothic mansion now provided for the Governors of New South Wales, and the promise of a "very beautiful garden" has been amply realised in the Domain, from the terrace of which Mr. Froude lately looked and wrote that what he saw was the loveliest scene he had ever looked upon. The range of store-houses near Government House has developed into the Treasury, the Colonial Secretary's Office, the Lands, and other public offices—great buildings constructed like most of the Sydney buildings from the red sandstone of the Pyrmont quarries. The traveller who to-day explores the neighbourhood of Darling Harbour is astonished to find whole streets of substantial and even handsome dwellings in a region of warehouses and docks. What Péron tells us of the position of the Barrack Square on the western hill, with the officers

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quarters and the club close by, explains the existence of these substantial houses and how it was that Darling Harbour became a fashionable neighbourhood, and remained so until it was ultimately deserted for Macquarie Street and Double Bay.

But the thirteen years of General Macquarie's rule, lasting from 1809 to 1821, was the period during which, more than any other, the material foundations of the town of Sydney were laid. By this time the initial stage which excited the sympathy of Sydney Smith had been passed. The colony was provided with necessaries. The settlers were housed and fed and had begun to look round and see if they could not do something to contribute to the world's wealth. In 1804 MacArthur, the founder of the wool industry—now worth upwards of twenty million pounds sterling annually to Australia—arrived in England. He had fought a duel with Colonel Paterson, and had been sent home under arrest by Governor King. He brought with him some specimens of the wool grown on his property, and showed them to the English manufacturers. Enquiries were made about this promising industry, and the result of the interest created in MacArthur's wool was seen in the fact that Lord Camden, then Secretary of State, instructed Governor King to grant MacArthur five thousand acres of land and to supply him with convict shepherds. But the early Governors were singularly unsympathetic to such enterprises, and MacArthur received but slight encouragement from King on his return to the colony. Governor Bligh was even more despotic and short-sighted than his predecessor. In an interview with MacArthur, in 1806, he said: *

"What have I to do with your sheep, sir? What have I to do with your cattle? Are you to have such flocks of sheep and such herds of cattle as no man ever heard of before? No, sir! I have heard of your concerns, sir! You have got five thousand acres of land, with the finest situation in the country, but, by ——, you shan't keep it!"

After maledictions on the Privy Council and the Secretary of State, he added, "What have they to do with me? You have made a number of false representations respecting your wool. The Secretary of State commands at home. I command here!"

In spite of this "series of ignorant and absurd Governors"—to use Sydney Smith's rather strong phrase—the resources of the colony were beginning to be recognised, and fine agricultural properties were falling into the hands of private settlers when Macquarie took command of the colony. His policy of "bricks and mortar" was severely criticised both in the colony and at

* Therry

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home. Dr. Lang, the first minister of the Scots Church, who published in 1837 an account of his previous life in Sydney, objects to this policy on two grounds. In the first place it required the concentration of the convicts, whereas *divide et impera* was (according to Dr. Lang) the true principle of Government; and, in the second, the buildings were too expensive. As an instance of this latter fault, he tells the story of the infirmary, which forms the centre of a range of buildings on the east side of Macquarie Street. The infirmary is now demolished, but the other two—the Parliament House and the Royal Mint—are still, I believe, used for the purposes indicated by their names. This building was known as the "Rum Hospital," and the method of its erection was as follows. After a plan for a centre building and two detached wings had been submitted by the colonial architect, and approved by the Governor, three settlers—D'Arcy Wentworth, Blaxcell, and Riley—undertook to carry out the work in return for a grant of a certain quantity of rum from the Government store, and a three years' monopoly of the sale of spirits in the colony. Lang sets down the value of the buildings at £20,000, and that of the monopoly at £100,000. At the same time Mr. Commissioner Bigge, who was sent out by the Home Government, recommended the expediency of stopping all works of an ornamental character. In particular he objected in his report to some very handsome stables which were being built for the Governor's horses.

Whatever may be the real value of such criticisms, the broad fact remains that at the end of Governor Macquarie's reign Sydney was beginning to assume the appearance of a town; and even the Sydney of to-day owes many of its most important public buildings to him. These buildings bear an easily distinguishable stamp of homely solidity. But it was not until ten years later that the colony made any decided social advance. An excellent account of the Sydney of this period is furnished by the reminiscences of the late Judge Therry, whose experiences ranged from 1829 to 1860. In 1829, when Therry first reached the colony, he tells us that he found "an agreable society" formed by retired military and naval officers and their families, and by settlers of the class fitted to form a magistracy. From this society, of course, "emancipists," as the ex-convicts were called, were rigorously excluded by the Governor, General Darling. The external appearance of the place had now begun to be attractive. Many of the beautiful promontories of Port Jackson were occupied by private houses. Vaucluse belonged to Wentworth, Burwood to Riley, Captain Piper had built his "marine villa" at Point Eliza, and Camden Park was the seat of MacArthur. Its inhabitants were well provided with the means of

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recreation and amusement, although in comparison with the Sydney of 1893 these means were limited in proportion as the society and the city were smaller. The Jockey Club had been founded by Sir John Jamieson, but its meetings were held at Homebush instead of Randwick. The drama had advanced since the time when, at the first theatrical performance held by permission of Governor Hunter, the convict actors introduced into their prologue the famous couplet:

> True patriots we—for be it understood,
> We left our country for our country's good,

and there was now a sufficient play-going public to support a Theatre Royal. Although as yet the flag of the Sydney Yacht Squadron was not to be seen either in the harbour or on the Hawkesbury, frequent regattas were held on the waters of Port Jackson. Newspapers and clubs were already established. The afternoon drive along the fine road constructed by Macquarie from the Domain to the lighthouse on the South Head, was an important feature in the social life of the town. "About four o'clock in the afternoon," says Dr. Lang, "before dinner in the *haut ton* circles, but some time after it among people of inferior station, all the coach-house doors in Sydney fly open, and the company begin to take their places for the afternoon drive on the South Head Road."

A somewhat remarkable fact about the Sydney of this period was the extent and variety of its manufactures. It would seem that before the era of steamships distance was more effective than protective tariffs. Among the industries established in 1830 are enumerated manufactories of soap, candles, and hats; breweries for beer made both from sugar and malt; distilleries for gin from maize and barley; rope-walks and tanneries, and foundries for iron and brass. Moreover, the coaches and vehicles of all descriptions, by which the roads of the colony were traversed, were built in Sydney; and all the various mechanical arts necessary for building, equipping, and repairing ships were already practised by its inhabitants.

As might be expected in a town of only thirty or forty thousand people, and in a society where official and professional standing afforded the sole criterion of rank, there was a good deal of social jealousy. So keen was the rivalry displayed that an appeal to the Secretary for the Colonies had to be made, and that minister sent out a table of precedence for the guidance of masters of ceremonies. Judge Therry relates that on one occasion an aide-de-camp of Sir Richard Bourke was "called out" by a civilian because the latter had not received a card of invitation to the

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king's birthday ball. At another time a lady refused to attend a public ball because her name had been omitted from the list of the committee; asking, indignantly, "What will the people of England say when they read the list of the committee and not notice my name there?" Therry himself heard an amusing passage of arms at the funeral of a high official. The Attorney-General and the Chief Magistrate of Police were disputing as to which of their respective carriages should take precedence. At last the Chief Magistrate exclaimed to his coachman, "By all means let Mr. Attorney-General *go first to the grave.*" At this time also the society of this far-off community was enlivened by the frequent appearance in its midst of runaway husbands and wives. Therry tells us that when he was Attorney-General he was accosted by a gentlemanly person, who, after inquiring if the person he addressed was not the Attorney-General, and receiving an affirmative answer, further inquired "if he might get married?"

"Certainly," assented Therry, "if the parties are willing."

The stranger then explained that he and his wife had parted company two years ago, and that he now wished to marry a lady in the colony. Therry, conceiving that it was no business of his to raise objections, listened in silence. At length the would-be bridegroom asked if he might tell a minister what the Attorney-General had said.

"By all means," Therry replied, adding, "provided you take the whole of the message."

"What more shall I tell him?"

"Tell him that as sure as you marry the girl you will be tried and transported, and he will get into trouble too."

Towards the close of this period severe heart-burnings were felt at the gradual admittance of "emancipists" to society. But the real fusion of ranks came twenty years later with the establishment of Responsible Government in 1855. Five years before Sydney University had been founded. When the community was thus provided with the machinery both for higher education and political training, artificial social barriers were rapidly swept away. If any date could be fixed as marking the separation of the old Sydney of military and naval officers and civil officials from the great democratic town of to-day, it would be this. Just as the social life of Sydney has overflowed the banks of the narrow channel in which it was originally confined, so the material growth of the town resembles nothing so much as the overflow of a pent up volume of water.

In one of his essays, Sydney Smith regrets that the town of Sydney had not been constructed upon some definite plan. As a

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matter of fact, Governor Philip intended Sydney to be as rectangular as Melbourne. In the plan which he sent to the Home Secretary in his despatch of July 9th, 1788, he had designed streets running at right angles or parallel to each other. Moreover, these streets were to be 200ft. broad, and each house was to be built upon an allotment with a frontage of 60ft. and a depth of 150ft. This arrangement, as he justly observed, would "preserve uniformity in the buildings and prevent narrow streets and other nconveniencies." Fortunately the infant town escaped from these apron-strings. It tumbled up first one and then another of its hills, and crawled down them again. And the result of the process s seen to-day. Twelve thousand miles from England a great town has been built, preserving some of the most characteristic features of the great towns of England, with long and comparatively narrow streets, the irregular growth of which has been conditioned by the physical surroundings of the place, and the actual contemporary needs of its inhabitants. But with this Sydney, the Sydney of sandstone palaces and ocean-going steamers, with its cathedrals, its parks, its docks, its railways, and its throbbing democratic life, we are not now concerned. That, as Mr. Rudyard Kipling would say, is another story.

W. BASIL WORSFOLD.

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THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.

By Brigade-Surgeon F. Gillespie.

The records of the Medical Service of the British Army reach back to a very ancient date, having been a recognised establishment in the Royal service long before the King, as such, possessed a regular Army. Gore says that the first mention of the Army Surgeons occurs in 1223. In 1314 a Medical Staff accompanied the grand Army which marched into Scotland, and the proportion of Surgeons was one to 1900 men. In 1322 it is stated that paid Surgeons were first employed in the Army; but this must be inaccurate, as Philip Beauvais, Surgeon to Edward I.'s Army in Scotland, received a sum equivalent to about £850 of our money. Henry V. had one Surgeon and twelve assistants in his Army, whose precedence ranked below barbers and above washerwomen, and whose pay was 4d. a day. In 1417, before starting again for France, Henry V. issued a Royal Warrant, "*De surgius providendis pro Viagio Regis*," to press as many Surgeons for the service as Morstede could find. This Morstede was a great favourite, and was enjoined to find a certain staff of assistants and a retinue of archers. He was styled the Knight Surgeon, was also a Sheriff of London, and held a combatant commission also. This double commission, obtained later on in the earlier wars in India, when it was not uncommon to be a Surgeon and a combatant officer; a case in point was that of a Surgeon of the 36th Regiment, who was also an officer commanding a cavalry corps.* In 1557 Surgeons were specially appointed for the ordnance service, and they continued from this time to be regularly attached to the staff of Generals in the field. They survived the revolutionary wars, some of them being in Sweden with the Scotch brigade and some attached to the body-guard which Charles II. formed from the cavaliers on the Continent, which became afterwards the three troops of Life Guards. On withdrawal of the troops from Tangiers the Medical Staff is mentioned, and on the accession of James II. the 5th and 6th

* "British Army," by J. Laurence Archer.

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Regiments, which had been formed in Holland, were brought on the establishment, including their eleven Surgeons and their Mates. In 1620 a full Medical Staff accompanied the forces to the Low Countries, and during Marlborough's wars they were much increased, and with good reason, as at Malplaquet alone they had 10,000 wounded on their hands. In 1758 Oliver Goldsmith failed to pass his examination as Surgeon's Mate. In 1784 a special and separate department was established in Ireland, whose badge was a harp and crown, and about this time an Act of Parliament was passed which founded the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, specially "for the purpose of providing educated Surgeons for the Army."

In 1802 Second Assistant-Surgeons were appointed to regiments. The uniform at this time being scarlet with a sash, but in 1805 the sash was discontinued. The department was re-organised under Royal Warrant, which lasted until 1858, and in 1808 a single Director-General was appointed.

The Medical Staff were highly spoken of at Toulon, but it is only since Badajos that Surgeons were mentioned in dispatches upon the recommendation of Sir J. McGregor, who managed to overcome Wellington's scruples as to the absence of precedent. This celebrated man on his return from the Peninsula was made Director-General, which office he filled with credit until 1851. During the retreat from Burgos 95,000 men passed though the hospitals, yet by the unremitting exertions of the Medical Staff, soon after, at the battle of Vittoria, there were only 5,000 sick.* After Waterloo, India became the chief arena for fighting, and Medical Officers had their full share of danger and exposure. In 1841 Dr. Brydon was the sole survivor of the massacres at Cabul, which incident is the subject of Miss Thompson's pathetic picture. The Crimean War afforded large opportunities of distinction to Medical Officers. Amongst the many notable acts of bravery, we may mention that of Assistant-Surgeon Wilson, who rallied the 7th Hussars and led them to the rescue of the Duke of Cambridge, whose life he probably saved. O'Callaghan was amongst the bravest at the Redan, while three of the Medical Officers besides won the V.C. The Indian Mutiny added many other names to the roll of fame, and five V.C.s marked the appreciation of their services. In the New Zealand War, Temple and Manley received the coveted cross "for valour"; while in later times several names were added to the list, among others that of Reynolds, of Rorke's Drift. At Majuba Hill Surgeon Landon was shot in the spine and his legs were paralysed,

* Napier.

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but seeing the agony of the wounded around him he caused himself to be propped up against a rock and busied himself in dressing their wounds, until his strength failing, he died at the post of duty. Corporal Farmer, Army Hospital Corps, got the V.C. for gallant conduct here. I must not fail to mention Parke, of the Stanley expedition, the beau-ideal of an Army Surgeon, full of skill, resource, and gentle tactfulness.

The Warrant of 1858, the outcome of Sydney Herberts' Committee, which had examined into the deplorable breakdown of the Medical Department in the Crimea, laid the broad outlines of the present department. While giving the officers increased rank and pay it enlarged their responsibilities. It organised a regular corps of orderlies and a staff of nurses. It increased and improved the supply of material and appliances, and established a Medical School at Chatham. This latter step was urgently required, as it was found that the education of the Civil Medical Schools did not supply quite the training required for a Military Surgeon. The school was opened in October 1860, the first competitive examination having been held in the August previous. Under the sage guidance of Parke, a man who combined the most charming personality with the greatest ability, the school prospered and did good work. But the continued improvement in the education given in the civil schools, the removal of the Army Medical School to Netley, and finally the establishment of a training school at Aldershot, where the course of instruction in ambulance work and first help to the wounded, as well as infantry and riding drill, military administration and law, are now taught (at a place much more suitable for the training of military Surgeons), renders the continuance of the school at Netley an expensive anachronism. The alternative is simply to publish a syllabus of the special education required for a Medical Officer, which would form the subject of examination for entrance, and the schools will be quite prepared to meet the call made on them without costing the public a shilling. The age of the candidates might well be reduced to twenty-three or twenty-four instead of twenty-eight as it is now. The age limit was extended from twenty-four to twenty-eight on account of the dearth of candidates, but this no longer applies, and it would be well to revert to the former practice. A man of twenty-eight is too old to commence life, particularly if he is obliged to return to school to go again over much the same ground as he had been doing for five years previously. His habits and ideas are too formed to admit of his adapting himself easily to such a new phase of life as he meets with in the Army, and he is apt to find the discipline and

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subordination galling. This ends in a loss of that feeling of good fellowship and bonhomie which forms such a large ingredient in military life, and which helps men to withstand the rough and tumble of the service. By adopting the earlier age, you would get the requisite number of candidates with ease, and these with a younger and more robust constitution, with five years of life to the good, and with the elastic and hopeful elements of their nature in full force.

As one of the results of the German experience in war from 1860 to 1871, it was seen to be necessary that the system of treating the sick and wounded should be rendered much more ready and efficacious, in the first place to render the fighting line more independent, and secondly, to place the wounded themselves under conditions more favourable for their recovery, and with this object Bearer Companies and field hospitals were established to receive and care for the wounded on the spot and to transfer them as quickly as possible to the rear and base hospitals. In the British service these new conditions had to be adopted, and it was very obvious that no modification of regimental arrangements could meet the object in view.

The Medical Officers were naturally the first to realise the full scope of the change, and, while regretting their personal loss in quitting regimental life, they loyally accepted what they knew to be for the good of the service. The regimental officers only saw that they were deprived of the services of a man they all knew and who knew all the men. They did not see the bearings of anything outside their particular regiment, nor that the regiment was only a unit in an organised Army, and held the Medical Officer personally responsible for the unwelcome change; but the introduction of short service put an end to the question, and military officers would show their wisdom in accepting accomplished facts. The merely sentimental idea of the association and co-operation of military and Medical Officers through long centuries of doing and daring in war all over the world should be sufficient to appeal to the generous instincts of British officers without having to remind them of their duty to the service. The complete withdrawal of the support and confidence which the Medical Officers up to then had always received, led to such misunderstanding and friction that the service was severely prejudiced, and it was found necessary to give Medical Officers such a military position of independence as would enable them to cope with their special difficulties. Medical Officers have now the command and discipline of their own men, as well as complete control over patients in hospital and all officers and men attached to hospitals for duty. The military commandant has

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been removed from Netley, and principal Medical Officers and all juniors in charge are made responsible for the organisation, discipline, control, equipment, and dieting of all hospitals in peace and war. To attempt to meet regimental officers views as far as possible, a system of attaching young Medical Officers to regiments for some years was tried, but experience proved that it was not calculated to meet any decided want, while the work and discipline of the station hospitals were so impaired as to materially affect the service. I do not think the appointment of Medical Officers to regiments is either practicable or advisable. It divides their allegiance, it prevents all *esprit de corps* in their own department, does not provide sufficient work for them, and so far is a waste of force; and finally, the expenses of modern messes is so great that no young Medical Officer could afford to live in them without private means. In war time a Surgeon is attached to each regiment in the field, but I question whether even this is necessary (unless a regiment be detached from the main force) as his movements must be governed by those of the regiment, and his aid to the wounded must, under the circumstances, be of infinitesimal value, while, as long as the regiment remains with the general force, the field hospitals and Bearer Companies are sufficient to afford the necessary aid.

As regards organisation, the Director-General is the responsible head and the commanding officer of the Army Medical Staff, which is composed of officers, and of the Medical Staff Corps, which is made up of Warrant Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men under the command of the former; as well as the corps reserves, the African Medical Service, the Militia Medical Staff, and the Volunteer Medical Service. Portions of the Indian Medical Service are also in a great degree under the control of Surgeon-Generals in the various presidencies.

The officers of the Medical Staff are nominally divided into administrative and executive officers. The former comprise Surgeon Major-Generals and Surgeon-Colonels, and the latter Brigade Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonels, Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonels, Surgeon-Majors, Surgeon-Captains, and Surgeon-Lieutenants, but the duties so overlap, that all ranks, at some time or other, may be responsible for doing any kind of duty, whether administrative or executive; but practically the two higher ranks may be looked upon as solely administrative. The establishment consists of the Director-General, nine Surgeon Major-Generals, twenty-five Surgeon-Colonels, fifty Brigade Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonels, and 763 of the lower ranks (besides Quarter-Masters), of whom it may be stated that more than half are

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employed on foreign service. In addition to these there are seventy-nine retired officers holding appointments at home, generally at the regimental districts. These receive a salary of £150 a year in addition to their retired pay, which is an extremely economical arrangement for the Government but presses very hard on the full-pay officers, as it deprives them of so many home appointments. These retired officers are liable to be recalled to the service on emergency until the age of fifty-five. There is also a large reserve of Medical Officers, principally belonging to volunteer regiments, as well as a militia reserve. The principal Medical Officer of a division holds an appointment on the staff of the General commanding. He is responsible for all the medical duties of the division as well as commanding the officers and men of the corps.

The pay of Medical Officers ranges from £2 15s. per day of Surgeon Major-General to £200 a year that of a Surgeon-Lieutenant, and, as a rule, is increased by 2s. 6d. a day for every five years' service. These rates are exclusive of allowances, which average about £70 a year in the lower ranks. Surgeon-Majors (and all ranks above) are mounted officers, and are allowed for a horse, a groom, and a stable. The rates of pension of Medical Officers are :—

Surgeon-General	2	0	0	daily.
Surgeon-Colonel	1	15	0	,,
Brigade Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel, under thirty years' service	1	7	0	,,
Brigade Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel, after thirty years' service	1	10	0	,,
Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel, after twenty years' service	1	0	0	,,
Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel after twenty-five years' service	1	2	6	,,
Surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel, after thirty years' service	1	5	0	,,

Surgeon-Majors and Surgeon-Captains, after ten years' service, get a gratuity of £1250; after fifteen years' service, £1800; and after eighteen years' service, £2500.

Medical Officers who elect to serve on the west coast of Africa receive double pay while serving on the coast, with a year's leave of absence for every year served there, and after three years' service on the coast they may be admitted to the general service. The limits of age on appointment, too, may be extended.

Under a late warrant the Medical Officers were granted titles which, though unwieldy and cumbrous, fairly describe their double functions, and show that they hold the Queen's commission, of which they are justly proud. Some men consider that, to be logical

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and uniform with other departments of analogous position, a still more military status should be granted; but I think the general feeling of the department is in favour of giving the present conditions a fair trial, and if combatant officers will only do their best in co-operation and support, there need be no necessity for further change. The Medical Staff Corps is organised in companies, one or more of which is posted to each district, and with its corresponding company of Volunteer Medical Staff Corps attached. The head-quarters is at the Medical Branch of the War Office in London, but the real working centre is at Aldershot, where the depôt and Training School are established, under a commandant, an Adjutant, and two Instructors, all Medical Officers, but who, unlike any other officers in analogous positions, get no pay for performing these special and very onerous duties. The Medical Staff Corps go on foreign service, though not to India, where special local arrangements are made, and where European ideas of the transport of sick and wounded do not prevail. But it is time that this service in India should be re-organised. In the West Indies, too, men from the native regiment are employed in attending on the sick. The corps is recruited by its own officers, and anyone of the rank of Surgeon-Major can attest recruits; applicants must have a good character and be between 5ft. 3in. and 5ft. 5in. in height. The higher limit has been fixed to prevent interfering with the enlistment of big men for the cavalry and line. But the Bearer Companies suffer, as lifting sick and wounded and carrying stretchers is really hard work, and requires full-sized men to perform it properly. If you could get men of this height with sufficient muscular and chest development it would be well enough, but as a rule men below the average standard of height of their race are probably inferior all round, morally, mentally, and physically, and this consideration does not seem to have its full weight in the enlistment for special corps, or indeed for the service generally. There are nineteen companies in the corps, besides the depôt at Aldershot, and it numbers altogether 2400 warrant non-commissioned officers and men. A Bearer Company is not a permanent establishment, being only brought together for a special temporary object, as is also the case with field hospitals.

The pay ranges from 5s. 6d. for a Warrant Officer to 1s. 2d., and all ranks, from Sergeant downwards, get additional departmental pay, varying from 4d. to 1s. a day.

The Medical Staff Corps wears, as a badge, the Geneva Cross, displayed in about the ugliest manner that could be devised. It looks like a disproportioned wheel with four spokes, fixed on the right arm, but could be made into a very pretty device if it were

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displayed as a small white pennant bearing the red cross. The officers do not wear it at all, and have nothing to show that they work under the red cross. I do not see why they should not wear a nice badge on their helmets and caps, such as I describe, in order to give them the small measure of safety which the symbol is supposed to confer. If they happen to be amongst the fighting troops there is practically no safety, as cannon and rifle balls are "like the dew from heaven" in their operations, and at most it might prevent the inconvenience of being made prisoner; while it is also very difficult to so particularise gun-fire as to give immunity to the field hospitals. But considering that 99 per cent. of our fighting is carried on amongst people who do not admit of a mixture of rose-water in their wars, it will be evident that, unless in European wars, and then even only very partially, the much vaunted cross is only an empty name except amongst Mussulmans, where it would be the symbol of instant death.

The head-quarters of the nursing staff is at Netley, under a lady superintendant, where probationers are trained for nursing duties. Nurses are only employed in the large hospitals at Aldershot, Woolwich, and Netley, as well as the special hospitals for soldiers' wives and children, and generally in war time.

In war time the distribution of hospitals depends greatly on the length of the line of communication; but, beginning at the base, which may be a hospital ship, there are one or more stationary hospitals on the line of communication, then the field hospital at the seat of operations with advanced dressing-stations improvised near the field with the Bearer Companies and the Medical Officers of regiments as the most advanced line of assistance; who, as the action proceeds, succour the wounded as quickly as possible making use of every ready means for stopping bleeding, and temporarily fixing broken limbs by making splints of anything to hand, as rifles, swords, bayonets, belts, &c. The wounded are then carried on stretchers or the crossed hands of the bearers, and in various other ways, to the dressing-station. There they are treated in a more complete manner so as to admit of their being moved, without hurt, in waggons to the advanced field hospitals where any immediate operations are performed, and then gradually drafted to the rear until they reach the base hospital.

A return current of those who have recovered, are, at the same time, rejoining the forces in front. The first practical demonstration of the work of the Bearer Company in British wars was at the action of Secocœni's Mountain, under Surgeon-Majors Hector and Johnston, and elicited the hearty commendation of the officer commanding the troops. The utmost energies of the Medical Officers

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are called into play in carrying out these services, and whether in the fight itself or in the field hospital they have all they can do to cope with the sudden influx of wounded. The new conditions of war produced by the improvement in fire-arms of all kinds, and the probabilities of an immense number of wounded within a very short period of time, causes one to look forward with much anxiety to the next time when men meet in the clash of arms on a European battle-field.

"The Medical Department of the Army is maintained in order to retain the soldier in health, which is his normal condition of physical fitness for duty. When disabled through disease or injury from performing his duty the soldier is an incumbrance to the battalion, which should be relieved of him under the direction of the Medical Staff, whose special province it is to restore the man to health and return him to the ranks as speedily as possible." * This is the corollary to the proposition laid down by the Duke of Wellington, that the individual soldier was the unit by whose physical strength might be gauged the efficiency of an Army.

The duties of an Army Medical Officer may therefore be looked at under three heads: 1, the professional; 2, the sanitary; 3, the administrative; but he must recognise the distinction between purely professional and other more general duties of administration, &c.

None can relieve him of the responsibilities belonging to the former, while many can be found to perform the latter duties, which are simply attached to his professional office for convenience and economy. The first and paramount duty of a Medical Officer, then, is to be a thoroughly good physician and surgeon, actuated by the highest sense of responsibility to his employers, his patients, and himself; pursuing his work in a thoroughly scientific spirit, but largely tinctured with the milk of human kindness. One who does not practically recognise this is unworthy of the name he bears or the position accorded to him solely on these grounds. His duties are very varied and overlap at so many points that it is impossible to treat of them separately, but we can form some notion of them by taking an ordinary day's work in peace time at home of a man in charge of a station hospital. In an ordinary day's work he sees the sick admitted; then those in hospital, for whom he prescribes and orders the diets; makes out the indents for the contractors; sees sick women and children; examines recruits brought for enlistment, and makes out their documents; vaccinates them with

* Riordan.

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calf-lymph; examines into any complaints against discipline; then plunges into the mass of returns, daily, weekly, monthly, half-yearly, and annually, for every figure in which he is responsible. He gives a lecture once a week to the orderlies, and also constant instruction in dressing wounds, &c.; keeps the pay-lists, defaulters' sheets, and clothing returns of his men; goes over the stores and equipment of the hospital to check them; makes a sanitary inspection of all the men and their barracks and the married quarters; inspects provost cells daily; parades his detachment, and puts them through their various drills and exercises. He then sees any out-patients, and visits the hospital again in the evening. This is the routine of his life in time of peace, which probably involves ten times the amount of work and responsibility that used to be exacted under the old system, but I have no hesitation in saying that the sick soldier was never so well cared for.

The Medical Officer is in touch with the soldier from the day of his enlistment until his discharge to the reserve or his death, and in carrying on his duties has to correspond with every department of the Army, as each one contributes more or less to the working of a hospital—Engineers, Army Service Corps, ordnance store, and pay departments—and he must be thoroughly conversant with the working of each of these, as far as his dealings with them are concerned. He should be a thorough sanitarian of the most practical kind, as it is his duty to give an opinion on all new buildings, drainage, water supply, sites for camps, wholesomeness of food, and the clothing and work of the men which tend to impair their efficiency.

There are certain anomalies in his position which tend greatly to restrict his usefulness. He is not allowed to sit as president or member of a board, except a purely medical one. If a new building has to be taken over from the contractors he is directed to attend as a witness, while the Engineer officer, who has probably planned and constructed the building, and is to that extent interested, is a member of the board, approving of his own work; while the Medical Officer, presumably the best informed on the subject, can only answer any questions which may be put to him. These being of an *ex post facto* nature, are worthless to upset the established fact. It is essential that Medical Officers should take their place on mixed boards according to their seniority; the present state of things is a mere delusion.

I have given a short sketch of the history, organisation, and duties of the Medical Department, and I must now attempt to show what sort of career it affords to a young man who looks forward to establishing himself in life, and by what means he can

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prepare himself for entrance into it. By the improvement in education and by the number of persons who possess the means to obtain it, there is very naturally an increased competition for places and appointments in civil life. The professions which possess a certain social standing offer attractions which the middle classes are anxious to avail themselves of, and in consequence, notwithstanding the increased difficulty of the educational tests, the professions are overcrowded, and their members jostle one another, making the struggle for existence a most arduous one, full of mental anxiety and physical wear and tear.

The medical profession is a notable example of this; and while there are a few prizes which come to men of genius and immense application, seasoned by a modicum of luck, the great mass of the profession are just able to live in decent comfort, while a large proportion find it extremely difficult to keep afloat, and a minority fail to do so altogether. At the same time the number of students is constantly increasing out of all proportion to possible vacancies, and the career of medicine is one to be carefully considered before being entered upon. If a man has command of sufficient capital to purchase a practice he may well entertain the notion if he is not afraid of what, perhaps, is the most trying and exhausting of life work. But this traffic in practices does not extend beyond England, and what has the young Scotchman or Irishman, or, indeed, any man who has not capital to look forward to? Perhaps an assistantship at £80 or £100 a year with the hope of some day falling into a practice, which is a poor look out. Some men of a little more restless energy find their way to the colonies or the mercantile marine, while others try their chances in the Navy or Army. Now these two alone furnish a full career of a definite compass, and once in, a man can look forward with complacency to the future free from the cankering cares of civil practice, and with a knowledge that he will enjoy a competency to the end of his days should no untoward event happen. But the entrance gate is narrowed by a stiff competitive examination which only a minority will get through. Without knowing personally a man's character and capacity I should be sorry to recommend anyone to enter on the study of medicine with the sole object of getting into the Army. He must gauge his own powers himself, but having once commenced his course of study many opportunities will present themselves of measuring his strength from time to time by his term examinations and his ability to hold his own, or get the better of his fellows; and by steady work from end to end, forgetting nothing, and always learning something, he may look forward with a certain amount of confidence to the result. The

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regulations of the General Medical Council lay down that before anyone can become a student of medicine he must pass an examination in general literature, comprising English, Latin, arithmetic, algebra, and Euclid, and either Greek, logic, or any modern language. A graduation or matriculation examination of any British or Colonial University, the examination in arts of the Apothecaries' Society, or the professional preliminary examination of the College of Preceptors, the examination for entrance to Woolwich and Sandhurst, and the first-class of the local examination of Cambridge will be accepted as sufficient, provided that the subjects enumerated are examined in.

The fees are very much the same at most schools, but we may take St. Thomas's Hospital as a sample. A composition fee to cover the whole course of lectures and hospital practice, with certain exceptions, is £150 in one payment, or in two or more payments at a slight advance, and the special courses, which are extra and amount to about £25. To this must be added the charge for the diploma, of qualification say £25, and we have as a result the outside cost of the education, £200. This may be considerably reduced to smart men by taking scholarships and prizes. For instance, at entrance there are scholarships of the value of £150 and £60 in the preliminary scientific examination, while there are many others ranging in value from £10 to £38 10s. each year during the course. The regulations of the Army lay down that every candidate for an appointment in the Medical Staff shall possess two diplomas—one to practice medicine and one surgery—and shall be registered under the Medical Act. A competitive examination is held twice a year for admission of candidates, but the Secretary of State has power, in case of necessity, to nominate half the number of candidates required, as may be proposed by various medical schools. This proviso is to prevent the danger of the department being boycotted by the schools, which has before led to much inconvenience to the service.

After passing the examination, the candidate goes through a course of study at Netley and Aldershot, and if found competent in all respects he is gazetted as Surgeon-Lieutenant. While a probationer he receives 8s. a day and quarters. On the whole I look on the medical service of the Army as affording an excellent career for a young medical man of energetic and active habits; at the same time the duties are very varied, and involve such a very different kind of work from that he has been used to, there is ample time and large opportunity for carrying on scientific work, particularly in the way of original research. This, I am afraid, has been a good deal neglected hitherto, with consequent loss to the service

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and to the Medical Officers themselves, one of whose chief claims to recognition in the Army should be that they are the qualified exponents of science.

I have met many men who had left the Army to engage in civil practice, and they uniformly expressed their regret for having done so; so great a change made in middle life is always to be deprecated, and I think that if a man joins the Army at as early an age as is possible he will see no reason to make any change in his condition. The social attractions are so numerous, the opportunities for travel, sport, and recreation are so large, and, lastly, the chances of gaining distinction are so abundant, added to the material advantage before spoken of, that they combine to render the career all that any reasonable man could desire.

FRANKLIN GILLESPIE.

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THE ITALIAN NAVY AND ITS RECENT MANŒUVRES.

By John Leyland.

The Italian Navy is one of the most considerable factors in the politics of modern Europe. Upon that force the Triple Alliance depends for the exercise of its influence in the Mediterranean. It is in part against Italy and her Navy that the maritime arm of France and the "menace of Biserta" are raised. To the assistance of the same power some Englishmen would have us trust for our final preponderance on the route to India. When we reflect that the situation in the Mediterranean has been seriously changed by the re-creation of a Russian squadron there, we cannot but regard anything that throws light upon the condition and administration of the Italian Navy as of very special interest. We are arrested at the outset by the consideration that that Navy is, at the present time, held in the deadly constriction of national poverty, which threatens to compromise its future, and to deprive Italy of the fruit of many of her sacrifices. At least, it may be said that she must now elect either to be a naval power or a military. She cannot, except in a minor degree, continue to be both. This issue has just been put very plainly before the country by Signor Vecchi, a well-known naval authority of Italy, who writes under the singular name of "Jack la Bolina," in a remarkable brochure entitled *Il Pericolo è dal Mare*, which has evoked a wide expression of trust in the maritime arm. The Italians do not conceal the gravity of the situation from themselves. In the masterly report upon the current Naval Budget, which Captain Bettolo presented to the Chamber, this was made sufficiently evident; and, in effect, the Budget Committee accepted the reduced estimates only on the condition that means should be found in the next financial year to re-establish the votes. These means are not forthcoming.

Yet, if Italy would maintain the great *rôle* she has assumed, she can neither turn back nor stand still. She advanced her naval votes from thirty-nine million lire in 1876 by slow degrees to seventy-six millions in 1884-85, more rapidly to 114 millions in 1887-88, and, by a great stride, to 158 millions in the next year. It was an expenditure she could not maintain, and there has since

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been a steady decline until, in the current financial year, the estimates were 99,739,269 lire, being a reduction of some two and a half million lire upon those of the previous year. The demand for 1894-95 shows a feeble increase to 99, 877, 894 lire, but these estimates have yet to be discussed. For half the sum she has expended upon her fleet of battleships, Italy might have provided a magnificent mobile defence, understanding that term with a wide significance, and have rendered her shores unassailable; but, admitting her policy of seeking to become arbiter of the Mediterranean to be the best for her own interests, it must be conceded that, in Admiral Riboty, Admiral Pacoret di Saint Bon, and Signor Brin, she has found organisers and administrators of very remarkable power. The task, however, of maintaining what they have created, and continuing what they have begun, may well be found too heavy for Admiral Morin, though one of the most capable of Italian seamen.

The theme of the manœuvres laid down by Admiral Racchia was one natural to Italy, viz., of a disputed command of the sea, wherein a weaker battle fleet sought to protect itself and the national shores from the attacks of a stronger. The manœuvre area included the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian Seas, with the Italian coast from Ventimiglia to Campanella at the southern end of the Bay of Naples, and the island of Sardinia. From Campanella it was bounded by a line which stretched across to the Trapani Islands, and then followed the parallel of latitude of Marsala, until this touched the meridian of Ventimiglia, which formed the western boundary. The western coast of Sardinia was the enemy's base of operations. With his superior force, representing, of course, the French fleet, he was to operate along the coast between Ventimiglia and Marsala, to bombard open towns, destroy railways, and cut telegraph lines, the purpose being to bring the defenders to action. Having defeated them in a fleet engagement, the attacking force would blockade or destroy the remnants of their forces in port, and would land an Army corps. The Permanent Squadron constituted the attacking fleet, while the defence was entrusted to the Squadron of Manœuvres. The following was the disposition of forces :—

ATTACKING SQUADRON,

Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral the Duke of Genoa; Chief of the Staff, Captain Palumbo.

First Division.

	Tons.
Battleship, *Lepanto*	13,340
,, *Ruggiero di Lauria*	10,830
Torpedo-cruiser, *Euridice*	840
Sea-going torpedo-boats, Nos. 103, 111, 114, 131.	

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Second Division. Rear-Admiral Corsi.

	Tons.
Battleship, *Italia*	13,680
„ *Andrea Doria*	10,830
Torpedo-cruiser, *Iride*	840

Sea-going torpedo-boats, Nos. 123, 124, 125, 126.

Third Division. Rear-Admiral Gonzales.

	Tons.
Battleship, *Dandolo*	11,120
Turret-ram, *Affondatore*	3,990
Torpedo-cruiser, *Goito*	730

Sea-going torpedo-boats, Nos. 57, 62, 115, 158.

Attached to the squadron: the torpedo-boat destroyers *Aquila* and *Sparviero*, and the tank-ship *Tevere*.

DEFENDING SQUADRON.

Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Accini; Chief of the Staff, Captain Bettolo.

First Division.

	Tons.
Battleship, *Re Umberto*	13,090
„ *Duilio*	10,690
Torpedo-cruiser, *Minerva*	840

Sea-going torpedo-boats, Nos. 59, 65, 72, 94.

Second Division. Rear-Admiral Quigioni Puliga.

	Tons.
Battleship, *Castelfidardo*	4,180
Cruiser, *Stromboli*	3,470
Torpedo-cruiser, *Urania*	840

Sea-going torpedo-boats, Nos. 71, 73, 74, 137.

Third Division. Rear-Admiral Marra.

	Tons.
Cruiser, *Fieramosca*	3,640
„ *Vesuvio*	3,470
Torpedo-cruiser, *Aretusa*	840

Sea-going torpedo-boats, Nos. 76, 77, 91, 139.

Attached to the squadron: the torpedo-boat destroyers *Falco* and *Avvoltoio*, and the tank-vessel *Pagano*. Many coast-defence torpedo-boats were also employed.

Vice-Admiral Luigi Bertelli, director of the manœuvres, flew his flag on board the *Trinacria*. Captain the Chevalier Persico, Italian Naval Attaché in London, was one of the umpires.

The naval force thus brought together embraced all that is good in the Italian Navy. It included, however, two ships that were a doubtful advantage—the old *Castelfidardo* (1863) and *Affondatore* (1865), which cannot be credited with a better sea-speed than ten or eleven knots, and must therefore have retarded their consorts. According to a scheme of co-efficients propounded by Captain Bettolo, which is as good as, and not much better than, such schemes usually are, the attacking squadron was worth fifty-six points to the forty-five of the defending force.

The first period of the manœuvres lasted from August 5th to the 15th. The Duke of Genoa was to destroy the defending force, while Admiral Accini was to play the part that Torrington would

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have played, if Nottingham would have let him, before the battle of Beachy Head, and, without being drawn into action, to maintain his "fleet in being." Father Guglielmotti, who is to the Italians almost as Admiral Colomb is to us—*vero padre dell'arte militare marittima*, says the *Italia Militare e Marina*—has told them that the admirals of the Republic of San Marco did not venture to attack the enemy ashore until they had first crushed him afloat. Admiral Accini was not sufficiently strong to protect his coasts from considerable ravage; but, on the other hand, the Duke of Genoa failed to bring his enemy to battle, and fell upon him in a manner that did not answer closely to the conditions of actual war.

At the actual opening of hostilities on the 9th of August the attacking force was anchored off Vado, while Admiral Accini's squadron lay between Porto San Stefano and Porto Ferrajo (Elba). The operations opened with promise for the Duke. He dispatched his light ships to reconnoitre, and, secure in his superior strength, sent out certain swift vessels to break telegraphic communication between Sardinia and the mainland, and to shell the railway bridge at San Vincenzo di Toscana. Meanwhile, Admiral Accini employed all his cruisers in scouting, but their vigilance was eluded, and nothing was done to prevent a destructive raid of the adversary along the coast of Northern Italy. Genoa—with Spezia and Maddalena—was considered unassailable, but otherwise many places that could be attacked by guns from seaward were ravaged. It seems to have been the hope of the defenders to draw the assailant into the Gulf of Piombino, but certainly during the night their torpedo-boats were sadly wanting in enterprise. At five o'clock on the morning of August 10th, the Permanent Squadron was in the vicinity of Monte Mesco, its first division being detached on look-out duty, while the remainder of its vessels carried on destructive operations against Levanto, Deiva, and the tunnel between Baffe and Monteglia. Eight ships of the enemy were presently signalled to the eastward, and the Duke of Genoa deeming it prudent to gain the open sea before nightfall, abandoned his destructive operations, and stood southward from the Tuscan Archipelago, while the look-outs of the defenders fell back on their main body which lay between Giannutri and Giglio. So far Admiral Accini had been inactive, but had gained negative success in avoiding battle. He was now fortunate enough to cut off a collier of the enemy, which was carried into Porto San Stefano. The necessities of coaling added much to the Duke's difficulties, but Admiral de Amezaga, one of the umpires at the manœuvres, who has published his personal impressions of them, points out with

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pleasure that all Italian first-class vessels have on board large reservoirs of naphthaline—a residual oil of distilled petroleum—which is burnt with coal to enhance the heating power, as a substitute for forced draught. Some torpedo-boats now steam wholly by the use of naphthaline, and the number is being increased.



The defending torpedo-boats again seem to have been wanting in boldness, for the enemy passed another night undisturbed, while Admiral Accini cruised between Giglio and the mainland, his light vessels being detached scouting to the northward. On the morning of August 11th the attacking squadron was signalled from Monte Argentaro to be standing in towards the Roman coast, with the presumed intention of bombarding Civitavecchia. To be effective,

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the bombardment must, under the rules, have continued six hours, but it was interrupted by the appearance of the defending squadron headed by the *Re Umberto.* An indecisive action took place, including some very pretty torpedo-boat manœuvres of dramatic character, but probably of no great value, and Admiral Accini, owing to the very fact of his weakness, retreated. He had gone into action while his cruisers were away scouting. The Duke of Genoa then sent in certain vessels to continue the bombardment, but in such circumstances as would have placed him in great danger in time of actual war. In short, at nightfall his situation would have been perilous. The director of the manœuvres, however, now signalled a cessation of hostilities, and both squadrons retired towards their respective bases to coal and provision. Some days later operations were resumed, and, after a foggy night, Admiral Accini was surprised in the Bay of Naples. A vigorous engagement ensued, in the course of which he launched thirty-four torpedo-boats *en masse* at the enemy; but he was held to be defeated. Here again, however, it is impossible to believe that in actual warfare a surprise like this would have been possible. To permit it, the defending torpedo-boats and cruisers must indeed have been wanting both in initiative and courage.

The second series of manœuvres was much less interesting, for it approached but distantly to the conditions of actual war. The defending squadron had retired to the harbour of Gaeta, in presence of a stronger enemy, and there, having re-fitted and coaled, was attacked. Its purpose was to make such use as was possible of the defences of the port and then to escape to sea. These conditions had been devised apparently with the chief purpose of affording a brilliant spectacle, for King Humbert, the Prince of Naples, Prince Henry of Prussia, and Admiral Racchia were present. The harbour had been protected by an immense boom, which admitted of ingress and egress only at its northern and southern ends, and was defended by thirty-four torpedo-boats, and by the fire of Forts Conca and Monte Orlando, as well as of batteries at the Punta Stendardo and along the shore. The hour of the Duke of Genoa's night attack on August 22nd was, in effect, pre-arranged, and in expectation the *Aretusa* and *Minerva* cruised in the offing, while the torpedo-boats took their stations outside the bar. At 9 o'clock at night Admiral Accini prepared to put to sea, when, by rockets and electric lights, the approach of the enemy was signalled. An hour later the engagement began. The torpedo-boats were driven in, and the enemy advanced to destroy the boom. Thereupon the *Re Umberto*, Monte Orlando, and the shore batteries opened fire, and a tremendous cannonade ensued. The flashing of electric

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lights, and the rapid movements of the torpedo-boats, made a superb spectacle, and the thundering of the guns added to its impressiveness. A terrific conflict with the torpedo-boats took place at the southern end of the boom, where the enemy sought to force a passage. One of the attacking boats, indeed, succeeded in passing the obstructions, and launched a torpedo at the *Re Umberto* (flag) in such conditions as might have been disastrous to that ship.

Admiral Accini now, however, saw his opportunity. At 11 o'clock the moon was going down. Ordering therefore the ships' lights to be suddenly extinguished, and profiting by the darkness in the *Re Umberto*, followed by the *Stromboli*, both at high speed and splendidly handled, he steamed out through the passage at the Punta Stendardo, and escaped to sea. Meanwhile the torpedo-boats had succeeded in driving the enemy back from the boom, and thus the *Duilio*, *Fieramosca*, and *Castelfidardo*, slipping their cables, were able to get away through the southern passage, and joined their consorts at an appointed rendezvous. These spectacular operations call for little remark. In war such an operation as that attempted by the Duke of Genoa would have been far too hazardous. We cannot conceive that the defending torpedo-boats could have been so ill-handled as to await the attack at the boom, where, we may be sure, an attempt would have been made by mine-fields to bar the enemy's passage.

The third series of manœuvres might well have been more instructive. The Duke of Genoa had been given an opportunity of gaining command of the sea by crushing his weaker adversary, and of destroying that adversary's vessels in port. He was now to convoy, from his Sardinian base, a fleet of transports, with an imaginary Army corps, which he was to disembark upon the Italian mainland. Admiral Accini, however, now at Spezia, was still possessed of the battle-ship *Re Umberto* and the cruiser *Stromboli*, with the torpedo-cruiser *Aretusa*, the torpedo-destroyers *Nibbio* and *Avvoltoio*, and twenty-two torpedo-boats, with which he was to do his best to dispute the enemy's purpose. I believe the Duke of Genoa was not responsible for this programme. The command of the sea was evidently still in dispute, and, according to the indefeasible principles of maritime war, the Duke, like the Venetian admirals of whom Padre Guglielmotti speaks, before attempting to land his troops, should either have destroyed his enemy's fighting-ships, or have neutralised these by blockading them in port. As a matter of fact, he did neither.

His reconstituted squadron was coaled and provisioned at Maddalena, and all preparations were made for the re-opening of

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hostilities on September 1st. The torpedo-cruisers *Euridice*, *Iride*, and *Urania*, with the *Sparviero* and *Aquila*, and four sea-going torpedo-boats, were to explore the neighbourhood of Elba and the Piombino Channel to the north, Civitavecchia and Monte Argentaro, and Gaeta and Naples to the south. The protection of the convoy was entrusted to three divisions, the first consisting of the *Italia* and *Ruggiero di Lauria*, the second of the *Dandolo* and *Duilio*, and the third of the *Fieramosca* and *Doria*, each accompanied by a flotilla of torpedo-boats, while the *Lepanto* and another flotilla were to operate independently. Some slight engagements between the rival look-out ships marked the opening of hostilities on September 1st. At 6 o'clock the same evening the Duke's convoy, representing sixty transports, put to sea. This was supposed to cover a rectangular area, whose sides measured some two and three-quarter miles, the corners being marked by the *Monzambano*, *Vesuvio*, *Castelfidardo*, and *Affondatore*, to which no fighting value was assigned.

A great opportunity now presented itself to Admiral Accini, which he failed altogether to take advantage of. His reported intention, having first gained touch with the enemy, was to fall upon the convoy and throw his torpedo-boats to their destructive work in the midst of the transports. The hypothetical flotilla, steaming at six knots, was vast and unwieldy, and in a high degree vulnerable to an enterprising and determined adversary. As Admiral de Amezaga points out, in his criticism of the manœuvres, the operation would have been somewhat less hazardous if the transports had been divided into groups, and they would thus have gained a degree of autonomy according to their speed. But so far as Admiral Accini was concerned, the dispositions of the convoy seemed to be immaterial. His defence of the Italian coasts proved a fiasco, for the Duke of Genoa, despite the dangerous nature of his enterprise, was wholly unmolested. The night was calm and clear, and the Duke sighted Montecristo at daybreak on September 2nd, where he learned the dispositions of the enemy. The decision as to the place for the landing might now be made. He had not contemplated effecting his purpose on the Ligurian coast, but had in view the coast of Tuscany, whence the troops landed might join hands with a force invading the valley of the Po from beyond the mountains; or, otherwise, the Roman or Neapolitan coast. He now determined to attempt the disembarcation of his imaginary troops at Volturno, between Gaeta and Naples, and signalled his purpose to Admiral Bertelli, the director of the manœuvres. Six uninterrupted hours were necessary under the rules for this operation. The Duke successfully

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accomplished his purpose, taking every precaution, and being wholly undisturbed by his adversary.

Whether such a success was thought to be due to the Queen of Italy's brother, or whether it was designed to impress upon the Italian people a belief in the danger of invasion, or resulted from some other cause, it is impossible to say; but certainly, in actual war, it could never have occurred. It would, indeed, be preposterous to suppose that a fleet of slow transports should be able to cross the Tyrrhenian Sea in calm weather, within striking distance of a squadron which included many swift torpedo-cruisers and torpedo-boats. Admiral de Amezaga points out, in relation to the failure of Admiral Accini, that Italy needs a localised coast-defence leaving no gaps in her coast-line. He would not have the Italians forget that the maritime defence of the country is closely bound up with terrestrial defence of the littoral, which makes common action of the fleet and the Army a necessity. In this country, to which command of the sea is an absolute necessity, such views will carry little weight; but to Italy, whose Navy unaided can probably never gain such command, a mobile coast defence, complete, alert, and efficient at every point, would probably be the best of all protections against invasion. Admiral Accini's curious inactivity remains, however, incomprehensible. Yet his partial failure in the first series of manœuvres, and his complete failure in the last, are as instructive as his success could have been. They make manifest by their conditions, to those who can read the negative lessons of naval manœuvres, that such offensive operations as those of the Duke of Genoa could have very limited success in war.

The secret report which the umpires have presented to the Italian Government will presumably show that special causes existed to explain the final feebleness of the defending fleet. The whole series of operations makes it evident, indeed, that the scouting of the "manœuvre" fleet, and the employment of its torpedo-boats, were singularly defective. At the beginning of the operations the Duke of Genoa was allowed to carry on his destructive work uninterruptedly. Later, again he was suffered to approach the Bay of Naples, where the defending fleet lay, without being discovered, and thus, by the very fact of his preponderating power, to defeat it. The want of enterprise of the torpedo-boats and cruisers at Gaeta may be attributed to the nature of the theme; but nothing could exceed the extreme feebleness with which these were handled during the final operations. Probably such lack of boldness is largely explained by the fact that the "manœuvre" squadron is not maintained in commission like that opposed to it. This was indeed the first time in the Italian

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Navy that a large number of vessels had suddenly been mobilised, subordinate to the calling out of men of the reserve (*marini in congedo illimitato*).

In contrast to the ineffective employment of the torpedo-boats away from their base, was the vigorous manner in which they were handled in action. Here, indeed, both officers and crews showed real energy and professional skill, together with great physical endurance; but the torpedo-boat actions, both in the battle off Civitavecchia and in the Bay of Naples, serve to show that the tactics of such an employment of them are yet far from settled. Admiral de Amezaga, who had the best opportunities of observing the executive officers during the manœuvres, awards the highest praise to them for their professional skill. But, if the officers of the permanent squadron are thus equal professionally to their duties, there can be no doubt that, in point of numbers, they are sadly deficient. Here, indeed, is one of the weakest points of the Italian fleet. Moreover the auxiliary officers grievously disappointed those who expected them to fill the vacancies that existed, for they answered in but small numbers to the call. Very many of them pleaded ill-health as an excuse. "This is fatal," says Admiral de Amezaga; "there is no power of artifice that can arouse to enthusiasm men cut off by the limit of age from their legitimate aspirations, without receiving any moral compensation whatever, or who have repeatedly been refused promotion when on active service." Clearly here, then, is a body of auxiliary officers which is a danger rather than an advantage to the Italian Navy; but it seems probable that a general call of the officers of the reserve would have given better results.

In regard to the *matériel* of the Italian fleet the manœuvres gave excellent promise. Indeed—although the two squadrons, including eighteen battleships and cruisers, four torpedo-boat destroyers, and fifty-four sea-going and other torpedo-boats, were manœuvring by day and night for a month—there was not a single mishap worth the name. This is a record that any other fleet might envy. It speaks well, not only for the ships and the care with which they were handled by their executive officers, but for the competence of their engineering staffs. As Captain Bettolo told the Chamber, the engineers are a part of the life of the ship, and, with the executive officers, share the dangers and, in a large measure, the responsibility in the most difficult situations. Yet the officers of the engineering branch are supplied in ridiculously small numbers to the Italian fleet. According to the "Annuario Ufficiale della R. Marina," the Navy has but 204 in all, very curiously, to English ears, classed in an equivalent military hierarchy, thus: one

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colonel, three lieutenant-colonels, nine majors, fifty-two captains, fifty-one lieutenants, and eighty-eight sub-lieutenants. But, just as there is a dearth of executive officers, so is there really a plethora in the engineering branch. The difficulty, in short, is merely one of promotion and pay, for there are more than 1000 *suttufficiale macchinisti* in the fleet, of whom 281 have reached the grade of *maresciallo.*

There are thus problems many and difficult before the capable administrators of the Italian Navy. They have a splendid fleet to maintain in efficiency, and to increase and renew with the progress of the arts and the developments reached by other nations. They have a body of executive officers, far from sufficient for the needs of the fleet, to increase and strengthen; and they have to man the fleet with seamen of perfect technical training, and inspired with high moral courage. They have also the engineering branch, and the reserve, largely to elevate and reorganise. As Admiral Morin told the Chamber with conspicuous truth, they are the trials and fatigues of constant navigation that train seamen; they are the tempestuous nights and watches in the midst of dangers, and not the tranquil days spent in port that give the necessary experience to officers. To Admiral Racchia must be accorded the high credit of having sent the fleet to sea; but, with national poverty and reduced credits, the difficulties before his successor are stupendous. It remains to be seen whether Italy will conquer her difficulties; but these are bitter warnings to be offered by a patriotic seaman, who, by a turn of fortune, has now become himself the responsible minister of a nation that has made extraordinary sacrifices for the creation of its fleet. They are warnings at the same time which Englishmen, who are tempted to lean upon the Italian alliance, will do well not to ignore.

JOHN LEYLAND.

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MOLTKÉ. BY WILLIAM O'CONNOR MORRIS.

WE know Mr. O'Connor Morris as an indefatigable student of military history. We know his power as a writer, and soldiers who have not the advantages of a classical education may well envy his clear and graphic style. We do not doubt his legal acumen, and we admit that his judicial training should stand him in good stead when he approaches the inevitable task of the military historian, the weighing of conflicting evidence. The volume before us is brightly and clearly written. The events of Von Moltké's life, and the incidents of his campaigns, are cleverly condensed. The main points are well brought out, and the character of the great strategist, his intense application, his modesty, his energy, his iron will, and unassuming piety, meet with due appreciation. The chapters devoted to the wars with Austria and France form a spirited narrative; and the general reader who desires to master the sequence of events in the memorable years of '66 and '70–1, will find assistance in Mr. Morris's pages. He will find there a readable sketch of two great campaigns, and he will at least learn how great a part the Prussian organisation and the Prussian training played in establishing German unity. Mr. Morris has not failed to emphasise the fatal results of Austrian and French unreadiness, lessons which civilian readers may well lay to heart. All this is well worked out; and the absence of technical terms, the wide berth given to all details which are purely professional, and the very small demands made upon knowledge of military matters, will render the book at once attractive and useful to the British taxpayer. It will probably prove less interesting to soldiers. We may admire Mr. Morris's industry as a collector of facts and opinions, but his want of technical knowledge must seriously detract from his value as a critic. As a student of character, we may be ready to accept his opinions. To pourtray the great soldier of whose career he treats in his true nature is manifestly within the bounds of his capacity. He has given us a life-like picture of Von Moltké. At the same time, we may be permitted to doubt whether his estimate of military achievements is just; and when he takes it on himself to decide whether eulogy is extravagant or censure well merited, it is difficult to take

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him seriously. Putting aside the fact that he must, of necessity, be ignorant of the essential details of the soldier's trade, the number of military biographies he has produced is sufficient to show that he has not studied war very closely. The task sits too lightly on him. Something more is required of a military historian than voluminous reading and a fluent pen. To form a sound judgment on any single campaign, save of the most simple character, or even of any single battle, is impossible, unless every single move is worked out with map and compass. Nor is this all. Due consideration must be given to space and time; moral conditions must be carefully weighed; and unless we are in possession of the information the generals possessed, unless we know the actual situation of their troops at any given moment, the conditions of supply, the state of the magazines, and the smoothness or friction of the machinery which comes under the heading of staff duties, our criticisms will have but little value. To work out a single campaign or a single battle, in sufficient detail for the formation of a sound opinion, is a most laborious task; but it is easy in comparison with the research necessary to ascertain the moral conditions of any single situation, the amount of information possessed by the generals, or the manner in which staff duties were carried out. Lack of practical experience and of familiarity with details makes it tenfold more difficult. Even if Mr. Morris has had the leisure to study, after this fashion, the campaigns of Marlborough, Turenne, Frederick, Napoleon and other leaders on whom he has written, it is perfectly apparent that so far as those of Von Moltké are concerned it has been impossible for him to do so. In the first place, he does not read German, and the whole history of '66 and '70 is not to be found in either English or French translations. His list of authorities is woefully incomplete. Not a single regimental history figures in it, and yet, as Colonel Maurice has told us, they are a most valuable fund of information. The names of Hoenig, Hoffbauer, Klein, Künz, Von Widdern, and Von Scherff are all absent. Von Moltké's own pamphlet on tactics, "The Influence of Arms of Precision," is not mentioned; whilst the well-known reply to "The Tactical Retrospect," by the late Bronsart von Schellendorf, is wrongly attributed to the chief of the staff. "Das Volk in Waffen" is missing, and there is no allusion to the famous number of the *Militär-Wochenblatt*, in which Von Moltké defended his strategy against his Austrian critics. Prince Kraft's "Strategische Briefe," although translated into French, are equally neglected, and Mr. Morris has evidently not heard of an excellent French review of Von Moltké's life, published anonymously in 1887, under the title of "Le Maréchal de Moltke." "Les Lettres

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de l'Autriche en 1866," on which many of his strictures on the operations in Bohemia are based, has been condemned by Colonel Maurice as "a Belgian translation, in many places intolerably bad, and requiring to be compared with the original." The best French account of the Metz battles, recommended by the French staff, and written by Alfred Duquet, he has not consulted. On page 123 he declares that "the Prussian Staff History is not always trustworthy, especially as regards the numbers engaged in several battles, no doubt in order to conceal the overwhelming superiority, as a rule, of the Germans in force." As he evidently thinks that German officers have no hesitation in deliberately misrepresenting facts, it is possibly no accident that he has made no reference to the very detailed statements of the numbers engaged on both sides in the Metz battles and of the casualties incurred, published by the historical section of the general staff. We would ask him, however, whether Derrécagaix' statement that the Guard and Saxons each numbered 40,000 men at Gravelotte, shows "careful analysis"? Including all the cavalry, all the gunners, and all the engineers, neither of these corps, on the day their mobilisation was completed, numbered more than 36,500 officers and men. A little practical experience, or a glance at the regimental histories, would have told Mr. Morris that the ranks soon thin under the effect of long-continued marches. His ignorance of German, however, is not the only reason which leads us to condemn his account of Von Moltké's campaigns as inaccurate and misleading. He is not sufficiently careful as to facts. A few instances may be selected.

"The march of the invaders," he writes, referring to the great movement of the Germans to the French frontier, "was carefully screened by bodies of horsemen, keeping away the enemy's patrols." The fact is, that on the 4th of August, the date of the first collision at Weissembourg, the cavalry division of the 3rd Army closed the line of march instead of heading it. On the other side of the Vosges, the cavalry of the 1st and 2nd Armies did not keep away the enemy's patrols, because the French made no attempt whatever to seek information beyond their own boundaries.

His account of Woerth bristles with inaccuracies. "Morsbronn," he says, "was in part fortified." It did not even form part of the position. It was occupied by two companies on outpost, who retired immediately the Prussians advanced. Nor, according to the best French histories of the battle, De Chalus and La Relaçion, were either Elsasshausen or Froeschwiller prepared for defence. McMahon had not 120 guns, but only 101, with five batteries of mittrailleuses. On the morning of the 6th, the Prussian 5th Corps did not "fall boldly on the French centre, supported by the

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2nd Bavarians." The 5th Corps made a small reconnaissance in force; the 2nd Bavarians, attracted by the firing and obeying orders, attacked after it had been broken off. The advanced guard of the 11th Corps struck in shortly afterwards, far away on the left; and the 5th Corps commander then sent forward seventeen companies only, in order to hold the French in front and prevent them from overwhelming either the advanced guard of the 11th or the Bavarians. The attack of the 5th Corps did not "completely fail." The French Marshal, his whole attention attracted by this attack, made no attempt to crush the isolated Bavarians on his left, and not a single battalion was sent to reinforce his right. The Crown Prince did not send orders to suspend the fight "because the situation was critical." but because he wanted to defer a general engagement to the next day. As a matter of fact, he knew nothing about the situation, except that some fighting was going on. He was certainly not aware of the danger which threatened the Bavarians. The French right wing did not "fall back towards the centre round Elsasshausen." The greater part, after its defeat at the hands the 11th Corps, went straight to the rear. The charge of the French cavalry at Morsbronn was not, except as regards the personal gallantry of the troops, "one of the finest charges in the annals of war." It was, in reality, one of the worst managed charges on record. The 1st Bavarian Corps did not "make the overwhelming pressure impossible to withstand." The French repulsed each one of its attacks until Elsasshausen, the key of the position, was captured by the combined efforts of the 5th and 11th Corps.

Spicheren is equally badly treated, and the account of Colombey concludes with the extraordinary statement that the arrival of fresh Prussian troops compelled Bazaine to retreat at night-fall, but that the French "were not defeated from a tactical point of view." Mr. Morris appears to consider that because the Germans, who were the assailants, suffered the heaviest loss the battle is to be considered drawn! We would recommend him to visit the field and carefully inspect the position held by the French from Bellecroix, along the Avenue des Morts, to the wood behind Colombey. It does not require very much tactical knowledge to recognise that the line is exceedingly strong, and yet the French were fairly turned out of it.

The battle of Gravelotte fares no better. It is asserted that the French position afforded little facility for counter-attacks. We have always been under the impression that facilities for counter-attack depend far more on the adversary's mistakes than

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on the lie of the ground, and as a matter of fact the ground on the French right was just as favourable for such an operation as Waterloo. The difficulty in the way of counter-attack was the excellent tactics of the Germans, the combination of the three arms, and the strong support rendered by their powerful artillery at decisive range. But this is a technical question, and Mr. Morris can scarcely be expected to do it justice.

Space forbids us to point out the evidently insufficient knowledge of the situation, and of the difficulties in moving vast masses of men, which call forth the adverse criticism on Von Moltké's march on the morning of the 18th; but we may mention several manifest errors in the account of the engagement. "Every hamlet and building had" not "been made an out-work." Ste. Marie aux Chênes, Chantrenne, Champenois, L'Envie, had not one of them been prepared for defence. At St. Hubert itself the arrangements were insufficient. The commander of the 9th German Corps did not believe when he attacked "that he had attained the extreme right wing" of the French. On page 24 of the German Official Account it is distinctly stated that, seeing an opportunity of surprising the enemy, he would not allow the advantage to be lost. The attack of the 9th Corps, "about 5 p.m." (5.30 exactly) was not made with the idea of beating back the enemy's centre, but to support the advance of the Guard upon St. Privat. It was, in fact, a fine stroke of tactics, and exactly what ought to have been done. It was not "unsuccessful." The infantry gained ground, and under cover of their fire part of the artillery pushed forward and broke up several French counter-strokes.

The most curious assertion, however, is that after the fall of St. Hubert, Von Steinmetz "gave orders for a grand general attack in the close columns of the days of his youth." There was no question whatever of close columns. Von Steinmetz, like the majority of the officers and men engaged, thought the French were retreating, and ordered the artillery of the 7th Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division to cross the Mance ravine. Mr. Morris seems to think that a counter-stroke would have been an easy and successful operation. He forgets that the borders of the wood were strongly occupied, and that a long line of guns stood on the opposite bank of the ravine.

As to the numbers engaged, his criticism on Von Moltké's statement is erroneous. The figures given by the chief of the staff —178,818, are evidently taken from the appendix to the official account, which *does* include the 2nd Army Corps. Von Moltké made a mistake in saying only seven corps were engaged, and he omits the cavalry, which were not employed. We may add that

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Von Steinmetz was not "dismissed from his command," as Mr. Morris puts it, until the 16th of September, nearly a month after the battle. It is unlikely, therefore, that his removal was a consequence of the attack on the Point du Jour. Moreover, the official account declares that "the 1st Army *fulfilled its task* of drawing the adversary upon itself." Mr. Morris has fallen into the common error of believing that the success of every single attack depends on whether the enemy's line is broken. He does not seem to understand that there are two kinds of attack—"the holding" and "the decisive." The former may not achieve local success, but by detaining the enemy's reserves at a distance from the critical point, may exercise a most important influence on the issue of battle.

We shall not refer at length to Mr. Morris's criticisms on Von Moltké's strategy and tactics. His want of technical knowledge makes them absolutely worthless. His ideas of strategy are those of the chess-board type. It is impossible that he can appreciate the difficulties of moving and concentrating vast masses of troops. If he did, he would scarcely have overlooked Von Moltké's extraordinary achievement in bringing 220,000 men on to the field of Gravelotte without jostling, overlapping, or confusion. He would scarcely have ventured to assert that Bazaine might have passed through Metz on August 17th and 18th, and have marched south across the German communications. He would probably have discerned that the great wheel northwards from the Moselle, cutting the retreat of the army of the Rhine on Verdun, is deserving of far more praise than he gives it; and he would have realised that Von Moltké, on June 22nd, 1866, knowing what he did of Benedek's struggling march, was justified in ordering the concentration of the two Prussian armies at Gitschin.

Mr. Morris does not go so far as Archbishop Whately. He has no historic doubts as to the existence of the German hero. He admits that Von Moltké had a great share in the German triumphs, but he stubbornly denies him every attribute of genius. "The conceptions of his campaigns were not original, that of 1866 was borrowed from Frederick the Great—a conception distinctly condemned by Napoleon; that of 1870 was borrowed from Prussian leaders who had formed it many years before, and if excellent it does not display genius. Moltké was never called upon to attempt exploits like those before Mantua in 1796, like the march on Ulm, and the march which led to Marengo; but he did not possess the imaginative power, directing the profound calculation and craft which have given these combinations their matchless splendour; it may safely be affirmed that he was unequal to them. In his operations in the field, too, we sometimes

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see a want of fertility and resource; he ought to have crushed the army of the Rhine after Wörth and Spicheren before it reached Metz; and he gave opportunities more than once to Bazaine, which a real general would have made disastrous to him. In his conduct of armies, a deficiency of art, a failure quickly to seize the occasion, a rigidity and even a slowness of movement are manifest in several striking instances; he could never have achieved feats of arms like Arcola, Rivoli, and Montmirail, and he seems to have been devoid of the gifts of surprise and stratagem, one of the highest gifts of a great captain." If this extract amuses our readers as much as it has done ourselves, we shall not regret having re-produced it. We have not seen its equal since we read the judgment on Napoleon pronounced by a student of war who was no less industrious than Mr. Morris. In Colonel Mitchell's exhaustive account of the Emperor's campaigns, the "combinations of matchless splendour," referred to in the above quotation, are every one of them relegated to the domains of the commonplace. The victories of Arcola, Rivoli, and Montmirail are attributed, as are Königgratz and Gravelotte by Mr. Morris, to the errors of the enemy, to good luck, and superior numbers. "The impartial reader of history," sums up Mitchell, "will see that this boasted man, at all times as callous of heart as destitute of principle, possessed but moderate talents, was presumptuous and arrogant in the hour of prosperity, timid, destitute of resources, deficient in firmness, deficient even of personal courage in the hour of adversity."

As for Mr. Morris's tactical knowledge, what can we say of a critic who blames the commander of the 3rd German Army Corps, not so much for beginning, as for persisting in his attack at Mars la Tour? What else could the poor man have done?

We may notice, as regards the suggested movement of Bazaine through Gravelotte, that the German official account is not, as he says, altogether silent. On page 6, vol. II. it is stated that "in the event of the adversary breaking out from Metz along the right bank with inferior forces the 1st Corps was to retire upon Remilly." Von Schell's "History of the 1st Army," gives the text of the original order. It runs as follows:—"In the *very improbable* event of the French executing offensive movements against the 1st Army in superior force, it should retire on Remilly to cover the communications." As a matter of fact, the idea of Bazaine passing through Metz is ludicrous, and the manner in which the problem has been worked out is amongst the blemishes on Hamley's "Operations of War." We have written this review with a due sense of responsibility. We have no wish whatever to close the field of military history to civilian writers. On the

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contrary. Few soldiers have either the necessary leisure or the literary talent to follow in the footsteps of Napier or Malleson. There are several civilian authors to whom we owe a lasting debt of gratitude. We do not allude to Mr. Archibald Forbes. The biographer of Havelock, the historian of the Afghan war, two of the best military books we have, is scarcely a civilian. But Hooper's "Sedan" and "Waterloo" are standard works, and Mr. Ropes has lately given us a most excellent volume on the campaign in Belgium. When we remember Carlyle's "Frederick the Great," and Kinglake's "Crimea," we can scarcely appeal to the proverb *ne sutor ultra crepidam.* All is fish that comes to the net of genius. But the art of war is not to be studied in text-books merely. Its mastery demands years of labour, wide experience, and much practical knowledge, not of technical details only, but of the limits which confine the performances of armies, and of the trammels which beset the skill of the General. We cannot, therefore, allow such criticisms and comparisons as those in which Mr. Morris has chosen to indulge, to pass without protest.

A great soldier like Von Moltké certainly deserves a better fate than to be "d—d with faint praise" by an amateur who never "set a squadron in the field." If Mr. Morris will leave criticism and comparison alone; if he will confine himself to narrative and the portrayal of character; if, in a word, he will do that which he can do well, and not attempt tasks from which even a Napier might well shrink, we shall welcome any future volumes from his pen. But to trifle with military history, as he has done hitherto, is certain to offend soldiers who believe that their profession is just as serious as any other, quite as difficult to learn, and more difficult to practice. "A Digest of the Laws of Evidence," by Lord Wolseley, or "Assault and Battery"—a congenial subject—by the author of "War," would probably provoke hard criticism in the Inner Temple.

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SUPPRESSION OF REBELLION IN THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES OF CANADA, 1885.

(Continued from page 294.)

III.

BY GENERAL SIR FRED. MIDDLETON.

MY narrative ended in the last number at the point when my small Army was about to camp after the affair at Fish Creek. It was a terrible night, blowing and snowing hard, and we had great difficulty in pitching our camp. Posting the piquets was no very easy work either, owing to the numerous coolees and bluffs scattered about.*

However, with Melgund's assistance, I managed it satisfactorily. Besides the piquets—four in number—we had as usual a small party of scouts, mounted, patrolling round the camp every hour. Melgund and I visited the outposts together after midnight, and found them all very alert. The morning of the 25th broke tolerably fair. The wounded were all doing well, including the amputation cases of which unfortunately there were several. The dead were buried early in the day, I myself reading the service, no clergyman having joined us up to that time. I was much relieved by hearing, in the course of that day, of Otter's safe arrival at Battleford without fighting, and that he had found all its people safe. This good news, combined with the arrival in camp of a small herd of the enemy's cattle which had been "rounded up" by some of Bedson's men and the American war correspondent, greatly assisted the officers and myself in dispelling a slight gloom which had overcast the camp since our engagement, principally owing to the sudden loss of some of their comrades, a contingency of war which had been brought home somewhat unexpectedly to my untried citizen soldiers. I now determined to re-unite my force and attack Batoche on the eastern side of the river, and gave orders accordingly. Melgund had never liked my plan of dividing the force which—though I believe it, as regards the

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* In North-West phraseology a "bluff" means a small wood or copse, and a "coolee" the same with a small pool of water in its midst.

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enemy, to have been a good one—I now saw was more suitable for a force of regular troops than for a body of perfectly untried and almost untrained militia, however willing and plucky they might be. Once having decided on re-crossing the left column, Melgund set to work at it with a will, assisted by Captain Haig, and it was safely accomplished in two days. Melgund re-assumed his position as chief of the staff, and that night when visiting the outposts he was requested by an amiable sentry to "throw up his hands" and say who he was. On his doing the latter, he was told to advance and show himself. The sentry, with rifle at "the ready," looked him over, and turning his head said in a hoarse whisper, "All right, Bill, it's only a orficer." It appeared "Bill" was lying down, close by, ready to fire if his comrade missed. Melgund mentioned that that was not the usual way to receive grand rounds, and passed on. About 2 o'clock in the morning the camp was aroused by three or four shots fired from the right piquet. I was soon out and mounted, and with Melgund and two or three scouts galloped off to the spot. The sentries declared that they had fired at two mounted men who would not answer their challenge. After patrolling all round and seeing nobody, we returned to camp and turned the force in. Next morning we found the sentries were quite right. A man who was in charge of a train having lost his way, had halted his waggons and ridden off with one of his men to try and find the trail. When challenged, not feeling sure it was our camp, he did not answer, and when fired at they turned and bolted, spending the rest of the night most uncomfortably in a small coolee. This alarm roused one of Boulton's men who had been very badly wounded, and was in fact dying. The poor fellow half rose and, calling for his horse and rifle, fell back dead. I visited the scene of our late fight, and after examining the locality I felt thankful that my scouts had been so advanced and extended as to have caused the enemy to disclose themselves prematurely, for had they allowed our main body to get well into the ravine before opening fire on us, I fear greatly that with my raw troops the consequences might have been most disastrous.* And that this was their intention we afterwards learnt by a report from Gabriel Dumont, found among Riel's papers captured at Batoche.

The rifle-pits were cleverly constructed, and so situated that their defenders were quite covered from our fire, both rifle and cannon. We found our two dead untouched, and had them carried back to camp. We also found one Indian lying dead,

* See the excellent military sketch of Fish Creek, drawn on the ground by Captain Haig, A.Q.M.G., and given in the last number.

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half in and half out of one of the pits, and another lying a little in front, besides the one shot at the commencement of the affair; also fifty-five dead horses and ponies. The Rev. W. Gordon joined us here as chaplain to the 90th.

We remained encamped at Fish Creek waiting for the arrival of the steamer *Northcote* with supplies and a few men, which ought soon to arrive. I was the more anxious for the arrival of the steamer as I wanted it to convey the wounded to Saskatoon, a small settlement some seventeen miles up the river, the inhabitants of which had kindly and thoughtfully offered their houses and services for them. I utilised this unwished for halt by practising the men at field drill, skirmishing, advancing and retiring, &c., and reconnoitring daily towards Batoche. In these reconnaissances only once did we come across any of the enemy; a party of them were in a house near the river some five miles from our camp. Their outlying scout caught sight of us and gave the alarm. They rushed out and galloped off with such a start that it was useless our following. Their dinner, consisting of chunks of under-done beef, which they had evidently just begun, served to allay the appetites of some of our scouts who were hungry and not too particular. Though we did not see much of the enemy in our reconnaissances, we often saw their cattle, horses, ponies, and sometimes fowls, and always brought some of them back with us; and we must, on these occasions, have looked like "moss-troopers" of old, returning from a raid. The cattle were converted into rations for the men, the horses and ponies handed over to the mounted corps, and the fowls sent to the hospitals for the wounded. The end of April drew near, and there were no signs of the steamer; so acting on the advice of Brigade-Surgeon Orton, I ordered some waggons to be made ready to carry the wounded to Saskatoon. This order was most admirably carried out by Captain Bedson, who had the hides of the captured cattle dressed and then fastened up hammock fashion, but stretched tight in each waggon. A light framework of willow wands was added, over which some strong canvas was fixed; the general result being a very fair substitute for an ambulance. On the 1st of May I received information that, owing to the lowness of the water, the steamer could not arrive for four or five days, so I sent off the wounded in the improvised ambulances, under the care of Drs. Orton, Rolston, Moore, and Willoughby—the latter being a resident of Saskatoon, who had come into camp, and had been of great service. Boulton and his scouts formed the escort. I may state here that this convoy arrived safely at Saskatoon, the waggon ambulances proving a

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perfect success. The wounded had borne their long journey of forty miles well, and were handed over to Surgeon-Major Douglas, who had paddled alone in a canoe from the Landing, a distance of about 200 miles. Brigade-Surgeon Orton and the other medical man returned at once to Fish Creek. The next day Deputy Surgeon-General Roddick arrived there, and took over medical charge, having brought with him an admirable staff and medical outfit. Dr. Roddick, who had been in our regular Army, proved to be a most skilful, energetic officer. Under his care all the wounded recovered, except two who were mortally hurt. He was ably assisted by his staff, and an excellent nurse, who was as skilful as she was kind and pleasant. Nurse Miller, as she was called, was simply adored by all her patients. After sending off the wounded, I despatched Bedson up the river with fifty empty waggons to meet the steamer and lighten her of some of her cargo.

The following is a rough return of the troops at my disposal in the North-Western Territories, and where they were on or about the 2nd of May, in addition to Otter's and my own column, whose composition and numbers have already been given.

MAJOR-GENERAL STRANGE'S COMMAND.

AT AND ABOUT CALGARY AND EDMONTON.

	Strength.
Winnipeg Light Infantry Battalion, Lt.-Col. Osborne Smith, C.M.G.	336
9th Battalion (French Canadian, raised for the occasion), Lieutenant-Colonel Amyot, M.P.	250
65th Battalion (French Canadian), Lieutenant-Colonel Ouimet, M.P.	340
Stewart's Rangers (raised for the occasion), Major Stewart	50
Mounted Police, Major Steele	67
SWIFT CURRENT.	
7th Battalion Fusiliers, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Williams	350
Halifax Provisional Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Bremner	350
Midlander Provisional Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Williams, M.P.	340
Land Surveyor's Scouts (raised for the occasion), Captain Dennis	50
QU'APPELLE (TROY).	
91st Battalion (newly raised), Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, M.P.	252
FORT QU'APPELLE.	
York and Simcoe Provisional Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien, M.P.	360
TOUCHWOOD.	
Cavalry School Troop, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Turnbull	40
Winnipeg Cavalry, Captain Knight	40
HUMBOLDT.	
Governor-General's Body Guard, Lieutenant-Colonel Denison	70
Total	2895

On the 5th of May the long expected steamer arrived after a tedious journey, most of which seemed to have been made on land

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All the steamers on this river are stern-wheelers, and have four strong spars fastened, two on each side of the bow, by a sort of hinge. These spars are kept triced up until the vessel runs on a shoal or sand-bank—which are many and shifting—when they are lowered and the vessel is forced over the obstacle, made to walk over it as it were. The steamer, besides supplies, brought two companies, about eighty men, of the so-called Midlander Battalion, formed from several Midland battalions, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. Williams, M.P. A gatling gun in charge of a Captain Howard, late United States Army, an agent of the Gatling Company, and Lieutenant-Colonel Van Straubenzee, whom I was glad to see. He had served in the Crimea with the old Buffs, and having retired was then serving as Deputy Adjutant-General in the Canadian militia, and had now come to join my force. Dr. Roddick had also come in the vessel from Saskatoon to report to me. Having discussed and settled with him the different medical arrangements, he left the same afternoon, taking with him in a waggon my aide-de-camp, Captain Doucet, whose wound he considered of a serious nature, the bone having been, in his opinion, shattered. This proved to be the case, and he practically lost the use of his right arm. On that day I also received the news of Lieutenant-Colonel Otter's engagement on the 2nd of May with Poundmaker and his Indians at Cut-knife Creek, about thirty miles from Battleford. The movement which led to the engagement was made without my orders, though Lieutenant-Colonel Otter had the approval of Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney, to whom however he should not have applied on such a purely military matter. Otter's force numbered about 325 men with two seven-pounders and one gatling, the enemy being estimated at about 200. After six hours' engagement, the trails of both guns having been broken, finding his position not tenable at night, and considering the object of his reconnaissance accomplished, he concluded to return at once to Battleford in case a counter attack might be made on that place. His casualties amounted to eight killed and fourteen wounded, including one officer, Lieutenant O. C. Pelletier, 9th Battalion, doing duty with artillery. Though this affair could not be considered a success, it reflected great credit on the untried officers and men engaged in it. The retirement—a difficult operation, especially with raw troops—appeared to have been remarkably well carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Otter, who in his dispatch wrote very highly of the conduct of both men and officers, naming some specially, in addition to his personal staff, namely: Lieutenant Sears, 38th Staffordshire Regiment, doing duty with C Company School Corps, and

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Brigade-Major and Captain Mutton, 2nd Queen's Own Regiment, Brigade Quarter-master.

On the 6th of May all preparations were made for marching on the morrow. I formed the infantry into a brigade, giving the command of it to Lieutenant-Colonel Van Straubenzee, with Captain Young of the Winnipeg Battery as Brigade-Major, a most energetic and zealous officer. I directed Captain Haig to make the upper deck of the steamer *Northcote* bullet-proof, which was done as well as was possible with the means and time at his command, and I placed a small force on board with a view to the vessel taking part in the attack. The force consisted of the following:—Thirty-one rank and file, two officers C Company School Corps, Captain Bedson, my aide-de-camp, Captain Wise, who though better was, to my great loss, incapacitated from walking or riding, three sick officers, Doctor Moore and Mr. Pringle, medical staff, several men of supply and transport services, Mr. G. Ham, a newspaper correspondent, and some settlers returning to their homes, amounting with some of the crew to about fifty combatants, the whole under command of Major Smith, whose orders were to anchor the first night abreast of our camp, remain there the next day, and on the morning of the 9th drop down and meet the column at about 8, just above Batoche. On the 7th we marched and halted at Gabriel Dumont's Ferry, where the steamer also anchored. Just as we were leaving Fish Creek Camp we were joined by Surgeon-Major J. Bell with Surgeon Gravely, Assistant-Surgeon Wright, and six dressers, a most welcome addition to our medical staff. My force was now nearly 700 strong and in excellent spirits. As I had learnt there were some nasty places to pass on the river trail, I rode out with some scouts to the east, accompanied by Mr. Reid, the Paymaster of the Midlanders, a a surveyor by profession, who had assisted in laying out allotments, &c., in this very neighbourhood. With his assistance I marked out a route for next day's march which would bring us on the Humboldt trail about five or six miles from Batoche. On the morrow we marched and halted close to the trail on some rising ground with a small lake on one flank and the open prairie on the other. Leaving Van Straubenzee to pitch camp I rode forward with Boulton and his scouts to within about a mile of Batoche, driving in some of the enemy's scouts, and I selected a site for a camp about three miles from our present one, in case I should want it next day. In the evening I assembled the commanding officers and told them what I proposed doing. Captain Freer of our Staffordshire Regiment, doing duty with B Infantry School, joined us here to act as my aide-de-camp. He, like his disabled predecessors, was

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a graduate of that excellent and valuable institution, the Royal Military College at Kingston, Canada, and proved most useful to me.

Next morning, the 9th of May, we started at about 6 a.m., leaving our camp standing with a small guard to assist the teamsters in case of an attack which, however, I did not think likely to occur. We advanced with our scouts well ahead, two of the guns and the gatling being near the head of the column. As we got near the river, much to my annoyance we heard a rattling fire and the steamer's whistle, showing that the latter was already engaged. We fired a gun to let them know we were at hand, and pushed on. When we arrived where the trail turned to follow the river there was no sign of the steamer, but we could hear her whistle going and continuous firing, and trusted all was well with her.

On ahead we saw some houses, and some men running wildly about. A round or two from the gatling, and a few shells, set fire to one of the houses and scattered the men, who, after a few long shots at us, disappeared behind what was apparently a church with a large wooden house close beside it. From the side of the latter a few shots were fired at us as we advanced. This was soon stopped by the fire of the gatling, which then turned its fire on the house, luckily without effect, as we caught sight of a white flag being waved from a window. I stopped the fire and rode up to the house, which I found to be full of people; three or four Roman Catholic priests, some sisters of mercy, and a number of women and children, the latter being all half-breeds. They were naturally alarmed, and having reassured them we continued our advance. Our scouts, who had cautiously advanced beyond the church, were at once checked by a fire from a sort of low brush about 200yds. or 300yds. ahead, and in accordance with my orders they galloped back and formed up behind the church. The 10th Grenadiers were now brought up and two companies extended and pushed forward to the edge of a ravine in front, two more companies being extended near the church. The guns and gatling were now brought up and opened fire, the former on the houses in Batoche, the latter on a thick scrub on the opposite side of the river, from whence a galling fire was being kept up by a totally invisible enemy. Finding the gun detachments and horses were suffering, I directed them to retire, and as they were doing so a heavy fire was suddenly opened upon them from a bluff just below. This fire was momentarily stopped by the gatling, which was well and gallantly handled by Captain Howard under the direction of Lieutenant Rivers' Canadian Artillery. But the fire soon recommenced, killing a horse and wounding one of the

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

Drawn by Captain HAIG, R.E.

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gunners working the gatling, which I ordered also to retire. The wounded man was pluckily brought in by my new aide-de-camp, Captain Freer, assisted by gunner Coyne of B Battery. Leaving Melgund on the left, I rode over to the church, and found the extended line holding its ground under a heavy fire from a bluff in front. I brought the gatling round the church, and Captain Howard made a dashing attempt to flank the bluff, but could not succeed, as the enemy were safely ensconced in well-made rifle-pits. Returning to the left, I found Captain Peters had made a gallant and vigorous attempt, with a few of the garrison artillery, to drive the enemy out of the bluff below, but had failed and had retired, leaving a wounded man behind. I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Williams to advance the Midlanders down a small gully which lay between the bluff held by the enemy and the cemetery, so as to distract the attention of the enemy. This was well and boldly done, and Peters, with some of his men, assisted by Dr. Codd of the 90th, gallantly went down with a stretcher and brought the man back without further loss; but the poor man was dead. Our wounded were placed temporarily in the church, where the priests and sisters did all they could to help the doctors. It was now getting late, and I saw that, though we were holding our own, it would not be advisable to risk an attempt to advance through the thick cover which surrounded the village, which was now swarming with the enemy, reinforced by the party who had been engaged attacking the steamer, and I had to decide as to where we should camp for the night. Most, if not all, of my senior officers were of opinion that we were not strong enough and ought to retire to our last camp and await reinforcements. I differed from them. I considered, though I would have been glad of a few more men, that we were strong enough as we were, and a few days' delay before actually forcing the enemy's position would only render our men more fit and anxious for it, and we could afford to expend more ammunition than the enemy. Moreover, even if reinforcements were found to be necessary, we could await them more advantageously where we were, for I felt certain that should we retire we should be followed up, and our retirement might chance to become a rout. Even if we fell back unmolested, the fact of our retiring at all would be made the most of all over the north-west territories, and a general rising would probably take place. So I determined to hold on at all hazards where we were, even to keeping with us the wounded, whom I at one time thought of sending back. At the same time I thought it wise to prepare for possibilities, and I wrote orders to be sent by telegraph from Humboldt to close up the troops on our lines of communication, so as to be at hand if

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required. I also wrote a dispatch to the Minister of Militia on the state of affairs, which I determined to send by Lord Melgund. He was naturally averse to leave me as I was to lose him at such a moment; but I explained to him my reasons for wishing it, and he departed that afternoon on the understanding that I was to telegraph to him at Winnipeg if matters became worse, and he was then to return with any troops he might find there. I sent back Mr. Secretan with Boulton and his scouts to strike our camp and bring everything up to us. This was done very quickly and a zareba was formed with the waggons on a piece of open ground about a quarter of a mile back from the church. Towards evening the troops were gradually withdrawn, some of the enemy following them up until checked by a heavy fire from the zareba. A few of them kept up a desultory long-range fire for a short time, killing two horses and wounding one man in the zareba. As darkness fell all firing ceased. We were a little anxious about the steamer as we could hear no whistling, and to let them know on board that we had not retired we sent up a rocket, which, by-the-way, nearly caused a stampede among our horses. The force had behaved well, the officers setting a good example by their coolness, Van Straubenzee and his Brigade-Major Young being always to the front, and Melgund, Haig, and Freer being of the greatest use to me. Piquets were posted and a trench made round the zareba. No tents were pitched except for the wounded, as all the horses were inside, and except for a little rain the weather was fine. The men lay down, with their arms, along the four sides of the zareba after a hasty supper. Our casualties for the day were two men killed and ten wounded, including Captain Mason, 10th Grenadiers. Next morning, the 10th of May, we were under arms at dawn, but all was quiet, and after an early breakfast I moved out part of the infantry; but we were not able to take up our positions of yesterday, as the enemy was in greater force, and now held the high ground about the cemetery and the ground in front of the church. Some of them, apparently Indians from their cries, had taken post at the end of a point of land below the cemetery, to answer which we had to send a party down to the edge of the river. The infantry were placed in as advanced positions as possible to engage the new positions taken up by the enemy. During the day A Battery had some practise at some houses on the opposite bank, and the two guns of the Winnipeg Battery shelled the cemetery and some rifle-pits. A body of mounted men, fifty in number, called the land surveyor's scouts, under the command of Captain Dennis, joined us that afternoon—a most useful, able body of well-mounted men, all more or less

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surveyors by profession—and did right good service. That afternoon we constructed, out of sight of the enemy, some trenches and isolated pits which would enfilade their usual advance when they followed our men up in the evening. Just before that time I placed some men in these pits and trenches armed with Martini-Henrys. When the advanced parties withdrew they were followed as usual by the enemy, who were speedily driven back by this unexpected flank fire. After the enemy had retired, two shots—evidently long range, unaimed shots—struck the camp, one killing a horse, the other, oddly enough, striking a waggon on which was my looking-glass, and before which I was shaving, after which all was quiet for the night. Our casualties that day were one killed and five wounded.

Having heard that there was a large piece of open prairie to the north-east of Batoche, I sent out during the day Captain French with some scouts to ascertain if such was the case. On his return he reported that it was so, and I resolved to make a strong mounted reconnaissance next day in that direction, with a view to preparing for our final attack, for which I saw our men were getting nearly fit, the retirement this evening having been much steadier, and our casualties for the day less.

The next morning, the 11th of May, having seen the infantry under Van Straubenzee take up their position and "open the ball," I started off with Bolton and his scouts and the gatling to reconnoitre the prairie ground said to be to the north of the village. As we were leaving we met a party carrying on a stretcher one of the Roman Catholic priests, who had been wounded in the thigh by a shot from the rebels fired into the house where he was sitting. The poor man bore the pain with great courage and patience. He was sent off to Saskatoon and, I am glad to say, eventually quite recovered under Dr. Roddick's treatment. Instead of taking the regular trail, I made a *détour* through the wood, which was inclined to be marshy, but I thought it possible the enemy might have defences on the trail. We soon came out on the plain, which appeared nearly two miles long and some thousand yards broad, with a slight ridge down the centre. We soon saw men moving about near the edge of the woods on the river side of the plain, and a few shots were fired at us. I advanced the gatling to the ridge, supported by some dismounted scouts, and soon drew a smart fire from them. We could see with our glasses that the enemy had a series of rifle-pits all along the edge of those woods, and numbers of them were running up between the woods and disappearing into the pits. Evidently they were prepared for an attack in this direction. Leaving the gatling in action I galloped off with my

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aide-de-camp, Boulton, and a few scouts after two mounted men who were watching us on our right. They got away in some woods, and on our return we captured a man on foot coming out of a small wood close to us. He was unarmed and declared he was the priests' man, and, though an Indian, was in European clothes. He was sent to camp, and turned out to be a full-blown rebel. We also captured some cattle and ponies which we took back to camp with us. After continuing our fire on the pits for some time we returned to camp. On going to the front I found we had more than regained our lost ground, my reconnaissance having drawn most of the enemy to the rifle-pits in our front. A party of Midlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel Williams's command, finding the fire slacken from the Indian's post below the cemetery, had, led by him, gallantly rushed it, the Indians bolting and leaving behind them some blankets and a dummy which they had used for drawing our fire. A battery shelled the cemetery and the rifle-pits below, and the Winnipeg Battery shelled a house on the opposite side of the river which was flying Riel's flag. In the evening the advanced parties retired unmolested, not even a long-range shot being fired into the camp. Our casualties for the day amounted to only four slightly wounded, including one officer, Captain Manly, 10th Grenadiers. Our men were now beginning to show more dash, and that night I came to the conclusion that it was time to make our decisive attack.

The next morning, the 12th of May, I left with all my mounted men, one gun of A Battery, and the gatling for the plain. Before starting I arranged with Van Straubenzee that as soon as he heard us well engaged he was to move off, and, having taken up yesterday's position, push on towards the village. I should, as soon as I had drawn the enemy to the rifle-pits, gallop back and join his attack. I took the same route as yesterday, and on reaching the plain dismounted some of the scouts, and with them, the gun and the gatling engaged the rifle-pits which were soon filled with the enemy. In the middle of all this we saw a man riding furiously towards us, waving something white. I rode forward to meet him, and found it was one of Riel's white prisoners, Mr. Ashby, a civil surveyor. He handed me a letter which he said Riel had written and sent to me. I opened it and found it was to the effect that if I massacred his women and children he would massacre the prisoners. As I supposed he referred to our shelling the houses, I at once wrote in answer that we were most averse to injuring women and children, and that if he would put them all in one place, or house, and let me know its exact locality no shot or shell should be fired at it.

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Just then another prisoner, a Mr. Jackson, came up on foot, having been sent by Riel with a duplicate of the letter brought by Ashby. The latter, in a few hurried words, told me that the prisoners were all, at that moment, in a dark cellar in one of the houses, the trap-door of which was kept closed by heavy weights, and that Jackson and himself had been taken out specially to carry the letter, and that they were being rather roughly treated. He then described the position of the house, and honourably and gallantly went back with my answer, fearing, if he did not, his comrades in misfortune might suffer. The other man declined to return. I now proposed to retire, first pouring in a heavy fire with some dismounted men and the gatling, while the gun and the mounted men withdrew covered from the enemy's sight by the ridge. The dismounted men held on for a short time, unfortunately losing one of their number, Lieutenant Kippen, of the Land Surveyor's Scouts. When the whole party was mounted we went as rapidly as possible back to our camp. Then I found, to my intense surprise and annoyance, that, owing to a strong wind blowing towards us, our firing had not been heard and the infantry had not moved out of camp. I am afraid on that occasion I lost both my temper and my head. I hurried off alone to the church to try and see what the enemy was about. Just as I got near it a fire was opened on me from the ravine, which soon pulled me up. I saw I was in a fix and turned about to walk back, but the fire grew so hot that I had to run for it, the bullets swishing about me in grand style. Luckily I managed to reach one of our rifle-pits, into which I thankfully dropped. The Brigade-Major, Captain Young, who had luckily seen the affair, advanced with some men, and I got back safe and sound. By this time the men had had their dinner, and I directed Van Straubenzee to take up our old positions at once and push on cautiously, while the rest of us had something to eat. Straubenzee moved off and extended two companies of the Midlanders on the left moving up to the cemetery. The 10th Grenadiers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grasett, prolonged the line to the right beyond the church, the 90th being in support. The Midlanders, gallantly led by their Colonel, swept on through the wood, driving the enemy out of the rifle-pits at the cemetery and between the cemetery and river. The 10th, under their gallant chief, Grasett, now advanced, driving the enemy out of the ravine, the whole giving vent to a rattling cheer, which brought myself and staff speedily to the front, where I found the whole line, which had been splendidly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Van Straubenzee, in the wood facing the village, the line being perpendicular to the river; the Midlanders, on the left, the Grenadiers in the centre, and the 90th on the right in column,

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commanded by Captain Buchan, Major Mackeand having sprained his leg early in the day, and Major Boswell being left in the zareba with a guard. The guns were now up, and commenced firing from their old position on the village and on the ferry, by which some of the enemy were escaping. The 90th were now quickly extended on the right of the Grenadiers, the extreme right being taken by the scouts, dismounted. About this time Ashby again appeared, having run the gauntlet of the fire of both sides to bring another letter from Riel—who, by the way, he said was in a blue funk—thanking me for my courteous reply, &c., but outside the envelope was written, "I don't like war. If you don't cease firing the question will remain the same as regards the prisoners." Of course no answer was sent, and soon, with the officers well to the front, a general advance of the whole line was made with rousing cheers, the place was captured, the prisoners released, and the fight was over, except for some desultory long-range firing, which was soon put down by two or three parties sent in different directions. About 6 p.m. the steamer *Northcote* appeared towing another steamer. We were all delighted to see them, and found that except two or three very slight casualties the *Northcote* people were all safe, but they had a long story to tell. I sent for our blankets and food, and bivouacked in and about the houses of the village, having, however, sent the scouts back to strengthen the guard I had left all day in the zareba under Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton, consisting of a party of the 90th, under Major Boswell, and a gun of A Battery. We posted our piquets, and were all glad to get to sleep after our successful day's work.

FRED MIDDLETON.

(To be continued.)

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ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE.

By H. Lawrence Swinburne.

O thou, that sendest out the man
  To rule by land and sea,
Strong mother of a Lion-line,
  Be proud of those strong sons of thine
Who wrench'd their rights from thee!

Tennyson.

To create sea-power demands, not only the construction of powerful and modern naval armaments, but also the maintaining and manning of such with due efficiency, and that much had to be done in this direction when the United States seriously took in hand the rehabilitation of her Navy can be very easily demonstrated. The Navy Department, like the rest of her administrative organisation, was tainted with the cancer of political corruption, and reform would have to encounter strenuous opposition from those whose idea was that a post in a Navy yard was as much the prize of the political victors as a postmastership in Minnesota, or a consulate on the shores of the Mediterannean. The Navy yards had fallen behind the times owing to the neglect of the administration in keeping pace with the marvellous and rapid development of Naval architecture, marine engineering, ordnance construction, and manufacture of explosives. Expenses for repairs were enormous and out of all proportion to the original outlay. The *Shenandoah*, built in 1862 at a cost of 463,866dols., had, in some twenty years, 906,481dols. spent on her in repairs. The *Ossipee* which originally cost a shade over 400,000dols. had, in the same period, nearly 1,250,000dols. spent on her. Very nearly the same amount was spent on the *Kearsarge*, a ship whose initial cost was barely over 250,000dols. In short as Secretary Chandler puts it, "instead of maintaining our Navy yards for the advantage and benefit of our ships, the ships have been dragging out a protracted existence for the benefit of the yards." The *personnel* also needed much in the way of reform. It contained a body of officers too large for the requirements of the service, and a certain proportion of the officers in every grade were, "for various reasons, not fitted for, or likely to be ordered to, the command of vessels or any other important duties." Promotion by seniority, and the inability to retire officers on account of age until they had reached the rank of commander, checked promotion, and junior officers of ability and

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merit were soured by feeling the best years of their life slipping away without being able to obtain advancement either in pay or position. It was possible to "bring about or modify departmental action on behalf of officers" if such officers were possessed of—or in a position to influence those possessing—political influence; and it was even possible for officers dismissed for incapacity, or for drunkenness, or some other misconduct, to in this manner effect their restoration to the service. There was also room for improvement in the condition of the non-commissioned portion of the *personnel*, and more especially for extending the apprentice system, so as to bring into the Navy a class of young and intelligent sailors. These were some of the difficulties that had to be grappled with, and in the following pages I purpose to show to what extent they have been overcome, by a description of the administration of the Navy department, and the organisation of the personnel as they to-day exist.

Commencing with administration we find that the whole administrative control of the Navy is vested in an official of cabinet rank, designated Secretary of the Navy, the appointment of whom is in the hands of the President, subject to his selection meeting with the approval of the Senate. Acting directly under the supervision of this secretary are an assistant-secretary, a deputy judge advocate-general, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and the chiefs of Bureaus. For administrative purposes the Navy department is divided into eight Bureaus, the officer in charge of each holding for the time—whatever his substantive rank may be—the acting rank of commodore. At the head of each of the first four Bureaus is a line officer, and at the head of each of the last four a staff officer of the branch under the control of the Bureau. These Bureaus are as follows:

(1) THE BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS has entire control of all naval yards and naval stations; provides funds and labour for the construction and maintenance of all buildings, docks, slips, wharves, &c., within them, but has nothing to do with ships under construction or repair, or the labour employed on them.

(2) THE BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT manufactures, purchases, and issues ropes, anchors, cables, rigging, sails, &c.; installs and repairs all electrical appliances; has charge of all coal depôts and supplies; controls the Naval Observatory, nautical almanac, and compass offices.

(3) THE BUREAU OF NAVIGATION promulgates, records, and enforces all orders to the Fleet and the officers of the Navy; has charge of the education of officers and men (except the War College and Torpedo School, which are under the Bureau of Ordnance); controls all enlistments and discharges, and prepares

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estimates for the pay of all officers and men; has under its directions all rendezvous and receiving ships; provides transportation and fixes the complement of ships in commission; controls the Hydrographic Office, survey work, publication and supply of charts, sailing directions, &c., and disseminates nautical and hydrographical information to both Navy and Mercantile Marine; is charged with the control of all relating to tactics, drill, signalling, uniform regulations, &c.; decides all questions of Naval discipline, movements of ships, and duty or change of duty of officers; receives reports of service performed by ships, officers, and men, of ordinary inspections of ships, and of all drills and exercises.

(4) THE BUREAU OF ORDNANCE controls all that relates to naval arsenals, torpedo stations, &c.; manufactures or purchases all armament, armour, and ammunition; designs gun turrets and (in conjunction with Bureau of Construction) determines upon location of armament, and construction of magazines, armouries, and gun-hoists on shipboard; and decides upon material, kind, qualities, and distribution of armour.

(5) THE BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR has charge of all operations relating to the designing, building, fitting, and repairing the hulls of ships, spars, capstans, windlasses, steering-gear, and ventilating apparatus; fixes and secures armour in the manner, and of the kind designated by the Bureau of Ordnance; and has the care and preservation of all ships laid up in reserve.

(6) THE BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING fulfills the same functions as the Bureau of Construction and Repair, in all that relates to steam machinery, whether for propulsion or auxiliary purposes.

(7) THE BUREAU OF SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTS purchases prepares, has charge of, and issues all provisions, clothing, small stores, &c.; purchases all supplies for the Naval establishments, except medical and surgical appliances, and supplies for the Marine Corps.

(8) THE BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY has charge of all laboratories, hospitals, and dispensaries, and supplies and issues medical and surgical appliances, &c., used in the Medical Department of the Navy.

The duties of the Judge Advocate-General are of the legal nature ordinarily associated with the office, and the officer holding this appointment ranks, irrespective of his substantive rank, as Captain, if of the Line, or as Colonel, if of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps I will not here touch upon, as it will be more conveniently dealt with when describing the personnel of the Navy.

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Under the control of the various Bureaus are a number of shore establishments, some of which, such as the Naval Observatory and Hydrographic Office, require no comment. I would, however, point out, with respect to the latter institution, that that portion of our Mercantile Marine, engaged in the Western-Ocean trade, is under great obligations to it for its issues of weather charts and other meteorological publications. The educational establishments can also be left aside until we come to the question of *personnel*, and I will here deal only with the naval yards and stations, which are twelve in number, and situated as follows:

(1) On the North Atlantic:

Navy Yards: Portsmouth, N.H.; Boston, Massachusetts; Brooklyn, New York; League Island, Pennsylvainia; Washington, D.C.; Norfolk, Virginia.

Naval Station: New London, Connecticut.

(2) On the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico:

Navy Yard: Pensacola, Florida.

Naval Stations: Port Royal, South Carolina; Key West, Florida.

(3) On the Pacific:

Navy Yard: Mare Island, California.

Naval Station: Puget Sound, Washington.

From the above it will be seen that the largest and most important yards are located on the North Atlantic coast. Of the stations on the New England coast, two are of little importance. New London, Connecticut, is merely a coal and store depôt, and Portsmouth, N.H., is neither a constructing yard nor capable of effecting repairs above those of a minor character. Boston, however, though not now used for construction, is of importance, as it is the yard at which are concentrated the manufactories of the Bureau of Equipment. Here are manufactured wire-rope, manilla and hemp cordage, anchors, chains, &c., as well as ships' galleys. It has fair capacity for effecting repairs. There is a granite dock taking vessels 355ft. in length, and new shears with large lifting capacity have been, or are about to be, erected. Passing south, we come to the Brooklyn Navy yard on the Hudson estuary, which is the largest and most important Government construction yard in the States. The yard is on the East river, facing New York, at a point about half-a-mile above the Brooklyn bridge. It has a very extensive water frontage, and includes also an island, which contains a large basin, wharves, &c., and on which arsenal stores are located. There are two dry docks, one of granite capable of taking a vessel 329ft. long, and a timber one to take ships of 450ft. A third dock, also of timber, to have a length of 600ft., is also in

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process of construction. That the capabilities of the yard in the way of ship-building are excellent is shown by the fact that the second-class battleship *Maine* (6648 tons), and the cruiser *Cincinnatti* (3183 tons), have both been constructed at this yard. Its importance is also enhanced by the fact that it possesses the largest plant for construction of engines and boilers of any of the Navy yards, and it has already turned out engines of 10,000 I.H.P. for both the *Cincinnatti* and her sister ship the *Raleigh*.

Coming to the Delaware estuary, we find there another Navy yard, which, though it has not, as yet, had any share in the construction of the new Navy, will probably be, in the near future, a large construction yard. This is the League Island yard, situated below the town of Philadelphia, at the junction of the Schuylkill and Delaware rivers. The recommendation of the Navy yard commission pointed to it as being in every way the most suitable situation for a large Government ship-building establishment, and this, when the needs of the Navy increase, and Congress see their way to appropriating funds for the purpose, is what it will undoubtedly become. It is the only Navy yard situated on fresh water, and where ships can lie without fouling. It is close to the great manufacturing and producing districts. It is in the centre of ship-building industry in the States, and thus skilled and experienced shipwrights and artisans are always available. Its situation, 70 miles from the sea, and the approach through a long and tortuous channel, gives it comparative immunity from attack. Geographically, it is not far enough south for work done there to be influenced by the enervating effects of a sub-tropical climate, nor north enough to feel the severe winters of New England, which hamper seriously such outdoor work as ship-building. In short, if the United States ever enter extensively on a programme of Government construction, the League Island yard will undoubtedly be the place selected for the bulk of the work. Up to the present, the work done towards fitting the yard for such a purpose consists in the construction of a magnificent dry dock, capable of taking in the largest warships, the building of piers, the repairing and facing of wharves and sea-walls, and the reclamation of a large area of marsh land.

Washington as a Navy yard, in the ship-building sense of the term, may be regarded as a *quantité négligeable*. There is a light marine railway, and minor repairs can be effected on small craft, but the sole importance of the yard lies in the fact that it is the naval ordnance manufactory of the United States. Here are constructed—or rather built up, as the forgings come from private firms—all the ordnance of the United States Navy of and above

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4in. calibre. On a small scale, as compared with Woolwich or Elswick, it is probably as complete and efficient a modern gun factory as there is in the world. The buildings are extensive and well fitted, and comprise a magnificent gun-shop, gun-carriage, projectile, breech-mechanism, and pattern shops, foundry, forge-sheds, &c. It is possible to construct guns up to 16in. calibre, though 12in. and 13in. are the largest that have yet been turned out, and the rifling machines and plant generally in the gun-shop are all of the most modern and recent construction. In the shrinking-pits hot air is the medium, so that no flame comes in contact with the metal, and petroleum is the only fuel used. The breech-mechanism and gun-mount shops are on a par with the gun-shop, but in the projectile department only cast-iron shell is made, armour-piercing projectiles being obtained by private contract. The ordnance manufactured comprises 4in., 5in., and 6in. quick-firing guns of 40 calibres; 6in. and 8in. breech-loading rifled guns, of 30, 35, and 40 calibres; 10in. breech-loading rifled, of 30 and 35 calibres; 12in. and 13in. breech-loading rifled, of 35 calibres. The proving ground in connection with the factory is situated at Indian Head, some 28 miles down the Potomac, on the Maryland side of the river, and lies in the mouth of a valley running down to the water, the guns having a clear sweep of fire over the broad estuary. Much labour had to be expended in cutting away the high ground on both sides of the valley to make room for gun-platforms and clear the line of fire down the range. The situation is one in every way adapted for its purpose, and the station is admirably equipped with all the appliances necessary for testing and proving guns, armour, projectiles, and explosives. The whole is practically the creation of a young officer, Ensign R. B. Dashiell (the talented designer of the quick-fire breech mechanism adopted in the United States Navy), who has had charge of the station since its removal from Annapolis some two years back.

Twelve hours steaming from Washington brings one to that point where the junction of the Elizabeth and James rivers, ere they enter Chesapeake Bay, forms the noble stretch of water known as Hampton Roads, a deep, absolutely sheltered roadstead, only some fifteen miles distant from the open sea. Here is situated the town of Norfolk, which gives its name to the Navy yard, though the latter is situated at Portsmouth, a suburb on the opposite bank of the Elizabeth river. The great strategic importance of the situation will be seen when it is remembered that it would be the naval base for all operations in defence of the Chesapeake, and through the Chesapeake only could attack be made not only on Washington but on Richmond, one of, if not, the most important

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commercial and manufacturing centres in the south. As far as hull construction goes it ranks with the Brooklyn yard, but it has not as yet turned out any engines. Here have been built the second-class battleship *Texas* (6300 tons) and the cruiser *Raleigh*, sister ship to the *Cincinnatti*. The yard has a length of about 3450ft., an extreme width of about 1150ft., and a water frontage of between 3500ft. and 4000ft., mostly stone-faced. Shops and plant are very complete, but owing to the configuration of the yard a large portion of the water frontage, and that, moreover, in the direction towards which any increase of the yard must of necessity extend, is comparatively distant from the principal shops. For this reason a new shop, fitted with the most modern appliances, and for which there is an excellent site, will, it is expected, soon be erected. It is also probable that a large timber basin, 800ft. by 200ft., and with a depth of 10ft., which now occupies a central position in the yard, will be converted into a fitting-out basin. There is a want of large locomotive cranes, though there are a 100-ton shears and a 65-ton crane, both fixed, and appropriations are now asked for an 80-ton floating and self-propelling derrick. Building and repairing accommodation are about on a par with Brooklyn, there being five building slips, with room for more, and two docks, one of granite to take vessels 290ft. long, and the second, a timber dock, the same size as that completed at Brooklyn. This yard is also specially complete and well-equipped in regard to saw-mills, joiners'-shops, and boat-building plant, a branch of its naval architecture of which the yard is particularly, and with justice, proud.

The present stations on the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico need but brief comment. The most northern is Port Royal in South Carolina, nearly 500 miles distant from Norfolk, and situated on Paris Island, on the right bank of the Beaufort river, some two-and-a-half miles from the town from which it takes its name, and about twenty-two miles from the open sea. It is at present merely a coal and store depôt, and has no facilities for repairs, but a timber dock, 496ft. in length and 80ft. in width is under construction, and the station is in process of being transformed into a small Navy yard. On the Gulf there are two stations, one at Pensacola, on the western border of the State of Florida, and the other at Key West, one of the numerous islands running out westward from the extremity of the Florida Peninsula. Both were rejected by the Navy Yard Commission as the site for the modern Navy yard to be created on the Gulf, but both are capable of effecting minor repairs. The coaling facilities at Key West have been of late considerably improved, but the Government

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TABLE I.—COURSE OF INSTRUCTION GIVEN TO CADETS AT THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND.

Year and Term.		Mathematics.	English Studies, History, and Law.	Modern Languages.	Drawing.	Sciences.	Mechanics and Applied Mathematics.	Steam Engineering.	Seamanship, Naval Architecture, and Tactics.	Astronomy, Navigation, and Surveying.	Ordnance and Gunnery.
First.	1	Algebra. Geometry.	Grammar. History.	French.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2	Advanced Algebra. Spherical Geometry.	Composition. U.S. History.	French. Spanish. German.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Second.	1	Descriptive Geometry. Trigonometry.	Composition. Law.	French. Spanish. German.	Mechanical.	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2	Analytical Geometry.	—	French. Spanish. German.	Mechanical.	Physics. Chemistry.	—	—	—	—	—
Third.	1	—	—	French.	Mechanical.	Physics. Chemical Analysis.	Differential and Integral Calculus.	Principles of Mechanism.	Seamanship.	—	—
	2	—	—	French.	—	Physics.	Mechanics.	Principles of Mechanism.	Seamanship.	Celestial Sphere. Nautical Almanac.	—
Fourth.	1	—	—	—	—	*Line and Engineer Division.* Physics.	*Line and Engineer Division.* Least Squares. Strength of materials.	*Engineer Division.* Marine Engines. Boilers. Designing Machinery.	*Line Division.* Seamanship. Construction. Tactics. *Engineer Division.* Construction.	*Line Division.* Theory and Practice of Navigation. Hydrographic Surveying.	*Line Division.* Ordnance. Infantry Tactics. Gunnery.
	2	—	*Line Division.* International Law.	—	—	*Line and Engineer Division.* Elementary Physiology. Hygiene.	*Engineer Division.* Applied Mechanics.	*Engineer Division.* Marine Engines. Boilers. Designing Machinery.	*Line Division.* Seamanship. Construction. Tactics. *Engineer Division.* Construction.	*Line Division.* Deviation of the Compass. Practical Navigation. Practical Surveying.	*Line Division.* Manufacture of Ordnance. Ballistics. Gunnery. Manufacture and Mechanism of Gun-Carriages. Preparation and use of Ammunition.

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floating dock at Pensacola has been left unfinished. Originally intended to be of six sections, with a total length of 250ft., and a lifting capacity of 3000 tons, work on it has been suspended after the delivery of six sections. Algiers, a transpontine suburb of New Orleans, will, in all probability, be the site fixed upon for the Gulf Navy yard, as the Commission, which reported in November, 1889, was unanimously of the opinion "that while the spot is not an ideal one, no other place in the Gulf compares with it in the advantages offered, and that the advantages are so many and so great, and outweigh the disadvantages to such an extent that the Commission has no hesitation in recommending the location of a Navy yard and dry docks at the present Government reservation at Algiers, Louisiana." The main disadvantages of the site lie in the liability of the location to yellow fever epidemics; the existence of unfavourable conditions for navigation in certain states of the Mississippi; and the fact that the work, in connection with the protection of the river banks and the carrying out of dock excavations, offers serious, though by no means insurmountable, engineering difficulties. The advantages on the other hand are numerous. New Orleans is the terminus of six trunk lines of railroad. There is easy and cheap water communication with the whole of the vast territory embraced in the valley of the Mississippi. There are ample facilities for obtaining every class of material and supplies, as well as skilled and unskilled labour, and coal, moreover, is abundant and cheap. Finally, the great commercial importance of New Orleans demands that it shall be as thoroughly and well protected as possible, whether it be the site of a Navy yard or not, and hence the necessity for special protection, which would arise if any unprotected site were chosen, does not exist.

Crossing over to the Pacific coast, we find that on Mare Island, in the Bay of California, the United States has established what in one respect is the most important Navy yard she possesses. Important for this reason, that it is the only base for a fleet operating in the waters of the Pacific, and hence—though inferior to them in facilities for construction—of as much strategic value as either the Brooklyn or the Norfolk Navy yards. The shipbuilding capabilities of San Francisco and its surrounding districts are amply demonstrated by the successful results of private industry achieved by the Union Iron Works, and that the Mare Island yard is destined to play an important part in the development of the sea-power of the United States is a fact that cannot be denied. As far as repairs go, the yard is fully equal to all requirements, as large appropriations have of late been made, and but little more generosity on the part of Congress is needed to equip the yard for

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TABLE II.—SHOWING NUMBER, RELATIVE RANK, AND ANNUAL PAY IN DOLLARS OF THE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.

Line.			Medical Corps.			Pay Corps.			Engineer Corps.			Naval Constructors.			Marine Corps.		
No.	Rank.	Pay.	No.	Rank.	Pay.	No.	Rank.	Pay.	No.	Rank.	Pay.	No.	Rank.	Pay.	No.	Rank.	Pay.
		dols.			dols.			dols.			dols.			dols.			dols.
6	Rear-Admirals ..	6000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10	Commodores ..	5000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
45	Captains	4500	15	Directors..	4400	13	Directors..	4400	10	Chief Engineers	4400 4200 3700 3500 3200 & 2800 (c)	2	Naval Constructors	3200 3400 3700 4000 & 4200 (c)	2	Colonels ..	3500
85	Commanders ..	3500	15	Inspectors.	4400	13	Inspectors.	4400	16	Chief Engineers		3	Naval Constructors		2	Lieutenant-Colonels	3000
74	Lieut.-Commanders	2800 & 3000 (a)	14	Surgeons .	4200 3700 3500 3200 & 2800 (c)	27	Paymasters	4200 3700 3500 3200 & 2800 (c)	44	Chief Engineers		nil	Naval Constructors		7	Majors ..	2500
250	Lieutenants (senior grade)	2400 & 2600 (b)	36	Surgeons .		13	Paymasters		nil	Chief Engineers		9	Naval Constructors		22	Captains ..	1800
			15	Passed Assistant-Surgeons	2000 & 2200 (b)	8	Passed Assistant-Paymasters	2000 & 2200 (b)	30	Passed Assistant-Engineers	2000 2200 2450 & 2700 (c)	nil	Assistant Naval Constructors	2000 2200 2600 (d)			
75	Lieutenants (junior grade)	1800 & 2000 (b)	40	Passed Assistant-Surgeons		12	Passed Assistant-Paymasters		36	Passed Assistant-Engineers		13	Assistant Naval Constructors		30	First Lieutenants	1500
			nil	Assist.-Sur.	1700 & 1900 (b)	1	Assistant-Paymasters	1700 & 1900 (b)	nil	Assistant-Engineers	1700 & 1900 (b)						
177	Ensigns	1200 & 1400 (b)	30	Assist.-Sur.		8	Assistant-Paymasters		44	Assistant-Engineers		—	—	—	8	Second Lieutenants	1400
64	Cadets (at sea) ..	950	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	Cadets (at sea)	950	6	Cadets (Europe)	950	—	—	—

(a) Maximum pay after four years' service in rank.
(b) Maximum pay after five years' service in rank.
(c) Rise of pay after every five years' service in rank.
(d) Rise of pay after every four years' service in rank.

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constructive work of any magnitude. The island, which is only twenty-six miles from San Francisco, has an area of about 3000 acres, with deep water all round, except at the north-western end where there is a large marsh. It is separated from the town of Vallejo by a narrow strait, forming an excellent anchorage, and on which the yard fronts, the depth varying from 24ft. to 26ft, and capable, if necessary, of increase by dredging. Climatically its condition is perfect, as outside work can be carried on all the year round, a fact which, in spite of the high price of labour on the Pacific coast, causes the actual cost of work done there to compare favourably with that of the eastern Navy yards. There is a granite dock capable of accommodating vessels of the largest size, and a sectional wood dock which can lift 5000 tons. Owing to the large amount of fresh water which the Napa river sends out at each ebb tide, injury to wooden ships or timber wharfs by the teredo, and the fouling of iron or steel vessels, is reduced to a mimimum. Railway facilities are excellent and the supply of timber unlimited. Demand for skilled labour can be readily met, owing to its proximity to the shipbuilding centres of Vallejo and San Francisco. It is not open to direct attack from the sea, and before it could be thus taken the fortifications protecting San Francisco and its neighbourhood would have to be carried. In short, the yard possesses all the requirements necessary to make it worthy of its strategic position as the great naval base on the Pacific. Another naval station on the Pacific, and one of decided importance, is now under construction. In 1888, instructions were given to a Commission appointed by Congress, and of which Captain A. T. Mahan, the celebrated historian and strategist, was president, to select a site for a Navy yard "north of forty-second parallel of north latitude, within the State of Oregon or territories of Washington and Alaska." Alaska was naturally at once dismissed from consideration, as it is not only separated from the United States by foreign territory, but has in itself practically no resources either in manufactures or in population. Their choice was therefore narrowed to a site either on the Pacific coast of Washington or Oregon, or within the large water area approached between Cape Flattery and Vancouver Island by the Strait of Juan de Fuca. In the stretch of 900 miles lying between San Francisco and Cape Flattery there is no harbour without shoal entrances and shifting channels, with the solitary exception of the Columbia river estuary, and this latter even is in a lesser degree subject to the same drawbacks, so much so, in fact, that underwriters will not accept risks on draughts over 22½ft. even under the most favourable weather conditions. The whole coast, moreover, is at all times subject to be lashed by an

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TABLE III.—SHOWING RATING AND PAY OF WARRANT OFFICERS, PETTY OFFICERS, AND SEAMEN OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY, AND OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.

Rank.		Seaman Branch.		Artificer Branch.		Special Branch.		Marines.	
		Rating.	Pay.	Rating.	Pay.	Rating.	Pay.	Rating.	Pay.
			dols.		dols.		dols.		dols.
Warrant Officers.		Boatswain .. .. ..

exceptionally heavy sea, and hence the choice of a site was limited to the land-locked waters of Washington and Puget Sounds. On this latter stretch of water the site has been selected, and the new Navy yard is now in process of construction at Point Turner, about ten to fifteen miles due west of Seattle, and about double the distance north of Tacoma. The main disadvantage of the site is that it is on the western shore of the Sound, and so separated by water from Seattle and Tacoma, the two most important commercial and manufacturing centres of this region connected together by rail, and the latter the terminus of the Northern Pacific railroad, one of the great trunk lines running across the Continent. The advantages, however, more than counterbalance this disadvantage. There is ample water frontage; excellent anchorage, with deep water, but not too deep; ground admitting of easy transportation of heavy masses and excavations for dry docks; easy water communication with Seattle and Tacoma; healthy climate and ample water supply; and, finally, it is so impregnable to attack that "within its ample limits, not only the Navy yard, but all the merchant shipping of the Sound can find a secure retreat." The main work now in progress is the construction of a timber dock, 605ft. in length, 92ft. in width, and with a depth on sill of 30ft.

Turning to *personnel*, we naturally deal first with the commissioned ranks of the Service. They are divided into two branches, viz., officers of the line, or military branch, and officers of the staff, or civil branch, the latter of which includes Medical, Pay, and Engineer Corps, as also the Corps of Naval Constructors. To the Medical and Pay Corps nominations are made direct by the President, the age limit being from twenty-one to twenty-six, and a qualifying examination has to be passed. The Line, Marine Corps, Engineer Corps, and Corps of Naval Constructors are all officered direct from the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Hence between these officers there is that close bond of *camaraderie* always engendered amongst those trained together at the same university. Where the Annapolis Academy differs essentially from the Brittania is in the fact that it practically is a university as distinct from a public school. The age of admission is from fifteen to twenty, averaging about seventeen, and nominations are made one by each member or delegate of the House of Representatives, and eleven by the President, one for the district of Columbia, and ten "at large." The course for the cadets is six years, four at the Academy and two at sea, at the expiration of which the final graduation takes place, and the district the graduate represented becomes vacant. Pay commences on

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admission and continues throughout the course. Up to the expiration of the third year the course of training for the cadets is similar with all, but on entering the fourth year selection is made of those intended for the engineer department, and from this to the expiration of their two years' sea-service the cadet belongs to either line or engineer division, the former being given commissions, either as ensigns in the Navy, or second lieutenants in the Marine Corps, and the latter as assistant engineers. At the expiration of the four years' course a few specially selected cadets are chosen from either the line or engineer division, and, in lieu of going to sea, they proceed to Paris, Glasgow, or Greenwich to study Naval architecture, and are, at the end of two years, commissioned as assistant naval constructors. For example, the thirty-three cadets who qualified at the expiration of their four years' course in 1890, were, in 1892, appointed as follows: Twenty ensigns, three assistant engineers, two assistant naval constructors, six second lieutenants United States Marine Corps, two honourably discharged. That the course of study, both literary and technical, is of a very high character, will be seen from the synopsis of the course given in Table I. Each term is of four months' duration, and every year the cadets of the first, second, and fourth years go for a summer cruise, lasting about two-months-and-a-half. In short, the whole system of education is one excellently fitted to turn out highly-trained and scientific officers, and that its effects are good, both morally and physically, is demonstrated by the fact that every naval officer looks back to and speaks with pride and pleasure of, the institution that gave him his professional training.

One very serious defect throughout the Service generally is the abnormally slow rate of promotion, which is by seniority, and dependent on passing a physical and professional examination. For example, all the ensigns promoted to lieutenant (junior grade) in 1892 were all gazetted to their first appointment as ensigns in March, 1883. All the lieutenants (senior grade) promoted to lieutenant-commander in the same year had been lieutenants since 1871, and had entered as midshipmen in 1863, thus taking almost thirty years to obtain the most junior grade of command. There is not a single captain on the list who joined the service later than November, 1859, and all the commodores and rear-admirals entered the service between 1846 and 1850. The pay of all ranks, however, is on a high scale, as will be seen from a reference to Table II. The rates given in this table are for sea pay, shore-duty pay, and pay "on leave," or "awaiting orders," being correspondingly less. There are no gunnery and torpedo schools for officers in the sense that we understand them, but officers are detached for special

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instruction to the Navy yard at Washington for gunnery, and to the torpedo station at Newport, Rhode Island, for torpedo work. The Naval War College is also affiliated to the latter establishment, and here officers can go through a course, which is very thorough and embraces all subjects, dealing directly or indirectly with the conduct and art of modern naval warfare.

Seamen are obtained by two methods—either by enlistment or entered as apprentices. The tendency, however, is to recruit the service as much as possible by the latter method, and the Navy will soon be almost, if not entirely, manned by this means. Apprentices join from fourteen to seventeen in age, and engage till twenty-one. On joining they rate as third-class apprentices, going for the first six months to the training depôt at Newport, Rhode Island, and for the next year to one of the training-ships on the same rating. During this year they have two cruises, and at its expiration are posted to war-ships as second-class apprentices, being after one year's service promoted to first class. Enlisted men—who must be able to speak English—join as ordinary seamen, if they have served two years at sea, or as seamen, if they have been at sea for four years. All enlistments of seamen and ex-apprentices are for a three years' term. Men who apply, or are selected for special gunnery or torpedo training, go, for the former, to the *Dale*—the receiving-ship at Washington—and for the latter to Newport, Rhode Island. Warrant-officers are now appointed from men who have been honourably discharged upon the expiration of their apprenticeship and have re-enlisted within three months of such discharge. Boatswains must have had seven years' service at sea, and one year at least as petty officers. Gunners are appointed from the seamen-gunner class, and have to pass a stiff technical examination. Carpenters and sailmakers must be good mechanics and skilled in the duties appertaining to their ratings. All warrant appointments are at first acting, and only confirmed after one year's service at sea. The pay of warrant-officers, the different ratings of petty officers and seamen, and of the non-commissioned ranks of the Marine Corps is given in Table III.

Finally we come to the United States Marine Corps, which like our own Royal Marines has established a very high record for discipline and good service. It has served both on land and sea in all the war operations undertaken by the United States, notably in the war with Mexico and the war of the Rebellion, and its *personnel* has been utilized for all and every kind of duty—from quelling a prison riot to extinguishing a conflagration. It was curiously enough before its English prototype in providing a camel corps contingent for service in North Africa, as such a

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corps was attached to the force under General Eaton which marched from Alexandria to Derne, during the operations against the Barkary pirates in 1805. The Corps has at head-quarters at Washington an establishment of the Colonel-Commandant, three Majors, as Adjutant, Paymaster, and Quartermaster respectively, and two Captains, as Assistant-Quartermasters, one being permanently stationed at Philadelphia, and charged solely with the manufacture and issue of clothing, receiving requisitions direct for the same. Promotion of officers is by seniority, and, below the rank of Major, dependent on their passing a physical and professional examination to the satisfaction of a Board composed of three Marine officers, senior to those under examination, and two officers of the Medical Corps. There is established at head-quarters a "School of Application," where advanced instruction is given to both officers and men. Officers go through a course of infantry and artillery drill; administration both on shore and at sea; naval gunnery, torpedo work, electricity, and explosives; topography, field-engineering, signalling, and military hygiene; minor and advanced tactics, and strategy. The non-commissioned officers and specially selected privates are instructed in drill, both infantry and artillery; administration on shore and at sea; torpedo work; field engineering and signalling; military hygiene and ambulance work; elementary mathematics; and minor tactics. The men of the Marine Corps are enlisted for a five years' term, and the pay, shown in Table III, is on a graduated scale dependent on length of service.

In conclusion, I will, without attempting criticism, point out some defects inherent in the organisation of the *personnel*, and which are not only admitted, but pressed on the notice of Government by naval officers and officials. The *personnel* of the Navy can never be really efficient until it is composed entirely of citizens of the United States. For the alien desertion has no penalties, inasmuch as if he escape he can return to his own country, whereas, unless the American accepts expatriation, he has always the fear of capture hanging over him. The present system of enlistment is wrong, in that it tends not to make the Navy a career for life, but merely a place for obtaining training and temporary employment. The fact that to make a seaman you must train him from his youth up has been acknowledged by the introduction of the apprentice system, but the term of enlistment, expiring at twenty-one years of age, is too short. The best men leave at that age, with a strong prospect of obtaining profitable employment in civil life, after having put the State to the expense of giving them an excellent mental, physical, and technical training. Enlistments again should

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be for a longer term than three years. Men whose time expires abroad cannot claim release till the termination of the cruise and return of the vessel ; but for the period after their time has expired they receive an increase of twenty-five per cent. on their pay. This means a heavy expense to the nation, as several months, at any rate, of the man's time is spent on a receiving-ship before being drafted to a sea-going vessel, and for the portion of his time above three years and before the vessel, which is commissioned for three years, is paid off he costs the State one-fourth more in wages than he need do. Naval officers have told me that in regard to intelligence, ability, and aptness, American-born seamen are the best in the Service ; but I am inclined to think that the latter must, owing to his strong individualism and the essentially democratic atmosphere in which he has been reared, be wanting in dicipline, or, at any rate, in that self-elimination which we of less free—or, shall I say, better governed—countries, deem essential in the *personnel* of our Naval and Military Services. After American-born seamen—who seem to be preferred for petty officers—Scandinavians seem to be most in favour. Negroes make fair sailors, but are messed and berthed apart from whites as much as possible. Irishmen, if somewhat inclined to drink, are quick and smart. Dagoes, as all southern Europeans are generally termed, are perhaps least in favour. These, at any rate, are my impressions gathered from conversations with many officers.

Again, while the average American naval officer is as a scientist fully equal, and perhaps superior, to the generality of officers in any Navy in the world—and this is especially the case in the junior ranks—there is a decided want of more technical scientific training for the men. Though the torpedo station at Newport, Rhode Island, is on a small scale a most excellent institution, its usefulness would appear to be in the main confined to the commissioned ranks, and a *bonâ fide* gunnery school is very decidedly wanted. In fact, institutions of the nature of our torpedo and gunnery schools and ships in the main for the non-commissioned ranks are an urgent necessity. Finally, there must be instituted some means of creating a naval reserve. It is true that some States maintain a naval militia, but such a force, consisting as it does of a *personnel* somewhat analogous to our disbanded naval volunteers, can only be regarded as a useful adjunct for coast defence, in contradistinction to a sea-going reserve. No reserve that is not constituted of men trained to the sea from their youth can be classed as a naval reserve in the real meaning of the word.

H. LAWRENCE SWINBURNE.

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MULE TRANSPORT IN PERSIA.

By C. E. Biddulph.

As Ispahan is the great seat of commercial enterprise in Persia it is there that are to be found the greatest number of mules, which are the staple means of transport in the country, and an officer of the Indian Staff Corps has wisely established his head-quarters there for the purpose of buying these animals for the use of the Indian Transport Department.

There appears to be no lack of mules of a very good stamp procurable, though at somewhat high prices. The great breeders of mules seem to be the Baktiaris, and some that I saw were of a most sporting appearance. For ordinary marching it appears that the produce of well-bred mares is found most suitable as being more plucky and enduring, while for the carrying of heavy weights bigger and coarser bred animals are preferred.

The necessary condition for the advantageous employment of the former is, of course, that they should not be overloaded, and this is a point which the ordinary Indian sarwan or muleteer, and more especially the British soldiers to whose tender mercies the animals thus purchased were eventually to be entrusted, have no idea of or do not trouble themselves to pay attention to. It was really quite heart-breaking as one looked at the long lines of these valuable animals, upon the careful treatment of which so much of our military strength in India depends, to think of what their experiences might be in the immediate future, in consequence of the various little frontier wars upon which we are at present engaged.

The mules are mostly purchased at ages from two to four years, with a view to their being fed up in India for a couple of years or so, and being regularly trained before being made use of for service, but in the present emergency it seems more than probable that they will be sent off for the use of the troops immediately upon their arrival in Bombay. In any case it seems a thousand pities that these mules should be sent to India without any muleteers to take charge of them, for the mule, like the camel, is an animal that requires to be understood, and one the value of whose service depends entirely upon the treatment he receives.

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In Persia, as the principal traffic of the country is carried on by means of mules, a special class of the population has for centuries devoted itself to gaining its livelihood by the maintenance of these animals, so the muleteers of Persia may be considered as nearly as possible experts upon any subject connected with mule transport.

It would thus be well worth while for the Government of India to offer a number of these muleteers liberal terms to accompany to India the mules bought in Persia, and thus form the nucleus of a mule transport corps.

As far as I could make out, it seemed to be the custom to attach one man to about every three mules, but such a large proportion would not be necessary in this case; it would be sufficient to take one Persian muleteer to every ten mules, the remainder being replaced by natives of India. Though the charvadar, as he is locally termed, a corruption from charpadar, is one of the most aggravatingly stupid and obstructive individuals in the world to deal with, there is no question that he is completely the master of the means he has adopted, or been bred up to, for gaining his living. He knows to a pound what weight each of his mules can carry, calculates exactly the distance they can travel without injury, and nothing on earth will induce him to exceed in either case the limits which he has fixed for their powers of endurance.

Then for himself, he spares no pains in looking after the comfort of his animals; the daily loading up is a most important function not to be hurried over on any account or done carelessly, then the moment the march is over, though he may have had to walk many miles under a hot sun, he busies himself over their feeding and later on their grooming, the last thing before lying down to rest.

The charvadar, as I say, has the general character of being one of the most aggravating specimens of the human race; there is nothing he is asked to do that he does not raise an objection to or grumble about, but this is only from his anxiety about the security of his means of livelihood.

Amongst his own countrymen of course, every one tries to drive a hard bargain with him to get him to put the heaviest loads upon his mules and take them over the greatest possible distance daily in the shortest time, so that naturally he has come to look upon every one who wishes to hire his mules as a person who is bent upon taking an advantage of him in some way.

It is astonishing, however, to observe, under such careful management, what distances his mules will traverse, and at what a pace on an emergency; or, if a sufficient inducement be offered, as I have mentioned on one occasion, when crossing the Darya-i-Namak our mules must have marched not less than fifty miles in

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about eighteen hours, including a long halt during the heat of the day. Again, in the case of the caravans one meets upon the roads, it is surprising to see the pace at which the mules travel and the loads they carry; so far from there appearing to be any occasion to drive them along, it is not an uncommon sight to see a little mule, almost buried under his load, scurrying away at such a pace that he has to be held back to keep with the caravan he belongs to; I say a *little* mule purposely, for the smaller stamp of animals seem to be the pluckiest. The pack-saddle used is worthy of attention, for it is evident from the peculiarity of its form that it has been designed purposely as the result of experience. In appearance it resembled the double hump of a camel, and its dimensions are out of all proportion with the size of the animal, but it answers its purpose infinitely better than all the new fangled inventions in the way of pack-saddles which have been produced, owing to the fads of various officers and others interested in the subject.

It is made of thick cloth, stuffed with hay, and its shape is such that the weight of the load is distributed evenly over the whole of the body of the animal, and not bearing upon the spine or jammed against the sides, as is the case in the various patterns of regulation pack-saddles.

There is no doubt that professional transport owners, whether they be camel men or muleteers, even though they may be Asiatics, understand all these things much better than European amateurs, for I remember well, during the late Afghan War, when I had exceptional opportunities of observations, being posted for months, years I might say, upon one of the principal lines of communication, I noticed that the much despised Punjaub pad was the mode of carrying loads which did least injury to the animals. As for a fiendish instrument of torture which had been invented for the occasion and consisted of an apparatus of iron and wood, weighing I do not know how many pounds, and with great hooks on either side, to which the loads were attached; it never seemed to have occurred to the inventor of this that no more ingenious method could have been adopted to bring the greatest possible strain to bear upon the spine and against the ribs. I know, however, that the consequences of this method of loading were most disastrous to the animals concerned.

C. E. BIDDULPH.

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THE RISE OF OUR EAST AFRICAN EMPIRE,

By CAPTAIN F. D. LUGARD, D.S.O.

It is not given to all men to have the power of both making history and of writing it. That Captain Lugard is one among these is proved by his book, which, from the splendid ambition of its title to those final phrases which have been set up as sign posts for the direction of future administrators in Equatoria, is a fine record of a fine work. It is probable that the writer has bestowed more labour and consideration on that part of his subject which deals with the slave question than on any other, and it may be incidentally pointed out how completely he here alters his style, laying aside the easy fluency with which he described his own doings and speaking in measured terms with carefully selected words which prove how fully he appreciates the importance of the matter he has in hand.

He insists on a careful distinction being made between those slaves who are aliens, "acquired and imported and retained as slaves by a people with whom they have nothing in common, no community of language, customs, and prejudices," and those who are sons of the soil "of the same race as the masters, and who merely merit the term 'slaves' because their chief has an absolute right over them, and because they are compelled to work, not for any fixed wage, but for contingent and equally definite advantages and form, in fact, but the lowest grade in the social scale." As a rule the lot of the son of the soil will be preferable to that of the alien—and among the latter are included all the slaves at the coast; the number of children born in captivity being very small, the vacancies caused by death are filled up by importations from the interior. The "Arab" of the seaboard, however, is a kindly master for the most part, and when this is so, we are told, the slave has many advantages; in ill health his master looks after him, in a row he takes his part, and if absent he can be assured that his wife and child are safe in his lord's keeping. Another writer quoted, compares the condition of the domestic slave to that

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of the Russian serf, and says he is frequently treated as one of the family. The proof of this is that in many cases slaves will refuse to be set free, and if removed from the scene of their subjection will fly back to it; while if their price be paid and freedom papers given them, they will frequently sell these for some little coveted article of luxury, and voluntarily reassume the fetters which weighed so lightly on them. "Such gratuitous ransom is in its tendency demoralising to the slaves," says Captain Lugard, "and would only encourage all the lazy blackguards of the coast to run away and get ransomed also. A slave thus redeemed would not value his freedom, and the precedent is bad. Another point, too, presents itself to me. Owners will co-operate in the swindle (of the sale of freedom papers), and arranging that their slaves shall return to them will get the price of their liberation and their slaves as well. I maintain that only such picked men should be liberated as have proved their real anxiety to be free."

In connection with this part of his subject, the writer treats of the difficulty of disposing of freed slaves, and propounds a very practicable scheme for the formation of villages to be populated by them. In considering the vexed question of slaves harboured by the missions, he, with characteristic fairness, considers the matter from the point of view of the Arab trader, as well as of the British missionary.

"The Arab saw his slaves appropriated by the missionaries. By them they were given work to do, and made to obey rules, and not allowed to run away. He could see no difference in their status. 'I buy my slaves with my own hard cash, or I expose my life and fight for them,' he bitterly said, 'and then your missionaries steal them from me, and make them your own without purchase.'

"It seems to me a farce," Captain Lugard continues, "that Europe should be told a mission has 'freed' so many slaves when, as a fact, they are as forcibly detained (in order to be 'instructed') as ever they were when 'slaves.' Are the slave children so purchased presented with freedom papers, or is it explained to them they are free to go where they will, and do as they please? On the contrary, are they not looked upon as mission property to be recaptured, even by force, if they desert, and compelled to do the work assigned to them?"

The writer considers that the hardships in the lives of those already in bondage would be mitigated, if not altogether removed, by the abolition of the legal status of slavery. Were this done the slave would enjoy the civil and legal rights possessed by other members of the community, and he would thus have a power of

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appeal against the cruelty of an owner and redress for any wrong he may suffer. However, Captain Lugard is not a man who advocates half measures, and at a very early stage of his narrative he writes as follows:—"The result of my contemplation of these measures was to confirm me in my views that the money expended on the suppression of the slave-trade was not applied to the best advantage, and that the only effective means was to attack the evil nearer its source . . . and in joining an expedition to fight against the slave-raiders in their own head-quarters, I felt myself to be on the path which should lead me to verify by fuller experience the theories I had already formed."

It would be unfair to the writer to attempt to compress within a few lines his thoughtfully-conceived scheme for establishing consulates at different points of the interior which would, better than the existing coast-guard, answer the purpose of bringing the coast population, with their turbulent elements, into touch with the central administration; on this, therefore, I must leave the reader to refer to the book itself.

On the *modus operandi* of the slave-raider, the writer has that to say which is new, and the systematic cruelty and insidious perseverance with which the raider gains an influence over the lands upon which he means to prey may be described, according to the views of the reader, as masterly or as diabolic, and the two terms are frequently at the present moment judged to be more synonymous than was once the case.

The raider introduces himself as a friend and a *nizungu*, or white man. He brings with him a fine retinue, and scatters gifts around him *en prince*. Generous hospitality is offered by him to the great chiefs, and though he assumes superiority over them he lets it be seen that there is not so great a gulf between himself and them as in the case with an ordinary European. He presents them with cloth in return for their ivory, thus showing what an advantage it is to them to have so magnificent a trader settled among them. It is only natural, they consider, that he should require slaves to carry his goods to the coast, and these are easily procured: it is a useful way of ridding the district of its *mauvais sujets*, and a profitable one of disposing of prisoners of war; and if the mere scapegrace is confounded with the malefactor, and some man in search of game from another tribe is mistaken for a prisoner of war, the noble stranger can by no means be considered in fault. The chiefs, his allies, are next presented with a few guns and a little powder, and this puts their few remaining doubts as to the sincerity of their guest to rest. They adopt his dress and his name; they order their households after the manner of his own, and vie with

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each other in their efforts to deserve his friendship by gifts of women, ivory, and land. The newly-acquired slaves, who might be a source of trouble, are now sent to the coast, and with them go all the more valuable stores out of harm's way, and the raider then devotes his attention to settling the quarrels of the different tribes, which, curiously enough, have become much more frequent and embittered since his arrival. These quarrels end in open war; the raider places his arms and his superior intelligence at the service of the strongest, and when the conflict is over he is able to send loads of ivory and long strings of captives to the coast; then, under the plea of fear of lions, an enclosure, which grows into a stockade, is put round the raider's quarters. Stalwart young natives come in from every side eager to be enrolled in his *ruga-ruga* and share in the carnage and the spoil, and too late the chief realises that he has within his gates a foe far more terrible than any rival chief could ever be.

But the inhabitants of hapless Africa labour under a worse evil than even that of the slave-raiders. This is the passage of the Swahili caravans and the tyranny of the dominant tribes. The lawless, undisciplined Swahili spread like ants along the caravan routes, stealing and looting everywhere, for they bring little food with them, destroying the crops, carrying off the children and the women who have gone out for water, or the hunters, who have wandered into the jungle, as slaves, and despoiling the country of its chief wealth—the elephant, as they ruthlessly destroy the females and the calves in a way which explains the disappearance of the animal from large tracts where it once abounded. Of the manner in which we ourselves have indirectly participated in this gigantic wrong, and the way in which Captain Lugard points out it might be remedied, the book must be left to speak for itself.

As an illustration of the tyranny of certain dominant tribes, let a description of a raid of the Angoni—an offshoot of the Zulu tribe—suffice:

"These Angoni were the terror and curse of all this country. Swooping down by night in their fantastic garb of war, with the unearthly yells, grunts, and groans with which they accompany their attack, they would fall upon villages, and loot everything, sheep, goats, fowls, crops; sometimes they would carry off captives of war, at other times they seem possessed with a lust for carnage only, and kill man, woman, and child without distinction, leaving not a living soul behind on the scene of their brutal attack. These awful bursts of savage slaughter, combined with their character for invincible courage, the appalling sounds they utter, and the garb they wear in war, have struck such terror into the surrounding

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tribes that resistance is rarely offered to an Angoni raid. When the dread cry is raised that the Angoni are coming, a blind panic seizes the helpless villagers, and each thinks only of flight and concealment, unless, as more often happens, the surprise is complete by night, and there is no time for escape." A later report dated but a year ago, says: "The Angoni came down to the lake shore in great numbers, they entered the village silently, and each warrior took up his position at the door of a hut and ordered the inmates to come forth. Every man and boy was speared as he emerged, and every woman was captured. News of this disaster reached the three white men at Karonga's, in the employ of the Lakes Company. One of their number set out with fifty guns to re-capture the women. In the afternoon they met the Angoni and opened fire. Taken by surprise, the raiders made off, but not being able to carry both the booty and the women, they immediately began to spear the latter. A horrible scene then ensued." Ultimately the one white man and his followers were successful, and the narrative goes on to describe the scene of the disaster later: "One man had fifteen spear wounds, a child of two had seven. What impressed me most, was the number of young girls and children (even on the breast) who were speared."

On reading such accounts as this, of what are not isolated tragedies but are of regular occurrence, one realises that we are indeed needed in Central Africa, and that those who inveigh against our short sharp methods of dealing with these lawless natives, would do well to compare the existing conditions with those which prevail when we have substituted for them a lasting peace.

In all the portions dealing with the missionaries, one feels that one is introduced into a labyrinth, through which no clear path can be found, terse and graphic as Captain Lugard's description of it may be. We are told that Urtesa, the tolerant King of Uganda, who died in 1884, at one time ordered the whole of his subjects to embrace the faith of Islam, but when they disagreed with him on some point of Moslem law he ordered all Mahommedans to be massacred. His successor, Mwanga, had to choose between the Roman Catholics and the Protestants, but was much puzzled and confused by finding that both alike called themselves Christians, yet were animated by deadly hatred of each other, while before, during, and after the war, each brought perpetual charges of partiality in favour of their opponents against Captain Lugard. In this part of the book the treatment of the dalliers as it was, is contrasted to that which it was alleged to be, and answer is given to their unaccountable charges against the Englishman. Captain Lugard gives the key to the whole problem when he writes:

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"Mgr. Hirth added that up to the time of the Anglo-German agreement, Uganda had been 'No Man's Land,' and it was then perfectly legitimate for anyone to establish an influence with a view to the ultimate political supremacy. That he had worked with this view hitherto, I understood him candidly to admit."

Reluctantly passing over the opening pages, on which some Stevenson or Haggard of the future will lay the foundation of his romances, let us consider of what the book mainly consists. There are the chapters already dealt with on the slave trade, each concise dispassionate statement in which will win for the writer a friend or a foe. From these, some among us will learn that we have hardly yet understood what slavery in Africa really is, and we close their perusal thinking how widely the views of Captain Lugard differ from those expressed by the indifferent who occupy the one, and the hysterical who take their stand at the other extreme of the field of sentiment.

There is the trouble caused by the unhappy divisions and jealousies of the English and French missions, which under the title of "Difficulties in Uganda," occupies the first part of the second volume, and which awoke much bitter controversy at home, controversy due in part to the belief entertained by so many, that Captain Lugard was sent out for the special purpose of ousting the Roman Catholic natives as such, in favour of the Protestants as such, and here it is incidentally shown that a dual control is no more possible in Central Africa than it once proved further north.

There is the story of that war which, so long and skilfully staved off, had to come at last, and which cleared the way for a settlement of affairs in a manner that years of patient diplomacy might have failed to do, and of which Captain Lugard is proudly able to write when submitting the terms of the treaty with Mwanga to us, "So at last the British flag flew in Uganda, over both creeds alike, and the national distinctions of *Fransa* and *Ingleza* were abolished."

There is the brief account of the manner in which the Government became directly responsible for the British sphere without any intermediary, and for sending out Sir Gerald Portal as its representative; and the chapters in which Captain Lugard no longer deeming it necessary to plead against evacuation, in thoughtful, well weighted words, treats of the measures to be taken for the effective occupation of the country and its subsequent development.

But before this a bitter moment had to be lived through: that in which despatches from the Directors say Uganda is to be given up by reason of the expenditure required. "This is a thunder bolt indeed," the journal says. "It is the second time now that a long

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spell of very hard work in Africa has been ended by a reverse so complete that all one's labour has seemed to be merely wasted and worse. This collapse will be terrible in its results. . . . Slavers, Waganda all will misdoubt our power and utterly mistrust our word . . . Hundreds, nay thousands, of lives may be sacrificed, and the blood must lie at some one's door." But at this point the British bulldog re-asserts himself: a rapid plan was made by which the evil may be mitigated to some degree. Next Captain Williams comes in, the assurance to the King that the rumour of evacuation was absolutely untrue, fresh on his lips. As though they were conspirators the two men whisper over the proposed betrayal, and Williams says that he has money of his own, and will give every penny he has in the world, sooner than break faith by leaving the country after such pledges of protection have been given. Happily, this act of self-denial was not required, for individuals at home privately subscribed a large sum of money which enabled the company to undertake to continue the administration for another year, with the result that is now universally known.

There are those chapters in which Captein Lugard writes of the commercial possibilities of the country, and proves that Uganda is by no means the White Elephant depicted by our favourite *Charivari*. In studying these, members of the Chambers of Commerce arrive at the conclusion that those hare-brained military adventurers who spring up from time to time, are not without their use, since they spare them the trouble of sending out experts for a period of years on their own account, and supply them with up-to-date information as valuable in its accuracy and its acumen as that contained between the boards of "The Rise of our East African Empire." There are the scattered pages on sport, when Captain Lugard throws his political and administrative mask aside and confesses that the pursuit of big game is the passion of his life. To these may be coupled the chapters on animal life, with that valuable one headed "Methods of African Transport," which grapples with a difficulty that every African traveller has glanced at in turn.

There is the careful reasoning on the advisability of making the tour in Buddu, and the description for which that tour affords legitimate excuse, of the varied scenery of the land of the Great Lakes, while the writer, who has evidently a love of the beautiful in nature, forgets the fever, of which a dose of quinine, had there been sufficient for himself as well as the others, would have cured him, and tells us of gorgeous butterflies glancing like meteors through the forest twilight, of the tree-ferns clothed with long-bearded

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lichens and orchids, of many coloured fishes gliding about among the rocks of the lake like gold-fish in a glass globe, while the silence around is only broken by the weird cry of a magnificent fish-eagle seeking for its prey. Among such scenes as these the restless rifle, which had been paid for in the absence of funds by shooting a man-eating tiger with a reward on his head, was carried, sometimes providing as much as a thousand pounds of meat in a single day for the hungry followers. On one occasion, while wandering alone parallel to the line of march, the sportsman's favourite practice—though he was warned the raiders knew of his habit, and meant to pick him off if they could—he came across a troop of lions, consisting of two males, four females, and four cubs. He bagged a handsome female, but for some reason the rest failed to bag him, which, in conjunction with other incidents, explain why the natives believed their commander had in his possession a *dawa* or charm against lions, so need not fear them. But the narrow escapes are as many as they are marvellous, especially when one considers the condition of both Captain Lugard's arms which had been shot through in the attack on Kopa Kopa's stockade soon after his first arrival in Uganda, and which remained in an unpleasant condition throughout his residence in the interior. As the personal part of the book is receiving little mention, some abbreviated phrases may be set down here from the account of that attack. "I shouted to every one to clamber over, and began to do so myself . . . A shot struck me and I fell in a heap in a sitting position . . . both arms being completely paralysed, or rather having fallen useless by my side . . . I said to Sharpe that I was done for, and could be of no more use, and would go towards the hospital-tree, but of course I never expected to reach it. Sharpe would not hear of allowing me to go away alone, but I begged him, 'as a last request,' to take my place and not give in if possible. I wandered about for two or more hours, and after that covered half the distance to Karonga's before the others came by . . . My way led through thick jungle, long spear grass and thorns, and across steep ravines, and both arms being useless, I could not protect my face from the boughs of trees or long grass . . . I lost a great deal of blood and a parching thirst set in . . . ague added to my troubles by shaking the fractured bone in my arm . . ." and thus our hero's feet being well set in the primrose way, we will leave him.

Finally, in this *résumé* must be included those passages which the writer set down in ignorance that his words could admit of any such construction, but from which we pronounce this African pioneer to be one of the most single-minded and dauntless men whom

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England has ever sent sent out to lay the stepping-stones of a future empire; one who in his loyalty to his comrades, his patience with a shifty, suspicious, blood-thirsty tyrant, his absolute fairness to all conflicting parties, his tenderness to the sick and the helpless, his kindliness to his followers, his justice, ever tempered, when such was safe, with mercy, to the wrong-doers, has rarely been surpassed.

Of all these his attitude towards those who worked with him is perhaps the most conspicuous. Not once is one able to find the words "alone I did it" set down between the lines; while the frankness and sincerity with which his generous appreciation of others is expressed, almost cause it to be passed by unnoticed. Grant, Maguire, Sharpe, De Winton, Monteith, Moir, Cross, Nicoll, Wilson, Selim, the Moslem, receive their tribute in turn, and Captain Lugard makes no attempt to conceal the respect, admiration, and affection which Captain Williams, his gallant successor, inspired him with from the first.

The maps and illustrations are another feature to which too high praise cannot be given, and it is unlikely that any future explorer will consider his mental equipment for the Great Lakes complete without a careful study of the former.

There can be no more fitting conclusion to a review of this book than a recapitulation of one or two of the expressions of opinion pronounced on the spot on Captain Lugard's work in Africa, opinions of which the sincerity cannot be doubted, as he was then leaving the country, so the speakers could have no interested motive in speaking thus—

To Her Majesty the Queen, Mwanga, the King, writes: "I want you to send this same Captain Lugard back again to Uganda that he may finish his work of arranging the country, for he is a man of great ability, and all the Waganda like him very much; he is gentle, his judgments are just and true, and so I want you to send him back."

The great Chiefs also write on their own account to the Queen. "We, the Protestant Chiefs, were annoyed with Captain Lugard. . . . We wrote to tell you to give us another man who perhaps might please us. But a short time afterwards he, Captain Lugard, settled the matter which had annoyed us, and pleased both us and those of all religions in Uganda. . . . Now he is the friend of all."

Père Brard, the French missionary, expressed his regret at Captain Lugard's departure, and a hope that he would return, writing that his "presence would have greatly tended to the peace of the country." Kimbugwe, head of the Romanist party, writes:

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"The Roman Catholics like you greatly. I thank you for giving them a place in which to dwell. They are very greatly pleased. . . . Now all the Catholics wish to become your children utterly and entirely." One native, who had followed him all through, came up saying his "heart cried" to say good-bye, but he was glad his Chief was going, as he was worn out and needed a rest in his own land, while old Mbogo, another of the Mwganda, said at the moment of Captain Lugard's departure, "So complete was the peace in Uganda that men who before had never left their doors without a gun in their hands, were now everywhere trying to sell them."

CONSTANCE EAGLESTONE.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT OF THE MOUNTED SOLDIER. By A. P.

To the Editor of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

SIR,—The writer of the above article states "that in military equitation and the training of horses we are behind the principal Continental nations," and that this is owing to the instruction imparted by the Riding Masters, who are not "horsemen or horse-masters, and are ignorant of what is required of cavalry in the field."

This is a very sweeping assertion, and I hope you will kindly permit me to refer to a few of the points mentioned in the article.

The musical ride as seen at the Military Tournament may not be a test of military training. It is not put forward as such; but the same men and horses may be seen tent-pegging, lemon-cutting, and jumping, which are tests of military skill, and show high training.

Recruits are not taught to dress by turning their heads and eyes to a flank. They are told to slightly turn the head so as to be able to see the surface of the face of the next man but one, *vide* Cavalry Drill, vol. I.

Why the bending lesson should spoil the rider's hands is not told. There are many who think it is the source from which good hands may spring.

To abolish the bridoon and have only the bit would mean that men would have to jump entirely on the curb; and to leave off the curbs for riding-school and watering-order parades would end in their being lost. Again, how could horses drink when led out from camp with bits in their mouths? Experience has not proved that all saddle arches made of iron and steel eventually open. The 1890 pattern has not failed in this respect; and to revert to the Nolan saddle because of the high cantle would be going back. Kits can be well strapped up on the present pattern, and Hussars can mount without the cantle, and they are the shortest men in the cavalry.

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It is suggested that the training of the remount should occupy at least three months, but the all-important question of age is omitted. Five-year-olds could be, and are put in the ranks in that time, if wanted ; but by far the larger number that join the cavalry are three-year-olds, and for the first three months it is more a question of nursing than training.

Longeing horses over jumps is recommended ; but where you have a riding school, or any enclosed place, turning them loose at the jump brings out their keenness for it. It also interests the rider who is waiting at the landing side with a few oats or some green stuff, and a little talk and fondling from the man is something done towards the next lesson.

It is stated that a radical change in our system of equitation is desired, and some novel suggestions are offered. Mounting and dismounting on the off side at a walk after four weeks' riding of one hour a day would be attended with much danger to both man and horse.

It is not quite clear how the riding would be improved by turning across the school and dressing when moving by looking straight to the front at markers placed eight feet high and eight feet apart on the walls, because as the horse is eight feet in length follows that when the ride arrives at the side under the markers it would be blocked up.

There is much to be said both for and against rising in the stirrups, but at present it is the instructor's duty to check it at all times, either in the school or in the field as a practice that is not in accordance with the cavalry regulations.

At the end of the course, as laid down in the article, it is said that the men would be qualified to drill in sections and march past. There are many who will say that under our present system the cavalry recruit when he leaves the riding school can do this and something more.

Some change in dress is perhaps desirable, but to dress the dragoon in cloth gaiters, black cloth gloves, and a "Stanley" cap would certainly not meet with the approval of those whom the change would most concern,

Yours truly,

D. HALL, Riding Master 20th Hussars.

21st November, 1893.

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NOTICES OF BOOKS, ETC.

These notices give a brief abstract of the general scope of the volumes referred to, and, without reviewing them at length, call attention to their most striking points.

Studies in Applied Tactics: Guide for Officers preparing for Tactical Examinations. By KARL VON DONAT. Part II., with map. London: Willam Clowes and Sons.

In this small brochure, which is similar in size and character to its excellent predecessor, Mr. Von Donat begins by taking a question that has been already set in one of the Service examination papers, and then carefully works out a solution. In so doing, he carefully explains in detail his reasons for any departure from usual custom, and his explanations are always worth reading, even if one does not always agree with him. A most useful feature in the book is the several groups of orders, which are clear, good, and to the point. This part alone renders the book of use to those who may have to write such orders for examination, or, in fact, any other purpose.

The Order of Field Service of the German Army, Authorized Translation. By J. M. GAWNE, Major, The King's Own (Royal Lancaster) Regiment, and SPENSER WILKINSON, Author of "The Brain of an Army," &c. Published for the Manchester Tactical Society, by Edward Stanford, Cockspur Street, Charing Cross, London, and J. E. Cornish, St. Ann's Square, Manchester. 1893.

The translators have done good service in placing this volume within reach of the very large number of British Officers who are either unable to read German at all or who do so with difficulty. It is divided into two parts. The first deals with "Service in the Field," which includes careful instruction as to orders, reports, and sketches, and useful information about reconnaissance, advanced guards, outposts, marches, quarters, baggage, medical service, ammunition supply, and the destruction of railways and telegraphs, &c. The second part comprises "Regulations for the Autumn Exercises," in which are given the distribution of time for the drills of the different units, and clear directions for the conduct of the troops and their leaders during the manœuvres. Though there is much in the latter section that is not applicable to our own Autumn Manœuvres,

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under the narrow and cramped conditions of ground that invariably obtain on these occasions in England, there are many minor details that might be introduced into our own service, notably that "the outposts, so far as circumstances will allow, are placed as in war." This is rarely, if ever, continuously done in our Army, and the training that the constant state of tension and strain which outpost duty involves is not given until it is actually required in an enemy's country. The most marked fact in this book is the importance attached to the development of the individuality of all soldiers and leaders, more or less, in order that they may be trained and encouraged to take the initiative should the necessity arise. In the Imperial preface it is stated that "many points in the practice of field service have been intentionally left open in order to give scope to officers of all ranks to make up their own minds and act according to their own judgment. Under no circumstances whatever is this absolutely necessary independence to be restricted by rules laying down forms not given here."

The outpost work is especially worth studying, but a strict cordon is not regarded as so essential as that in which the roads alone are guarded and the intervening ground patrolled.

A useful appendix, giving full explanation of terms, &c., such as the strength and composition of the various units, &c., has been added. The translation has evidently been very carefully done, and the book is one that should be read by every company officer.

The Army Book of the British Empire. A Record of the Development and present Composition of the Military Forces, and their Duties in Peace and War. By LIEUTANANT-GENERAL W. A. GOODENOUGH, R.A., C.B., and LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. C. DALTON (H.P.), R.A. London: Printed for H.M. Stationary Office by Harrison & Sons, St. Martin's Lane. 1893.

The title of this valuable work is fully borne out by the subject-matter of its pages. The authors have compressed, without omitting any salient point, a very large subject into some 600 pages, and have done their work well; while the list of names of those who have assorted them would carry weight with any one who knew how conversant they were with the subjects on which they treat.

The subject is divided into four parts, dealing successively with the "Army System," the "Components of the Army," the "Army in India, and Colonial Forces," and "War," and it is illustrated by portraits of Her Majesty the Queen and H.R.H. the Duke of

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Cambridge, together with maps showing the British Military districts and the coaling stations on a Map of the World.

Of course, in so small a space it would have been impossible to condense enough information for experts, who may be presumed to know what is in it and more; but it is a valuable book of reference even to them, and its very brevity will give it a more extended circle of readers than a more detailed account. In fact, it is a book for the use of the public generally; and those who wish to know how the machine for which they pay works can have no better guide than this "Army Book." The chapters of Part I., which are devoted to "Imperial Defence," the "Army before 1872"—which gives a brief but excellent account of the upgrowth of our military system from the time of Charles II. to 1872—and the causes which led to the alteration in the army system after the mutiny, and still more to the introduction of short service, are full of interest from an historical point of view; and the authors are right in attributing the present increased general interest in and sympathy with the army, as compared with the feeling of apathy more or less that characterised the public bearing during the long peace, to the reports of war correspondents and to the enthusiasm of the volunteers. This latter movement has, by the more intimate admixture of the Regular and Auxiliary forces, done most of all, perhaps, to raise the status of the private soldier, and to destroy that last lingering political objection to a standing army in England, which is evidenced by the first passage in the "Bill of Rights."

The same may be said of Part IV., which deals with "War," which tells, so clearly that "all who run may read" and understand, what our offensive means are and how far they are ready for use. But there seems a trace of optimism in such statements as that "batteries of field artillery are now supplied with their complete equipment in time of peace," as there have been rumours that to rapidly mobilise for war even the field artillery complement for one of the two Army corps we hope to be able to put in the field would strain our resources, and that in the matter of transport we are by no means so ready as either France or Germany, with ten times the force to put in the field. Still, this is a matter on which the author can write with greater knowledge and authority than the outside public; and it is satisfactory, at least, to know that two officers, at least, are satisfied with our preparations.

As providing useful information, in a most readable way, the "Army Book" will commend itself to all who read it It would have been interesting, perhaps, to have had the names of those who "assisted" appended to their sub-sections—not that it is difficult in many cases to guess who they are—as further

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adding the stamp of authority to the subjects with which they deal. The price of the book (5s.) should bring it within the reach of everybody interested in our second line of defence.

Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny 1857-59, *including the Relief, Siege, and Capture of Lucknow, and the Campaigns in Rohilcund and Oude.* By WILLIAM FORBES MITCHELL (late Sergeant 93rd Sutherland Highlanders). London: Macmillan & Co., 1893.

The history of a campaign, written by one of the subordinate actors therein must always have a certain interest. The testimony of an eye-witness of what he himself saw and did, related by himself and not by a compiler, will have, necessarily, a more personal feeling than if the story had been told from hearsay, even if the writer in the latter case were more skilled than the narrator. Not that there is any want of skill in Mr. Mitchell's book. The story is well and pleasantly told, and contains many minor points of interest that are—in print at least—new. It practically deals with the doings of the old 93rd Highlanders in the Indian Mutiny from the point of view of a soldier in the ranks, and describes the adventures of the regiment from its start for China and its landing at Calcutta to the fight at Bareilly.

The pages bristle with anecdotes of different characters in the regiment. One of these, "Quaker" Wallace, who goes into action at Secunderabagh with the words of the 116th Psalm audible on his lips, might have been one of Cromwell's Ironsides or a Covenanter at Bothwell Brigg; another, Sergeant D. White, who was grieved that he "should have to tell in the Saut Market of Glasgow that he had seen men fight with bows and arrows," reminds one of Dugald Dalgetty and the Children of the Mist; and there are pleasant chatty stories of well-known men, such as Lords Wolseley and Roberts.

The reminiscences are well worth reading by other soldiers than those of the regiment to which they are dedicated.

Rulers of India, Haidar Ali and Tipú Sultán, and the Struggle with the Mussulman Powers of the South. By LEWIN B. BOWRING, C.S.I. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1893.

When this series is completed it will form a very complete and exhaustive history of the political condition of India at various times and under various rulers; and of all the native rulers none stand out more vividly than the two great leaders, whose lives Mr. Bowring, in a very small compass, tells. In the history of the

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Mussulman usurpation of Mysore, the history of the son is to us more interesting than that of the father; for though the latter is a personage because of the "energy, enterprise, and daring," which enabled him to seize a throne, the former came into more personal conflict with the armed strength of Great Britain.

Both lives are briefly but clearly told, and the crowning incidents of the siege of Seringapatam—during which a certain Colonel Wellesley, afterwards to be Duke of Wellington, was slightly wounded in the retreat after a repulse—are especially interesting. But the writer calls attention to the difference between the tombs of Haidar and Tipú in the fine mausoleum maintained at government expense, and the "graves of the English officers and men who fell at Seringapatam, and who are laid in an adjacent cemetery, the ground overgrown by weeds, and the names on the ugly flat stones barely distinguishable." This neglect is to be regretted to say the least.

The Story of an African Chief, being the Life of Khama. By Mrs. WYNDHAM KNIGHT-BRUCE. With a Preface by EDNA LYALL London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1893.

With the Matabili War still fresh in our memories, anything that relates to any of the actors therein is of interest. Khama was one of those; and though he does not seem to have been as actively useful as he might have been, still, none the less, he did, in the very latest of our small wars, fight side by side with the European conquerors of Lobengula and his raiding impis. The small brochure—for it is little more—is a reprint of an article in *Murray's Magazine;* but interesting as the story is, it savours rather of tall talk to refer to Khama, as Miss Edna Lyall does in her preface, as such a "grand living witness to the victory of the Cross," that "had he lived in former times" he "would have been canonised and accorded a place of honour in many a stained-glass window." That sort of language places this undoubtedly excellent sable chieftain on a level with bygone saints, or such men as Bishop Hannington and that leper-hero Father Damian, and to a mere reader that seems rather far fetched. No doubt he is out and away a better and more honest man than many of his compeers in African rule, and is wise enough to see the value of, and adopt the advantages of, European civilisation; and the man was brave. He did not fear, in 1862, with a mere handful to attack the Matabili, who threatened a raid; the race, whose destruction there are English people who condemn, despite the fact that these men were "brought up to slaughter and rejoicing in blood," and that "neither men, women, nor babes were spared by their assegaies."

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Khama, from all accounts, was a true Christian as well as a brave man, and showed his moral courage in becoming one and continuing in his faith against the opposition of many of his people, as much as in resisting the cruel Matabili invasions. His staying the "smelling out" system, his stopping the cruelties of his savage tribe as regards women and children, not only stamp him as a humane man, but as a wise administrator. He is probably the only native ruler who is a good ruler; but this does not make him a saint.

Saving this excessive appreciation of his right-doing and honesty of purpose, the story of Khama's life is most interesting; and it shows what some at least of the African tribes are capable of developing into. But they must be kept clear of such races as the Matabili, even if the latter have to be forced by vigorous measures to learn to avoid raiding neighbouring territories for the pleasure of slaying.

British East Africa, or Ibea. A History of the Formation and Work of the Imperial British East Africa Company. By P. L. McDermot. London: Chapman & Hall. 1893.

"This work was undertaken," says the Chairman of the Court of Directors in the preface, "at the express desire of the late Sir William Mackinnon," who wished to "place on record a concise and authoritative account of the circumstances which led to the formation of the Imperial British East Africa Company, by way of explaining its constitution and character, and of vindicating its aims and ends." This volume of nearly 400 pages fully carries out the object in view. In it is traced the political history of Sir William's connection with Zanzibar and Sultan Barghash, which led indirectly to the formation of the Company, which he fully considered was assured of the support of the English Government, and "of which the Royal Charter was regarded as a pledge." The collision with so-called German interests, the occupation of Witu, the "race for Uganda," and the general difficulties in political and administrative matters with which the Company had to deal are well and temperately told; and the appendices, comprising copies of the various agreements entered into, and the correspondence relating to the withdrawal from Uganda, are especially valuable.

A System of Free Gymnastics and Light Dumb-Bell Drill. By Sergeant-Major S. G. Noakes, Chief Instructor of Gymnastics in the Army. London: Gale & Polden. 1893.

This small *brochure*, with an appreciative preface by Colonel Onslow, A.A.G. (Inspector of Gymnasia, Aldershot), gives a

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series of exercises, with illustrations "calculated to produce a uniform and harmonious development of the whole muscular system all capable of being taught in any fair-sized room, or, weather permitting, in the open air, the only apparatus necessary being the light bells for the dumb-bell drill at the end." The book would appear to well answer these requirements.

Fire Discipline, its Foundation and Application. By Lieut. STEWART MURRAY.

Mr. Stewart Murray emphasises what is already known as "fire discipline," viz., as he rightly puts it: "(1) The habit of instinctively falling into new commands out of the pell-mell. (2) Controlled mass fire. (3) The habit, when leaders grow scarce, of quietly "fighting on by himself."

The above are published by Messrs. Gale & Polden, London and Aldenham.

The Attack Drill made Easy. By WILLIAM GORDON.

A small monograph intended to promote "uniform regimental system of instruction" in the subject dealt with.

Telling Off and Posting a Piquet. By Lieut. G. D'ARCY-EVANS.

Supplementing the Drill Book by giving in detail the posting of a Piquet and the formation of the advanced guard for a Battalion.

At the Front. Being a Realistic Record of a Soldier's Experience in the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny. By ONE WHO WAS THERE. London: Alexander Gardner. 1893.

This is the personal record of an observant man who tells, almost in diary form, the events of his life. Its main use is to show what the private soldier does and thinks, and more especially how he sums up the character of his officers. The small volume abounds with notes of various kinds, arranged as short stories grouped together in short chapters. Without giving any fresh information about the Crimean Campaign, the writer tells his story clearly, and from the standpoint of an actual actor in the struggle.

Cancer and its Complications. By CHARLES EGERTON JENNINGS, M.D. &c. London: Ballière, Tindall, & Co., 1893.

Dr. Jennings's treatise, which first appeared in 1889, has reached a second edition. As has been already remarked in the *Lancet*, the

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doctrine advanced in this monograph of 150 pages "is the most reasonable and hopeful one to be taken in this class of disease." The Author is convinced that complete extirpation of the disease in its earliest stage may be considered possible, and in a series of short chapters deals with the character of the disease in various parts of the human body.

Stories Re-Told: Being a few scraps contributed to the "Madras Mail," during 1891-92, *and reprinted by kind permission of the Editor.* By AIME. London. 1893.

A small monograph, of seventy-eight pages, but unfortunately without an index, containing a series of articles on such subjects as "The Question of Clothes," "Upon 'Calling' in India," &c., dealing generally with Indian questions and Eastern life. They are light and well told.

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LIST OF BOOKS, ETC., RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

The Rise of Our East African Empire, by Capt. F. D. Lugard, D.S.O. Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons.

Army, Navy, and Defence Review. Sydney, N. S. Wales.

Heinrich Jordon. Mittler, Berlin.

Die Reichswehr. Vienna.

Army and Navy Journal. New York.

Canadian and Military Gazette. Montreal.

The New Review. Longman, Green & Co.

Rulers of India Series—Haidar Alí and Tipú Sultán, by Lewis B. Bowring, C.S.I. Clarendon Press.

Imperial Federation. Cassell & Co.

Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny, 1857-59. MacMillan & Co.

Revue Militaire, de l'estranger. Paris.

Marine Rundschau. Berlin.

Militärische Zeitschrift. Wilhelm Braumüller.

Musketry Instruction in India. Simla.

Militärische Blätter. G. von Glasenapp.

United Service. L. R. Hamersley & Co., Philadelphia.

North American Review. New York.

The Globe and The Laurel. Gibraltar.

Revue Militaire Suisse. A. Borgeaud.

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

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BAZAINE'S ASSERTED ALTERNATIVE.

BY ARCHIBALD FORBES.

TO the student of military history the annals of warfare present no more interesting and instructive field of investigation than what is known as the First Period of the Franco-German War of 1870-71 —the memorable month from the opening skirmish of Saarbrücken on August 2nd to the catastrophe of Sedan on the 1st of September, 1870. Of that period the five days from the 14th to the 18th August, both days inclusive, constitute the most momentous section, since of those five days three were days of prolonged and bloody battle, the outcome of which proved beyond all question the superiority of the German fighting-power.

During the preceding fortnight things had gone ill with the French. The main body of the "Army of the Rhine," after the forcible excision from it of MacMahon's command, had gradually fallen back into the vicinity of Metz. The ailing and incapable Napoleon had devolved the command on Bazaine, with the commission to extricate the army by a retreat on Verdun. When that retreat began in the early morning of the 14th with the withdrawal through the city of the trains, part of the French army was already on the left bank of the Moselle. About noon the troops on the right bank took up the retirement, and towards the middle of the

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afternoon there remained beyond the eastern forts only one corps and a division of another. The 1st German Army watching its enemy noted the signs of withdrawal, and its advanced bodies engaged with vigour in an unpremeditated fight which later swelled into a serious and bloody battle. The retreating French columns counter-marched with alacrity at the sound of the strife, and a fierce struggle, which lasted into the darkness, resulted in the French retirement under the protection of the fortress. The retreat which the battle had interrupted was then resumed, and by nightfall of the following day (15th), notwithstanding the encumbered state of the only road used by his left wing, Bazaine had the greater part of the three corps comprising that wing camped in echelon on the plateau from behind Flavigny and Vionville back to and in rear of Gravelotte. The two corps of his right wing, however—the corps which had borne the brunt of the fighting of the afternoon of the 14th, and whose line of retreat was by the Plappeville and Woippy roads—were in no condition to comply with the order to continue the march towards Verdun at daybreak of the 16th. Three divisions of that wing were still back in the valley of the Moselle, and Bazaine therefore ordered the postponement until noon, for all his five corps, of the renewal of the retreat.

A couple of hours before that time, however, the 3rd German Army Corps, which had crossed the Moselle during the night of the 15-16th, and had mounted the plateau from Gorze, interposed itself daringly between the French Army and its line of retreat. A desperate struggle ensued, and was maintained until nightfall. In the afternoon the 10th German Corps joined the 3rd, and later in the day detachments from other corps took part in the fighting. All of Bazaine's five corps were seriously engaged; on each side some 16,000 men fell, and when darkness hid the ghastly field, the French had lost their right of way along the lower road to Verdun by which the retreat was projected, and had been pushed back from Vionville upon Rezonville, leaving the shambles-like battle-field in possession of the Germans.

On the morning of the 17th, however, there still remained to Bazaine the choice of certain alternatives. His troops, spite of their heavy losses, were in good heart; they did not consider that they had suffered a defeat. Their impression, indeed, was that they had won a victory; only pessimists spoke of a drawn battle. Were he in vehement earnest to make good his point, Bazaine might renew the battle on the 17th, with the object of forcing open the lower road. Again there were clearly open to him the two upper roads to Verdun, the one by Conflans, the other by Briey. If he was not keen either for fighting or

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for marching—if, as his tactics of the previous day seemed to suggest, he was loth to cut loose from Metz—there remained to him the recourse of falling back in the direction of the fortress, and of taking up a defensive position in its western front, of strength so great that his adversary, if he assailed it, might haply batter himself to pieces against it. As all the world knows, this was the choice he made. The Germans having at disposal for the moment, besides their two corps which had suffered so severely the day before, only one other corps (the 9th) and some weak details, were prepared on the morning of the 17th to withstand, indeed, the attack which they expected, but were well content to refrain from the offensive pending the arrival of their reinforcements. When their adversary did not attack, but, on the contrary, withdrew from their front, they had no other conviction than that he was either retreating on Verdun by the northern roads or falling back towards Metz. Bazaine utilised the comparative passivity of the Germans in taking up and strengthening the defensive position from St. Privat to Point du Jour in which he fought on the 18th the battle which we in England know best by the name of Gravelotte.

The foregoing may be accepted as a comprehensive although compressed summary of the occurrences about Metz during the period from 14th to 17th August, both days inclusive. On the known and accepted data the problem presents itself whether there was for Bazaine on the 17th and 18th August any eligible, or even any possible, opportunity of extricating himself from his seriously compromised situation, outside of the alternatives which in the foregoing summary have been set forth as open to him.

The question might be regarded as in effect answered in the negative by virtue of the all but unanimous absence of suggestion of any such opportunity. But from this passive concurrence there stands forth one notable dissentient, of weight and significance so great that the authority of his single name may fairly go in the scale against any volume of inference suggested by the silence of other commentators. Praise of the late Sir Edward Hamley's "Operations of War" from the pen of a casual writer would be a mere impertinence. The work has long ago taken its position in contemporary military literature. It is at once a standard and a classic. From its pages the soldiers of our generation have acquired invaluable instruction in the principles and practice of their profession. It may be styled the text-book of advanced study in the art military. The third edition of the "Operations of War," published in 1872, contains a chapter on the Campaign of Metz and Sedan, in which is put forward the possibility, and inferentially

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at least, the advisability of the extrication of Bazaine's Army by the expedient of striking out from Metz up the right bank of the Moselle to the southward, across the German communications, in the early morning of August 18th, the next day but one after the battle of Vionville–Mars-la-Tour, and the actual day on which the battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat was fought. It should be premised that, with the exception of the 1st Army Corps left behind on the south-east of Metz to cover the railway communications with Germany, and of some details, all the German forces were already across the Moselle by sundown of the 17th. Thenceforth, on the right bank south of Metz, there remained a space some six miles broad from the river to the Strasburg road, bare of enemy save for watching videttes and supports of cavalry, and for outposts of the 1st Corps, which latter had instructions, if attacked in superior force, to retire on Remilly to cover the communications. If the denudation of force from this area does not mark with sufficient significance Moltke's opinion of Bazaine's chances of an escape to the southward, the terms of his order to Manteuffel—"in the very improbable event of the French army proceeding to execute offensive operations against the 1st Army Corps"—seem fairly convincing in that regard.

General Hamley's postulate, accordingly, was in great measure complied with; the space to the southward on the right bank was watched rather than guarded. "Let us see, then," he proceeds, "what would have been the chances in favour of an effort to break through by traversing the communications of the enemy." He predicates that Bazaine, instead of attempting to prosecute his retreat or taking up a defensive position, had, on the early morning of the 17th, withdrawn his troops from before the enemy, had recrossed the Moselle, and had passed his army through Metz, receiving three days' provisions and a replenishment of ammunition during the passage through the town or in the bivouacs in which the night of 17-18th was to be spent. These were as follows: the Guard about Montigny between the river and the railway; the 3rd Corps about La Sablon on the road to Nancy, due south of Metz; the 2nd behind it; the 4th behind Fort Queuleu, near the great Strasburg road, south-east of Metz; the 6th in rear of the 4th. The whole army to start on the march south-eastward towards Strasburg on the morning of the 18th, the movement to begin at 3.30 to 4 a.m. The Guard to advance along the Moselle bank, destroying the bridges by the way and if necessary disputing their repassage by the Germans, ultimately falling into the rear of the main body heading to the south-east. The 3rd and 2nd Corps to move on the Nancy and parallel roads; the 4th and 6th by the

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Strasburg and parallel roads. Two cavalry divisions to cover the front, a third on the left flank east of the Strasburg road; the Guard Cavalry Division to Pont-à-Mousson to destroy the bridge there. The author claims that at 8 a.m. the main army would have had its front from Pommerieux to Pontoy, a distance of about seven miles from the starting base. "We know," he continues, "that at that hour the 2nd German Army was heading for the Jarny road, a long day's march from the nearest passages of the river; the corps of the 1st Army three or four hours from their bridges on the Moselle, the 2nd Corps across the Moselle, with its head many hours toward Gravelotte . . . so that the reader may calculate for himself the chances of their stopping the march of the French Army." It was to flow on to Strasburg, and, by raising the siege of that place, impart a victorious aspect to the movement. As for the German Armies, "it may be safely concluded that they would have been much more solicitous to restore their communications than to follow Bazaine."

It is respectfully submitted that in the circumstances the programme marked out by General Hamley for Bazaine's army as summarised above was impossible of performance. The conditions which the fulfilment of that programme demanded were non-existent. From the battlefield of the 16th, the French troops, to judge from their immediately previous performances in marching, could not have reached their proposed bivouacs in time to be in condition for the commencement of their southward march on the morning of the 18th. And again, if the French army had duly reached those bivouacs on the evening of the 17th, it would have found its projected movement hindered by German troops in sufficient strength to arrest its progress while reinforcements were being hurried to the all-important point with adequate promptitude and in adequate force to baulk the effort.

Bazaine's left wing had not shared in the fighting of the 14th, and the three corps composing it, one of which had gone part of the way on the previous evening, had approximately reached their appointed destinations, about ten miles from Metz, before sundown of the 15th. The march was arduous—"*très-lente et très-pénible*"—because of the blocked state of the roads, the trains having preceded the troops; but it was accomplished in time to afford the troops sufficient rest in anticipation of the resumption of the march early next morning. But it was far different with the two corps of the right wing, the 3rd and 4th, which had suffered severely in the fighting of the 14th. When that fighting ceased at nine in the evening these corps bivouacked on the edge of the battlefield under cover of the forts until daybreak of the 15th, at which hour they took

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up the retreat in accordance with the orders issued by Bazaine. The respective objective points prescribed for the night of the 15th were; for the 3rd Corps, a position between Verneville and St. Marcel, in prolongation due northward of the position of Bazaine's left wing; for the 4th, Doncourt, yet farther northward and somewhat forward of the position assigned to the 3rd Corps. Neither corps completed its allotted march. Three divisions of the 3rd reached the plateau of Gravelotte, considerably short of its destination, at 10 p.m. of that day; its remaining division, however, still detained in the Moselle Valley. On the morning of the 16th, the three divisions which had spent the night near Gravelotte moved forward into the Verneville-St. Marcel position, remaining there inactive pending the arrival of the belated division; the corps did not participate in the battle of the 16th until after 3 p.m. The 4th Corps on the 15th made even less headway than the 3rd. Its foremost division on that night was between Lessy and Plappeville, another was at Woippy, and a third so near Metz as Devant-les-Ponts. It was not until 4 p.m. of the 16th that the 4th Corps came into action on Bazaine's extreme right near Bruville.

It may be assumed that Bazaine, at all events on the 15th, was earnest to push the retreat on Verdun, since on the evening of that day he issued the order for the renewal of the movement at daybreak of the 16th, and was baulked in the fulfilment of it only by the failure to come up into position of the two corps of his right. What were the causes of the bad marching of Bazaine's army in the inception of the retirement on Verdun—disheartenment because of the retreat, the blocked roads, lack of energy in its commanders, exhaustion after the battle of the 14th—need not be investigated. If it be claimed that the poorness of its execution on this occasion was exceptional, it may be replied that since there is no evidence to that effect, its performance under notice must be accepted as the measure of its normal capacity in similar conditions. That performance may be summarised as follows:—The three corps of the left wing, which had not been in action on the 14th, marched on an average ten miles in sixteen hours on the 15th. The two corps of the right wing, which had suffered considerably in the fighting of the 14th, although under pressure not to delay, from sunrise of the 15th—the time of quitting the battlefield of the 14th, until 3.30 p.m. of the 16th—the hour at which they entered the battle of Mars-la-Tour, spent a period of thirty-five and a half hours in traversing a distance of twelve miles.

The battle of Vionville-Mars-la-Tour, fought on the 16th, lasted until after nightfall. The French loss amounted to over 17,000, by far the greater proportion of which fell on the corps of

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the left, the 6th losing 5500 and the 2nd over 5000 men. But all suffered more or less; the 4th, for instance, which entered the battle late, and had lost sharply on the 14th, now sustained a further diminution of some 5250 men. The whole army was more or less exhausted; the left had been fighting constantly for many hours; the larger proportion of the right had both marched and fought. In the orders which, on the night of the 16th, Bazaine issued for the withdrawal of his army into the approximate positions in which he fought the battle of the 18th,* he directed that the prescribed movement should begin at 4 a.m. of the 17th. Had he elected to undertake the enterprise which General Hamley advocated, he could not have named an earlier hour for its inception, having regard to the physical condition of his army. That condition was obviously less favourable on the morning of the 17th than it had been at the renewal of the retreat on Verdun on the morning of the 15th. Then, the three corps of his left had been quite fresh; now, on the early morning of the 17th, there had not been for them a sufficient interval of rest in which to recover from the exhaustion of a desperate battle which had lasted until after dark of the previous evening, and to rally from the lassitude which in the best troops inevitably follows the moral and physical strain of hard fighting. The condition of the two corps of the French right, on this morning, could not but be even less favourable, since within three days they had undergone the *Sturm und Drang* of two hard-fought battles. Yet it is this army, one wing of which, when fresh, had taken sixteen hours to march ten miles, the other wing of which, after a battle, had occupied thirty-six hours in marching twelve miles;† of which, now worn, disarranged, and sorely reduced in a struggle whose embers were not yet cold, General Hamley's programme would demand exertions more severe than those of which, under presumably equal urgency and when in greatly better case, it had in the immediately preceding days come far short. Of his project the essential requirement is that Bazaine's army, starting at 4 a.m. of the 17th from its battlefield bivouacs, should re-traverse the distance back to Metz by routes still blocked by the multifarious transport of a great host, defile across the narrow bridges, "drag its slow length along" through the cramped gateways and narrow tortuous streets of Metz, halt by instalments during the distribution of ammunition and provisions from the various magazines of the place, and finally march beyond the city into its extra-mural bivouacs, with sufficient time in hand to allow

* The Battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat.

† From its bivouacs east of Metz, at sunrise of 15th, to the fighting line St. Marcel-Bruville-Greyère, on afternoon of 16th.

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of the troops cooking an evening meal and subsequently enjoying such an interval of rest before reveillé in the small hours of the following morning, as would fit it for the long, swift marching which is another main factor of the projected operation. It may be added that the scheme, in a point of detail, creates an apparently needless complication. The 3rd Corps, belonging to the right wing, is directed to cross the Moselle by the southernmost bridges and bivouac due south of Metz. The 6th Corps, again, part of the left wing, has the order to cross by the northernmost bridges, and bivouac south-east of Metz. One of two results is entailed by this dislocation of Bazaine's organisation : either a delay during the exchange of places by the twc corps named at or previous to the start ; or the necessity for their crossing each other's line of route in the march—either alternative occasioning much friction and loss of time. If the motive of the altered disposition was that the corps which had suffered least in the battle of the 16th should head the march southward on the morning of the 18th, it may be remarked that since the main argument for the possibility of that movement hinges on the absence of opposing forces in its front, and since the German pursuit which it is not unreasonable to anticipate would naturally fall on the rear and rear-flanks of the retreating French army, the proper position for the strongest and freshest corps of the latter would apparently have been elsewhere than in the front.

It may be suggested that the author of "The Operations of War," seems to beg the question when he wrote :

"That the 17th was a day on which the French were absolutely free to execute their designs without molestation, is shown by the fact that on the 18th the German 2nd Army advanced for hours in a wrong direction before discovering the French position."

The logic of the sentence appears weak, but this is comparatively immaterial when premiss and conclusion are alike in fact inaccurate. It may be acknowledged, indeed, that within certain limits, the Germans were exceptionally supine on the 17th. On that day, for reasons good, they were well content to be let alone. Therefore it was that they were not aggressive in reconnaissances ; and they frankly admit having lost touch of the enemy in front of the 2nd Army on the afternoon of the day in question. But it is an unwarrantable strain of words to speak of the French as "absolutely free to execute their designs without molestation." The morning was considerably advanced before the French troops began perceptibly to withdraw from their proximity to the Prussian outposts. "As soon," writes the French author,* "as the enemy

* Author of "Metz, Campagne et Negotiations."

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perceived that we were no longer in his front his reconnaissances grew bolder. They advanced to the plateau and approached Gravelotte by the ravines and the woods." These, sent out by the 9th Corps, ascertained that Metmann's (the covering) division was still about Gravelotte, and their attitude compelled that force to burn the great convoy of loaded vehicles massed behind Gravelotte. Before noon the advance of the 7th Corps was on the northern and eastern edges of the Bois de Vaux, close on the left flank of the French army engaged in taking up its new position; and throughout the whole day there was maintained a constant brisk skirmish between the Westphalians on the edges of the wood and Frossard's left about Point du Jour. All this was "molestation"; but the molestation was merely the means to an end—the ascertainment of the French dispositions and intentions. When at 2 p.m. Steinmetz reconnoitred from the plateau south of Gravelotte, "columns were seen marching along the high road in an easterly direction toward Point du Jour," viz., Metmann retiring on his supports; "and the heights east of Gravelotte, as well as the ridge running from Point du Jour by Moscou Farm to Leipsic, were evidently occupied in force," viz., by the 2nd and 3rd French Corps. Touch and observation of the French left were maintained without a break. Whatever might be the action of the other three corps, it was certain as regarded the two latter that they had neither retired into Metz, nor gave definite indication of a purpose to take up the retreat toward Verdun by the northern roads. From 9 a.m. of the 17th the Saxon Cavalry Division held the Conflans road throughout the day without finding any enemy on or near it. Thus in the evening of that day (17th) the Germans knew definitely two things: first, the actual stationary whereabouts of the French left wing; and secondly, that Bazaine had not utilised the day in pushing his retreat to Verdun by the Conflans road with any part of his Army. It follows from their knowledge of the former point that the Germans knew Bazaine could not be adopting the expedient suggested in "The Operations of War"; and it follows also from what has been stated, that the French, on the 17th, were neither "absolutely free to execute their designs," nor had entirely escaped incidental "molestation" at the hands of the Germans.

But assuming that on the early morning of the 17th, the French army could have folded its tents like the Arabs and as silently stolen away from before the Germans, bent on the prosecution of the project outlined by General Hamley, the configuration of the terrain and the positions of sundry German posts of observation were such that the movement could not have escaped detection. From the eastern edge of the Bois de Vaux there is a clear

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prospect down into the Moselle valley, and Steinmetz's foreposts must have seen the dust of the French columns as they descended on Metz. The German brigade holding the left bank of the Moselle northward of Ars and crowning the heights commanding the valley, could have swept with glass or eye the debouche of columns upon the flat by Moulins and Longeville and their march to and across the nearer bridges. The lancer-piquet on the summit of Mont St. Blaise looking down into Metz, commanded a view of the upper bridges, and would have detected any preparations being made in the bivouac positions about Le Sablon. Cavalry videttes and patrols watched Metz on the southward with lynx-eyed vigilance, from the Moselle to the Seille. The 1st Army Corps, standing on the south-east of Metz to cover the German communications, was unlikely to relax its vigilance under the command of Manteuffel, and its foreposts actually sent in the report that about 5.30 p.m. dust was seen rising from the main *chaussée* on the left bank, "apparently made by returning columns," but more probably by the *queue* of the trains returning to Metz on the news of the arrest of the retreat. A diversion made on the afternoon of the 17th by the 1st Corps in the nature of a two-hours cannonade of Metz with field guns from the south-east, coupled with a *canard* of portentous dimensions which reached him about the same time, would assuredly have given Bazaine abrupt pause if he had been acting on the lines defined in General Hamley's programme. Bazaine, during this demonstration, thus wrote to the Emperor: "It is reported that the King of Prussia, at the head of an army 100,000 strong, is now at Pange or Aubigny. I am induced to attach some credence to the report from the fact that as I write the Prussians are making a serious attack on Fort Queuleu." An army at the places named would have been square on the left flank of a French army sallying southward from Metz; and it may be taken for granted that neither Bazaine thus informed, nor General Hamley, had he been in the French commander's place, would have ventured on the reckless *Ausfall.*

Finally, if the assumption be accepted that the French army, having recrossed the Moselle without detection by the Germans, could have reached the bivouacs prescribed by General Hamley south and south-east of Metz, at from 8 to 10 p.m. of the 17th, the latest period, certainly, admitting of some rest before the hour of starting specified by that writer, let us study the prospect of its effecting that movement to the southward on the following morning which he regards with favour. A great host does not settle into new camps without much inevitable noise—and a French army so engaged is exceptionally noisy—nor in twilight and darkness

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without reddening the sky by the blaze of torches and camp-fires, which cannot escape quite significant recognition by a watchful and intelligent enemy. Over against and close up to the French bivouacs behind Fort Queuleu stood the alert foreposts of the German 1st Corps; from their left to the Moselle watched the troopers of the 3rd Cavalry Division. Behind the latter, on the night in question, were the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Corny, and Gneisenau's brigade of the 8th Corps at Arry. In the battle of Vionville–Mars-la-Tour, on the 16th, three French corps, less one brigade* and three cavalry divisions, during five hours hard fighting from 10 a.m. till 3 p.m., had not succeeded in holding their own against one German corps, plus a casual infantry demi-brigade and two cavalry divisions. But now the proportions of strength would be overwhelmingly favourable to Bazaine. The French army marching out on the morning of the 18th with five corps less one brigade, and three reserve cavalry divisions, would meet with opposition from but one German corps, one infantry brigade, and two cavalry divisions, assuming that this slender force could not receive timely reinforcements.

But were such reinforcements impossible? Many things, indeed, were against the possibility. The German armies were in position for beginning at daybreak a movement in a directly contrary direction. The supreme head-quarter was eighteen miles rearward, at Pont-à-Mousson. Prince Frederick Charles, chief of the 2nd Army, had his night-quarters in Buxieres, behind its left rear. Steinmetz, commanding the 1st Army, it is true, was at Ars; but he virtually controlled only the 7th Corps, since the 8th Corps was temporarily withdrawn from his command, and since Manteuffel had, in the nature of things, commanding discretion in regard to the 1st Corps. The conditions, therefore, were exceptionally adverse, and the time presumably available, extremely scant. Yet, with energy, decision, ready acceptance of responsibility, and thorough co-operation, the Germans, it is submitted, could have accomplished something as follows:

At 8 p.m. of the 17th, tidings from the foreposts reach Manteuffel in Laquenexy that French troops are rapidly assembling behind Fort Queuleu. He immediately sends out his Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel von der Burg, one of the most capable of Prussian staff-officers, to investigate the situation. Von der Burg rides the forepost line by Grigy, La Horgne, and St. Ladre, reaching Tournebride, on the Pont-à-Mousson road, at 10 p.m., after having,

* Division Laveaucoupet of 2nd Corps constituted garrison of Metz (not Division Metmann, as Sir E. Hamley states); but *per contra*, that corps had attached to it Brigade Lepasset, a waif from 5th Corps.

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during a ride from Laquenexy of one-hour-and-three-quarters, looked into the three great French bivouacs southward of Metz, and assured himself that they contained, at the least, a large proportion of Bazaine's army. From Tournebride he sends a succinct detail of his observations by a galloper with escort to the Royal Head-quarter at Pont-à-Mousson, and a duplicate to Steinmetz at Ars, only three miles away. He himself returns at speed to Laquenexy, arriving there before midnight. On his report, Manteuffel, holding the circumstances altered since receiving his previous orders, acts on his own discretion, alarms his corps, sends forward his artillery with orders to open promptly and maintain a heavy fire on the French camp behind Fort Queuleu, and moves up his infantry to cover the guns and flank the debouche of the French troops along the Strasburg road, should that movement be attempted.

The mass of the 7th Corps is close to Ars, no part of it more distant from the river road than two miles, and Ars is but three miles from the bridges at Corny. The 8th Corps is at Gorze, less than four miles from the bridges at Noveant, higher up stream than Corny. Both corps are fresh, after short marches on the 17th. Steinmetz gives orders for the 7th Corps to be ready at Ars to march at 2 a.m. of 18th, calculating that by that hour he may receive acting orders from Pont-à-Mousson; he sends von der Burg's report to von Goeben at Gorze, with the suggestion that he should be in similar readiness at the same hour, and further instructs him to forward the tidings to Prince Frederick Charles at Buxieres, as well as to the Commander of the 9th Corps, which is the nearest neighbour of the 8th, on the chance that both the Prince and the 9th Corps may be called upon to act at short notice.

Von der Burg's galloper, after a ride of fifteen miles, reaches Moltke in Pont-à-Mousson by midnight. After a short interview with the King, Moltke sends orders to the 2nd Corps, now in bivouac at Pont-à-Mousson, to start at 2 a.m., the 3rd division to recross at Pont-à-Mousson, march to the north-eastward about seven miles, and take up a position, with its right strongly pivoted on Longeville-le-Cheminot on the Seille, securing the bridges and throwing others, its left northward towards the Bois St. Arnould; the 4th division to move down the left bank of the Moselle to the bridges at Champey, cross there, and move into position on the left of the 3rd. Sends orders also to 8th Corps to start from Gorze at 2.30 a.m., cross the river at Noveant, and moving south-eastward deploy on left of 2nd Corps about Marieulles; to 7th Corps to quit Ars at the same hour, cross the river at Corny, cover the bridges there with its left, and extend its right towards Fey; to the 9th to follow the 8th with all speed. Sir Edward Hamley claims that

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marching at 4 a.m., the French army at 8 a.m. would have its front on the line Pommerieux-Pontoy. Starting at the respective hours named above, none of the three German corps in the first line of the suggested defensive position would have marched further than eight miles, and all the three could well have been in that position in advance of the hour named for the heads of the French corps attaining the line Pommerieux-Pontoy. Bazaine could not have brushed past such a force in such a position; he could not have done other than have formed front to his right flank with his three corps following the river and middle roads. His other two corps marching by the Strasburg road would have had enforced on them by Manteuffel a similar evolution. The four German corps already thus on the right bank might be trusted at least to "hold" and detain Bazaine's Army, pending the arrival of reinforcements from the 2nd Army, now assured of there being no strong hostile force on the left bank of the Moselle.

ARCHIBALD FORBES.

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BLOCKADES AND BLOCKADE-RUNNING, PAST AND FUTURE.

By Stephen Hardcastle Clarke.

Ominously few, it is to be feared, would be found ready to dispute the proposition that the world is within measurable distance of another great war; and none would be found to deny that the many improvements which have been made in warlike material during the last twenty years will assert themselves directly war itself breaks out, or that the nation which has realised best their meaning, and assimilated its resources to the using of, and contending with, these improvements, will hold an immense advantage at the outset, even if it does not win in the end. But if this argument, which is in fact based upon the importance of *matériel* as compared with *personnel*, can be applied to military establishments, with what pertinacity must it not be urged in naval affairs?

We are, however, at this moment concerned with one species of sea-warfare only, a species of sufficient importance in itself to the British Empire to deserve individual treatment, and one which has perhaps been allowed to escape the discussion it merits. The immense increase of sea-borne trade alone, coupled with the vital importance which the latter bears in regard to the position of the Great Powers individually, would justify at once the conclusion that blockades will be at least as numerous in future as in past wars. Granted a blockade the rest follows, *i.e.*, blockade-running and its accompaniments. This, be it observed, is the commercial aspect alone, and does not include the efforts of the blockaded party to maintain its line of communication by sea, or to pursue an active naval policy in spite of the blockade. In seeking for a definition of the term "blockade," or for information about blockades generally, enquiry cannot fairly concern itself with any period anterior to the sixteenth century, except for a purely historical purpose. Taking, as a second period, the years extending from the above date down to the Peace of 1815, we find that much useful

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information may be drawn therefrom, not certainly as regards the method of a blockade in the future, but rather the mutual position of parties necessary to permit of one. It opens during the outburst of maritime enterprise consequent on the discovery of the New World, an outburst which by the end of the seventeenth century has resolved itself into a contest between England, France, Holland, and Spain for maritime and colonial supremacy. After an intermittent struggle of a hundred years, England emerged victorious over the other three, having, by a series of stubborn wars, driven them into an inferior position. Yet the naval wars of the eighteenth century, albeit many in number and rich in incident, furnish the blockades least worthy of the name; and this, partially, because the policy on which they were framed was not to confine the enemy in his ports, but merely to keep a hold upon his movements, partially because the main circumstances which tend to produce blockades, beyond the control of the contending parties, were absent. Throughout the whole period the most remarkable feature is the power of recuperation shown by the defeated navies, owing to the comparatively slight *mutual* power of destruction then possessed by ships generally, and to the comparative ease with which the latter were built. Hawke's so-called blockade of the French Atlantic ports in 1756, may deserve to be considered a success as such, in that the French ships, although they left port, were quickly brought to action and defeated; but its looseness and utter lack of system make it hard to reconcile it with the stricter definition of the term. Similarly, Nelson's vigil outside Cadiz previous to Trafalgar has been termed a blockade, though his principal object was to tempt the enemy to come forth and give him battle. The watchword of British naval commanders then was "fight," not "blockade." In the Mediterranean alone, a sea naturally favourable to prolonged naval operations, the French ports were (after the battle of the Nile) practically sealed. Ample proof of this may be found in Napoleon's fruitless endeavours to send relief to Egypt by dint of offering large rewards to private enterprise. Yet even here the blockade presents more the appearance of an incident than the object of England's then naval policy against France. As Admiral Colomb has recently stated, the blockade was of French making, not British. Opportunities to leave port and gain an offing were not wanting; it was only the moral certainty of eventual capture or destruction which prevented the attempt. A blockade in the modern sense, *i.e.*, one implying ships with permanent stations outside a port, was apparently found impracticable, and

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except where the place under blockade was entirely isolated, as Malta, was never attempted. Even in instances like the latter, the blockading ships were always "under-way," and not unfrequently compelled by weather to put to sea. Doubtless, too, against blockades militated the power then possessed by fleets against fortifications, a power which provided a surer and more speedy method of reducing a stronghold than a blockade. Thus the wars of the eighteenth century have, in this respect, only a partial lesson to teach the modern enquirer. This lesson, so far as it goes, may be condensed into the statement that a condition of things naval which tends to produce great sea-fights and bombardments, which makes ships easy to build and not so easy to destroy, and which gives them sails alone as a means of propulsion, cannot produce strict blockades, but relegates them generally to a position of secondary importance.

From the Peace of 1815 to the American Civil War is a great leap in regard to change, if not to time. The old order of things had only lingered on for the first naval engagement of the war to demonstrate, with pitiless severity, the inferiority of one side to armour and steam. From the outset two cogent facts were manifest: one, the almost entire absence on the Confederate side of a navy, or the means of creating one; the other, the utter unpreparedness of the Federals for a naval campaign; a deficiency supplied, with characteristic energy, in a comparatively short time. Professor J. R. Soley, in his work, "The Blockade and the Cruisers," sums up thus:—

> As to the legal efficiency of the blockade after the first six months, there can be no question, and by the end of the second year its stringency was such that only specially adapted vessels could safely attempt to run it. If proof of its efficiency were needed, it could be found in the increased price of cotton, and in the scarcity of manufactured goods at the South. In the last year it became as nearly perfect as such an operation can be made. Taking its latest development as a type, it is probable that no blockade has ever been maintained more effectually by any state, and it is certain that no state ever had such a blockade to maintain.

This is no overstatement of the case. It is hardly possible to conceive a combination of circumstances which should make a blockade a greater necessity to the blockaders, or a more tempting opportunity for blockade-runners. The Confederates were utterly outnumbered from the first. After the action between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads, and the scuttling of the latter, all danger to the North from seaward was practically over. The existing naval supplies at Norfolk were soon exhausted, and the dockyard itself was captured before the war was half finished.

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Pensacola, the only naval depôt left, was utterly inadequate to fill the deficiency, so that, so far from the Federals being obliged to drive their antagonists off the sea before blockading them, the latter were, virtually speaking, never afloat.

And yet, in that half year or more, during which the North was hastily amassing a fleet, there sprang up a neutral trade with the Confederate ports, which no vigilance or stringency on the Federal side could entirely annihilate. A regular system of commerce had been established, large sums were invested therein, and speculators were emboldened by the magnificent profits accorded them. Those who wonder at the destruction of ships and cargoes to the value of thirty-one millions of dollars, must remember that with ordinary cargoes alone the prospect of profit averaged as much as 30,000 dols. each way, and when money could be made as quickly as this the risk of losing a ship or two did not deter merchants from attempting to pass the Northern cruisers.

Professor Soley speaks of steamers as the most successful blockade-runners. He describes the special type employed: "long and low, with twin screws or feathering paddles, of from 400 to 600 tons displacement, with telescopic funnels, turtle-backed, painted grey, and burning Welsh anthracite." This is without doubt a reliable representation of the steam blockade-runner, but it would be a mistake to think that steamers were the only paying vessels to use. Readers of Mr. William Watson's book, "The Adventures of a Blockade-runner," will note how much unostentatious blockade-running was done by small coasting schooners into Galveston and the inlets of the Texan and Floridan sea-boards.

This blockade is specially worthy of attention, owing to its position as the first, and at present the only extensive operation of the sort under steam. It is owing to this in particular, that the change in tactics from the preceding period is immense—a change which is partly a reversion to the blockade system of ancient days. The innermost vessels are moored in line at regular intervals, instead of cruising in loose order, and trust to the maintenance of that line through the heaviest weather for the adequacy of the blockade. The outer service of sea-going cruisers is not necessarily kept within signalling distance, but their commanders are permitted, within certain bounds, to use their discretion. On the whole the introduction of steam preponderated in favour of the blockaders, by rendering their movements independent of wind and current, and so enabling them to keep their place without regard to ordinary changes therein. A port, it was found, was no longer liable to be thrown open by a gale blowing on shore, or even if a blockading fleet were compelled by extraordinary stress of weather

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to put to sea, it was not carried two or three hundred miles away, as was Hawke for instance, from his station off Brest. As regards the influence of coast formation the general verdict to be gathered was that on a coast with uniform outline, and moderately deep approaches, a blockade can in time be made absolute, but that nearness of neutral ports or a coast with numerous inlets or shallow approaches make a perfect blockade absolutely impossible, if there is sufficient incentive to break it.

Besides affording reliable data bearing on the steam tactics of blockading, the number and description of vessels employed, and the influence of coast outline, the American blockade conveys two distinct warnings. One is that only a few months delay in instituting an efficient blockade are needed to create a blockade-running trade possessed of hydra-like vitality, and able to involve the blockading party in ruinous outlay before it is suppressed; the other (the lesson of the *Alabama*) that a few swift cruisers, once out of reach, are alone needed to do incalculable damage to commerce. But the general lesson it teaches, like that of the eighteenth century, is only partial. The American blockade was essentially commercial. Its direct aim was to paralyse the Confederates by cutting off their communication with the outside world, and though its existence was varied by occasional bombardments in co-operation with troops on shore, it remained, as a steady blockade, of paramount value to the Federal interest. As such then, it abounds in useful information, but as an example of purely naval tactics, it supplies practically nothing. The action of a navy, without a navy in opposition, is immeasurably simplified, and it would be unjustifiable to count upon a recurrence of a condition of things without parallel in history.

It may be safely surmised that the War of Secession had the indirect effect of bringing to an issue certain moot points in the international code affecting blockades, in so far that the rules then observed met with tacit approval from most other governments. When issued, the declaration of the North contained one clause, *i.e.*, the warning to neutral vessels found in the vicinity of a blockading port, which, if continued, would have given every blockade-runner two lives instead of one, and in effect have made the blockade twice as hard to maintain. This was soon dropped. Further, the attempts of blockade-runners to evade confiscation by clearing from an European for a neutral port such as Nassau or Havana, with the intention of proceeding thence without discharging, were condemned by a revival of the doctrine of continuous voyages. A second recourse to clearing for New York, and thence to a neutral port, and a third recourse to transhipment of goods, met with a

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similar fate. The increased stringency with which the blockade was enforced as time went on, certainly amounted to an infringement of the original articles, vessels being frequently seized and searched on very doubtful grounds. The blockade, informal perhaps, of the Rio Grande, the river dividing Mexico and the United States, was directly opposed to international law. Whether "informalities" such as these will be tolerated in the future remains to be seen. Their commission was plainly the result of the aggravation felt by the Federal Navy at the continued impunity of so many blockade-runners, and not of a wish to tamper with the rights or dignity of neutral powers, a sufficient reason in itself for the leniency which overlooked them.

The nine weeks' blockade of the Prussian coasts at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, though hopelessly eclipsed by the contest on land, furnishes one or two useful facts, chiefly as giving a clue to the influence which torpedo warfare may exercise in a future blockade. Too much reliance, however, must not be placed on experience, which does not include any actual test of torpedo defences. The shallow coast of Prussia, and the very imperfect charts thereof in the possession of the French, had probably as much to do with dissuading them from approaching land, as the contact torpedoes laid down; and though the spar torpedo flotilla was able to demonstrate its usefulness by compelling the French ships to put to sea every night, it had no opportunity of trying conclusions with them. Possibly the success which attended the daring of Cushing and his followers in the war just dwelt upon had already demonstrated the power of torpedoes to everyone's satisfaction. Yet a torpedo-scare at that date (1870) becomes somewhat remarkable, when the crudeness of the torpedo machinery then existing, as compared with its present development, is taken into consideration. The chief defect of the blockade, from the point of view of the seeker after useful information, is that, like the American one, it furnishes no clue to the force required to imprison an enemy's fleet in his ports; this barrenness of instructive incident resulted in varying degree from the extreme caution of the French, the inactive policy of defence adopted by the Germans, and the trifling duration of the blockade itself. There is, however, a strong general conclusion to be drawn from it as to the insurmountable difficulties presented by a shallow and shoal-begirt coast to an attacking fleet, and the corresponding advantages afforded thereby to the defending party; perhaps also the refusal of the British Government to regard coal supplied to French men-of-war as contraband of war has created a precedent.

Leaving it, as the latest practical instance of a blockade, it

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remains to be determined what changes have been wrought between then and now, which will come into play on one side or the other, in the event of a blockade in the near future. Be it observed, however, that we are concerned, for the present, with the commercial blockade alone. There are, at any rate, three improvements of overwhelming importance: the development of torpedo-warfare, and the introduction of the electric search-light and machine guns. The first may operate in favour of either side; the two latter will be entirely against blockade-runners. The Federals attempted to overcome the disadvantages of darkness by the use of calcium lights, but these were a failure owing to their fitfulness and uncertainty. Now, by the use of search-lights, singly or in combination, almost any extent of sea-front may be kept under close observation, while the hail of fire which can be poured in from quick-firing or machine guns cannot fail to have a very damaging effect upon the swiftest steamer attempting to run the gauntlet. The danger of torpedo attack at night will serve to keep a blockading fleet permanently in a more distant position than it would otherwise have taken up, but at the same time the latter will generally be able to lighten its labours by laying down torpedoes for the destruction of blockade-runners. Improved coal endurance will probably operate a good deal in favour of the blockading fleet; certainly the partial solution of the problem of coaling at sea will help to prevent the periodical weakening of its numbers.

But after all this, the question will be asked whether the next naval war is to be a war of blockades, or rather whether the conditions of modern naval warfare are likely to produce them. In the absence of any actual experience to guide to a conclusion, the reply to the question must necessarily be a qualified one, and as a commercial blockade cannot ordinarily be an initiatory step in any naval campaign, but only follows by nature upon the disappearance of the defeated fleet from the sea, we are confronted by the preliminary question of modern naval battles, the data for which are scantier still. As has been shown, however, the circumstances prevailing in the era of wooden ships did not tend either to this disappearance, or to the maintainance of strict blockades. The enemy might be signally defeated, but they were never irreparably disabled; in a short time they were able to reappear with a respectable fleet, and dispute the title to supremacy again. It was a change of policy, rather than of circumstances, which ended the naval wars of that time. This state of things does not prevail now. Not only do we note the absence, one and all, of the causes which then militated against blockades, but also that their

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extreme opposites are at work instead. There will not be an apparently inexhaustible supply of steel battleships, as there was of three-deckers a hundred years ago. Instead of the latter, which could receive seventy or eighty shots in their hulls, and ride out a gale the next day, there are the ten times more costly armourclads, not only possessed of the most tremendous *mutual* destructive power, but also liable to complete annihilation from a torpedo boat which they could carry on their davits: and the same character, that of costliness, limited supply, and great liability to destruction, belongs to every type of modern warship, though to the larger ones in particular. Opinions as to the result of a meeting of two modern naval fighting forces differ only in degree. Some naval critics consider it doubtful whether a great general engagement is possible under the conditions of these latter days; but, granted a battle, all agree as to the destructive result. One thing seems to be certain; that so far as pitched battles are concerned, the next naval war is to be one of months or weeks, and not of years. Thus the answer to the question so far must be one of two alternatives: (1) The weaker side will never leave port; (2) The side will win which has most in reserve. Both of these have the same bearing on the likelihood of a blockade. In the wars of Rodney and Nelson, the victorious fleet waited for the reassemblage of the enemy, and in case of his protracted absence, resolved itself into an expedition against his place of refuge; but when the defeated remnant of the modern fleet has withdrawn under the cover of fortifications, it is practically safe. The growing consensus of opinion that modern fortifications will easily prove themselves to be superior in power to modern ships is founded upon the plainest fact, and, as a general maxim, perforce will be obeyed. Nothing in short remains to the victorious navy, either for aggression or defence, but a blockade of the enemy's coasts.

To apply this conclusion to the present imbroglio of international friendships and jealousies is a hard and uncertain task, especially where the rivalry lies more on land than on sea. For this reason, indeed, it is, comparatively speaking, unprofitable to debate upon the result of a meeting of the naval strength of Russia and France with that of the Triple Alliance. Whatever tactics either side adopt, they can hardly have a determining effect on the fortunes of the war. Germany will once more lay up her mercantile marine, and rely in safety on her extensive system of torpedo defences. France may defeat an Austro-Italian fleet, and follow up her victory by raids on undefended places; the sympathy existing between Italy and England on behalf of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean would practically exclude Russia from the only sea where she could

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advantageously join forces with her ally. The military situation will overshadow all.

England alone remains unconsidered. The possibility of hostilities between her and any member of the Triple Alliance is too remote to be worth discussing in the presence of others far weightier and more imminent. In case of war with Russia, though a repetition of the latter's Crimean policy of inaction is unlikely, it is not too much to say that England could close Russia's outlet into the Pacific a month after the outbreak of hostilities, and oppose to her movements a force sufficient to prevent exit from the Black Sea or the Baltic with little or no delay at all.

But if the name of France be substituted for that of Russia, the conclusion is not so easy. There are, it is true, some naval critics, who are not English, and who have asserted that in case of a war with England France would find herself compelled to withdraw her Navy under the shadow of her sea fortresses, and adopt, from the outset, the tactics of the weaker side. This may be so, but it must not be taken for granted. Her proximity to England, and her high position as a naval power, are not likely to lead her to this. The probable action of her battleships must be taken independently. These may come forth to war or not. If they do, a brief and sharp conflict may be expected, resulting finally in favour of the strongest side, *i.e.*, ourselves. Admiral Colomb has recently stated his conviction that the moral certainty of defeat would now, as in time past, prevent France from breaking our blockade of her coasts. It is to be hoped that he is right; but it cannot be hoped that this will hold good when attempts against the commerce round our shores or our unfortified coast towns are in contemplation. Her swift commerce destroyers, if once they have succeeded in shaking off our cruisers, may do immense damage before they are caught. There is, in fact, no remedy for it but a close blockade of the entire French coast. If we could make this effective, its value as a commercial blockade alone would be incalculable, and would make itself felt from the beginning. Of its eventual result there can be no doubt whatever.

The system to be pursued in blockading the French coast for the purpose of paralysing her commerce is fairly obvious, as is also the force required for it, if an analogy may be drawn from the War of Secession. The blockading of her fleet will require special squadrons outside the different naval ports, each of sufficient strength to cope with the force within; battleships will be opposed to battleships. Admiral Colomb, judging from recent naval manœuvres, is of opinion that it will be an exceedingly hard thing

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for a large ship to run a blockade unobserved nowadays, while Colonel Maurice, an authority whose opinion is worthy of the gravest attention, holds that it is impossible to estimate the force required to keep a modern fleet in port. Who shall decide when doctors disagree? Perhaps, after all, the important thing is not that ships should not leave port, but that they should not do so *unobserved*; if so, our chief object should be to keep the necessary pursuing force in constant readiness, and this part of the blockade will become, as heretofore, a blockade of observation.

But to return to the commercial blockade. The entire force under steam available for the North in the War of Secession consisted of fifty-four vessels of 2500 tons and over, and 145 of various tonnage ranging below that figure, including forty-six double-ended paddle-boats largely employed for service in rivers and their estuaries. Twenty-seven vessels of the larger class were armoured ones used almost exclusively for purposes other than blockading, while of the remainder forty-six were cruisers proper, and not attached to the inshore flotilla. This leaves for the latter 126 (or in the proportion of three to one cruisers), including thirty-seven armoured ones. The extent of coast under surveillance may be taken roughly at 2300 miles, and on this there were five special points of blockade: Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and Galveston. The other places of importance on the Confederate sea-board were captured too early in the war to rank with these. France has a sea-board 1500 miles in extent, on which Brest, Cherbourg, L'Orient, Rochefort, and Toulon are her great naval depôts, besides points of close blockade such as Boulogne, Dunkirk, Havre, Marseilles, and the Loire and Gironde estuaries. Compared with the Texan or Floridan coast her outline is simple, and, on the whole, unfavourable to the "small vessel" system of blockade-running. But France possesses (what the Confederate States did not) a well-developed system of railway communication, and for this reason her minor ports will not be rendered unavailable owing to inaccessibility, as were Brownsville and similarly conditioned towns. The average distance from the numerous ports in Belgium, Spain, and Italy, likely to serve as blockade-running bases or entrepôts, would be less than 250 miles, while in the case of the Confederate ports the average run was from 600 to 800 miles. Thus, on comparison, it seems that while (for blockaders) the French has the advantage over the Confederate coast-line of being 800 miles shorter, and less indented with creeks and inlets, it presents important facilities to blockade-runners, which the former did not, and might even require closer

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observation. Taking from the former, however, the average required, the French blockade would want 115 vessels, of which twenty-eight would be cruisers of the outer line. With this as a moderate estimate of our necessities, it remains to make a reckoning of the resources available to meet it. It is obvious that in doing this, account must be taken only of the new type vessels, and not of the slow and comparatively obsolete ones, which, though they still serve a useful purpose in the Navy, would be easily eluded by swift blockade-runners, and as easily captured or destroyed by the enemy. Taking torpedo gunboats and look-out ships in one class for the inner line, and making the small deduction of eleven for service on other stations, forty remain. The number of second and third class cruisers is fifty-one, and of the first class armoured and protected classes, twenty-nine. Of the two first-named classes, some are constantly serving on foreign stations, while a considerable call would further be made upon them for reinforcement in various quarters of the globe in case of war. For the blockade, however, thirty may possibly be allowed. The first class cruisers are, with a few exceptions, already bespoken for duty, either in company with the fighting fleet, or in patrolling the trade routes, and cannot therefore be counted on in force, though out of their number three or four might be retained. The total result gives a deficit of forty, principally in the smaller types —a deficit which, in default of additions to the Navy, must be filled in some way by the mercantile marine. The fleet of thirty reserved merchant cruisers, which are intended to serve as cruisers or intelligence vessels, would be altogether unsuited in size and draught for inshore work, and would moreover be in frequent requisition for special service, or even transport duty. Among the 200 or so steamers on the Admiralty List, some might be found which would fulfil the four requirements, speed, light draught, handiness, and suitability for an armament, but it is more than unlikely that the best of them would make a squadron of blockaders, as reliable and as homogeneous as, for instance, the "Sharpshooter" class in the British Navy. In any case, their preparation would occupy a considerable time; and the fatal character of any delay in instituting an effective blockade has been already pointed out. Of their value in other departments there is not the least doubt. One effect of war must be to lay up the weak and incapable portion of the mercantile marine, and the better class of cargo carriers will therefore find their sphere of usefulness proportionately increased.

Were England drawn into war with a Russo-French alliance, an eventuality which not a few prophets are inclined to contemplate,

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our shortcomings would be somewhat magnified. Russia, however, is very differently placed to France, so far as these islands are concerned. The additional drain would be more upon our armourclads than the unprotected types, and in the matter of these there is good reason to hope that we should find ourselves adequately provided. Looking, too, at the inevitable connection between a Russo-French alliance and Russian aspirations towards a position in the Mediterranean, we may confidently expect that against these two we shall not stand alone.

It seems then that on a very moderate estimate, and with due allowance for the latent strength contained in our mercantile marine, and the additions from time to time to the Navy, a grave deficiency remains in the smaller class of vessels. It is not a case where the wants of the Navy can be first felt and then supplied; they must be provided for beforehand, or the scheme will suffer incalculably. The very uncertainty which overhangs the utility and durability of a modern fighting fleet should impel us to make sure of the one certain means we possess of dealing with our possible enemy. In the case of an Anglo-French war the paralysis of French sea-borne trade must become an even greater necessity to England than the closing of the Confederate ports was to the Federals, who were winning on land as well. In short, a blockade is, after a pitched naval battle, the first and last means of both attack and defence which Great Britain possesses against France: of attack, because our small military establishment would not permit us to embark on an expedition against her territories; of defence, because her vast Army must be kept within her boundaries, and because raids with armed cruisers upon our ports and our commerce will be her most potent means of assailing the British Empire.

STEPHEN H. CLARKE.

NOTE.—The publication of the above, though written some time ago, coincides very nearly with the appearance of M. Lockroy's article in the *Eclair* on the relations of France and England. It is worth while calling attention to the conclusion to which M. Lockroy is drawn, when discussing the means of aggression against England open to France: *i.e.*, that England's one vulnerable point is her commerce, and swift cruisers are wanted to deal with it.

S. H. C.

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LIFE ASSURANCE FOR MILITARY AND NAVAL OFFICERS.

By W. G. Kirby.

THE general advantages of life assurance are now so universally admitted that it is quite unnecessary to preach a homily in its favour. The many-sided value of a life policy has long been recognised and taken advantage of by commercial men and members of the civil professions. Every argument that could be brought to bear in favour of civilians insuring their lives applies with double strength to the case of officers of Her Majesty's Army and Navy. The ordinary citizen engaged in professional or commercial pursuits may, speaking generally, count with some degree of certainty upon his span of life not being shortened by any of the thousand and one dangers which ever beset those who have embarked upon a military or naval career.

Up to quite a recent date, however, officers of the sister forces, no matter how much they were willing to avail themselves of the advantages of life assurance, were largely debarred therefrom by reason of a clause in all ordinary policies limiting the insured to residence within certain degrees of latitude and excepting the risk of war. Undoubtedly permission to take part in active operations was generally granted by the life offices when the occasion arose, but only on the payment of additional rates which were almost prohibitive. Thus at a time when a life policy was most needed, that is to say when the assured was undertaking an enhanced risk, the protection of life assurance was practically denied, and the policy-holder was placed in the awkward position of paying unduly enhanced premiums which he could perhaps ill afford, or sacrificing altogether the fruits of his previous investments by being forced to throw up his policy. It must be remembered that a life policy is nothing more nor less than an investment, whether for future personal advantage or solely for the benefit of others, depending upon whether an endowment or a whole-life policy is taken out.

General Henry Brackenbury gives a very good illustration of this state of affairs in an article which he wrote for the UNITED

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SERVICE MAGAZINE in the early part of 1892. To quote his own words:—

"On the outbreak of the Ashanti War my life was insured in the ——— Office for £1500. I was called upon by that office to pay £21 down for every £100 insured if I wished to keep the policies in force. It was not convenient to me to pay £315 at the very moment when I wanted ready money for outfit, for payment of bills for which at such a moment one's creditors are sure to ask, and for the maintenance of my household during my absence.

"I, therefore, decided to surrender policies for £1000 and kept on foot one for £500 only, for the maintenance of which I had to pay £105 in hard cash. Even higher war premiums were in some cases asked, Sir Garnet Wolseley having to pay £25 for every £100 insured. His life was insured in a first-rate office, and I have not the slightest doubt that the directors considered the risk so great that they were only doing a duty to their shareholders and policy-holders in asking this enormous war-premium. But the fact remains that such extra premiums are prohibitory to poor men; and that, under the conditions of all ordinary policies, officers are liable to have forced upon them this desperate choice: 'Which will you give up—your profession, or the provision you have been making for your family?'"

In the face of restrictions such as these it is no wonder that officers of the sister services were very chary at taking out policies on their lives whilst liable to active service. A few years ago some of the leading life offices began to consider whether it would not be possible to compile premium rates which would cover all risks and enable an officer in Her Majesty's service, once he had taken out a life policy, to rest assured that whether on garrison duty at home or abroad or engaged in active service his original premium payments would never be added to.

Amongst the life assurance offices which now offer inclusive premium rates to officers of Her Majesty's Army and Navy is the Gresham, and it is from a report compiled jointly by Mr. A. H. Smee, chief medical adviser to the Board of that office, and Mr. T. G. Ackland, the actuary and manager, that the subjoined is chiefly drawn. At the time General Henry Brackenbury wrote the article already referred to he stated that though "whole world and war" policies, under which the insured may go to any part of the world and engage in any war, paying for this privilege a fixed yearly addition to the ordinary premium, had then been adopted by some offices, so far as he had been able to ascertain the amount of extra premium demanded by insurance offices for war risks was not based upon any statistics. Whether this is true in every case I

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cannot say, but at any rate it rather adds to the interest attaching to Messrs. Smee and Ackland's researches, and their methods of arriving at some definite conclusions upon which scales of premium rates could be compiled of a character which, while offering a maximum of advantage to assurants, would be within the margin of safety so far as the office was concerned. In assessing the risks to be provided against in the case of professional naval and military lives consideration had to be given to the following distinct elements :—

1. The risk of death at home stations, or the *normal mortality.*

2. The risk of death at foreign stations in time of peace, or the *climate risk.*

3. The risk of death in *active military service* in the constantly recurring "*small wars.*"

4. The risk of death in *active military operations* in "*national wars.*"

5. The liability in time of peace to *foreign service.*

6. The liability to *active service* in the field in "*small wars.*"

7. The liability to *active service* in the field in "*national wars.*"

In connection with the first proposition it was found that the average annual rate of home mortality was about 5 per 1000 for commissioned officers, and between 7 and 8 per 1000 for non-commissioned officers and men. These figures indicate a light rate of mortality as compared with the general male population of the United Kingdom, in which the annual rate of mortality between ages twenty and fifty averages 12 per 1000. The mortality of assured lives, as shown in the Healthy Male Table of the Institute of Actuaries' Experience, gives an average annual rate between ages twenty and fifty of about 10 per 1000. The "Select" Healthy Male Table (assured lives during the first year of assurance) gives an average annual rate between ages twenty and fifty of somewhat over 5 per 1000. It will be seen that this latter rate accords closely with the experience of commissioned officers in the British Army, and does not differ materially from that of the Army generally. This agreement between the rate of mortality in assured lives during the first year of assurance, and the mortality of the Army at home, is due to the fact that the careful selection as to physical fitness of the soldier in great measure finds a parallel in the medical selection of lives proposed for assurance. Though the mortality of the Army at home is in early manhood considerably more favourable than that of the general population, or even than that of assured lives, as age progresses the difference diminishes until ultimately the mortality of the soldier is less favourable than that of assured lives or even of the population generally. Without

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giving the tables of death-rates, which, for the purposes of this article would take up too much space, in general terms it may be stated that the mortality of the soldier exceeds that of the entire population from about age thirty-five; exceeds that of assured lives from about age thirty; and exceeds that of select assured lives (first year of assurance) from about age twenty-five. The heavy mortality of ages above thirty-five arises, no doubt, in great measure from a considerable proportion of soldiers of advancing years being included in the experience, which is also swelled by the heavy death-rate in regimental depôts and the departmental corps. Taking, however, the mortality of the Army at home as a whole, there would seem to be no doubt that it may be safely assumed that the death-rate does not exceed that of assured lives, and that the Healthy Male Table of the Institute of Actuaries may be considered as a fair representation of the risk in this respect.

The next point to be dealt with was that of climate risk. In this connection calculations were made of the average mortality per 1000 among the troops at foreign stations during the ten years 1876-85, and also during the two years 1886 and 1887. It transpired that the average mortality in time of peace at foreign stations was $16\frac{1}{5}$ per 1000 during the year 1886 (including 408 deaths from disease and climate in Egypt) and 13 per 1000 during the year 1887. The average rate of mortality over the ten years 1877-86 approximated to $15\frac{1}{5}$ per 1000 (excluding the experience in Egypt during the four years of military occupation, 1883-86, and in South Africa during the campaign of 1879-81). The mortality among commissioned officers in the three Indian Presidencies during each of the six years 1882-87, over which period there were no active military operations of any magnitude in India, averaged 19 per 1000 in Bengal, 11 per 1000 in Madras, and 12 per 1000 in Bombay, or 14 per 1000 over the three Indian Presidencies. Regarding the mortality among the officers and men in the British Navy, it was found that the deaths from disease showed an average yearly rate of $5\frac{1}{2}$ per 1000, and from violence of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per 1000, giving a total average annual mortality of 9 per 1000. It was considered, from the indications given by the above statistics as to the rate of mortality in the Army and Navy abroad in time of peace, that this risk might fairly be represented by an average annual rate of 15 per 1000. As the home or normal risk may be taken upon the average at $7\frac{1}{2}$ per 1000, the climate risk in time of peace represents, upon these assumptions, an addition of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per 1000 to the normal home rate.

The war risk was the next thing to be considered, and here, as might be expected, more difficulty was experienced. The subject,

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as already shown, was divided into two heads, "Small Wars" and "National Wars." In regard to small wars, the whole of the military operations in which the British Army has been engaged during the fifteen years 1872-86 inclusive were taken. It appears that the British Army was engaged in "small wars" during twelve out of the fifteen years, the total number taking part being 92,650 and the deaths in action 1398. The death-rate varied from 64 per 1000 (South Africa, 1879) to 1 in 10,000 (Egypt, 1885), and averaged over the whole almost precisely 15 per 1000. This rate for the mortality of the British Army in small wars was adopted.

Coming to the question of mortality in a "national war" in which this country might be engaged, there is but little available data to go upon, and the assumptions become more and more purely matters of judgment. For the purpose of the present calculations, however, it was assumed that 20 per cent. of the British Army called out on active service in a national war would die from wounds in battle or from hardships of the campaign. This is equivalent to a campaign of about two and a-half years' duration on the basis of the mortality obtaining in the Franco-German war (5 per cent. of the force engaged during seven months), or to a campaign of about three years' duration on the basis of the mortality obtaining during the American Civil War (7 per cent. per annum of the force engaged).

In regard to the liability in time of peace to foreign service, the fifth point considered, it appears that the average strength of the Army abroad closely approximates to one-half of the total Army strength, this proportion applying equally to officers and non-commissioned officers and men.

Sixth in order comes the risk of liability to active service abroad in small wars. During 1872-86 the proportion of the troops stationed abroad who were annually engaged in active military operations varied from 2 to 22 per cent. On the average somewhat more than 6 per cent. of the total strength abroad was annually engaged in small wars. This ratio of 6 per cent. was accordingly adopted as the basis for the assessment of the risk of active service abroad in small wars.

The final, and perhaps the most indefinite, element was the estimate of the liability to active service in a national war. The conditions of national warfare have so materially varied of recent years, with the increased precision and efficiency of offensive weapons, both on sea and land, that it is probable that considerations of the available data in respect of past campaigns would be practically of little or no value in forming an estimate as to the extent, duration, and mortality of future national wars. It is,

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however, to be remarked that while the efficiency of warlike methods and weapons has wonderfully developed of late years, the mortality from disease and climate risks has very materially diminished. In order to arrive at some definite conclusions it was decided to assume that the British Army and Navy would be engaged once in forty years in a national war involving the calling out on active military service for a term not exceeding three years of two-thirds of the whole force of officers and men in both branches of the service.

The result of the estimate of the additional risks from a life insurance point of view with which the career of a British naval or military officer is surrounded may be summarised as follows:—

1. That the home or normal mortality of the officers and men of the British Army and Navy may be taken on the basis of the Healthy Male Table of the Institute of Actuaries.

2. That the mortality of the Army and Navy on foreign service in time of peace may be considered to be equal, on the average, to an additional death-rate of $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. per annum.

3. That the annual mortality from "small wars" may be estimated at $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total force engaged on active service.

4. That the mortality from "national wars" may be estimated at 20 per cent. of the total force engaged in the campaign.

5. That it may be estimated that one-half of the British Army will be engaged on foreign service at any particular time.

6. That 6 per cent. of the force on foreign service will, on the average, be engaged annually in small wars.

7. That it may be assumed that the British Army and Navy will be engaged once in forty years in a national war involving the service of two-thirds of the whole force for a term not exceeding three years.

Combining these probabilities and summing their values, we get an annual addition to the normal intensity of mortality arising from military and naval risks of war and climate, amounting to about $7\frac{1}{2}$ per 1000, of which one-half, or $3\frac{3}{4}$ per 1000, represents the addition in respect of foreign service in time of peace, or climate risks, and one-half, or $3\frac{3}{4}$ per 1000, the addition in respect of active military operations, or war risk. To reproduce the mathematical calculations by which these conclusions are arrived at is unnecessary. Suffice it to say that in these calculations it was assumed that an officer in the British Army or Navy might, upon the average, be expected to retire from active service between fifty and fifty-five years of age, when the special risks incidental to his profession were considered as no longer operative.

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Upon these bases a set of premium rates were computed and adopted by the Board of the Gresham, calculated to meet all requirements in the way of life assurance for military and naval officers. Instead of, as in years gone by, an officer who was ordered on active service having to pay heavy extra premiums in order to keep his policy in force, only a comparatively small addition per cent. is made to his annual premium. Thus in the case of a "whole world and war policy," which covers all risks in respect of climate and warfare, an officer, aged say thirty, would only pay annually for every hundred pounds of assurance 8s. 8d. more than a civilian; whilst an officer aged forty-five could cover the same risks for an additional annual payment of 3s. 9d. per cent. only.

A correspondingly small increase is charged in the case of other forms of policies, such for instance as endowment assurances, under which the amount insured is paid either on the death of the policy-holder, or on his attaining a certain age —ranging from fifty to sixty-five. The difference between an arrangement such as this, and the heavy war premiums which General Brackenbury was called upon to pay is remarkable. Military and naval officers who wish to insure provision for their families have every reason to be thankful that the days of fixing war and climate risks by rule of thumb, or no rule at all, are passed, and that careful investigations and actuarial calculations, based on the immutable law of averages, have placed life assurance within the easy reach of gentlemen who follow the profession of arms whether on land or at sea.

W. G. KIRBY.

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NAVAL AND MILITARY CRITICS ON AUSTRALIAN DEFENCES.

By Major-General Tulloch, C.B., C.M.G.
(Commanding Local Forces, Victoria).

Australia now occupies no small amount of space in the home papers, and much strong language is used with reference to its present financial condition, more particularly by those who have lost money by colonial investments. Naturally the criticisms are severe, and unfortunately in some instances only too just. As usual in similar cases, not only have the newspaper critics passed judgment on bank and company directors, but some have gone a good deal further and pointed out how people living in Australia should manage their own affairs, in a way that would lead one to suppose that there is no common sense beyond the English Channel. Many of these criticisms are evidently written by people who really know little or nothing about the colonies; occasionally some admirable articles do appear, such as those written by the special correspondent of the *Times*, but these are the exceptions.

The magazines also join in the general chorus of advice, and even naval and military writers think Australia not unworthy of attention. In one military journal we are told that Australia ought to copy the Canadians and turn the present force into a militia on the Canadian system. Evidently the writer, who has probably never been in any of the self-governing colonies, and doubtless knows as much about Canada as he does about Australia, must think this country in a very bad way indeed when he considers the Canadian system, so trenchantly reported on by its own commandant, is better than that existing here. There are other writers also, globe-trotting visitors, whose acquaintance with a large colony may be that of a few weeks or even days, but that does not prevent such critics, civil as well as naval and military, from laying down the law as to what a colony should or should not do in matters about which specially selected officers have already given most careful consideration and furnished the authorities at home and the colonies with the most detailed reports, all of which have been attended to and are carried out as funds admit.

From a perusal of the many criticisms on Australian Defence the public might well assume that there is no one in command of

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the forces of the different colonies, and that each colony is blundering along in the way indicated by the writers in the English magazines. Mistakes doubtless were made when the colonies first started their own defence, but those made some years ago have been rectified or very nearly so. Can the same be said with rather more than mistakes nearer home?

To those who really know the present actual military value of the different colonial forces of the Empire, such reading is simply amusing, and doubtless by this time, anyone interested in Colonial Defence, will have taken all such statements as those referred to *quantum valeant.* Very different, however, is it with articles appearing in such a publication as Lord Brassey's "Naval Annual" —the names of the contributors to that book give it almost official weight.

The article referred to is that on "Colonial Defence and Commerce Protection," and contains a number of statements about Australian towns and defences and Imperial indifference, which are anything but correct. Under the heading "Present State of Colonial Defence" it is stated that, "Unfortunately, when there has been a disposition on the part of the colonies to assist in the work of defence, no word of advice or encouragement has come from the Mother Country. Instead of the Imperial Government initiating joint action in the matter, each colony was left to its own devices. Hence we find some ports bristling with guns on shore, while others are left without any such defence. In one locality small torpedo-boats are obtained incapable of action, except in the finest weather; in another colony gunboats are favoured which, owing to lack of speed and other qualities, would be equally ineffective against an enterprising enemy who had evaded our fleet. Then great store is set in certain quarters on submarine mines; and elaborate systems have been devised which will infallibly break down under the stern test of war.

"I do not wish to be considered as one opposed to all forms of submarine defence. There are many places in which this weapon can be applied with excellent results, but they depend on local conditions which do not exist everywhere. Mines should not be relied upon to any great extent. Combined with forts they may avert an attack in front, but cannot guard the flanks and rear of a coast town. They did not delay by one hour the fall of Valparaiso when the forces opposed to Balmaceda, having command of the sea, landed a few miles north of the town. There appears to have been no one to bring such points home to the minds of our colonies when they proceeded to invest their limited resources in local defences. The Imperial Government must share the blame.

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We thought the gift of an obsolete cruiser cancelled further obligations and relieved us of future responsibility."

A more unjust statement against the Mother Country could hardly be made. Sir George Verdon went home as a colonial delegate from Victoria in 1866, when he received not only advice and the greatest assistance from Sir John Packington, the Admiralty, and War Office, but also obtained for the colony a perfectly new ironclad turret ship which cost the Imperial Government £100,000, and in addition obtained for the colony a present of a steam line-of-battle ship for training purposes. In the following year the commodore of the station, an R.A. and an R.E. officer, formed a local committee to advise on the defences. Subsequently Colonial Defence was taken in hand by the Fortification Committee of the War Office, of which two specially selected naval officers were members, and finally one of the most able Engineer officers we have ever possessed, General Sir William Drummond Jervois, was sent out as adviser to all the Australian Colonies.

Lord Carnarvon's Commission, of which Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn Simmons and Admiral Sir Alexander Milne were members, in 1882 reported, "that no more time should be lost in completing the land defences of Australian ports, as recommended by Colonel Jervois."

Commodore Wilson, in 1881, gave the New South Wales Government a most carefully considered report on the defences of that colony. In 1884 the late Admiral Tryon, who took the keenest interest in the Australian Defences, made, at the request of the Colonial Governments, several most valuable reports. Sir Andrew Clarke, when head of the Fortification Department of the War Office, also gave the question his careful attention, and such well known officers as General Sir Peter Scratchley, R.E., Colonel Crossman, R.E., and Captain Thomas, R.N., have all been advisers on Colonial Defence matters.

In 1887 there was a special meeting in London of delegates from the colonies, who conferred with the War Office and Admiralty officials on Colonial Defence, and finally, in 1887, the Colonial Defence Committee, composed of specially selected officers from the War Office and Admiralty, was constituted, and to this committee everything connected with Colonial Defence has been regularly submitted by the colonies who placed themselves under its guidance. In 1888 General Sir Bevan Edwards made a report to the War Office on the state of Colonial Defence, and in 1890 a meeting of the different commandants was held in Melbourne, when arrangements were made for organising the *personnel* of the Defence Forces as far as possible on one system.

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As regards ports bristling with guns, a perusal of the different naval reports shows that it was on the direct advice of the admiral of the station that "the most powerful guns that we have" were mounted in the more important works. No ports worth the name are now unprotected.

With reference to torpedo boats, New Zealand has four second class, Tasmania one, and Sydney two. The New Zealand boats may be rather out of date, but the others are good enough for the purpose intended, viz., harbour defence. The Victorian torpedo boat flotilla is a powerful one; the officers of the Imperial Navy who command it are certainly not under the impression that "they are incapable of action except in the finest weather." It may be mentioned that the last torpedo boat, 130 tons, was fitted with small fore and aft sails, and came out by herself round the Cape, the voyage lasting five months.

As regards gun-boats, Commodore Wilson, in his report, says:—"I strongly advocate the employment of gun-boats carrying guns of moderate calibre, say 10in. Gun-boats of the *Staunch* class, and armed like that vessel, are most suitable." "The gun-boats ordered by the colonies are with their heavy B.L. guns formidable vessels, and quite fit for the purpose for which they were built, viz., local defence," *vide list in Lord Brassey's Annual.*

With reference to submarine mines, there are only two ports where submarine mining is arranged for to any great extent, viz., Sydney and Melbourne. The submarine mining defence of the former port is an easy matter, and under the direction of an Imperial engineer officer is now quite effective. At Melbourne a considerable amount of ship channel has to be guarded, but the whole system there is one of the most perfect that can be seen in any part of the world. Imperial naval officers and submarine mining experts who have reported on it state, that such a perfect system and readiness for instant work does not exist anywhere outside the United Kingdom.

If such a system will "infallibly break down under the stern test of war," then the large sums expended by the Imperial and Continental Governments in submarine mining are a simple waste of money, and the sooner the submarine mining establishments at Chatham and everywhere else are abolished the better. Apparently one objection to submarine mines is that "they cannot guard the flanks and rear of a coast town"; certainly if they could perform work which is usually assigned to infantry and field artillery, they would be most wonderful weapons.

Further on in the same page, under the heading of "Australian Squadron," exception is taken to the arrangement for providing an

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auxiliary squadron, to be paid for by the Australian colonies. Surely it cannot be known that the scheme was prepared and submitted by one of the most able English admirals of our day—the late Sir George Tryon—and concurred in by the Admiralty and the different Governments concerned, for the opinion of our critic is that an arrangement completed and carried out by the highest authority in such matters "cannot be considered satisfactory for either side." Fears are entertained that some colonies may not pay up, and that each colony will want its share of the squadron at its principal port in war time. Why there should be fear of Australian colonies repudiating a public debt is not stated, and as regards the stations for the ships, the only restrictions on the squadron are that it must not be taken out of Australian waters without the consent of all the colonies. Now, considering that the Australian waters—that is, the Australian naval station—as laid down in the agreement, extends from the Philippine Islands in the North (excluding Java, Sumatra, and Borneo) to the South Pole, and from 1000 miles West to 3000 East of Australia, there is no fear that the restriction referred to can really in any way tie the admiral's hands.

Curiously enough, further on, our critic himself proposes stations for the ships, viz.: Two cruisers and two large torpedo boats at King George's Sound, two cruisers and two torpedo boats at Port Darwin, a small ironclad and a small flotilla of torpedo boats to protect Adelaide (six miles inland) from bombardment, and a naval force to guard the approaches to Melbourne, Sydney, and Tasmania; as regards New Zealand, "an adequate force of cruisers would necessarily be detailed to protect the commerce approaching and leaving its shores." When the number of ships required to carry out our critic's proposition is added up, it will be found that the auxiliary squadron will not nearly furnish the ships which he proposes should have fixed stations and cruising grounds, the very arrangement which he fears might hamper the admiral in command. The agreement already referred to gives the admiral full power to take the auxiliary squadron to any place within an enormous area, and if, in chasing an enemy, one of our commanders approached the border line, does anyone suppose for one instant the limit of the command would prevent him from following the enemy in sight till he brought him to action?

The next subject in the article "Imperial or Britannic Federation with reference to defence," is a big question; but as far as Australia is concerned not much more can be done till the colonies have themselves joined in Federal Government; when that is accomplished it is calculated that one million annually would fully

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cover the cost of all requisite military and naval expenditure, New Zealand and the auxiliary squadron included. Every one who has studied the subject must be aware that if any further protection is necessary it should be in an increase of naval strength by an addition to the auxiliary squadron paid for by the colonies. This is not unreasonable when it is remembered that the Imperial Government spends about one-third of its income in defence, but the Australian colonies only about one-thirtieth.

In the paragraph headed "Australian Federation for Defence" a strange statement is made:—"Nothing appears more ridiculous now than the way in which the several colonies in Australia all worked on different lines when they decided to guard against some spectre attack, the direction and force of which they were unable to define. Misled by military experts who should have been the last persons called in where it is a question of estimating attack by sea, they wasted their substance in providing elaborate batteries with guns of all natures; while I remember a few years ago being called on to inspect some torpedo boats for colonial defence which were armed with a weapon we had long discarded."

As regards the statements about military experts being the last persons who should have been called in, when it is a question of estimating an attack by sea, surely it would be just as correct to say that naval officers can know nothing of the resisting and punishing power of a battery, and that they should get military experts to direct them where to place their ships when attacking shore defences. However, it has already been shown that the works referred to were arranged by the military experts working in conjunction with the best officers in the English Navy, both examining the positions together; such men must certainly have been the best judges of what was necessary.

In looking over the correspondence and reports of the naval and military authorities engaged, the curious discovery is made that with reference to certain suggestions for the defence of Melbourne, the Inspector-General of Fortifications proposes two ships of the *Archer* class, but the admiral commanding the Australian station proves that a fort would not only be far more economical, but also much more effective in the special case referred to.

With regard to torpedo boats being armed with obsolete weapons, that must have been several years ago when probably some temporary expedient was adopted from inability to obtain the proper article. Strange as it may seem, the colonies as a rule are usually in advance of what is being done at home in the matter of armaments. The torpedo dropping gear now used by

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the English Navy is the invention of one of the torpedo men in Victoria who received a reward of £500 from the English Government. The field batteries of Victoria were armed with the new type B.L. guns as soon as the pattern was sealed by the Imperial Government and before they were issued to a single battery at home. The forts of the colonies were supplied with hydro-pneumatic mountings as soon as they were approved of by the War Office and before Imperial forts were supplied with them, and now a very simple but very effective gun lock, invented by the Victorian Inspector of Ordnance Machinery, has met with the approval of the Ordnance Committee, and by this time is a sealed pattern for the English Service. The inventor of the Brennan torpedo is also a Victorian. Instead of being behindhand the Australian colonies are like the go ahead energetic American, too apt to wish to be always in the front rank of invention and improvements; as a check on such, everything connected with armament is referred to the Ordnance Committee of the War Office or the Admiralty, and their advice rigidly adhered to.

Under the heading "Nature of Attack to be expected and Military Expeditions," the article is as follows:—"In dealing with colonial defence it is first necessary to consider and settle what are the probabilities of attack and its nature. We start with the assumption that Great Britain obtains—if it is not conceded—command of the sea. What do we mean by this term? It is often used to imply much more than it is really capable of effecting; such, for instance, as the complete protection of commerce, and the immunity of isolated points from raids. But we may claim that command of the sea does exclude extensive military expeditions across the water, and attacks on distant territory with a view to occupation. A superior fleet is a more complete check on such operations now than ever it was. If, therefore, any suspicion arises as to our liability to sustain an attack of this nature, the safest plan is to augment the fleet rather than to adopt elaborate measures for dealing with such a point on arrival."

With the above every one will agree, and we may even go farther and say that what is known as "command of the sea" precludes absolutely extensive military expeditions across the water and attacks on distant territory with a view to occupation; but with the increased steam power and coal-carrying capacity of ocean liners getting bigger every day, it is not now safe to say the base from which a small expedition starts must be only a few thousand miles from its objective. Doubtless an enemy would do his utmost to attack our commerce in the manner indicated in the

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article, but it might also be worth his while to chance a small expedition of five or six large fast steamers carrying troops, and convoyed by a small squadron, not with a view to occupation of territory, which would be simply a useless waste of men, but for the purpose of raiding expeditions to destroy or cripple some important port or for the purpose of creating a diversion, and making us withdraw our ships from some other part of the ocean. With coal mines and coal ports in so many places in the East, and coal in bunkers afloat everywhere, the difficulty as regards replenishing fuel would not be so insurmountable as is generally supposed.

Further on the article takes a survey of British interests in all parts of the world, pointing out that "the welfare of the colonies depends very largely upon preserving intact the goods they are receiving and sending across the sea by well-known routes. In the case of Australia there are three most important ports, viz., King George's Sound, Sydney, and Port Darwin. Their importance consists in the volume of ocean trade which converges towards them and the excellence of the harbours they possess."

Sydney, as everyone knows, is a great port usually full of shipping. King George's Sound, although a strategic position of great importance, is merely a port of call for mail steamers; and Port Darwin is a port in name only, and really quite away from the trade route. Commencing with the first-named, Sydney, the following statement is made:—"A single battery armed with medium sized guns at the extremity of Inner South Head or on Bradley Point would suffice to keep out any hostile vessel which had evaded our cruisers. The torpedo boats would give complete security at night. To this extent I would concede local defence at this port."

Such is the opinion of our critic writing his article in London, but here is the opinion of the flag captain of the Australian squadron given before a Royal Commission in Sydney last year:—

Question. Supposing there were no mines laid, would it be possible to run three or four ships straight in and get under the forts?

Answer. Yes. I think you could run the channel very easily without lights or anything else, and at a high rate of speed. I would do it with the *Orlando*, but a hostile vessel would be acted on by want of knowledge as to whether these were mines laid or not, and being hostile he would have to think twice before he attempted it; but on the supposition that there were no mines there is nothing to prevent you coming up at any time you like.

Q. You would do it yourself?

A. Yes, I would undertake to come through at ten or twelve knots, and not get much damaged.

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Q. That is from your intimate knowledge of the harbour?

A. Not at all, or at least, not entirely; there are charts of the harbour, and it is as well-known as any other large port.

Q. At twelve knots you would not mind coming in at night?

A. No, and make a rushing attack.

The second senior naval officer of the station in charge of the naval establishments stated before the same Commission.

Q. Could any vessel run past the batteries we have here?

A. I think it might be done, but it would be very risky work for whoever tried it, and I think they would have a very rough time of it.

Q. But what about getting out again?

A. Yes, that has to be considered, but still, they could do a good deal of damage when they were in.

Q. Would you run a vessel in under cover of the night?

A. Yes.

Q. Without any previous knowledge?

A. Yes.

Q. Going only by the charts?

A. Yes, the charts are quite sufficient.

It is instructive to notice how the presence or absence of submarine mines, so much despised by our critic, is taken into consideration by the responsible naval officers when giving their views concerning the defence of a port which is the naval base of the Australian Squadron.

The batteries at Sydney are decidedly formidable, far exceeding what our critic proposes, and yet without submarine mines there can be no doubt that Sydney Harbour might be rushed as mentioned; once inside the batteries, the ship or squadron would practically be in the heart of the town, which would then be at its mercy, as well as ships, docks, and naval stores. To render the naval base of the Australian Squadron useless would alone be worth risking the possible loss of a couple of cruisers, specially sent out for the purpose, and it may be taken for granted that everything connected with such a scheme has been carefully worked out by those nations with which we may some day be at war. The possibility, or rather, according to our critic, the impossibility, of a hostile landing near Sydney, and a dash at the capital, is taken into consideration, but the possibility of bombarding Sydney from the open sea over the ground about Bondi has apparently been overlooked. It may, however, be satisfactory to know that a few anti-bombardment guns have been mounted to prevent such an unpleasant possibility.

With reference to King George's Sound, it is odd that any one writing on the defences of Australian ports should apparently be

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unaware of the circumstance that three years ago a committee, composed of special experts, including a naval officer sent by the Admiralty, visited Albany and selected the site for a battery to defend the port. The battery has been constructed, armed, and garrisoned by Australian Permanent Artillery, supported by a local corps. On going over the ground it was found that Point Possession was anything but a suitable place for the battery. Point King, on the opposite side, was selected as being a perfect site in every way. Point King is considerably higher than Point Possession, commands the whole of the grounds there, and being on the same side as the town enables a fire to be directed on to the only place where a landing might be made to attack Albany, and the coal stores, &c. As regards the Sound, three 4·7″ quick-firing guns on Breaksea Island, and two field-pieces at Herald Point would, with the existing battery at Point King, make the sound untenable for an enemy's ship.

Port Darwin is a tumble-down collection of huts and shanties. The only stone buildings are those of the telegraph establishment, the Resident's house and offices, two or three stores, the cottages of the railway employés, and the resident doctor. The total white population, annually decreasing, is under 150, the remaining inhabitants being Chinamen, who make a living in connection with the wants of their countrymen at the gold mines further inland. Owing to the climate, European miners cannot work there. When the mines were first discovered there was the usual rush and land boom, but that has long since collapsed and the only vestiges of it at present are the ruins of a brick building just above the pier which cost colonial money. The China steamers touch at Port Darwin once a fortnight, being under contract to do so. An attempt is being made to ship cattle for the Dutch settlements and Singapore, which it is hoped may succeed and do a little to put life into the little place which even the Chinamen are leaving. The telegraph station and shore end of the cable is really the only thing to be considered, and the committee of experts decided that two field guns, two machine guns, and one hundred rifles were all that were required. The existence of another place in West Australia, viz., Roebuck Bay, where a second cable connects with Java, seems to be unknown to our critic. Fever is very prevalent at Port Darwin and the climate decidedly objectionable. As for the railway from Port Darwin being continued to Adelaide, the very idea of such a thing—unless an El Dorado were found in the very centre of Australia—is out of all consideration; coloured labour being allowed in Queensland, it is not impossible that

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the Queensland railway system may be extended in a north-westerly direction to a port in the Gulf of Carpentaria. The Northern Territory, that is the Port Darwin district, is part of South Australia, and is governed from Adelaide, where climate, people, and interests are entirely different. As lately expressed, Jamaica might just as well be made part of a constituency in the East-end of London. The working-man naturally objects to coloured labour in Australia, but until such is permitted on the coast of the Northern Territory, that immense extent of country where cocoa-nuts, rice, sugar, india-rubber, arrowroot, ginger, nutmeg, cinnamon, &c., could be grown almost without limit, will remain as unprofitable as a desert of sand, and Port Darwin remain what it is at present, a port in name only. A more depressing sight can hardly be imagined than that of such a magnificent harbour without a vestige of life on it except an occasional native canoe.

Of Thursday Island, which our critic has a poor opinion of in comparison with Port Darwin, it is sufficient to say that vessels going through Torres Straits pass close to it, and most of the steamers calling there to coal. It is a busy place, and rapidly growing in importance; the climate is healthy, and being on the North of Australia traffic route, supplies of any nature can always be quickly laid in. The Island was specially selected by the Admiralty for a protected coaling port, and a glance at the map shows its great strategic value. The same committee which visited King George's Sound selected the site for the battery of which the guns were furnished by the Imperial Government. As at Albany the battery has been completed and armed, and the place garrisoned by Australian Permanent Artillery. It bids fair to become a small Singapore.

Adelaide, our critic states, "is a locality which except at an enormous expense can only be effectively covered by guns afloat. A small local ironclad could guard the approach up Gulf St. Vincent and engage any cruiser that hoped to secure a rich booty under threat of bombardment." Some extraordinary mistake has apparently been made here, as no man-of-war can get within six miles of Adelaide, and certainly no officer commanding an enemy's cruiser would waste his shells in firing at a moderate sized and scattered town six miles away. Possibly in looking at the chart the little town of Port Adelaide has been mistaken for the capital further inland, but even that little place, which might have ships in its harbour, is protected by two strong batteries. The Government of South Australia is apparently under no fear of their capital being required to furnish

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a rich booty as it has not been considered worth the expense to mount two heavy B.L. guns which they have in store, and which at one time it was intended to put in battery not far from the little town of Glenelg.

At Melbourne it is stated that "local defences have in fact been overdone here and absorbed money which might have been more usefully employed. A single battery on Point Lonsdale and Point Nepean would keep off any hostile vessel. No defences need be placed elsewhere to prevent the neighbouring bays being occupied. As for landing, unless the enemy brings a fleet of transports and a force of 50,000 men, the idea may be dismissed. Besides, the Victorian Navy numbers several vessels and torpedo boats, including the coast-defence monitor *Cerberus*." Now as to what the strength of the local defences should or should not be, surely the naval commander-in-chief of the Australian Squadron ought to be no mean judge of what was wanting.

In April, 1887, Admiral Tryon stated as follows :—

"The defences of Melbourne are placed by —— in the same category as the defences of coaling stations, and with the defences of commercial ports. It seems to me to be not creditable to compare the defences of a coaling station with those of the capital of a great colony, the seat of Government, the centre of organisation. Nor is it right to compare them with the defences of a commercial port at home, which if attacked can always command the resources of thirty-six millions of people within a few hours . . . . In addition to what I have already named vessels quitting Europe during a period of war for these seas will make for those ports within which, when attained, they feel they will be secure. Thus defence works enable us to keep up our communication with the rest of the world during a time of war. If there were no such works the port would be deserted.

"I see nothing new in ——'s letter, nor any point that has not been considered, and I adhere to the opinion I have already expressed in previous papers, and there can be no question that the proposed fort [an addition to those then and now—1893—existing] will afford far greater security to a vital position like Melbourne than the gun-vessels and proposals —— submits."

Looking at the small chart of Port Phillip given in the article on Colonial Defence, an ordinary reader might easily fancy Point Lonsdale the proper place for a battery to cross fire with Nepean, but if anyone sufficiently interested in the subject will take the large chart of Port Phillip Heads, and lay off the course of a ship entering the channel, and then draw arcs of fire from Lonsdale, Nepean, and Queenscliff, the reason for making the battery at

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Queenscliff, instead of Lonsdale, will be at once apparent. One of the defects of Lonsdale for a battery is that it is 4000 yards from Nepean, the flood tide also between Lonsdale and Nepean adds five knots to a vessel's speed running past those points.

The statement that 50,000 men would be required to capture Melbourne is certainly very flattering to the little force of the colony, and will doubtless raise a smile in the Intelligence Departments of more than one country where the defence organisation of Australia is carefully recorded up to date. Given time and arms, then every man in Australia would in a few months be made into a soldier. Unfortunately time is just what is not given in the present day, and, in defence matters, calculations have to be founded on the trained men available at the moment or within a reasonable time. In the first place the idea of any hostile expedition beyond a few thousands ever being sent to Australia may be put out of consideration, that is as long as the British Navy holds its own. When it ceases to do so, the heart and not the colonial extremities of the Empire will be attacked, and when the heart is pierced the colonies will cease to exist as portions of the British dominions. They would then simply be taken possession of by the conquerors; fight they undoubtedly would to the last, but crushed by overwhelming numbers they would be taken in detail and annexed. If our statesmen do their duty and keep the Navy up to its proper strength, Australia need fear little beyond attacks on its commerce by solitary cruisers; but, as already stated, it is possible that raiding expeditions may be employed, not for the sake of occupying useless territory, but to damage our shipping and colonial trade and to cripple us as much as possible in every way. A raid might be a matter of two or three days, or even less, and would take the form of an attack on one of the capitals of the colonies, and be driven home, and succeed or fail, before the forces of the other colonies could be sent to assist, more especially when they might be nervous as to their own security.

The Colonial Defence Committee, composed of naval and military experts from the War Office and Admiralty, in their remarks on General Sir Bevan Edward's report on the defensive capabilities of the Australian colonies, state generally what land force is required, and how it should be organised to guard against raiding attacks. The committee point out clearly to the colonies that they will in war time have to rely on themselves: "In the event of a great war the military resources of the Empire will be heavily taxed, and the responsibility for land defence must necessarily rest with the colonies, which have willingly accepted it.

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"Finally the Colonial Defence Committee desire to point out that the *rôle* which the Australian colonies will probably play in the event of war, is not likely to be limited to the passive defence of ports little liable to attack. The possibility of being able to take a vigorous offensive at the outset of war against points which might prove menacing would be a strategic advantage of the first importance."

Just now the financial difficulties of the Australian colonies have caused a considerable reduction in the defensive strength. When matters improve it is to be hoped that funds will be available to carry out the recommendations of the Colonial Defence Committee. Although the forces of the colonies look large on paper, the numbers available for mobile field work are too small. At Sydney, for instance, only 1350 infantry are available to guard the coast from the Heads to Botany Bay or to oppose a landing in that great extent of smooth water but four miles from the city.

In the article a suggestion is made that there should be universal military service in Australia, every one taking his share in the defence of the country; the colony, however, is not yet prepared for such wholesale soldiering, neither is there any necessity for it. A volunteer system of defence has been the nearest approach to the proposition, but that has proved a complete failure; all the colonies have now come to the conclusion that the proper military force for Australia is a well-organised militia, of which the privates get about £10 per annum in return for a very considerable amount of drill which makes them excellent soldiers. A certain proportion, about one-third, of highly-trained permanent artillery is necessary for the militia gunners and for a similar reason a small corps of permanent submarine miners is also maintained. Any further reference to the *personnel* of the Australian forces would here be out of place, but it is hoped that sufficient has now been stated on the subject of Australian defences to show that matters are not exactly as has been represented by our critics.

Although Australia is only in point of time a month away from England, people at home occasionally make strange mistakes about the country and people, such for instance as that of a London newspaper describing a particularly smart man of the Victorian Mounted Rifles at the Military Tournament as a perfect specimen of a bushranger.

ALEX. B. TULLOCH.

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THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE. 1799—1808.

By General E. Clive.

The history of the Royal Military College commences with that of a military institution, formed to qualify commissioned officers for service on the staff and which had existed at High Wycombe, county Bucks, since 1799. This institution was under the superintendence of one General Jarry—an officer formerly in the French service, and who subsequently had served on the staff of Frederick II. of Prussia in his campaigns—with Lieutenant-Colonel Le Marchant, as Superintendent of Military Study. In 1799 two or three professors were appointed; and thirty-four students, paying thirty guineas for a two years' course, were admitted, at an expenditure of £1429. In the following year four more professors were added, raising the cost of the establishment to £2429; and in 1801 this institution was founded under Royal Warrant, dated 24th June, as the Royal Military College. Lieutenant-General the Hon. William Harcourt, afterwards Earl Harcourt, was appointed the first Governor of the College before the issue of the Royal Warrant; which at its promulgation contained the appointment of a Supreme Board of Commissioners, consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary at War, the heads of the great military departments for the time being, with other officers of high rank in the Army, three of whom (the Secretary at War, the adjutant-general or the quartermaster-general being one) formed a Board for the purpose of controlling the affairs of the College.

The first Supreme Board—composed of H.R.H. the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Hon. W. Harcourt, Governor, Lieutenant-General David Dundas, Quartermaster-General, and Lieutenant-General The Lord Cathcart, met for the first time, July 1st, 1801, and recommended that Lieutenant-Colonel Le Marchant should be appointed lieutenant-governor

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and superintendent-general of the College, with a salary of £730; that the First or Senior Department be established; that General Jarry should be Commandant with a salary of £790 9s. 7d.; that the officers, professors, and masters now employed at High Wycombe be considered as transferred for the present to the establishment of the Royal Military College with specified salaries; and that Mr. Charles Greenwood be the treasurer, and Assistant Barrack-Master-General Colonel Mackenzie be secretary with a salary of £200. On the 14th October the Supreme Board presented to His Majesty their proposed Regulations for the Administration of the College, which, by Royal Warrant, dated 9th December, 1801, were confirmed as "The statutes for the Government and conduct of the First Department of the Royal Military College." In January, 1802, a Royal Warrant directed that appointments of military officers to the College should be conferred under His Majesty's sign manual; but that nominations of professors and masters should be by Warrant under the hands and seals of five or more commissioners.

This First or Senior Department was formed to instruct commissioned officers who had served a specified number of years with their regiments in the scientific parts of their profession, in view of enabling them the better to discharge their duties when acting in command of their regiments, and of qualifying them for employment in the Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's Departments. The Warrant did not limit the number of officers to be admitted, but directed that each officer, retaining his regimental rank and pay, should contribute thirty guineas annually towards the expense of his instruction. He was required after a certain period to keep a horse for work in the field, for which he received forage. In April, 1802, the students then in residence presented a petition requesting to be relieved from this double payment, and in June the Supreme Board decided that officers admitted prior to 3rd June, 1801, should pay the old rate of thirty guineas for the two years' course; those entering subsequently were to pay the increased fees of thirty guineas per annum.

Up to March, 1802, therefore the Royal Military College consisted only of its First or Senior Department—but the proceedings of the Supreme Board at their first meeting, in recommending the establishment of the First or Senior Department, make it certain that the College was intended to be supplemented by the addition of a Junior Department for the benefit of sons of officers. Accordingly in March, 1802, a Royal Warrant formulated the Regulations of the Junior Department that was shortly to

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be added to the College. Its design was the instruction of those who from early life were intended for the military profession, and to afford assistance to the orphan sons of meritorious officers who had fallen or had been disabled in the service of their country, as well as for the sons of those officers who, from pecuniary difficulties, might not otherwise be able to give them an adequate education. The military staff appointed by this Warrant consisted of a Superintendent as Commandant, to direct studies and to be responsible for discipline and interior government, payed per year £290 9s. 7d.; Inspector of a Company, £100; and a Sergeant-Major, £37 12s. 9d. The site proposed for this College had already been purchased by Government in April, 1801, and was situated in the parish of Sandhurst, in the county of Berks, whence the College has taken its name. Prior to its sale the land formed a portion of the Tekel's Castle Estate, from which it was separated by the great London-Southampton road near the village of Blackwater, Hants. The purchase included the manor house, farm buildings, now the present Government House, and premises. The property is believed to have belonged previously to Lady Griselda Tekel, who sold it to her uncle, the Right Honorable W. Pitt, from whom the Government purchased it.

This site is said to have been chosen, first, because of the uncircumscribed extent of land, which admitted of the buildings being so placed as to avoid a neighbourhood injurious to the morals of the cadets, and which allowed space also for military movements, and the construction of military work without interruption; and secondly, because of the opportunity of military instruction afforded by the large encampments of troops, which were then generally situated in the vicinity of Bagshot; and lastly, the low price of land, with the facility of water carriage by the Basingstoke Canal. The events of the last eighty years, including the institution of Aldershot Camp, and the advantages of open country, have abundantly justified the selection for the College made in 1801. The amount of land purchased was about 450 acres, and the price paid, including £1300 for fees and £1070 for furniture, garden plant, farming stock, and utensils, amounted to £9966 12s.

Early in 1802, Mr. Simonds and the other neighbouring landed proprietors in the parish of Sandhurst urged General de Lancey, Barrack-Master-General, to join them in applying to Parliament for an Act to enclose the waste lands in the parish. It appears that some £1357 was paid in June, 1802, to the

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Enclosure Commissioners for additional land, and this, with about eleven acres near Blackwater purchased in July, 1802, at a cost of £805, brought the extent of land and waste to 500 acres or thereabouts, of which 147 were under cultivation, and 353 land, heath, waste, or water, at a price of £14,075 1s. Mr. Bracebridge was appointed to look after the estate under the Governor, at whose discretion the estate was to be planted, and he continued to do so from April, 1801, to August, 1802. The site having been acquired, Mr. Wyatt, the architect, had been instructed in 1801 to prepare plans, elevations, and estimates, for a building to be erected on the Sandhurst Estate for the accommodation of both Senior and Junior Departments of the College, and pending the approval of them and the completion of the building a house at Great Marlow was leased for the temporary accommodation of the 1st Company of the Junior Department, and £500 was granted to fit it up for them, the work to be completed and the house ready for occupation on the 17th May, 1802. In the following January the Treasury suggested that other eminent architects should be called upon to furnish designs, but the Supreme Board replied that this would lead to considerable expense and much loss of time, while, as the building would not be completed for three years, the payments would be part payments only. In April, 1802, Mr. Wyatt submitted his plans for the consideration of the Supreme Board. The building was to be erected on a part of the waste land, its cost was estimated at £118,956, qualified by a suggestion that £14,000 might be saved by the employment of military labour in the construction of the College. The plans as well as the site were approved, and the Secretary desired to take steps to obtain an Act of Parliament for enclosing the waste belonging to the Sandhurst Estate, so as to enable the Supreme Board to give orders for the erection of the College. Mr. Copland was approved as the contractor, and offered to purchase the stock, &c., at a valuation, and to rent a part of the lands, "that he might be able by having it in his own possession to give up any portion of it, for the purposes of the College, at a day's notice, and that the workmen might be better accommodated, and not considered as trespassers when they passed to and from Blackwater." The premises let to him consisted of a lodge and out-buildings and 120 acres of land, from ten to twenty of which were appropriated by him to brick-making, at a rent of £90 per annum. The stock was valued at £610.

Early in 1803 it was decided to fit the Mansion House as a temporary barrack for officers and men of the Staff Corps to be employed in the construction of the College; the estimate for

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one officer and 176 men in berths was £997 10s., and that for one officer and 100 men in bedsteads £1072 15s. The same Warrant (1802) appointed the Collegiate Board for the government and regulation of the two departments, to consist of the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and the Commandants of the Senior and Junior Departments. Lieutenant-Colonel James Butler, R.A., was appointed Superintendent of Military Studies, Captain Charles Stone, 16th Light Dragoons was to be Paymaster of the College and Secretary to Collegiate Board, and Captain Muller Clifford, 11th West India Regiment, was to be Inspector of the 1st Company of Gentlemen Cadets. An offer to the Directors of the East India Company, made in April, to train twenty Indian cadets, was accepted; ten were to present themselves at the opening of the College in May and ten later.

In May, 1802, the present official seal was made for the College, the device thereon being the King's Arms and the words "Royal Military College" round them. Patterns of uniform, caps, swords, and accoutrements were considered and approved in May, a sum of £10 being allowed for each cadet's clothing. There was to be one vacation from December 1st to January 31st, and the Junior Department was duly opened at Great Marlow on the 17th May, 1802, by the arrival of sixteen cadets. A scale of lodging allowance for Senior and Junior Departments was also promulgated. On the 23rd and 24th July, Lieutenant-Generals the Earl of Harrington and the Lord Cathcart inspected the College at High Wycombe and Great Marlow and reported "that the studies of the Senior Department are carried on with great zeal on the part of the students, and with great skill and attention on that of the instructors, and with regard to the Junior Department that the cadets seem animated with no less emulation and industry; that they are in uniform; and already assume a military appearance." At the close of the year the College consisted of forty-two cadets, five of whom were East India Company cadets.

In March, 1803, the King approved a proposal for training cadets, intended for the ordnance service, at the Royal Military College, and the Royal Warrant on this subject, issued on April 27th, ran as follows: "1. In order to admit of the introduction of a certain number of cadets destined for the service of our ordnance the number of companies of cadets in the Junior Department of the College shall be augmented to four, and each of the said companies shall consist of the undermentioned number and description of cadets, viz: Twenty-five, the orphan sons of officers who have lost their lives in our service, twenty,

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the sons of officers actually in our service, and paying £40 per annum, and twenty-five, the sons of noblemen and gentlemen, fifteen of the Royal Artillery, fifteen of the East India Company's Service.*

"2. The formation of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Companies of the Junior Department of the College shall take place by virtue of this our Royal Warrant, at such period or periods as may appear advisable to our Supreme Board.

"3. Candidates for admission into the third class of the Junior Department shall be eligible if under *sixteen* years of age, and cadets of that class shall not continue at the College after attaining the age of nineteen."

Ordnance cadets were to be posted in proper proportion to the companies, and put through the same course of instruction as the other cadets. A second house, the property of Mr. Williams, at Great Marlow was taken at a rent of £200 per annum; and a syllabus of instruction was submitted and approved. During the year 1803, thirty-seven cadets were withdrawn to join the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich.

In January, 1804, the inspectors of companies were named "captains of companies," and their pay was raised to £150 per annum, uniform with that of a captain in the Army. As it appeared, from the returns of cadets enrolled, that out of 199 only thirteen were sons of deceased officers and twenty-six of officers serving, and that the establishment of two companies, A and B, might be rapidly completed if more favourable terms were made for the sons of officers, the following scale of annual payments was suggested and approved in February, 1804:—Sons of General Officers with regiments £60, on half-pay £40; Colonels-Commandant £60, on half-pay £30; Field Officers on full pay £30, on half-pay £20; Captains on full pay £20, on half-pay £10; Regimental Surgeons on full pay, £20, on half-pay £10; Subalterns and Quarter-Masters of Infantry and Assistant Surgeons, gratis. This scale was subject to the following terms of service:—Field Officers and Regimental Surgeons, six years; Captains, four years; and Subalterns, Quarter-Masters of Infantry, and Assistant-Surgeons, two years. It was approved by the King in June, 1804, with one alteration, that the sons of General Officers on half-pay without regiments should be trained for £30 instead of £40.

The increasing accommodation required for the College appears to have met with difficulty at Great Marlow, for the Secretary of

* Each of the last three groups paid 90 guineas per annum.

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State suggested that the King's House, Winchester, and the buildings attached to it, should be surveyed for conversion to accommodate the whole of the College. Plans and estimates were called for, and the question was referred to His Majesty whether a temporary removal to Winchester would not be advisable. The plans furnished in August estimated that the King's House could be converted for £19,560 by 1st February, 1805; but the building being reported as filthy and full of vermin, the New Hospital at Chatham was suggested in place of it, as a temporary home for the Royal Military College. This also was found to be inadequate, as it would not accommodate more than 250 cadets. It also was therefore pronounced unsuitable. This search for accommodation at Winchester and Chatham seems to have made Mr. Copland, contractor for the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, apprehensive; for in October, 1804, he wrote that, pursuant to the contract entered into with him on the 10th December, 1801, he had made vast preparations, and that if the plan were changed he would suffer much loss, inasmuch as he had retained workmen and made many bricks. At this time he was referred to for the proposed increase of building required at Great Marlow, and he made a proposal to erect two buildings for twelve officers, eighteen non-commissioned officers, and 100 cadets, including a hall of exercise, four halls of study, clothing and waiters' rooms, and armoury, exclusive of fittings, for £4345, which was approved and referred to the Treasury. At the close of the year the strength of the College was 108 Army cadets, seventy-four ordnance cadets, and sixteen East India Company cadets, and the enrolment of the 3rd Company was commenced. In February, 1805, Mr. Wyatt produced his plans and estimate for a new design for the College (£199,439 14s. 5d.) which were referred for the King's consideration. The Governor submitted that the building of the College at Sandhurst should be commenced forthwith, adding that if Mr. Wyatt's plans were considered too expensive, the Junior Department only should be placed at Sandhurst, and the Senior moved from High Wycombe to the Junior Department buildings at Great Marlow, when the latter moved to Sandhurst. Pending the work of construction, the necessary accommodation was to be provided at Great Marlow gradually for the Junior Department only, and the Masters and Senior Department were to be furnished with accommodation in the town. At this time also it was considered advisable to propose to increase the companies from 100 to 150 cadets, and to admit the sons of respectable but poor parents at half price to the 3rd establishment. This privilege was to extend to the sons of

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masters, commanders, and superior officers of the Royal Navy; but it does not appear that the suggestion of reducing the fees met with approval.

The estimate for the College in 1806 were:—General Staff, £3734 11s. 6½d.; Senior Department, £4306 8s. 8d.; Junior Department, £12,120 6s. 10½d.; total, £20,161 7s. 1d. The ordnance cadets being found in excess of their proper proportion, it was ordered that the establishment of fifteen per company shall be adhered to for the future. In October of this year, General Jarry resigned, receiving a pension of £400 per annum. He died on the 15th March, 1807; when an annuity of £100 was granted to his widow, and £50 to each of his two daughters, during their residence in the United Kingdom. Major Howard Douglas succeeded him.

A new Warrant, altering the course of instruction and introducing Latin as a study, necessitated an addition of six classical and six mathematical masters, and raised the contribution of cadets on the 3rd establishment to £100 a year. Cadets at the College, who had entered under the Warrant of 1803, were to pay the increased sum from 25th December, 1806. The 4th Company was commenced in 1807, the establishment then being four companies with three cadet officers to each company. It was ascertained that many cadets took advantage of the College to get a year's training, and then solicited nominations to the Ordnance or East India Company, to the "prejudice of the Service." A special certificate was therefore demanded from parents and guardians, declaring upon their honour that the candidate was intended for His Majesty's Regiments of the cavalry or infantry.

The proposal to transfer the Royal Military College to King's House, Winchester, and the Senior Department to Searle's House adjoining it, was renewed. The expense of conversion was estimated at £70,000. The Sandhurst site for the Royal Military College was therefore seriously jeopardised. The Mansion House, now fitted as a barrack, and the bricks made for the College building, which were perishing, were recommended by the Collegiate Board to be put up for sale, and the estate was ordered to be let, without right to cut turf or timber (which was estimated at £100), "keeping in view that the whole of the property may probably be disposed of within a short time." All progress was deferred pending reference to the Government. On the 27th May, 1808, the Supreme Board made a strong recommendation in favour of the Sandhurst site to the Lords of the Treasury in the following terms:—

"The Board having taken into consideration the indispensable necessity of coming to an immediate decision respecting the

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situation for erecting a suitable building for the Junior Department of the College, together with the necessary accommodation for the military officers, professors, masters, and other persons belonging thereto, and having determined that the estate at Sandhurst, near Blackwater in Hants, purchased for the purpose of erecting a Military College thereon is calculated for the purpose for which it was originally intended; and Mr. Copland, with whom the Commissioners on the 10th December, 1801, entered into a contract for building a Royal Military College, having offered to build houses, if required, for the several professors and masters, on the ground belonging to the public, he being paid an annual rent for the same, which houses may be redeemed at the pleasure of the Commissioners according to a contract he is ready to enter into, which removes the objection of there being no town in the immediate vicinity of Sandhurst wherein they can be lodged. Mr. Copland having also given in a plan and estimate which the Board had directed him to prepare for the erection of a building for the Junior Department, together with the necessary accommodation for the military persons belonging thereto; and the Board having approved the same, directed the Secretary to prepare a letter to the Secretary to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury (to be signed by all the Commissioners now present) enclosing the said plan and estimate, as an outline, and submitting the same to their Lordships' consideration, requesting they will be pleased to sanction their immediate entering into a specific contract with Mr. Copland for carrying on this work on such terms as their Lordships may be pleased to direct; also stating that the institution having suffered the most distressing inconveniences from the present temporary and inadequate accommodation, obtained at a very considerable expense in the town of Marlow, they request to call their Lordships' earliest attention to the subject, as they have no hesitation in assuring their Lordships that the existence of this great national institution materially depends on suitable and permanent accommodation being provided for it without further delay."

The establishment for whom the building was to be appropriated, was to consist of a governor, lieutenant-governor, one chaplain and librarian, one paymaster, one surgeon, one assistant-surgeon, one quarter-master, one commandant, one major, four captains of companies, one adjutant, four staff-sergeants, one clerk of the kitchen, four drummers, 412 cadets, one purveyor, one housekeeper, one assistant-housekeeper, one nurse to infirmary, one armourer, twenty men servants, sixteen women servants, one clerk to paymaster, one senior and junior clerk to commandant, and one

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clerk to governor. The governor and lieutenant-governor were to have separate houses. The Collegiate Board surveyed the Sandhurst Estate in October, 1808, and recommended the following improvements:—A bridge was to be made over the waste water from the Mill Pond (now York Town Bridge), the estate and fir grove were to be fenced, and the south-east bank of Mill Pond and hill adjoining were to be planted with Scotch fir, larch, sycamore, and mountain ash. In the same month the Treasury approved of the building of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, at a cost of £89,770; directed that the same should be carried into immediate execution, ordered an estimate to be made of the other necessary work not comprehended in Mr. Copland's estimate, and the Supreme Board fixed the 14th November for inspecting the estate and deciding on the precise site on which to erect the building. The site chosen was the north-west side of the ground in rear of the fir plantation and 120 yards from the road running east and west. The foundations were to be proceeded with at once, and the heath ground in rear of the intended building was to be acquired. Mr. Copland became tenant of the estate, 114 acres at £150 for three years, the fifty acres required for the building excepted. He was not to cut timber, break up pasture, or dig for bricks without permission.

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THE CAMPAIGN ON THE LOIRE IN THE AUTUMN OF 1870.—VOL. II.*

By Count A. Bothmer.

THE most interesting features in the second volume of Captain Hönig's work are the defence of Beaune la Rolande, the key to the German position, and the neighbouring graveyard, and the author's delineation of the character of Generals von Voigts-Rhetz, von Alvensleben, and von Manstein.

In the battle of Beaune la Rolande we learn how disadvantageous a too extended front must always be, as it is impossible in such a case for the commander-in-chief to keep his forces in hand and to give the necessary orders, and this is the fault which was committed on the side of the Germans. The French were superior in numbers, they had the population on their side, and the German cavalry encountered difficulties in reconnoitring such as are quite unusual in modern warfare. The whole engagement was, therefore, one of an exceptional character, namely, want of leadership on the side of the Germans, and want of organisation and generals on the side of the French.

It happened on the side of the Germans that subalterns did the very best work, where they were left to their own devices for want of orders, whilst the French sacrificed thousands of lives to no purpose with a heroism worthy of a more successful cause. How careful Captain Hönig has been in compiling his work we may learn from the fact that he has studied every possible source—he has had access to them—both in France and Germany. He has read the various histories of different regiments in the German and French Armies, and has written more than 2000 letters to various persons in order to gain the most accurate information, and to clear away much doubt that has hitherto obtained on many subjects connected with the campaign. These subjects of doubt have been generally satisfactorily cleared up, whether they were matters of greater or of less importance. The book may be considered most

* "Der Volkskrieg on der Loire, 1870." By Captain Fritz Hönig. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1893. For review of Vol. I. see United Service Magazine for July, 1893.

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reliable, and though German officers are often of opinion that Captain Hönig has been too severe in his criticism, it is evident that the mere relation of facts can be of but little value to the *student* of the art of warfare. A true and just criticism will interest the military reader and help him much further than the perusal of mere occurrences.

Before the defence of Beaune la Rolande and the graveyard is described, it may be well to touch on a few points which seem of interest. The German piquets were pushed too far forward on the 28th November, the day of the engagement; the position was about ten miles long, but was sufficiently supplied with cavalry for purposes of reconnoitring, as it had two squadrons at its disposal in the piquet-line. A line of retreat does not seem to have been marked out for the troops. The cavalry, constantly fired on by the French people, encountered great difficulties, so that the 38th Brigade, dissatisfied with the Hessian Cavalry, made a request that some dragoons might be sent in place of them, which, however, was not complied with. The Germans were obliged to make an example of a civilian who had been caught firing on the outposts. He was shot in the Beaune graveyard by a file of men, having previously offered to show the Germans the French positions. Moreover, he disclosed General Crouzat's system of reconnoitring. French officers in the garb of peasants were sent forward to discover the plans and positions of the Germans, and it was by this means that the French always had accurate information about their enemy's affairs.

The German position was weak, for no uniform measures were taken to strengthen it, or to connect the different natural positions with one another, although four days would have been ample time for the work, and there were men and materials enough for the purpose. Houses in front of and close to the line of defence were left standing, thus affording shelter to the enemy at close quarters. The distances in front of the position had not been marked out, and in fact, the whole battle consisted of most determined and independent fighting at various points. An officer was found in command of a brigade in which his senior commanded a regiment, a division was in the hands of a colonel, whilst another brigade received orders from two different commanders of divisions, and generals of all ranks and colonels might have been observed directing the movements of a few companies; a proof how much leadership was wanted on this occasion. Prince Frederick Charles' staff was stationed at Pithiviers, which was not an advantageous post for the leader and those around him, as he was a day's march from Beaune, the centre and most important part of his position. The consequence

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was that he never had a correct idea of what was going on during the engagement, and in point of fact was not in a position to know the results during the 28th at all. Napoleon's maxim, that the leader must be the first on the spot must always remain true.

As regards the French, we notice that they did not make sufficient use of their artillery before the real attack was commenced. Indeed, till mid-day (the engagement began at an early hour of the morning, as the French troops were on the move at 7 a.m.), no artillery was made use of by them. About this time, when their first attacks had failed, this branch of the service was made use of *en masse*, but still not long enough to shake their opponents. Bonnet's brigade, for instance, advanced against the German positions, and was repulsed by the artillery of the latter without receiving infantry fire at all. The German artillery swept away the solid columns in which their opponents advanced, without any difficulty. The disadvantage of clothing reserves in a different uniform to that worn by the line is made apparent by the fact that the French Gardes Mobiles in their grey trousers were easily distinguished from the line-regiments which wore red trousers. Naturally enough the Gardes Mobiles were looked upon as less formidable opponents, and suffered accordingly all the more whenever they became visible.

The defence of the graveyard of Beaune la Rolande must prove of interest to every military reader. The cemetery and the town formed the key to the German position, and the defence of this place is all the more remarkable as it was carried out by Captain Feige against the direct and repeated orders of his superiors, and therefore on his own responsibility. The position was a poor one, not having been fortified in any way; moreover, the number of men to defend it did not exceed two and a half companies at any time.

The first attack on this handful of soldiers—they had been cut off from the rest of the German forces—began at 11.25 a.m. Brisac's and Vivenot's brigades, having poured in a heavy fire against the German position, advanced against the south-west corner of the churchyard, but were repulsed. A battery of 12-pounders fired against Beaune at a distance of 500 yards—one gun is said to have been brought up as close as 300 yards at one time. The Germans were attacked on the south at the same time. They could observe how the generals spoke to the troops before the attack commenced, which advanced, with the band playing, in compact formation. Not a shot was fired until the French were 400 yards off, then Captain Feige gave the order to open fire, but the enemy continued to advance till within 200 yards of the churchyard

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wall, when there was a pause. The firing ceased on both sides. The morning was misty, and the smoke hung like a veil over the whole scene. When it lifted an indescribable chaos was visible. The French officers, mounted and on foot, were seen trying to collect their men and lead them on afresh. Captain Feige opened fire once more for about the space of one minute on the French who now retreated to re-form when out of the reach of the German bullets. At 11.45, that is in twenty minutes, the first attack had been repulsed.

As the distances varied at which the Germans were able to open their fire, Captain Feige could not keep an eye on his men. "No volleys," however, was the order given; every man was to choose his own mark. At 12 o'clock the first shrapnel fire by the French struck the Morgue, and soon thirty guns were systematically pounding the building and the stone wall round the burial ground. By one o'clock the wall, four feet high, had been levelled with the ground, and a shower of iron and stones poured down without intermission on the men, who had received orders to lie down flat, whilst the officers relieved each other in looking out. At one o'clock a fresh battery joined the others. By this time the Morgue was levelled with the ground, and the houses on the south of the graveyard were on fire, so that it became doubtful whether they could be held any longer. Not a gravestone remained standing, the graves were cut up into deep furrows, and the living seemed to run a fair chance of being buried alive with the dead. At the end of the fight, the men who defended the houses mentioned above found their uniforms and boots scorched and singed to such an extent that their clothes were mere rags.

At 1.30 the French batteries suddenly ceased firing. Their infantry was collected at distances varying from 250 to 500 yards from Beaune, which manœuvre could be carried out without any danger, on account of the hilly nature of the ground and the numerous objects which afforded protection. It was for this reason too that the artillery had to cease firing, as otherwise the French infantry would have been endangered during the second attack, which General Crouzat, on the assumption that the enemy had been sufficiently weakened, was now about to attempt. The sequel, however, proves, as Captain Hönig very rightly remarks, that good infantry cannot be forced by artillery alone from its position, even when its cover has been destroyed, and in this case the two and a half German companies were surrounded by eleven French battalions besides.

The silence of the French batteries was perfectly understood by the defenders of the graveyard. The men had their cartridges

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lying close to them, ready for use, the grease of which had got covered very much by sand. Suddenly Captain Feige gave the words, "Up, men!" and every soldier responded to the order. The French were again advancing in close formation, not a sound was heard in the cemetery but the crackling of the burning woodwork in the houses close by. One volley was poured in by the French masses which, however, did no harm. At the same moment the French officers sprang forward—some on horseback, some on foot, waving their swords; whilst shouts of "*En avant!*" filled the air. This overpowering force bearing down on the small force was enough to try the nerves of the bravest men. Not a rifle was discharged on the side of the Germans, who had already been suffering such hard pounding for so long. When the French were only 400 paces off, Captain Hönig gave the word to commence firing. Never during the Franco-German war were such losses inflicted by so small a force on such large numbers in so short a time. Men of special pluck on the French side dashed forward, and were encouraged by the fact that a battery drove up in the rear of the Germans and began firing. Not a man moved a muscle. Meanwhile the attack progressed with cries of "*Courage*," and accompanied by bugle-calls, but the Germans continued to fire steadily; not a bullet was fired without finding its billet. A moment more and the French fled back in wild confusion. When the smoke cleared off the ground was thickly covered with dead and wounded. It was two o'clock, and the second attack on the position had been repulsed in half-an-hour. The first dead Frenchman found on the following morning was eighty yards from the German position; the most distant bodies were found at 320 yards. Then followed a space of 300 yards in which no corpses were found; but beyond this plenty of dead were observed, who had been killed by the German artillery.

At this time it was fully recognised that the French had entirely surrounded the graveyard, and that no retreat was possible. The peculiar cracking of a mitrailleuse from the north-east proved this fact conclusively. There was nothing to be done except hold out to the end.

The attack made simultaneously on the south side of the burial ground and the town was equally unsuccessful. Here the Zouaves advanced with great boldness, but were repulsed with heavy losses, and the French battery, which has already been mentioned as having fired at a distance of 500 yards, was forced to retire before the fire of the Fusilier-battalion of the 16th Regiment. This part of the day proved the most trying for the Germans. The defenders of the town showed great skill in the use of the needle-gun. As

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the distances at which firing could be commenced varied considerably on account of the nature of the ground, the men could not all fire together, but had to wait until the French came in sight opposite to their particular part of the position, and it was due to their splendid fire-discipline that the day, as we shall see, was ultimately decided in their favour.

As soon as the French had been repulsed, their batteries began firing again at the graveyard, supported by an uninterrupted fire from skirmishers on the south-west corner. The Germans began to feel the want of ammunition, consequently no attempt was made to return the fire, and Captain Feige gave orders that not a shot was to be discharged till the French came within 300 yards. At a quarter to three the third attack began, which this time was chiefly directed against the west side of the German position. At 300 yards fire was opened on the thick line of skirmishers and the masses in close formation. The French fled almost instantaneously, so that the firing on the part of the Germans did not continue more than two minutes at the outside. The attack made simultaneously against the north corner seemed more likely to be successful, for here the French, concealed by clouds of smoke, got as near as 150 yards before they were discovered. Then a decimating fire was opened on them, which drove them back in a very short space of time. The Zouaves were as little favoured by fortune in their attack made against the southern corner of the burial-ground. It was noticeable that the strength of the French troops was broken, they had lost an enormous number of officers, and their *élan* seemed unable to carry them any further.

By this time the Germans had little or no ammunition left in the graveyard, and men were sent into Beaune to fetch a fresh supply, the result being that every man received seven rounds. The houses betwen the cemetery and the town were now fully on fire, and the uncertain feeling whether the men in them would be able to hold them, added to the doubtfulness of the position. At 3.30 a fourth attack was attempted by the French, which, though it had been prepared for by the fire of several batteries, proved the weakest of all. Captain Feige opened fire with skirmishers at 600 yards, but the French never got nearer than 400 yards on this occasion, when they broke and fled. The French artillery at once commenced firing again; the Germans had no more than four rounds apiece after this fourth attack had been repulsed, and though a fifth attack was contemplated, it was not carried out.

Such was the celebrated defence of the graveyard of Beaune la Rolande, and three monuments remind the visitor of this sanguinary struggle, and of the losses which the French incurred

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on this occasion. The Marquise de Bois Thierry in Château Renault remarked to a German, "*toute la jeune noblesse de la Touraine est enterée devant Beaune*," and it is a fact that the first in the land fought with the lowliest peasant shoulder to shoulder with more bravery than in any other part of the campaign.

Some remarks about the firing of the Germans during the day may prove of interest. No volleys were given, though the opportunities for making use of them were good, for the distances were short, and the French advanced in compact bodies. It cannot, however, be said that this was a mistake. The German soldiers had the larger part of a campaign behind them, and knew how to manage their firearms admirably. Not a single shot was fired without the order having been given, and, most remarkable of all, the men ceased firing twice of their own accord in order to be able to judge of the effects of their work. Such examples of fire discipline are almost unique.

Never during the whole war was such a weak force exposed to such merciless firing. For four hours the Germans were exposed to the fire of thirty guns, and during one hour no less than thirty-six guns were brought to bear on them. The French never missed their aim; not one stone was left on another, and the graveyard and the houses close to it were kept by the Germans even when they knew they were cut off entirely. How small the tactical value of artillery is when opposed to good infantry is amply proved by this example. There is no doubt, moreover, that with smokeless powder and steady troops, a position like that of the Beaune cemetery would be far easier to defend nowadays. The pauses in the firing, which in 1870 were a necessity, would no longer occur, and the enemy instead of being under fire for one or two minutes only, would be pelted during the whole attack, both whilst advancing and retreating.

The soul of the whole affair was Captain Feige. His determination to act contrary to orders, his cool courage, and his wonderful command over his men, gave the Germans the day, which would otherwise have been lost to them, for the graveyard was the key to the position. The Germans estimated that 700 bodies were found after the contest. The clergyman of Beaune maintains, however, that 1800 of his countrymen were buried round the place. When all was over, the German soldiers at once fell into a deep sleep where they stood. The weather was cold, they had had little or no food all day, and had been under some of the severest firing ever experienced for four hours. The losses of the Germans in the

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cemetery were not heavy; they are calculated to have been thirty of all ranks. The battlefields of Gravelotte and St. Privat show no such losses as are to be found on this occasion on the side of the French.

It is a curious fact the first news of the 28th November, when it reached Tours, was received with great satisfaction, for the Government considered that although Beaune had not been taken, the day might well be looked upon as half a victory; several generals received promotion, and on the 29th a circular was sent to all the civil and military authorities informing them of the triumph the French had won. General Crouzat made an effort to inform de Freyçinet of the severe losses he had incurred, who answered him in a manner such as was most unwarranted. "It seems that you lose your courage very easily," were the words with which he commenced his answer, and the rest of his letter was very much of the same character! Eventually Crouzat was made the scapegoat for the losses at Beaune.

Captain Hönig blames the Germans for not having made better use of their successes on this occasion. The French were allowed to remain unmolested for four days before the German front, and were permitted to concentrate themselves on their left wing, marching along the German lines without any interference, which, had it taken place, must have led to a second disaster for the French forces. There can be no doubt that the German cavalry was not made use of as it might have been; and Captain Hönig relates that General von Hartmann, when he received the order through a field-officer to pursue the French, merely looked over his shoulder and contemptuously remarked, "Young man!" Indeed General von Alvensleben had difficulty in inducing him to use his cavalry. "Your Excellency, I will ride forward, but only at walking pace," was his answer.

The artillery, on the other hand, did its duty in every instance, though it had the misfortune to lose one gun (the only one the French ever took during the war) by a mistake which might have been avoided. The infantry fought well. It was without any reserves beyond those that stood close behind the line of defence, as it was necessary to make use of every man against the enemy. The German forces numbered some 30,000 men of all branches; the French were 150,000 strong. The battle of Beaune la Rolande has aptly been termed by the Germans as the "Private's battle," because there was little leadership, each man doing his best at his post without receiving orders.

A very high authority, Field-Marshal Count Moltke, says that, "the French attack was divided into two distinct operations, which

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had very little influence on each other." Captain Hönig does not share this opinion, but, on the contrary, observes that General Crouzat's and General Billot's plans show the contrary; and this is proved historically, for the two French Army Corps attacked the Germans at the same time in connection with one another, the idea being to force the German wings whilst the centre was only to be engaged.

In speaking of the German generals of the Second Army, Captain Hönig gives it as his opinion that von Voigts-Rhetz, leaving William I. and Moltke out of the question, was the greatest man; then come von Goeben, the King of Saxony, Prince Frederick Charles, von Mannteuffel, von Blumenthal, and von Stosch. General von Stosch was a man of wide views, with genial ideas, and with plans of his own. He was an infantry soldier, and had filled various staff-appointments to the satisfaction of his superiors. As a man he was candid in his manner, and of a sympathetic character; he thought nobly, he was a thorough gentleman, and of a kindly disposition; he had a fine figure, and the back of his head, highly developed. denoted great energy. He was most hospitable, in his criticisms he was short and to the point, and where it became necessary to blame an inferior, he always did it in a manner which could not wound the person he spoke to. It was due to his measures that Krupp's steel breech-loaders were introduced into the service when it was a question whether these or cast bronze should be chosen; his decision made him many enemies, the more so, as he was an infantry soldier.

General von Voigts-Rhetz was no courtier, and in this point was inferior to Moltke. He was also in favour of the two years' system of service, against which William I., Moltke, Bismarck, and Von Roon had always been, but which was introduced into the German Army last year. These two facts made his residence in Berlin unpleasant to him, as the King did not rely on him as he might have done. After the campaign of 1866, he was made Governor-General of Hanover, and placed in command of the Prussian 10th Army Corps. Although he was an industrious man, and liked work, "red-tapeism" was his horror, and he fully recognised the difference between work and the wasting of time in offices. Even in 1866 he was satisfied that the needle-gun could not be compared to the chassepôt. Captain Hönig himself heard him remark, "How can people say that the chassepôt is not much better than the needle-gun? I had to go through a similar experience with the smooth-bore guns, but now a campaign will cost us much more against the superior rifle than in 1866." He was a great horseman, and insisted on his cavalry officers being smart, enterprising, and persevering.

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General Constantin von Alvensleben was a guardsman, a man without any prejudices, and estimated no qualities in a soldier more highly than those of bravery and manliness, and it was his opinion that there was no predicament a soldier could be placed in out of which he could not come with honour. Although every kind of ovation was unpleasant to him, he was more popular than any general has been with his Army Corps, with the exception of von Goeben. He did not possess the same scope and the general knowledge which General von Voigts-Rhetz had, but was superior to him as regards soldierly qualities and strength of character. In the field he was in his proper element, and struck everybody by his clearness and decision. No officer had so much influence over his men during the campaign of 1870, with the exception perhaps of von Goeben. He never attempted anything without the fixed determination of carrying it through to the very end, but always considered his plans very carefully. He had, moreover, that inestimable quality of fearing no superior, and would step in to defend any of his inferiors if he considered them to be in the right. His temper was somewhat violent, but he was able to restrain himself as a rule; on the other hand his straightforward character made it difficult for him to attain much worldly wisdom. His sense of justice was as strong as that found in a child, which made him difficult to treat in the position of an inferior, and he was contented to leave the Army rather than not do what he considered to be right.

Under fire he showed the greatest coolness and presence of mind, and his sense of duty was so great that nothing would have induced him to quit the field of battle, although his health was not by any means good during the war. Many men would have succumbed under similar circumstances, unless endowed with an energy equal to his. He was the favourite of the soldiers, and himself was warmly attached to his Brandenburgers, of whom he was accustomed to say that they had but one fault, namely, that "the little devils could never be got to retreat."

General von Manstein had the good fortune to be in the full confidence of Prince Frederick Charles. He was not a man of great capabilities, nor of great education, but he knew the rules and regulations of the service in a very wonderful manner, especially those of the infantry. During the campaign he learned to value the services of the artillery, and at the close of the contest he perhaps overrated this branch. He never allowed contradiction, but he also never attempted to force his views on a superior; orders were the only thing he knew. Unlike von Voigts-Rhetz and von Alvensleben, he never appealed to the goodwill of his inferiors,

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but depended entirely on military discipline for the carrying out of his orders. He was a superior who was not liked by his men, and his successes were more due to the fear of punishment on the part of his inferiors than anything else. He, however, was careful of the comfort of his troops, and though many men of his character would have been hated by them, it was not the case with him. Of the three generals that have been shortly criticised, it may be said that von Voigts-Rhetz had all the qualities of a commander-in-chief, von Alvensleben would have been capable of commanding more than an Army Corps, whilst von Manstein was not fit for more than the post given him.

In conclusion it should be remarked that it was the misfortune of the French that the strategy of the Army depended entirely on the politics of the day. The Government at Tours had one idea only, namely, to bring about immediate successes to satisfy the national vanity. Taine's description of his own countrymen may be aptly cited to show their character: "Exaggerated sentimentality, excitement suddenly bursting out, infectious outbreaks of delight, torrents of irresistible passion, morbid credulity and morbid distrust, in short enthusiasm and panic are incited in them. They are excitable and communicative, the slightest thing will drive them beyond all bounds, they are susceptible to strange impressions, and they do not possess a natural counterpoise to these qualities, which is to be found in our Teutonic neighbours on account of their less variable character and the influence of completed brain-work done in solitude." These remarks of Taine's, coupled with the fact that there was no commander-in-chief at that time in France, who could take the command of the French, must explain the reason of the fatal results to France of the campaign on the Loire in 1870.

A. BOTHMER.

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NAVAL TACTICS.

By Mark Hamilton.

That our position as mistress of the seas is at hazard is a matter of notoriety, and that our fleet ought immediately to be strengthened both in ships and men is generally allowed, and will probably be effected. Meanwhile, that there may be *no* flaw in our armour, I would suggest that a little closer attention might be directed to naval tactics, and to the best method of manning our ships and training their crews. All three are matters of no minor importance, and yet apt to be neglected, while the question of increasing the naval vote is absorbing all attention.

In this article I will confine myself to the tactics question only, which is at any rate clearly neglected in the sense that there is very little literature on the subject, our own works being almost confined to a few essays. This may merely mean that we are an intensely practical nation, and do not care to elaborate theories little founded on the experience of war.

Yet Lissa was only four years previous to Gravelotte, and Alexandria was bombarded only two months before Tel-el-Kebir was stormed, and soldiers do not argue that a long period of comparative peace is a reason for the neglect of the study of the art of war. Every day brings us nearer to the *next* fight, and present events seem to indicate that a great naval struggle for supremacy is not far distant. I know that it will not find the higher ranks of the Navy unprepared, but I submit that the neglect of adequate discussion and instruction tends to leave the younger officers in a state of comparative ignorance of the more important problems of naval warfare, until such time as they learn to work them out quietly for themselves, or till the acquisition of a position of responsibility forces the study upon them.

Naval manœuvres have taught much, but their lessons are more strategical than tactical, and it is only by discussion, preceding and following practice, that knowledge can be gained, or rather that the lessons gained by the experiences of one may be shared

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by his less fortunate comrades. It is rarely that one takes up a service magazine or paper without seeing an able article on military tactics; yet how strange to see any written naval opinion on corresponding points. Nor does ward-room conversation supply the deficiency; but it is only in the rubbing of brain against brain by lecture, reading, or discussion, that those lessons of war, which are too horrible, too costly in human life to be practised for instruction, can be learnt. However, it is only fair to state that the naval subject, though of vital national importance, is far simpler than the military one. Indeed, one of the objects of this paper is to prove that in one much-used sense of the word, *tactics* in the Navy had better be neglected than encouraged. What *ought* to be studied is the manner in which fleets and individual ships should be worked in the presence of a hostile force from the very beginning to the end of the engagement, including also those methods by which the use of the ram, gun, and torpedo shall be brought to their highest development. What *may* be neglected is the practice of complicated fleet evolutions carried out under steam, without any "general idea," but with the hope that they may, one day, by some unforeseen process, contribute to a victory of the style of Trafalgar. As this is a name to conjure with, let us imagine what would have happened if Nelson had employed his Trafalgar manœuvre with the battleship of to-day. He was considerably inferior in strength to the combined forces of France and Spain, having only twenty-five sail of the line to their thirty-three, and four frigates to their seven (it was of the inferiority in frigates as depriving him of "eyes and ears" that Nelson alone complained. Have we not heard something of the same kind to-day?), yet he compensated for this inferiority by his superior tactics, following his usual plan of crushing a part while avoiding the remainder.

The allies under Villeneuve were sailing in close order of battle in an ill-formed single line ahead, about five miles in length. The British fleet bore down on them in double line ahead, in a direction almost at right angles, Nelson leading the weather column and Collingwood the lee. The latter had orders to break through the enemy's line about the twelfth ship from the rear, while Nelson attacked the centre, thus bringing say twenty-five ships to attack twenty, for the allied van could evidently take no immediate part in the action. An excellent plan, which Villeneuve had to some extent foreseen, but, following the tactics of that time, one which he was not skilful enough to frustrate. Had he been aided by steam and modern artillery, and provided with that formidable weapon the ram, he would by no means have been at so grievous a disadvantage.

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The British attacking lines would be exposed on the broadside to the effective fire of the turret or barbette guns of the most distant ships of the enemy's line. These ships, too, could at once alter course and attempt to ram the advancing column. The British would have to face outwards to meet the new danger, and the fight would resolve itself into an irregular line against line. Nelson's division would be confronted by considerable superiority, while Collingwood would be so engaged as to be unable to render effective aid. In any case the superior numbers of the enemy might be brought to bear, and the great advantage gained by Nelson when sailing-ships were concerned would be lost, owing to the ability of the steamer to rapidly alter course in any direction. I will not follow the idea further here, except to point out that as the fleets approached one another the attention of every captain would be concentrated on the action of his own and his opponent's ram. Many ships would pass comparatively unscathed through the opposing line, and a modern organisation would be required to bring them back to the attack. It is, moreover, absurd to instance Trafalgar as illustrating, in any way, the principles of employment of rifled guns. Indeed, the whole example has merely been inserted to show that in the altered condition of affairs all reference to Nelson's tactics is hopelessly out of the question as regards the modern training for the fight.

Unfortunately there has been no general engagement upon which to found an argument since Lissa, and there it is remarkable that the Italian admiral, Persano, evidently dreaded an engagement with the Austrians, because it was such a plunge into the unknown, although he was a gallant officer of tried worth, and commanded a fleet considerably superior to that under Tegethof. The Austrian admiral, on the contrary, although equally ignorant as to the capabilities of ironclads, had no such hesitation, and doubtless half won the battle by his individual intrepidity.

On the 19th July, 1866, with his fleet formed in three divisions, his seven armoured ships being in the first line, Tegethof approached Lissa, and issued orders to his captains to close with their opponents as soon as possible in the attack in order to diminish the superiority of the Italian armament. On the 20th July, after Persona's fleet had been sighted, Tegethof signalled: "Run on the enemy and sink him." Immediately this attempt to ram became evident the Italian ironclads, till then in single line ahead, altered course, and passed through the intervals of the first Austrian line—no serious

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damage being done on either side by ram or gun! The Austrians were the first to rally and return to the attack, but the main battle resolved itself into a genera mêlée, and no fleet tactics were possible. A result very similar to the one I have indicated in the modern Trafalgar. The *Ré d'Italia* was rammed and sunk by the *Ferdinand Max*, 400 men being drowned; and the *Palestro*, set on fire, blew up during the engagement. The Austrian loss was insignificant, and they gained an undoubted success.

Admiral Jurien de la Gravière has deduced from this that in future fleet engagements, after the first charge on both sides, the fight can only be resumed by the fleets turning and charging again, and that this will lead to innumerable fatal collisions, unless the captains are thoroughly drilled in manœuvring their ships individually and independently. Although this opinion is based on a single encounter, yet in the progress of the last thirty years, and in the building of larger and yet more powerful iron-clads, nothing has occurred to greatly modify it.

The engines and steering appliances have vastly improved, yet the increased momentum following on increased weight renders a huge battle-ship almost as unwieldy as in the days of Lissa. Every ship has a different turning circle, and has tricks of helm which can only be thoroughly realised by officers constantly exercised in navigating her; and the not infrequent occurrence of collisions in broad daylight, with a calm sea, and whilst not performing any dangerous fleet evolution (such as that between H.M.S. *Dreadnought* and *Ajax* off Portland in July, 1887), presage what may reasonably be expected to happen in the stress of battle.

In fact, "Grand Tactics," as soldiers understand the term, can never be carried on by a fleet, for such manœuvres, in order to be carried out effectively in the presence of the enemy, require that the units commanded should be approximately of the same strength, moving at the same rate, armed alike, and impelled and guided by identical methods. At the present time there is no fleet extant with this amount of homogeneity. In fact, every battle-ship requires a different system of tactics of her own; her weapons and resources are peculiar to herself alone, for when she was designed or launched was she not referred to as "the most powerful ship in the Navy"?

Thus the main requirements of an attack or defence formation are to allow to each ship her maximum power of offence with all three weapons, while providing mutual support and a neighbourly protection from ramming.

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Therefore the practise of complicated fleet evolutions have their chief value in that they teach the captains of the fleet to handle their own ships, and this instruction might be arrived at in other ways. It is only fair to the nation that our costly monsters should never be needlessly hazarded, and therefore evolutions which can have no other object than that of trying the nerve and skill of the officers engaged should be rejected, for surely in the ordinary course of naval service the nerve of either captain, navigating-officer, or watch-keeper is sufficiently tried for practical purposes. It is however only on board a man-of-war acting in a fleet that officers can be fully trained, and in order that a man should well command a battle-ship in war he must be fully exercised in its command in peace, and the feeling of high national responsibility is a principal part of that training.

Since the captain's first object in action appears to be to avoid the ram of friend and foe, and yet make the greatest use of his own, it is in the direction of the improvement of ramming tactics that the higher training should lie.

In this I have somewhat neglected the artillery question, and perhaps because the Navy neglects it also. When more attention is paid to aiming drill and target-practice, then gunnery may rise again to the position of importance in which Nelson placed it. Here is work for every day, cannon-tubes, Morris-tubes, every kind of aiming drill should be continually tried, so that the quarterly firing may be changed into a really careful war-training. Moreover, supposing two fleets to be making for one another, and fire to have been opened from the heavy guns at 4000 yards, and suppose the rate of approach to be as slow as ten knots, then only about ten minutes will be allowed for the effective action of heavy guns, and judging from the ordinary results of target-practice this would not have any decisive effect. Of course, a lucky shot may have done great things.

But within the 1500 yards zone the fire from secondary batteries, quick-firing and machine guns, will create havoc among the *personnel* and lighter *matériel*, and as this is the critical time as regards the ram, their deadly work is by no means to be despised.

On the above grounds I am inclined to think that the enormous guns carried as main armament are not calculated to have an effect proportionate to their cost, also that every effort should be made to reduce the number of different patterns now issued, the 4·7in. and 6in. quick-firing guns being quite capable of absorbing the duties now relegated to fifty varied "marks" now in

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the service. As things now are, the day after a fight may well be looked forward to with apprehension, should the enemy be at all in position to renew the struggle.

Ammunition of some guns would be running short, and with regard to fresh supplies, the number of "marks" concerned would cause confusion to reign supreme.

Our ships in both of the above particulars are ill-designed to carry out a bombardment. Their only chance of damaging the modern high-lying indirect fire land battery is by pouring on its approximate position an overwhelming hail of medium-sized projectiles. The land service are rejecting armour in favour of concealment, so the heavy guns would be almost useless, and if the bombarded port were far from our base an effective fire would cease for lack of ammunition.

Moreover, in fighting guns laid by position-finders and range-finders, it is necessary for secondary batteries to be armoured if they are to be tenable. But this work is only the secondary object of the Navy; its first must be to defeat the enemy's fleet and to protect the commerce of Britain on the open sea.

The use of cordite will render the work of laying the guns easier, and also, if smokeless coal be used, signals will be more easily taken in than in the days of Nelson, but in any case the losses among the signalmen and the rapidly changing position of the ships will always render this work difficult, even should the signal staffs be efficient to commence with. Criticisms of the last manœuvres have hinted that these are not all as they should be, especially among the small craft. This is a matter which may be readily remedied by increasing the numbers of trained signalmen, and I think that more use might be made of the marines for this work. There is no lack of efficient recruits amongst them, and if larger classes were trained to a high degree of efficiency at the respective head-quarters under their own officers, many of these latter would be able and willing to act as signal officers in the fleet.

On the question of high explosives we seem to be behind-hand, but until it has been definitely determined that they are more dangerous to foe than friend it is difficult to say that we are wrong. Melanite shells may revolutionise naval tactics, but I am of opinion that during the next ten years, at any rate, the high explosive will not have a decisive effect.

Turning to the third weapon, the torpedo, I cannot see that it will affect the manœuvres of the actual battle. The ship's tubes would find their best opportunity in the confusion following the first onslaught, and a well-directed attack by

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torpedo-boats at this juncture might have stupendous results. But here is a matter of pure conjecture. These small craft are best placed under a separate officer, who selects the right moment for their onslaught, that is if the nearness to a port or the state of the weather permit their being brought on the scene at all. In fact the torpedo flotilla somewhat resembles the cavalry division, and has its greatest value in independent operations on the first outbreak of war, or in twenty-four hour enterprises from some sheltering port. In time of peace they have a high value in training young officers for higher commands, and it is on board these craft that eye and nerve of the future captains of the fleet can best be exercised.

To recapitulate, ram tactics are placed first because gunnery, though improving, has not yet attained such decisive results as to prevent closing, and because the torpedo, though entailing additional watchfulness on the part of the already over-taxed naval officer, acts equally in approaching fleets similarly fitted. Lastly, signalling is of vital importance in every stage of the fight, from the first observation of the enemy to the rapid return to the attack after the first shock.

Since the ram is still, in my opinion, the first weapon, and since the heaviest natures of guns do not appear to have an effect commensurate to their weight and cost, much is to be said in favour of building smaller ships on account of their greater mobility, and, since many ships must be lost, that it is as well not to put all our eggs into one basket; yet as regards ourselves, there is one absolute rule: we must be stronger in every useful class of vessel than our most formidable enemy. However, following this rule and the above arguments, we require more cruisers of every kind, both as scouts for the fleet and as a protection to our commerce, so vastly greater than that of any other country. They are undoubtedly the most paying investment after our superiority in battle-ships has been barely established. On early information depends all strategy and every preparation for the fight, so the fleet must be constantly surrounded by its scouts.

Coming now to the best formation for attack, after information has been thus obtained, one is face to face with a truly difficult problem. How is one to speak without experience? What steam evolutions should be practised? Certainly only the simplest; but what constitutes that simplicity? I do not know for war cannot be fought on the blackboard, and it is on this head that literature and lectures as well as experience are lacking.

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Lissa, though distant, seems to show that every struggle will in the first instance resolve itself into one of line against line, no matter in what formation the ships have been brought to the charge, and that in this first shock it is possible that very little damage may be done. It now appears that some organisation is necessary in order to bring superiority to bear at the decisive point. This may be arrived at by the group system—every fleet being divided into groups of two battle-ships and a cruiser—under a group leader, who acts independently, only receiving a "general idea" from the flagship, in a similar way each captain in the group being allowed an independence of "initiative" under the general guidance of his leader.

To follow out how this arrangement is to work, let us imagine that our fleet has passed through a hostile one, and that both are thrown into considerable confusion by the damage and loss occasioned by fire, by torpedo, and by ram. At this critical moment each group leader selects a single ship for attack and endeavours to ram it, the second vessel of the group follows, while the third strives to divert assistance. Now should our leading ship fail in its endeavour, and even should it be so unsuccessful as to be rammed itself, the second ship striking in must sink the enemy, as it would take it at the moment that it is striving to disengage, and in this manner defeat would be neutralised, while, with the ordinary chances of war, success would be ensured.

The greatest value of the group lies in the fact that there would be no delay in returning to the attack, while assuming complicated formations, and that it is an endeavour to concentrate superior strength at the decisive point. For it is a *sine quâ non* of the system that the groups on the exposed wing, or wings, should fight a delaying action with the balance of the enemy not already accounted for. Of course, it is a system which would give superiority at certain points to the enemy, and its whole efficiency rests on its claim to greater rapidity of action than other systems, so that delaying action would actually hold the balance of the enemy till they could be in turn overwhelmed.

Suppose a fleet of twelve battle-ships and six cruisers opposed to one of equal numbers, four of our groups might sink four of the enemy's battle-ships before the rest of the enemy could assist, their actions being impeded by our remaining four battle-ships and six cruisers. This is merely an idea and open to many objections, and in any case the success of the fight will most certainly lie with the side which has the boldest and most carefully trained captains, who shall know every trick of helm of their ships, every advantage

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to be gained from modern science, and who, on their own initiative are prompt to seize every opportunity given them by a mistake of the enemy.

To attain this ideal standard it would seem as though some practice of ramming tactics were necessary; there are many practical difficulties, and the only method that occurs to me is for solitary ships when engaged at target practise to manœuvre against a fast torpedo-boat which shall be always able to evade the bows of the attacker at the critical moment. This, like the rest of the paper, is only written with a view to provoke discussion that we younger officers may gain needed instruction.

MARK HAMILTON.

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THE FRENCH IN INDIA.*

THE new edition of Colonel Malleson's "History of the French in India" appears at an opportune moment. It is six-and-twenty years since the book was originally published, and it is safe to say that the action of the French in the East concerns us much more in the year 1894 than it did in the year 1867.

At a time when the French are almost threatening to give us a second land frontier, bordered by a powerful European nation, before we have well got over the shock of realizing that we have a neighbour close to our Northern frontier, it is well that we should have brought home to us how great was the dominion that the French once founded within what is now our own Indian Empire, and should realize what were the conditions that gave them that power and why they failed to establish it. No Frenchman can complain that because Colonel Malleson is an Englishman he has not thrown himself with sufficient enthusiasm into the work of doing justice to the great French statesmen and soldiers whose deeds he recalls. There are times when it almost seems as though, carried away by his sympathy as an author for his subject, he scarcely does justice to his own countrymen. He certainly has a feeling that the French, more especially Dupleix, had on the whole a better method of dealing with the natives than we had. Of course there are many details, such as the relations of La Bourdonnais with Dupleix, as to which opinions will always differ, and in regard to which those who take the side of La Bourdonnais will not be prepared to accept all the conclusions of an English writer. On the whole, however, it seems to me that Colonel Malleson has fairly established his position in his contest on that matter with Sir George Birdwood, and that the history which has been for years accepted as the standard authority in relation to this deeply interesting episode of Indian history, deserves its position by the impartiality with which the evidence has been collected and weighed.

* "History of the French in India"; from the founding of Pondichery, in 1674, to the capture of that place in 1761. By Colonel G. B. Malleson, C.S.I. New edition, carefully compared and revised. London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1893.

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There are few stories more full of dramatic incident, more fertile in strange variations of good and evil fortune than those of Dupleix, La Bourdonnais, Bussy, and Lally. The biographies of each of them, taken singly, have, with the exception of the absence of any love story in them so far as these pages are concerned, all the elements which give interest to the most exciting fiction. The stories of Dupleix and La Bourdonnais are probably, at all events as regards certain parts of their careers, most familiar to Englishmen, because of the extent to which their struggle for dominion brought them into collision with us. That of Bussy is an incident apart, and his doings in the Dakhan (Dekkan),* where, with his small French force, he virtually ruled supreme over a vast territory until he was recalled by Lally, are as well worthy of record as any in the whole strange drama of the relations between Europeans and Asiatics in India. Probably it would have been impossible for anyone attempting to write a true account of these events not to enlarge upon the immense influence which was exercised upon them by the characters of the several men who successively played their parts in them. I must, however, do Colonel Malleson the justice to say that no one could have brought out in a more telling manner than he has done the way in which throughout the history great men rose superior to difficulties and overcame them, while the most favourable conditions changed almost instantly into disaster when incompetent leaders succeeded to command. The successive incidents of failure and success follow one another with such startling rapidity that it is impossible in any space that I could ask for to trace them all. Enough, however, may be quoted, even in a few pages, to show how all important, throughout these events, the choice of leaders proved itself, and how if the best laid schemes went "aft agley" it was nearly always because the working out of the schemes fell into feeble hands.

The earliest foundations of French power were laid by Martin, whose patient, kindly, and just dealing with the natives Colonel Malleson sympathetically records. There was then, however, no strength in the French settlement sufficient to resist Dutch attack, and Martin had for the moment to bear the bitter disappointment of seeing all his work undone by the Dutch capture of Pondichery. On its restoration at the Peace of Ryswick, however, September 21st, 1697, Martin, with marvellous patience and vigour, succeeded in recovering the lost ground, raised Pondichery to a

* I give both the spelling of Colonel Malleson's text and of his map. These have no analogy whatever, and, in the case of some places which I have not had occasion to name, differ much more seriously than is the case with the names I have given.

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far higher condition, both of size and strength, than it had attained before its surrender, and, thanks to the reputation for fair dealing which he had acquired among the natives, retained all his former influence over them and even increased it. Here the man was everything, both before the surrender and after it. He had had few and scanty resources. Other settlements supported by the whole strength of the French company had failed. "Everything was due to Francis Martin. His energy, his perseverance, his gentleness with the natives, his fair dealing, formed the real foundations of Pondichery."

Dumas, who was his next great successor, was able to show bolder and not less valuable qualities. Their circumstances were different. Martin, threatened by Maratha attack, had skilfully bent before the storm, and had even made it serve his ends. Dumas, who had greatly strengthened the defences of Pondichery, when threatened by a similar danger, fronted it, and was able, without fighting, to leave such an impression of reserved power that the invaders did not venture to attack. Pondichery assumed the position of a safe haven of refuge for those natives to whom Dumas extended his protection. Again the skill of the Governor had done everything.

Dupleix succeeded. The ablest of all the French rulers of India he ultimately failed: first, because the nation behind him at home was the France of Louis XV.; secondly, because, brilliant as he was as an organiser and administrator, he was not able himself to take the field so as to put into practical execution his designs; thirdly, because he was continually obliged to employ incompetent or jealous subordinates. It is hard to say that he failed also because his magnificent schemes were beyond the means he had for carrying them out, for, had it not been for the other causes, his means would not in his hands have proved inadequate. He began by putting Pondichery into a condition to resist attack by sea, knowing that war with England was imminent. Having vainly endeavoured to settle a truce with the English during the war at home, he secured a peremptory order from the Nawab of the Karnatik that the English should not attack him. Still the English fleet was supreme in the Eastern seas, and cut off his communication with France. From that situation he was relieved by the genius and energy of La Bourdonnais. That remarkable man contrived to fit out in the Isle of France a fleet, of which it is hardly too much to say that he had created it out of nothing. "By his own personal teaching—whether as regarded the merest rudiments or the higher requirements of agriculture—the first principles of mechanical labour, or the requirements of the skilled

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artisan," and by the example of his wonderful energy he had so trained a population who, when he arrived, were "almost naked, defenceless, and starving," that he was able with their help to construct wet and dry docks, pontoons, canoes, yards, and timber. Eighteen months after his arrival he was able to launch a brigantine. The following year he built two good ships. Betrayed by the authorities in France, and deprived of a fleet which had been placed under his orders for the safety of the Indies, he yet, by impressing merchantmen and adapting them in the docks he had constructed, contrived to sail from the Isle of France with a fleet sufficiently strong to engage and actually beat off our English squadron, under Commodore Peyton. Again, it was a question of the commanders: La Bourdonnais beat Peyton, not the French fleet the English. It is from this stage that Colonel Malleson's statement of the case becomes most open to question. He denounces La Bourdonnais for not having at once yielded to the wishes of Dupleix and the Pondichery Council by carrying out an attack on Madras. Here, however, he will find that he has to deal with a strong school of our own naval officers, of whom Admiral Colomb is the most conspicuous. Peyton, though he had not ventured to renew the contest, as Colonel Malleson himself shows that he might easily have done, had been little crippled. La Bourdonnais, if he ventured to engage in the attack on Madras, might, for anything that he could ascertain, be liable at any moment to be assailed by the English squadron. Dupleix seems at one time fully to have realised this danger. La Bourdonnais could not bring Peyton to action. Failing that, my own impression is that most sailors will sympathise with La Bourdonnais in his unwillingness to commit himself to the attack on a fortified town. At all events, it appears to me to have been, to an extent which neither Dupleix nor the Council at that time recognised, a question of pure naval strategy on which La Bourdonnais had a much better right to decide than Colonel Malleson allows him. When he did attack Madras it was a bid against time. He captured it so rapidly that Peyton, had he wished it, would have had no time to interfere.

Colonel Malleson appears to have established the fact that La Bourdonnais did receive what we should certainly now regard as a personal bribe for the concession of more favourable terms than Dupleix would have granted. I think also that he has shown that La Bourdonnais had no adequate authority for granting terms without Dupleix's sanction, and that, therefore, the English charge against Dupleix personally of breach of faith in not subsequently carrying out the conditions, cannot be

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sustained. On the other hand, it is clear, from the readiness with which La Bourdonnais placed himself voluntarily in the hands of the authorities in Paris, that he did not believe himself to be open to censure; that such presents were then regarded as little more than questionable, though customary, perquisites, and that La Bourdonnais, dreading the return of Peyton's fleet, may have thought that it was in the interest of France to obtain the surrender of Madras on almost any terms. This much, at all events, is certain, that the quarrel between these two able men largely tended, at this time, to save the English settlement from utter destruction. La Bourdonnais, despite his own fears of the very catastrophe which occurred, had, in order to prosecute what in its later phases became an unquestionably high-handed and almost treasonable quarrel with Dupleix, remained so long on the coast that his fleet was caught in a hurricane and almost destroyed. La Bourdonnais went home, to be captured by an English cruiser on his return journey, to be received with all honour in England, voluntarily to return to France and be thrown into the Bastille. Deprived of pen and ink, he, by means "of handkerchiefs steeped in rice water, of coffee dregs, and of a pen made of a piece of copper money," wrote his biography, and when, after three years, declared innocent, he came out only to die.

Meantime, in India, the Nawab of the Karnatic, who had been kept quiet by Dupleix during the attack on Madras by a promise of its surrender to him, had become impatient at the delays which had been occasioned by the quarrels of the two French statesmen. He marched a large army to enforce his rights. Dupleix boldly met force by force. On November 4th, 1746, on the banks of the Adyar, near St. Thomé, Paradis, for the first time, demonstrated the superiority of a handful of European troops over hosts of Asiatics. With 230 Europeans and 700 Sepoys without guns he inflicted a crushing defeat on 10,000 of the Nawab's troops. The position of Dupleix appeared to be supreme. He had captured the chief settlement of the English. He had defeated the Nawab. He now pushed on to complete his work by seizing Fort St. David, held only by 200 Englishmen. Almost in a moment the scene changes. An incompetent old gentleman, General De Bury, commanded the French troops in Pondichery. Dupleix longed to give the command to Paradis. Seniority forbad it. The natural consequences followed. The English had entered into close alliance with the Nawab. Together they surprised and defeated the French under De Bury. Yet again the positions of the combatants were suddenly reversed. Dupleix received a reinforcement of four ships which had wintered at Achin. He

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negotiated with the Nawab so skilfully as to induce him to leave the English to their fate. Paradis, after the previous failure of De Bury, was appointed to command. The fate of the English appeared to be sealed. The kaleidoscope is shaken again. Scarcely has Paradis settled down before Fort St. David when the English Squadron, now under Admiral Griffin, arrives in the harbour. After a few minor changes of fortune, Admiral Boscawen's arrival with a powerful fleet and expedition completely turns the scale against Dupleix, and he is obliged to defend himself in Pondichery. But Boscawen, excellent at sea, was no commander for an army in the field. Dupleix, though not a soldier, quite outgeneralled him during the seige which followed. The English had to retire from before Pondichery with a loss of over 1000 men, though Boscawen commanded the largest European force which had yet landed in India.

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1849, restored Madras to England. Leaving both sides with considerable forces of specially-trained natives and some Europeans, for whom they had no immediate employment, the peace led to that system of assisting native princes with trained troops which became so important an element in the future of the two nations in India. Colonel Malleson points out that in almost every instance the demand for these services was made by the native princes. There followed a very remarkable phase of the contest, during which Dupleix and the English were nominally at peace, but were actually straining all their nerves against one another in nominal support of different native chiefs. At first Dupleix gained enormous advantages. He knew his own mind. The feeble English governor did not know his. We began the system of lending troops for a consideration, but in a half-hearted way and with no settled purpose. Dupleix lent them so as to be able to nominate, in the event of success, the great Subadar of the Dakhan, the ruler of more than the territory over which the Nizam now reigns, and also the nominally subordinate, virtually independent ruler of the Karnatic. He gained a victory for his nominees and held a stately court for their reception at Pondichery. But the victory had been only gained over the ruler of the Karnatic. He had been killed. He had left a son, Muhammad Ali, who had taken refuge in Trichinapalli. The actual ruler of the Dakhan, Nasir Jang, was gathering a great army. In a feeble way the English, by sending twenty men to Trichinapalli, had committed themselves to the defence of the claims of Muhammad Ali.

From this moment the whole interest of the struggle centres round Trichinapalli. Dupleix sees at once its importance. As

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long as Admiral Boscawen's fleet remains in the East the twenty Englishmen in the town are a guarantee against attack. As soon as Boscawen leaves the struggle for it begins. Dupleix's first attempt on it fails because of the incompetence of his native allies. After minor vicissitudes he totally routes Muhammad Ali. Then, after a brilliant feat of arms by Bussy in the capture of Jingi, De la Touche, much aided by the skilful intrigues of Dupleix, meets in the field Nasir Jang, who is killed, and De la Touche seats Muzaffar Jang on the throne of the Dakhan. Dupleix is thus apparently established in authority over all Southern India. Muzaffar Jang begs for Bussy's support with a contingent of troops and, when Muzaffar is assassinated by rébels, Bussy has no difficulty in establishing his brother, Salabat Jang, as Subadar in his place. Everything promises that Bussy, supported by his 300 Europeans and 2000 sepoys, will become Mayor of the Palace to the chief native ruler of the South. The one difficulty is still Trichinapalli, where Muhammad Ali, promising submission, but taking no steps to surrender the town, still holds out.

This time, however, the English are thoroughly roused to the danger with which the success of Dupleix threatens them. An able governor, Mr. Saunders, has succeeded to incompetent men, and at once throws the whole strength he can spare into the defence of Trichinapalli. At first, however, he finds no agents fit to carry out his schemes. The English in Trichinapalli, under incompetent leadership, are reduced to extremities, when Clive presents himself before the Governor and lays before him his scheme for the seizure of Arkat, the capital of the Karnatic. Instantly, as if by magic, the whole scene changes again. Clive, with his 200 Europeans and 300 Sepoys, captures, without difficulty, the abandoned fort which commands the town. In vain Dupleix endeavours to ignore the capture whilst he presses the seige of Trichinapalli. Chanda Sahib cannot bear the loss of his capital, and draws off 4000 men for the famous seige. The gallant defence encourages the Marathas to take the field. Clive repulses the final attack with heavy loss. He follows up his success rapidly, and at Kavaripak heavily defeats the French and their allies. Meantime, under feeble leaders on both sides, events at Trichinapalli drag on till Major Lawrence, with Clive, appear on that scene also. In a short time instead of the English being beseiged in Trichinapalli it is the French under Law and their allies, who are invested in the island of Srirangam. The whole French force has to surrender at discretion. With Bussy far off in the Dakhan all Dupleix's available strength seems to have disappeared. But Lawrence and Clive are both laid down by illness. The English command

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falls into incompetent hands. Then, in a few months, the English are again beseiged in Trichinapalli, and fort St. David is blockaded. The news calls Lawrence from his sick bed. He arrives at Fort St. David on August 27th, 1752. By September 6th not only has he raised the blockade, but following up the retreating French has inflicted a severe defeat on them. A long series of operations, of which Trichinapalli is again the centre, after alternations of success, ends in our retaining our hold on that important place, resisting all Dupleix's successive efforts to take it, and at last inflicting on his final expedition under Mainville so crushing a defeat that even he sees the necessity for making peace.

Meanwhile, in the Dakhan, Bussy had been triumphantly maintaining his position, defeating the enemies of the Subadar, triumphing over intriguers at the court, and gaining every sort of advantage for Dupleix and French interests until sickness laid him low. His temporary successor, Goupil, was an incompetent man, and almost instantly everything fell into confusion. The French were in a condition so despicable that the Subadar's chief minister, who had been intriguing against them felt himself able to promise our Governor, Mr. Saunders, that he would get rid of them altogether. When, however, Bussy, rising at this news from his sick bed, resumed command, immediately everything was changed. The French discipline was restored; they regained all and more than all the advantages that they had held before.

It is the same story repeated in this respect over and over again, and might serve for an historical sermon on Napoleon's text, "In war, men are nothing; a man is everything." On an even larger scale, the same fact was to be verified. Dupleix was replaced as Governor by Godeheu. The result was for the French an ignominious peace, in which most of the results of the brilliant achievements of Dupleix's skill were lost.

By the time, however, that war between the two countries again broke out—May, 1756—Mr. Saunders had been recalled, De Leycit had become the French Governor. In a very short time the situation was reversed once more. The English were cooped up within a few strong places. The French had overrun the Karnatic. It was the time when the great struggle for Empire under Clive was going on in Bengal, and the English settlements were almost denuded in order to concentrate all force in Bengal. Moreover, France was making a serious effort to recover her position in India by a great expedition under Count de Lally. The advance party had already arrived. Once more it was man rather than circumstances which

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determined the issue, and finally destroyed all the hopes of the French. Not that Count Lally was not a capable soldier. In many respects he was one of the most able whom France ever sent to India, but having a most difficult body of subordinates, many of them most corrupt and unpatriotic, to deal with, he contrived to quarrel with everyone of them, even with Bussy, whom he had recalled from the Dakhan in order to concentrate his forces. He was ill-supplied with funds from France. He had not the private fortune which Dupleix had lavished in the service of his country. The consequence was that after a few transient gleams of success, in which he captured Gudálur (Cuddalore in map) and Fort St. David, and laid seige to Madras, his great scheme for the expulsion of the English from India, ended instead in the final destruction of the French dominion. Colonel Coote's victory at Wándiwásh in January, 1760, the brilliant conduct of Colonel Forde in the Northern Sirkars and finally the capture of Pondichery by Coote on January 16th, 1761, brought the scene to a close.

Colonel Malleson has the faculty both to make his work most interesting and to bring out most effectively the true deductions from the history. There are few books more full of varied suggestiveness. At the present moment when there is the greatest danger lest faction at home should misrepresent, distort, and hamper the work that is being done for us in Africa, just as faction in France misrepresented, distorted, hampered, and ruined the work of La Bourdonnais, of Dupleix, and of Lally, it is well that this story should be studied. Some of the great Frenchmen died on the scaffold, others in penury and misery. France devoured her most gallant sons. It is for England to learn the lesson and avoid her fate. Detraction of men engaged at a distance from home is always easy, with certain classes popular, and often a well-rewarded game. The France of Louis XV. is an object lesson of what to avoid.

Excellent, however, as is Colonel Malleson's own work, I must demur to the statement that this edition has been "carefully compared and revised." No one who has had any experience in the preparation for press of such a volume as this would be disposed to assume that the author is the person to be blamed. When printer's reading is not carefully done errors may be introduced even after the last proof has left the author's hand. When I find on three successive pages such sentences as these—"the English commander, who had likewise *tried him his on* persuasive powers—" p. 286; "Desertions from a victorious to a vanquished enemy are not common, least of all among nations of the East. But, however,

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they may have been, it did not influence—" p. 287; "The force under Captain Gingens *consti- with the tuted*, exception of 180 men—" p. 288, I venture to think that I do Colonel Malleson a kindness in suggesting that he should exchange a few words with his publishers. If he will look up a few references in the Index he will perhaps add also a few remarks on that subject. At present it is almost, if not quite, useless. The reader who, wishing to trace the career of Lawrence, turns up the reference "out-manœuvres and beats Brennier, 395," finds himself concerned on that page with an entirely different series of operations, those against Astruc. Brennier's defeat is not recorded till six pages later. Similarly Law "resolves to retreat into Srirangam" not on p. 313, but on p. 316. As far as I can judge at a moderate computation half the references are thus wrong.

It is difficult for a reader to know whether author or publisher is responsible for the fact that there is no sort of correspondence between the names of places as given in the text and the names as they appear in the map. Colonel Malleson has adopted on high authority a method of spelling Indian names not familiar to ordinary readers in England. That may or may not be wise. For my part it seems to me that the difficulty in getting English readers to interest themselves in Indian questions is sufficiently great without adding anything which tends to frighten them away. If, however, he prefers the more strictly correct "Sipahi" to the popular "Sepoy," there is no reason why he should not indulge his preference. A reader soon translates such words into the more familiar lingo. With the names of places the case is altogether different. With what ought to be a classical work like this the one object of a map is to enable the operations to be easily followed from place to place. Here the difficulty is greatly enhanced by the absolute difference between the names in text and map. Either the map should have been brought into accordance with the text, or the text with the map. I cannot congratulate the publishers upon their production of this valuable book.

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SUPPRESSION OF REBELLION IN THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES OF CANADA, 1885.

(Continued from page 389.)

IV.

BY GENERAL SIR FRED. MIDDLETON.

MY article in last month's magazine concluded with the capture of Batoche, the rebel headquarters, on the 12th of May, 1885. Needless to say, I was well satisfied with the result of the day's fighting, which proved the correctness of my original opinion that these great hunters, like the Boers in South Africa, are only formidable when you play their game, "bush-fighting," to which they are accustomed, but they cannot stand a determined charge. This fact had been practically brought home to my men, and from that moment I felt that the dash requisite to fully utilize their pluck and coolness under fire would not be wanting. I could not, however, help regretting that I had deprived Lord Melgund of having the share in our final success which his previous good service with the force most justly entitled him to. Our casualties for that day amounted to five killed, of whom four were officers, viz., Captain French, Captain Browne, of Boulton's Scouts, Lieutenant Fitch, 10th Grenadiers, and Lieutenant Kippen, of Land Surveyor's Scouts, who had all died gallantly doing their duty, and whose loss was deeply deplored—and twenty-five wounded, including two officers, Major Dawson, 10th Grenadiers, who had ably assisted his chief during the day, and Lieutenant Laidlaw, Midlanders. This made our total list of casualties for the four days at Batoche up to eight killed, of whom four were officers, and forty-six wounded, of whom four also were officers.

We found twenty-three dead rebels in the vicinity of the houses and cemetery, and five wounded. We afterwards received from one of the Roman Catholic priests a report of the rebel loss during the four days' fighting, which amounted to fifty-one killed and 173 wounded, of which forty-seven were killed and 163 wounded on the last day, the 12th of May.

We found a large camp of women and children, natives and half-breeds, under a cliff on the river side, who had been left behind by

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their lords and masters, and who, of course, were in an awful fright, but were soon reassured by us. From them we learnt that Dumont and Riel had fled together as soon as they saw the day turning against them, and the further remarks of some of those ladies concerning those two gentlemen were, to put it mildly, the reverse of complimentary.

I sent out scouts at once to try and find out what they could about them, as from what I could learn they had not crossed the river. On going over the ground we were astonished at the excellence of the construction of the rifle-pits, a good idea of which can be gained by reference to the sketch of one of them by Captain Haig, R.E., A.Q.M.G. We found blankets, trousers, coats, shirts, boots, shoes, food, oil, Indian articles of dress, a few rifles, and some damaged shot guns in and about these pits, with recesses made in the sides to keep their blankets, &c., from the rain. Detachments of the enemy had evidently lived day and night in these pits safe from our fire. They were most judiciously placed to repel an attack from the large plain, but by attacking their right we had turned their entrenchments, and thus avoided a heavy loss. One or two of the pits showed signs of a hurried attempt to reverse their defence. Riel told me afterwards that our two reconnaisances to the open plain had confirmed them in their idea that we intended attacking from that side, and that the main part of their force was consequently posted there the last two days. I sent off one of Boulton's scouts to Humboldt with a telegram to the Minister of Militia, announcing our success, and the messenger returned during the night with a congratulatory answer. The next day brought us telegrams of congratulation from the Governor-General, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Wolseley, then in Egypt, which were both published in general orders, to the great gratification of the whole force. The story of the steamer *Northcote* was as follows:—Having anchored about two miles above Batoche, she moved on at 7.40 a.m., and was soon after fired upon from both banks, the men on board returning the fire. Luckily, the man at the wheel was well covered, but the captain, pilot, and most of the crew lost their heads, and the boat swept on, the wire ferry rope carrying away her smoke-jack and steam whistle. The enemy's fire was kept up for nearly two miles, but with little effect, only three men being slightly wounded. The steamer was then brought up, and finding it impossible to steam back with the two heavily-loaded barges she had in tow, it was reluctantly resolved to continue on to the Hudson Bay Ferry, repair damages, leave the barges there, take in more firewood, and return at once to Batoche. Unfortunately, they were delayed some hours before

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reaching the Ferry by running on a sandbank. They found the steamer *Marquis* at the Ferry, and a party of mounted police under Superintendent White, and it was determined to strengthen the steamer, put the police on board, and take them with the *Northcote* to Batoche.

The two steamers started on the morning of the 12th, but again the fates were against them, as the *Marquis* broke down and had to be towed by the other steamer, and they did not arrive at Batoche until 6 p.m., too late, to their intense regret, to share in our victory. Though the *Northcote* was unfortunately prevented from taking part in our attack on Batoche, I have little doubt that the probability of her returning with reinforcements tended to disturb the enemy, and Major Smith and his party deserved great credit for the resolute way in which they met the difficulties with which they were beset. Major Smith reported highly of the conduct of those with him, especially of my aide-de-camp, Captain Wise, Derbyshire Regiment, who, in spite of his wound, persisted in taking up a position with a rifle in the most exposed part of the boat and joining in the defence.

May the 13th was devoted to sending the wounded to Saskatoon by steamer, and to getting ready to move off to Prince Albert

A great number of half-breeds came in, vigorously waving white flags, and gave themselves up with their arms. I had a list of the worst of the rebels, and those not in it I dismissed. I received news during the day that Riel and Dumont were certainly on our side of the river.

The next day, May 14th, we marched for Lepine's Crossing, but during our midday halt I received reliable information that Riel was lurking in the neighbourhood, so I made for Guardepuis Crossing, which was close at hand, and camped for the night. The half-breeds continued to come in in great numbers with their white flags. The next morning, May 15th, we commenced crossing the river, using one of the steamers for that purpose. I sent Boulton off with nearly all our mounted scouts to scour the woods as far back as Batoche. While he was beating the covers, the principal game was driven into the hands of three of my courier scouts, Hourie, son of the interpreter, Deal, and Armstrong, all good men and true. They being well acquainted with the country, had detached themselves from Boulton's force, and came across Riel, who, fearing to fall into the hands of the troops, gave himself quietly up to them and begged to be taken at once to me. He had in his possession a letter which I had sent out, at the request of Mr. Ashley, by a half-breed the day Batoche was taken. This letter guaranteed his life, if he surrendered, until handed over to

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the civil authorities. I sent off to recall Boulton, some of whose men it appeared had caught sight of Dumont, but he was too well mounted and got away from them. I may as well add here that Dumont eventually succeeded in making good his escape into the United States. As soon as Riel arrived in camp he was brought to my tent while one was being pitched for him next my own. I found him a mild spoken and mild-looking man, with a short brown beard and an uneasy frightened look about his eyes, which gradually disappeared as I talked with him. He had no coat on, and looked cold and forlorn, and as it was still chilly out of the sun I commenced proceedings by giving him a military great coat of my own. He spoke English perfectly, and I had a long talk with him. He told me that he had intended escaping to the United States with Gabriel Dumont, but finding troops all about in the woods he had given up the idea of doing so, as he felt he could not bear the hardships and privations he would have had to undergo in trying to escape, not being accustomed to a hunter's life as Dumont was.

After conversing with Riel a good deal for two days, I came to the conclusion that he was sane enough in general every-day subjects, but was imbued with a strong, morbid, religious feeling, mingled with intense personal vanity.

After giving him some dinner I sent him off to his tent, and placed him under the personal charge of Captain Young, the Brigade-Major, who never let him out of his sight until he had handed him over to the Police Authorities at Regina, even sleeping under the same blankets with him. Whatever duty I assigned to Captain Young I could always depend on his performing it thoroughly and well. Sentries were posted about Riel's tent, and he was very anxious that they should receive orders that none of the soldiers were to be allowed to enter his tent, as he was sure they wanted to kill him, though I assured him such was not the case. Lieutenant-Colonel Houghton left that day for Winnipeg, and I gladly appointed Major Smith, of C Company School Corps, to succeed him as Assistant Adjutant-General, and Captain Harston, of the 10th Grenadiers, to succeed Captain Young as Brigade-Major. Captain Harston had served in the Royal Marines, and was a most zealous, intelligent officer.

May 16th we were still engaged in crossing the troops, which was nearly completed by night, the second steamer having arrived from Saskatoon. Received news that day of the capture on the 14th of May of a supply train of twenty-three teams with their teamsters, on the Swift Currant trail, about fifteen miles from Battleford, by Poundmaker's Indians. This was the only instance, during the

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whole campaign, of an attack being made on our trains. The same Indians, a few hours afterwards, attacked and drove back a patrol of nine men of the Mounted Police, who had one man killed and one wounded. The next day, the 17th, was Sunday, and we had divine service as usual. The Rev. C. C. Whitcomb, Church of England, joined the 10th Grenadiers that day. We finished crossing the teams, which was laborious work. The steamer *Baroness* arrived in the afternoon with supplies from Swift Current, bringing also two more companies of Midlanders under Major Harry Smith. Four rebels were brought in as prisoners, one of them having been Riel's secretary. Large quantities of arms were brought in by half-breeds, who, after being warned, were let go. The next morning, May 18th, the *Northcote* steamer was despatched up the river with Riel, under charge of Captain Young, and some other prisoners, who now numbered twenty-four in all, *en route* for Regina, where they afterwards arrived safely. The other steamers went on to Prince Albert. I sent two teams loaded with flour, bacon, tea, &c., to the Roman Catholic priests at Batoche, to enable them to relieve any distress among the women and children that might arise. The column marched at 10 a.m.; the day, though fine at first, turning to heavy showers in the afternoon. We did the thirty-five miles to Prince Albert in two days, arriving there early on the 19th after an eighteen miles march, and we were met by the Bishop of Saskatchewan and Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine and a good many of the inhabitants, who presented me with an address. The Mounted Police looked smart and well, and were a fine body of men. The town, which is a straggling one, runs along the right bank of the North Branch of the Saskatchewan. It had been hastily and imperfectly put in a state of defence at different points, but as the ground about it was clear it must have been all along tolerably safe from attack, as half-breeds and Indians are not fond of attacking even slightly protected positions in open ground, and it was evidently not considered liable to attack from the river, no attempt having been made to protect that side of the houses. In point of fact there was no attempt at attack made by the enemy on Prince Albert, or its immediate neighbourhood, as the Bishop of Saskatchewan lived near a large school or college, which was situated a little distance from the town, and was not molested.

We remained halted at Prince Albert for three days, during which time I was busily engaged in receiving from, and despatching telegrams to, my different detachments, and in making arrangements for going on to Battleford. On the 22nd of May I embarked my force in two steamers, except the mounted men and

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transport who I directed to march by the north trail, crossing the river at Fort Carlton. I took on with me from Prince Albert Mr. Hayter Reid, Assistant Indian Commissioner, who was kindly lent to me by Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney, and whose knowledge of the country and Indians was of great assistance to me. To my great regret I was obliged to leave Captain Wise at Prince Albert, his wound not being healed.

The next day, the 23rd, as we were steaming on to Battleford, a canoe was seen to shoot out from the bank ahead of us. We slowed down, the canoe ran alongside, and an Indian, accompanied by a white man, boarded us. The Indian proved to be a messenger from Poundmaker; the white man—a Mr. Jefferson, an Indian instructor, who had been captured by the Indians—accompanying him as a sort of interpreter. The Indian handed me a letter written in English, which read as follows:—

"Eagle Hills, May 19th, 1885.

"SIR,—I am camped with my people at the east-end of the Eagle Hills, where I am met by the news of the surrender of Riel. No letter came with the news, so that I cannot tell how far it may be true. I send some of my men to you to learn the truth and the terms of peace, and hope you will deal kindly with them. I and my people wish you to send us the terms of peace in writing, so that we may be under no misunderstanding, from which so much trouble arises. We have twenty-one prisoners, whom we have tried to treat well in every respect.* With greetings.

"(Signed) POUNDMAKER. His X mark.

"To Major-General Middleton,
"Duck Lake."

I sent back the following not quite grammatical answer:—

"POUNDMAKER,—I have utterly defeated the half-breeds and Indians at Batoche, and have made prisoners of Riel and most of his council. I have made no terms with them, neither will I make terms with you. I have men enough to destroy you and your people, or, at least, to drive you away to starve, and will do so unless you bring in the teams you took and yourself and councillors, with your arms, to meet me at Battleford on Monday, the 26th. I am glad to hear you have treated the prisoners well and have released them.

"(Signed) FRED MIDDLETON,
"Major-General."

* Mr. Jefferson informed me that the teamsters had been released before he started.

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Next day, the 24th, we arrived at Battleford, and were received by Lieutenant-Colonel Otter, commanding there. The principal part of this straggling town is situated between the Saskatchewan and the Battle rivers, but at some little distance from the former. The houses of the Judge and others, and a native college, were on the south side of the Battle, and that part only was molested by the Indians after it had been deserted, who burned and pillaged some of the houses the night of Lieutenant-Colonel Otter's arrival and halt some three or four miles short of Battleford. The other part was surrounded by fine, clear, open grass land, and was never attacked by the Indians at all, the goods left in the abandoned houses being found untouched on the arrival of Otter's force. The weakest spot in the whole settlement was the Police barracks or stockade, which, hastily and imperfectly strengthened, was situated in the vicinity of a large coulee, and there all the inhabitants were collected. As the 24th of May fell on a Sunday, the next day I had a parade of all the troops to celebrate Her Most Gracious Majesty's birthday. On the 26th, Poundmaker and his people came in about 1 p.m., and we held a "pow-wow" in front of the camp. It was rather an interesting sight. The Indians, in war paint, to the number of about seventy, squatted themselves down in a semicircle in front of my chair, Poundmaker, a tall, fine-looking Indian, taking up his position between the Indians and myself, Hourie, my interpreter, standing close to Poundmaker. Outside the semicircle were to be seen a few squaws, squalid and dirty as usual. Close round me, in a semicircle to match the squatting Indians, stood all my officers, the whole completely encircled by the men of my force.

Poundmaker opened the ball by making a long oration, embellished with allegories and the usual Indian flowers of speech. The gist of it was that he knew little of what was going on, that he had done his best to keep his young braves quiet, and that now he had come to make his peace, which he seemed to think was very praiseworthy of him. Several braves followed him, but it was difficult to understand what they were driving at. At last a squaw came forward and wanted to make a speech, but I objected, saying that, like the Indians themselves, we did not admit women to our councils in war time, and that I could not listen to her. When this was translated to her, the dirty but crafty old woman shrewdly remarked that we ourselves were ruled by a woman. In answer, I allowed that such was the case, but pointed out that our gracious Queen only spoke on war matters through her councillors, among whom were no women. The old lady did not seem to see it, and she was dragged away, grumbling loudly, by some of her friends.

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Poundmaker kept a dignified silence during this little interlude. After the braves had all finished I made a short speech, in which I pointed out the ingratitude of the Indians, who had been well treated by the white men, in joining the half-breeds in rebellion, and that now, when they heard of the defeat and capture of Riel, they came in with lies in their mouths begging for peace. I then went on to say that, in obedience to orders from Government, I should arrest Poundmaker and four of his braves, bearing the curious names, when translated, of Lean-man, Yellow-mud-blanket, Breaking-though-the-ice, and White-bear, and that the rest could return to their reserve, first giving up the men who had committed two deliberate murders of white men a short time before. Upon this, a brave, wearing an European woman's straw hat with ribbons, stepped out of the semi-circle, and, sitting at my feet, which he grasped with his two hands, confessed to one of the murders. Strangely enough, this man's name, when translated, was "the man without blood." Another Indian now stepped out, and, stripping himself to the waist, advanced and confessed to having committed the other murder. I then declared the pow-wow at an end, and the prisoners were taken off by the mounted police, and eventually sent to Regina. The next day, the 27th, the rest of my force arrived by steamer under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Van Straubenzee. A small party of mounted police, under Major Perry, arrived early in the morning from the Alberta Field Force, which he had left at Fort Pitt, where they had arrived on the 25th after great difficulties and arduous work under the command of Major-General Strange. This party had been sent down the south bank to see if any information could be obtained of Big Bear's people, whom General Strange believed had started off to join Poundmaker. On finding that General Strange was at Fort Pitt, I at once sent off a steamer with supplies for his force, in charge of Captain Bedson, putting a company of the 90th, under Captain Forrest, on board, also Major Perry and his party. When nearly half way to Fort Pitt, the steamer was boarded from a canoe by a messenger from General Strange with the account of an engagement with Big Bear's people, and Captain Bedson, very wisely, having landed the mounted police, returned at once to Battleford for further orders. It appeared that General Strange, having received certain information, had marched from Fort Pitt late in the day on the 27th with all his available force, and came up with the enemy in a strong position on a wooded ridge, from which he drove them, and bivouacked there for the night. The next morning, the 28th, he followed up their trail and came upon them strongly posted, near a

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hill called "Frenchman's Butte," well covered by a swampy creek. After engaging the enemy for some time, and having three men wounded, it was reported by scouts that the creek was impracticable for his men to cross, so considering his force not strong enough to run any risks, General Strange determined to return to some open ground six miles to the rear, from whence, after a halt of two hours, he fell back to Fort Pitt about five miles distant. It was a pity General Strange had not waited for my arrival, when a more decisive blow might have been struck. He reported favourably of his troops, specially mentioning the names of some of his officers, Brigade-Major Dale, late Madras Fusiliers, Major Steel, Mounted Police, Lieutenant Strange, now Royal Artillery, and others. I immediately issued orders for the whole of my column to be ready to leave next day, the 30th, for Fort Pitt, by steamer, except the mounted part, which was to march by the trail on the south bank, Lieutenant-Colonel Otter and his column remaining at Battleford. Accordingly the next morning, May 31st, we left in three steamers. The day after, when within six or seven miles of Fort Pitt, Major Dale, Strange's brigade-major, came on board with the information that the Alberta Column had left Fort Pitt, and was then camped some twelve miles off on its way back to Frenchman's Butte. Major Dale also brought the very welcome intelligence that on his way to me he had come across the Rev. Mr. Quinney, his wife, and some half-breeds, who had escaped from Big Bear's camp in the confusion caused by the attack at Frenchman's Butte. Major Dale left with the escaped prisoners, and a message from me to General Strange that I would be with him next day. On the 2nd I landed, and with a small escort rode off to General Strange's camp, leaving orders for the troops to be disembarked and camped where they were. After a disagreeable ride we found Strange's camp pitched near Big Bear's late position, he having ascertained that morning that the Indians had abandoned it. Indeed, we afterwards heard that they had done so the day after the fight. I found Strange had sent Major Steele to follow the trail of Big Bear, who had apparently gone northwards. He had also sent Mr. McKay, Hudson Bay Company, with some scouts, by another trail, who afterwards came across a party of Indians with Mrs. Gowanlock, Mrs. Delany, and other prisoners who had separated from Big Bear's party, and whom they took in to Fort Pitt.

We went over Big Bear's late camp, and found that the Indians had made numerous rifle-pits, but they were not all well placed, a good many of them being too far back on the plateau. The gully below was full of carts, broken and sound, harness, old bedding,

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blankets, cooking-pots, flour, bacon, &c., most of it being loot. This abandonment of, to them, valuable property, showed that the Indians were getting demoralised. General Strange informed me that the trail taken by Major Steele was impassable for teams owing to the very bad muskegs, and he wished to take his force by Onion Lake towards Frog Lake. This I agreed to; but I did not believe that the trail was so difficult as was made out. "Norwesters" were still rife, and I determined to follow Steele's trail myself. I returned to my camp by the river, and next morning, June 3rd, having directed Van Straubenzee to move our camp to Fort Pitt, I started back to Strange's camp with all the mounted men, viz., Boultons, Herckmer's, Mounted Police, the Surveyor's Scouts, and Brittlebank's,* (late French's), about 225 in all, with Major Short, Captain Peters, Lieutenant Rivers, twenty-five artillerymen, one gatling, and 150 infantry, selected from each regiment, under command of Major Hughes of the Midlanders, all carried in carts. We had a very hard march, and it rained all day. Found Strange waiting to see me, his force having left for Onion Lake.

At 2 a.m. next morning, I was awoke with the news that Major Steele had caught up the rear of Big Bear's party crossing a ford, and had killed five of them, three of his own men being wounded. Strange started to catch up his force, and we started at day-break on Big Bear's trail after Major Steele. The first part of the road was terrible, owing to numerous muskegs, but everyone worked hard, and we managed to get the gatling and the teams through, the latter being lightly loaded. On our march, at one of the enemy's halting places, we found a rough mound, which a half-bred scout, we had as interpreter, declared to be a grave. As there were fears that the Indians might kill some of their prisoners, I had given orders that the ground in the vicinity of our march should be well searched for graves, and that they should be all opened, and reclosed carefully if only Indians were found therein. This one was opened in my presence, and was found to contain an Indian chief, who had evidently been badly wounded by a piece of one of Strange's shells. The body was partially clothed, and had an eerie look about it, owing to both cheeks being painted red. It was replaced and covered over again. We found more carts here, some with food in them, and a great many furs hidden about, some of which were presented to me by their finders. A silver mug was picked up here with an inscription on it "Presented by General

* Captain Brittlebank, a most excellent partisan officer, had, as second in command, succeeded poor French at his much lamented death.

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Rosser to Katie Maclean," which I took charge of and afterwards returned to the young lady herself.

We halted at a point some ten miles from Fort Pitt where the trail from there joined the one we had come by. I heard such awful accounts of the trail ahead that I set men to work to make travoies* after the Indian fashion, and sent into Fort Pitt for some rough pack saddles that the indefatigable Bedson had prepared for an emergency. I also sent back my infantry, much to their regret, but I felt they would keep us back, and ordered the second gatling to join us under Lieutenant Rutherford, B Battery. I sent for the other gatling more to console the mounted force for the loss of the infantry than for any advantage I expected to derive from it. Though the gatlings had been well and pluckily worked, they had proved unsuitable for the kind of fighting we were engaged in. At least our experience at Batoche taught us that the physical as well as the moral effect of the gatling on our enemy had been very slight. During the day three wounded mounted police came in from Major Steele's party, which was camped about eight miles from us. I rode out to the camp and saw Major Steele. He reported that he had come up with what was apparently the rear-guard of Big Bear's party packing up their camp. He attacked them, killing several, but the rest escaped across a ford to an island, and having counted seventy-three camp fires at a camp he had passed, he did not think his party strong enough to follow them, and so had retired. He also reported that his horses were mostly played out, having had little to eat, and he spoke most highly of the conduct of his officers, Captain Oswald and Lieutenant Coryell, non-commissioned officers and men, especially praising the pluck and endurance of the three wounded men. That evening my aide-de-camp, Captain Frere, informed me that Major Steele and his men were very anxious to turn back and go with us, to which I consented, sending back the most used-up of his men and horses to Fort Pitt. I knew from General Strange that Major Steele and his men had been most useful to him, and they did excellent service with me, Major Steele proving himself to be a most zealous and excellent officer. Ever since we had left Frenchman's Butte our route had been through woods, the weather being very hot. The mosquitoes and flies were terrible; however we all bore it with Christian fortitude, an occasional big "D" excepted!

Steele's report of the road ahead was tolerably favourable, though he thought we might have some difficulty at the ford he

* A travoie is made by fastening two long poles at one end, the other two ends dragging on the ground, and being kept apart by two transverse sticks on which the load is put. This affair is dragged by a pony, dog, or squaw as the case may be.

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had mentioned, so I determined to start with my teams, taking with us the travoies and pack-saddles in case we might want them. We left Travoies Camp (as we called it) early next morning, June 6th, picked up Steele's party, and camped at 6 p.m. after a twenty-five mile march, still in the woods, mosquitoes and a large sort of cattle fly called "bulldogs,"* being fearfully troublesome. We had had considerable difficulty in getting our teams on, but had managed to do so. I sent on in advance the Surveyor's Scouts under Captain Dennis, with axes, and when they came to a bad part or a stream they bushed or bridged it, so that we were seldom delayed, the party doing their work admirably and skilfully. Believing now that Big Bear and his braves were thoroughly disorganized and might scatter or turn, I sent off orders, before leaving Travoies Camp, to Lieutenant-Colonel Otter to leave part of his force at Battleford under command of Major Dawson, 10th Grenadiers—who had not quite recovered from his wound—and to take the rest across the river, move on to Jack-fish Lake, and patrol to the north-west or Squirrel Plain. I also directed Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, at Prince Albert, to cross a mounted party at Carleton, and patrol towards Green Lake, so that with General Strange moving on Beaver River by Frog Lake, and my party moving northwards, it would be difficult for Big Bear to get away. I determined to leave our camp standing here with a small guard, and not take any tents on at all, as it would lighten our teams considerably; and marching at day-break, halted at mid-day near one of the enemy's old camps. We found several broken carts, with food, &c., and one of our scouts discovered hid under a large pile of boughs and leaves two carts full of furs, part of which was presented to me. There were more signs, as usual, of the presence of the prisoners in this camp, bits of torn photographs, lids of work-boxes, small pieces of coloured wools tied to branches of bushes, &c. That evening, after doing twenty-five miles we camped on the high ground, overlooking the lake and ford, where Steele had caught the enemy crossing. The lake was a large one, though not shown on our maps, and was known to the half-breeds as Loon Lake, there being numbers of these birds about it. I went down to the ford, passing through the old Indian camp, where more things were left scattered about, with one Indian lying dead, shot through the body. We found the ford quite passable for our teams and gatlings, and next morning we marched early, crossed over safely, and found ourselves on the

* This pest takes a small bit out of you each bite, leaving a drop of blood trickling down your face or neck.

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mainland and not on an island. On our way we passed another lake on our right, and on the ridge of land between the two lakes came across another Indian camping ground with, as usual, furs, carts, food, &c., lying about, and three graves which were found to contain three Indians. We found some scraps of paper here with writing on them, saying that the prisoners were all right. Our trail this day was very hilly and tried the draught horses terribly, and it was wonderful to see over what apparently impassable ground we brought our gatlings and teams in safety. The trail conducted us to what we called the "Narrows," being a rapid stream running from one lake to the other, and which the Indians had evidently crossed by means of rafts of wood and rushes. We at once set to work and made a raft to take over the saddles, blankets, &c., and swam the horses over, leaving the teams, gatlings, and twenty-five mounted police on the hither side. We moved on and bivouacked on a wooded ridge, where there were evident signs that the Indians had camped within forty-eight hours. Just below where we halted we found the body of an Indian squaw in a kneeling position. She had a piece of raw hide—"shaka-nappy," as it is called—round her neck, the ends being fastened to a young tree, and had deliberately strangled herself. We heard afterwards that she had some disease which prevented her walking, and her party having no means of carrying her on, the unfortunate woman committed suicide. Boulton, who had been sent forward, returned with the unpleasant news that the trail of the Indians had entered a muskeg, which was the only way by which we could follow them to the north, not having boats, and that the muskeg would be quite impassable by us. I went forward to judge for myself. A few yards on in the muskeg lay a cart, sunk in over its wheels, and beyond it, on the track taken by the Indians, were strewed bundles, pots, and things dropped by them to lighten their loads. I rode myself into the muskeg, but soon sank to my saddle girths and was extricated with great difficulty. We bivouacked where we were, the night being hot, rainy, and "moskitoey." Next morning two scouts managed, with great difficulty, to cross the muskeg, nearly losing their horses returning. They reported the enemy's trail as going north, and assured me that we could not cross without losing probably half our horses, and perhaps some men. With such probable consequences in view, and fearing the risk of placing such an obstacle between ourselves and our supplies, I determined to return to Fort Pitt, and from there make my way to General Strange on the Beaver River. The next morning we crossed the Narrows again by a sort of light bridge of faggots and ropes, cleverly made

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under Captain Peters' directions, the horses being swum over, and after two days' fatiguing marches arrived at Fort Pitt on the 11th of June. On the 13th I started with the mounted men for Beaver River. Marched thirty-five miles to Frog Lake and pitched camp close to that of the Midlanders under Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, whom I had ordered there to support Strange. The settlement had been completely destroyed, and the Midlanders had buried two or three bodies of white people they had found. The next day we made another march of thirty-five miles and camped near the Hudson Bay Post, being torn to pieces by mosquitoes and flies, though we were better equipped to meet these monsters than before, having gauze veils and linen gauntlets, part of the numerous articles kindly made and sent up to the force by the ladies of Toronto, Ottawa, and other parts of Canada, a great part of which, however, unfortunately went astray or were stolen. Her Royal Highness the Princess Louise, with the kindly thoughtfulness of her race, also had graciously sent out Dr. Boyd with an extensive medical and surgical outfit, and a large sum of money for distribution, and I received a most kind letter of congratulation on our success from the Marquess of Lorne. The next day, June 15th, after a short march of ten miles, we arrived at General Strange's camp at the Roman Catholic Mission on the Beaver River. We had a pow-wow with some Chippewayan Indians, who had been (unwillingly) with Big Bear, and had got away from him, bringing with them their missionary, Father Le Goff, a very good, worthy man. After some talk it was arranged that two of the Indians should be sent down the river to try and find out where Big Bear was. Captain E. Palliser arrived to-day to join General Strange's column, after a hard and adventurous journey down the river from Edmonton. On the 17th June, I started with my aide-de-camp, Captain Freere, and Mr. Hayter Reid for Cold Lake, about fifteen miles off, where Lieutenant-Colonel Osborne Smith had been sent with the Winnipeg Light Infanty. We had to swim our horses across the Beaver River, and found two or three nasty muskegs on the other side, and were more or less baited by mosquitoes and "bull-dogs" all the way. I found Osborne Smith had sent the Rev. Mr. McKay—one of our best scouts—off in a canoe with two Indians to try and gain information about Big Bear. This lake, which is a large one, is well called Cold Lake, as its water is icy cold, but it seems to agree with the white fish, pike and trout, which abound, and are of immense size and very good to eat. The next day Captain Bedson arrived with supplies and letters for us, and in the evening the two Indians

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came in with news that the Macleans and the rest of the prisoners had been released and were travelling by Loon Lake to Fort Pitt. This was grand news indeed, and I gave orders for my mounted party to move off at daybreak for Fort Pitt, and directed Major-General Strange to collect his force and join me there. Captain Bedson and myself started in a waggon next morning, the 19th June, at 3 a.m., for "the landing" on the North Saskatchewan River, a distance of fifty miles, which we did, over a bad and difficult road, in about twelve hours, capturing a small black bear cub on our way. At "the landing" we found a steamer, and in it reached Fort Pitt at 10 p.m., Captain Bedson starting at once with teams to meet the released prisoners at Loon Lake. Our camp was pitched on the plateau overlooking the remains of Fort Pitt, which had been placed in a bad position as regards defence. On the 22nd June Captain Bedson arrived with the released prisoners all safe and well.

On the 26th I received the news that Big Bear's band had broken up, so with Batoche captured, Riel and Poundmaker prisoners, Big Bear powerless and a fugitive, and all the prisoners released, I considered my work nearly done, and began to make arrangements for breaking up the force. By the 3rd of July the last of the troops at Fort Pitt had embarked in the steamers, except the Winnipeg Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Osborne Smith, which were left behind to gather in arms and prisoners, perhaps Big Bear himself. On my way down the river, however, I had the satisfaction of receiving a report that Big Bear had given himself up on the 2nd July to a small detachment of mounted police at Carlton. This actually completed the perfect success of our campaign, but our joy was damped by the untimely death of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, M.P., commanding the Midlanders. He died on board the steamer from the effects of a chill. His loss was universally deplored, not only by us, his comrades, but by the whole of Canada. I cannot better conclude this narrative than by quoting the General Order with which I took leave of my force:—

"In thus completing the breaking-up of the North-West Field Force, which has been under the immediate command of Major-General Middleton during the late campaign, he cannot let the officers and men comprising it separate without expressing his great satisfaction with them. During the whole time he has not had to assemble one court-martial; and, in fact, there has been an almost total absence of crime. The troops have had great hardships to undergo, and real difficulties to overcome, and have borne and met them like men, with ready cheerfulness and without

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complaint. They, as untried volunteer-soldiers, have had to move in a country where an extraordinary scare existed, and against an enemy with whom it was openly prophesied they would be unable to cope, unless with great superiority of numbers. The scare they disregarded, as shown by the fact that during the whole three months not more than two or three false alarms took place in camp, and the prophecy they falsified by beating back the enemy with a fighting line only equal if not inferior to him in numbers. Each regiment, corps, or arm of the service has vied one against the other, and each has equally well done its duty; not forgetting the transport service, which under its two able officers has so well aided our movements, the medical department which has been so efficiently directed, and the chaplains who have so carefully and assiduously ministered to our spiritual comforts. The Major-General in taking farewell of his old comrades begs to wish them all happiness and success in their several walks in life, and to sincerely thank them, one and all, for having by their gallantry, good conduct, and hard work, enabled him to carry to a successful conclusion what will probably be his last campaign."

FRED. MIDDLETON.

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NEW NOTES ON WÖRTH.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL V. BOGUSLAUSKI sums up in his recent *brochure* all the literature—French and German—bearing on the battle of Wörth. He has already described and analysed it as far back as 1872; but at that time, for obvious reasons, accurate and full criticism was scarcely to be expected so soon after the end of the campaign, in which it was one of the earliest battles.† Much of the pertinacity of fighting which characterised the fight on the Sauer on the 7th August, 1870, more than any action during the war, is ascribed to the fact that both the French and German battalions, particularly the 5th Corps of the latter Army, were largely composed of veteran troops; and most of us will cordially agree with General v. Boguslauski in believing that "young troops may certainly *enter* action with greater confidence, but the superiority of veterans asserts itself in such sudden crises as sudden losses and counter-attacks." Certainly it was for such occasions that Napoleon formed the Old and Young Guard.

A very simple explanation is offered of the lack of unity of action in the German frontal attack, for with the exception of the passage of the Gunstett bridge, the Sauer—that day in full spate—could only be crossed by hop-poles laid side by side; and these being, of course, impassable to mounted officers, the direction of the fight consequently fell into the hands of company leaders and their subordinates only.

Crushing as was the effect of the massed batteries of the 5th and 11th Corps in the artillery duel, it has nevertheless been somewhat exaggerated; both natural cover and the wet soil causing many shells to burst harmlessly; and this gave such protection to the French infantry from the German guns as to allow of it inflicting enormous losses on the subsequent advance of the 10th Division.

* Neue Studien über die Schlaeht bei Wörth, by Lieutenant-General v. Boguslauski. Mittler. Berlin (by post, 1s. 9d).

† Tactical deductions from the War of 1870-71, by A. v. Boguslauski. Translated by Colonel Lumley Graham.

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Attention is also drawn to the conspicuous display of the traditional French *élan* in this battle in contradistinction to the other engagements of 1870; the most striking example being the dashing counter-attack of the 1st Turkos against the German troops pushing forward from Elsasshausen, demonstrating that even in these days the determined frontal attack by fresh troops of a line of mixed up regiments can be made with some chance of success.*

Unfavourable as was the ground to Bonnemain's charge, it is not generally recognised that in all other respects the opportunity was in favour of the cavalry. The German infantry was mixed up to a great degree, the 5th and 11th Corps had been a long time in action, and had been repulsed at least once. In a word, according to the modern views, the infantry *ought* to have been in that condition "when it does not know whether it has a rifle or pitchfork in its hand." Nevertheless the charge was received without even an alteration of formation.

The great reluctance of the higher leaders to interfere with the liberty of action of their subordinates was, says the author, responsible for the disconnected fashion in which the Germans commenced this battle. All this might have been prevented he thinks, had but the commander of the 5th Corps followed Napoleon's almost invariable custom of marching with the advanced guard, and so exercising his own judgment as to the advisability of the attack.

The highest praise is given to Lartigue for the manner in which he repulsed the attack of the 20th Brigade. He used just enough troops, and handled them with great determination. But one fault can be found with his defence, in that "had the eastern lisière of the forest bastion between Spachbach been garrisoned not a soul could have crossed at Spachbach."

The suggestion that seeing how the fight was going at 2 p.m., the twenty-six squadrons of divisional cavalry might well have been massed by 5 p.m. on the German left flank, in readiness for the pursuit, meets with no approval. Boguslauski ably contends that even had such a concentration been possible, it would have entailed the disunion of the cavalry from the divisions; that a leader of this heterogeneous collection would have had to be suddenly improvised; they would not have been able to follow far with their then armament; and that in any case Falkenstein would have been the limit of their pursuit, as

* The details of this counter-attack, which illustrate very strikingly the difficulties of wood fighting, are to be found in the regimental history of the 50th Regiment, also by Lieutenant-General v. Boguslauski.

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there Guyon de Lespart's infantry would have met them. Finally, they would not have been available for reconnaissance next day.

Favourable as was MacMahon's position for watching the valley of the Sauer, Kirchbach's determined frontal attack focussed his entire attention. He wasted his power in isolated counter-attacks instead of delivering a powerful one against Kirchbach, and then, concentrating on his right flank, striking a second and still more powerful blow.

The French made no preparation for retreat. Instead of holding on to the last and using up Bonnemain's cuirassiers and the reserve artillery, these last might have been more profitably utilised in taking up a position east of Reichshoffen to cover the retreat.

The pamphlet concludes by pointing out several evils which long peace engenders and war speedily stifles. The desire which troops have to "blood" themselves often frustrate the views of the higher leaders. A mistaken independence is prejudicial to unity of action. And finally, upholding of "orders" will cause men to think calmly in danger, and, should they depart from an order, conduct themselves as Kirchbach did.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

SIR,—As I was pressed for space in my article in this month's issue of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, will you kindly allow me through your correspondence columns to tender my most grateful thanks to the courteous officials in private yards, and to those officers on duty at the Navy yards and in the Navy Department who so willingly afforded me information and helped me in my study of "the new American Navy." The UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE is widely read in professional circles in the States, and these lines will, I know, meet the eye of many to whom I am under great obligations. More especially would I acknowledge my indebtedness to Lieutenant-Commander French E. Chadwick, U.S.N., late Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and now, I believe, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, to whose kindness and courteous introductions I owe much.

Yours faithfully,

H. LAWRENCE SWINBURNE.

21*st December*, 1893.

NOTICES OF BOOKS, ETC.

These notices give a brief abstract of the general scope of the volumes referred to, and, without reviewing them at length, call attention to their most striking points.

The New Egypt: A Social Sketch. By FRANCIS ADAMS. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1893.

This very interesting volume was left unfinished by the late Mr. Adams at the time of his death, but was so far advanced that it was thought advisable to publish it as it is. It is not only brightly and pleasantly written, but contains much valuable information. The author seems to have gone to the country with the ordinary ideas which we Englishmen have, of what we have done, are doing, and hope to do in the way of teaching the Egyptians

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self-government and self-reliance. A notable feature of the book is the personal experience of the different classes with whom Mr. Adams came in contact, and they give a very fair impression of what, on the whole, is the feeling as regards the English occupation. Of course there are many opinions, from the Greek who thinks that if the good old times returned he would have a chance of sharing in with the rest of the *gros lots* of the big places in the Government, to the English official who says, "Remove England from Egypt and you remove the one honest public administration yet possible"; but few of the inhabitants seem to consider that there would be any risk of a repetition of the Alexandrian massacre if we quitted the country. There is food for reflection in every chapter of this remarkable book.

Handbook of British East Africa, including Zanzibar, Uganda, and the Territory of the Imperial British East Africa Company. Prepared in the Intelligence Division, War Office, 1893. London: Harrison and Sons. 1893.

Captain Foster, to whom the compilation of this useful monograph was entrusted, has produced an extremely useful book, containing as it does a careful digest of all that has been written on the subject. Each district of the country is dealt with separately, and much information is in each case imparted regarding the physical geography, the inhabitants, climate, and products; while separate chapters deal with the general climate and ethnology of East Africa. Chapter XII. is devoted to communications and travel, and gives some valuable hints to travellers about caravans and their organisation. A full list of books of reference and some excellent maps are given at the end.

Physical Drill of All Nations. By A. ALEXANDER, F.R.G.S., Director of the Liverpool Gymnasium. London: G. Philip and Son. 1894.

Lord Wolseley, in an introductory note or preface, expresses a hope that this book "may rouse the people to a full consciousness of how necessary it is to attend most carefully to the physical development of our boys and girls, if we intend to be in the future the great nation we have been in the past." There is no doubt of the value of physical training to the young of both sexes, and Mr. Alexander in a very practical and fully-illustrated manual shows how this training should be carried out. The exercises, divided into twelve chapters, deal with the gymnastic instruction in all the leading nations, and at the end of each is the National Anthem of the country dealt with.

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Order Book for Executive Officers of the Royal Navy. Compiled by COMMANDER W. W. HEWETT, R.N., Portsmouth. J. Griffin and Co. 1893.

As the title implies, this small volume is designed to assist executive officers in newly commissioned ships, and is the result of personal experience. The subject-matter is arranged alphabetically, and blank spaces are left to be filled in, according to the class of the ship. For example, under the head of "Ashes," after "at sea the ashes will be got up by the 'working party' at the following times," a space is left in which the hours chosen would be entered. Of course, the volume is of a purely technical character, and the information it imparts is clearly and methodically expressed.

Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland, 1878-1891. By HUGH H. ROMILLY, C.M.G., Deputy-Commissioner for the Western Pacific, and some time Acting-Commissioner of New Guinea. Edited, with Memoirs, by his brother, Samuel H. Romilly. London: David Nutt. 1893.

This well-illustrated volume records the services of the late Mr. Hugh Romilly between the years 1879 and 1891, in a series of letters and extracts from his journals. It deals with the early days of the occupation of Fiji and Rotumah, the declaration of the Protectorate over New Guinea, his consular experiences in the New Hebrides, and finally his visit to Mashonaland in command of one of the exploring parties.

Matabeleland. The War and our Position in South Africa. By ARCHIBALD COLQUHOUN, First Administrator of Mashonaland.

Mr. Colquhoun writes with authority in dealing with one of our latest acquisitions on the African Continent, inasmuch as he accompanied the pioneer expedition of 1890 and executed the Manika treaty, and therefore has seen the upgrowth of the new colony from the outset. Beginning with the gradual and successive partition of Africa, he describes the physical geography of the Matabele and Mashona districts, and in describing Lobengula and his power hazards the prophesy, that as his fighting men have degenerated, "the whole fabric may be easily shaken or broken." The recent campaign has fully proved this. Sanguine views are expressed as to the commercial future of the district, in which there are 27,000 square miles of gold-bearing formation. Appendices give Lobengula's concession to Messrs. Rudd, &c., the Royal Charter granted to the British South Africa Company, and some useful information to those who are desirous of colonising.

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A Year Amongst the Persians. Impressions as to the Life, Character, and Thought of the People of Persia, received during Twelve Months' Residence in that Country in the Years 1887-88. By EDWARD G. BROWNE, M.A., M.B.

In a handsome, well-indexed volume of some 600 pages Mr. Browne relates his experiences in Persia, whither he went to complete his studies in the language, to become eventually lecturer in Persian to the University of Cambridge. His travels are pleasantly told, and he describes with careful minuteness much of the domestic life which his knowledge of the language enabled him more fully to understand. The author visited most of the principal towns, and tells some curious stories about mysticism, occultism, and magic.

The Army Book for the British Empire.

With reference to the short notice we gave of this important work in our January Number, we have been authoritatively assured that the statement made by the authors as to the state of preparation of the Artillery are literally and categorically correct.

LIST OF BOOKS, ETC., RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

Matabeleland—The War and our Position in South Africa, by A. R. Colquhoun. Leadenhall Press, Leadenhall Street, E.C.

Letters and Memoirs of Hugh Hastings Romilly, by S. H. Romilly. David Nutt, Strand, W.C.

English Illustrated Magazine. Illustrated London News Office.

The Needs of the Navy. Daily Graphic Office.

A Year among the Persians, by Edward G. Browne, M.A., M.B. Adam & Charles Black.

Die Reichswehr. Vienna.

Militärische Zeitschrift. Wilhelm Braumuller.

New Review. William Heinemann, Bedford Street,

The Empire. Toronto.

Army and Navy Journal. New York.

The Australasian Army, Navy, and Defence Review. Sydney.

Memory, by Professor A. Loisette.

The New Egypt, by Francis Adams. T. Fisher Unwin.

The Oxfordshire Light Infantry Calendar.

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The Jewish Quarterly Review. D. Nutt and Co., Strand.

Physical Drill of all Nations, by A. Alexander, F.R.G.S. George Philip, Fleet Street.

Handbook of British East Africa, prepared in the Intelligence Division, War Office. Harrison & Son, 59, Pall Mall.

Neue Militärische Blatter. G. von Glasenapp.

The Word on the Waters. Missions to Seamen.

Volunteer Service Gazette.

Canadian Military Gazette. Montreal.

Souvenir of the Inns of Court Hotel.

United Service Review. Philadelphia.

Revue Militaire de l'Etranger. Paris.

Marine Rundschau. Berlin.

The Strategic Geography of Central and Western Europe, by T. M. Maguire. Gale & Polden, Aldershot.

Deferred Pay; or A Major's Dilemma, by Lieut.-Colonel W. H. M'Causland. Digby, Long, & Co., 18, Bouverie Street.

North American Review. New York.

Globe and Laurel. Gibraltar.

Die Entwickelung der Feldartillerie in Bezugauf, Material, Organification, und Taktik, von 1815 *bis* 1892, by H. Müller. Mittler, Berlin.

Catalogue of English Official Military Works, issued by the British Government. London.

The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa, by A. B. Ellis. Chapman & Hall.

All communications for the Editor should be addressed "THE EDITOR, UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, 15, *York Street, Covent Garden, London; W.C.," and, if intended for insertion, should be written on one side of the paper only. The Editor does not undertake to return rejected communications unless accompanied by stamped and addressed envelope.*

Communications concerning subscriptions or the business of the Magazine must be addressed to the Publisher.

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 784.—MARCH, 1894.

PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES' MISCONCEPTION.

BY ARCHIBALD FORBES.

PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES, in his prime, was a brilliant fighting soldier. In battle his *coup d'œil* was swift and true, and for the most part his decisions were justified by results. But in the rare occasions when he found himself in independent command his limitations disclosed themselves. He was not by any means always happy in drawing accurate inferences from fairly plain data. His military mind was lacking in scope and elasticity, and when the problem was at all obscure he needed Moltke to do his thinking for him. At one momentous crisis in the early days of the Franco-German war, when he was empowered, in his own judgment, to carry into effect a series of extremely important operations, thus left to his own devices he allowed himself to become the victim of a misconception, the results of which, but for singular, and, it may be added, undeserved good fortune, must have entailed disaster of a very serious character. The successive phases of this stubborn and dangerous misconception it may be worth while to expose, more particularly since, strangely enough, the subject has met with attention by the military critics neither on the Continent nor in England.

In the second week of August, 1870, the German Armies were advancing from the frontier towards the Moselle. The 1st Army

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(Steinmetz), forming the right wing of the great German host, was marching directly on Metz. The 2nd Army, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, and consisting of the following corps: Guard, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th, 10th, and 12th, was heading for the Moselle above (southward of) Metz. The 3rd Army, under the command of the Crown Prince, and constituting the left wing, had crossed the Vosges and was approaching the upper Moselle about and above Nancy. Scouting parties of cavalry from the 2nd Army were already across the river, daringly pushing their investigations. It had been the belief in the German head-quarter that the French Army had already completed its retreat across the Moselle, and was marching on Verdun; but that impression vanished when, on the 13th, the heads of columns of the 1st Army, having reached the heights west of the Nied, beheld great masses of French troops lying in defensive positions covering the whole eastern front of Metz. The orders for the 14th were that the 1st Army should remain on the Nied in an observant attitude due east of Metz, in direct face of the enemy; while the two right-wing corps (3rd and 9th) of the 2nd Army, temporarily withdrawn therefrom, should halt in positions south-east of the fortress. If the French should assail the 1st Army, the two corps of the 2nd Army would promptly strike them in flank; if, again, the enemy should choose these two corps as his objective, the 1st Army was in position to take him in flank. Meanwhile, the remaining corps of the 2nd Army were pursuing the march towards the Moselle farther to the southward.

Bazaine, upon whose reluctant shoulders the Emperor had thrust the command of the French Army, had issued orders for its retreat on the 14th. From early morning the trains were in motion, by noon two corps and all of the cavalry were on the left bank, and by the middle of the afternoon there remained outside the eastern forts but one corps and one division of another. That the French retreat was in active progress had become clearly apparent to the Germans, and a brigade commander of the 7th Corps took upon himself the responsibility of bringing on an unpremeditated battle, on the ground, in the words of the German *Staff History*, that "an attempt to molest the withdrawal of the French as much as possible, and to retard their contemplated retreat, appeared to be justified by the ordinary rules of war, and indeed necessitated by the existing strategical situation." Thence eventuated the fierce and bloody struggle which the Germans call the battle of "Colombey-Nouilly," the French that of "Borny." It was a series of desperate combats rather than a battle, and for the Germans there was in the course of it "many critical moments," but in the

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end they pushed the French out of their positions, and drove them back under cover of the guns of the fortress. Moltke was grumblingly content with the results, which were that "the retreat of the enemy had been arrested, and a day had been gained for the crossing of the Moselle by the 2nd and 3rd Armies."

Prince Frederick Charles had reached Pont-à-Mousson, a town on the Moselle about twenty miles south of Metz, where he found the 10th Corps in bivouac. It was not until early the following morning that he received a telegram from Moltke informing him of the success of the 14th, and concluding with the words: "Pursuit along the Metz-Verdun road, important." The Prince promptly sent forward the 5th Cavalry Division with all speed in the direction of that, the lower, road, and thence towards Metz, charged to discover whether the French Army had already quitted that city or whether it was still engaged in doing so. In support of the cavalry the 19th Division (10th Army Corps) was ordered to follow to Thiaucourt. Thus far the Prince acted with vigour and wisdom. Having approached Maiseray, about twenty miles west of Metz, Rheinbaben, the commander of the cavalry division, sent Redern's brigade, with a horse battery, eastward from that point along the great road. A squadron sent to Latour, and another *viâ* Sponville to Mars-la-Tour, found no enemy, but presently some shots came from the south-east, and Redern rode in that direction. Two hostile cavalry regiments were seen advancing on the Puxieux heights, which retired northward under the fire of Redern's battery. From the heights mentioned several French cavalry were descried in the lower ground south of Mars-la-Tour, and two batteries in the same vicinity. Under stress of the more powerful hostile artillery Redern withdrew out of range until reinforcements should reach him. Soon after 2 p.m. thirty-four squadrons (being the whole of the division save two squadrons) and two horse batteries were available in the southern vicinity of Mars-la-Tour. The enemy, by-and-bye, withdrew to the neighbourhood of Vionville, whereupon the German cavalry went into bivouac by brigades about Mars-la-Tour. Rheinbaben seems on this occasion to have lacked his wonted energy. With his eight and a half regiments, he was actually confronted only by Forton's Cavalry Division, consisting of four regiments; Valabrèque's Division (of the French 2nd Corps) did not advance beyond Vionville, and even if it had come into action the German commander had the superiority by half a regiment. But some casual explorers had been more enterprising. Captain Vaerst, who on the previous day had sent patrols close up to the western forts of Metz without coming in contact with hostile troops,

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early on the morning of the 15th resumed his reconnaissances towards Metz, and while so engaged came into collision with four regiments of French cavalry and two batteries eastward of Rezonville, presumably the cavalry division of Frossard's Corps (2nd), from which, with his two squadrons of hussars, he cut out several dragoons, from whom, strangely enough, he does not seem to have gained any information. A squadron of lancers detached from the cavalry division during the afternoon, taking a northerly direction, found Barail's Reserve Cavalry Division at Jarny on the upper Metz-Verdun road which forks to the north-west at Gravelotte. Captain Kotze, passing with his squadron of hussars towards evening by the south of Vionville in the direction of Rezonville, observed on the high ground thereabouts bodies of the enemy of all arms, estimated at 20,000 men, who were engaged in cooking in their camp. Throughout the day the lancer patrols visiting Montigny over against Moulin les Metz on the left bank, continued to observe masses of French troops moving westward along the Gravelotte (Metz-Verdun) road.

It is quite possible that all these items of cumulative circumstantial evidence tending to prove that up to the evening of the 15th the French retreat could not have progressed far to the westward of Metz, did not reach the Prince in time to have weight in his decision as to his future course of action. He was now his own master and in the possession of the whole of his own Army. By a morning telegram sent him by Moltke from among the burial parties on the battlefield of the 14th, his two right-wing corps had been replaced at his full disposal. The evening *Directiven* contained a sentence which bestowed on him high honour, but which also laid upon him a momentous responsibility. "The fruits of yesterday's victory," thus wrote Moltke, "can only be reaped by a vigorous offensive on the part of the 2nd Army towards the Metz-Verdun roads, by Fresnes and by Etain. The *Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army is empowered on his own judgment to carry such into effect with all the means at his disposal.*" In the guarded phraseology of the *Staff History*, "The intelligence which reached the Prince from the 5th Cavalry Division during the 15th had not as yet brought to light the real situation of affairs." In other words Rheinbaben's inactivity had caused him to be unable to answer definitely the actual question which he had sent to solve. Yet, it is submitted, that notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of the information sent in from the cavalry division, there was to the Prince's hand evidence enough and to spare on which to arrive at a decision whether the French Army, with an unwonted alacrity and dexterity, had made good its line of retreat, or whether it was still

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between the Moselle and the Mars-la-Tour bivouacs of Rheinbaben's brigades. No Army, especially no French Army, just off a battlefield whereon, not to use stronger terms, it had not achieved victory, ever made a twelve miles' retreat without leaving staring tokens of its having passed. To solve the problem which he had been sent out to elucidate, Rheinbaben had only to look over his horse's withers down on to the *chaussée*. Yet the intelligence sent in from his division "had not brought to light the real situation of affairs." Since Rheinbaben and his troops, although unenterprising, were not blind, the clear inference was that the French Army could not have effected its retreat, at all events by the lower Metz-Verdun road. Again, it is customary for an Army on the march to be preceded by its cavalry. The Prussian brigades found Forton's Cavalry Division about Mars-la-Tour on the lower road. The lancer squadron sent out northward, found Barail's Cavalry Division at Jarny in the middle road; both rencontres furnishing the reasonable inference that the French infantry was behind the French cavalry on either route. In support of that inference was Kotze's report of what he had witnessed on the high ground about Rezonville. Then there was the testimony from the lancer patrols, who throughout the 15th had seen French troops marching westward only a few miles from their point of departure about Metz. But apart altogether from this mass of evidence, and assuming that none of the *indiciæ* which have been recapitulated had been communicated to the Prince, it seems extraordinary how the common-sense and self-evident conviction should not have come home to him—that an Army, a large proportion of which had been long and fiercely engaged immediately before taking up a retreat which the French themselves have described as "*très-pénible*," could not possibly have marched twenty-three miles in eleven and a half hours, viz., from the close of the battle at 9 p.m. of the 14th until 8.30 a.m. of the 15th, the hour at which Rheinbaben reached the Metz-Verdun road about Maiseray.

But Prince Frederick Charles, empowered as he was to act on his own judgment, acted thereon in a manner which might have gone far to wreck the campaign. To quote the expressions of the *Staff History*: "The communications which arrived from the royal head-quarters in the course of the 15th, as well as the reports of the separate corps, especially of the 3rd Army Corps, had convinced the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army that the French forces were already in hasty retreat towards the Meuse, and that it was necessary, therefore, to follow them up at once." This conviction was reported by telegraph to the royal head-quarters so early as

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11 a.m. on the 15th, *i.e.*, before he had been authorised to act on his own judgment. No instructions in a contrary sense were sent him, as was only natural, since the resolution had been taken in the royal head-quarters to permit the Prince to act on his own discretion. There no doubt it was assumed that the Prince was duly making his reconnaissances, and was in possession of facts on which to base his course of action. The "vigorous offensive towards the Metz-Verdun roads, by Fresnes and by Etain," of which Moltke had written, was clearly to be in fulfilment of the leading idea of that great strategist's plan of campaign—the forcing of the main hostile Army in a northerly direction away from its communications with Paris, an operation which, according to Prince Frederick Charles' intentions, was to take in the first instance the character of a pursuit in combination with a northward pressure on the enemy's rearward corps, to be consummated farther westward in the Meuse valley by a decisive battle, as the result of which the main French mass should be hurled towards the inhospitable north.

According to the design of Prince Frederick Charles, the advance on the Meuse became the leading idea of his operations. The assumption adopted that the French Army would not again be encountered in the vicinity of the left bank of the Moselle, the expectation was fairly warrantable that, because of the superior marching powers of the German troops, the enemy would be come up with and headed on the former river. For this undertaking the Prince, in his orders promulgated on the evening of the 15th, specified four of his seven corps, viz., the 12th, Guard, 4th, and 2nd, of which only two, the Guard and the 4th, had as yet reached the Moselle. Preceded by the Saxon and part of the Guard Cavalry Divisions, these four corps were to march westward towards and across the Meuse on lines southward of the great Metz-Verdun high road. As the latest general directions from the royal head-quarters had attached a special importance to that *chaussée*, it was held that this requirement would be sufficiently fulfilled by sending in its direction on the morning of the 16th two corps, the 3rd and 10th, and two cavalry divisions, the 5th and 6th, a third corps, the 9th, to follow the 3rd on the morning of the 17th.

Prince Frederick Charles was a man who had no hesitation in spending blood as if it were water, when he believed that the slaughter was the necessary means to the object on which he was bent. But he was no reckless butcher. No man knew better what was the measure of the compass of good soldiers, and only once in all his fighting career did he wittingly overstrain that measure, when on the late evening of the battle of Mars-la-Tour he enjoined on

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dead-beaten men an effort which their prostration rendered futile. Had he been near enough August of Würtemburg to be able to address him when on the afternoon of Gravelotte that elderly gentleman sent six noble regiments of the Prussian Guards on a palpably impossible enterprise athwart the long bare slope leading up to the "fortress-like village" of St. Privat, and when, in the glorious attempt to achieve the impossible, one-third of the 18,000 heroic men were struck down by shell or chassepôt bullet, the Red Prince was not the man to have refrained from expressing himself to the commander of the Guard in terms which would not have been palatable to the latter. Of the two corps which, on the morning of the 16th August, he was sending towards the Metz-Verdun road, one, the 3rd, he had commanded for years, and though for long promoted from its headship, he was still the idol of the corps which he had made the finest in the Prussian Army. Nothing was farther from his thoughts than to send that corps to the all but certain fate of crushing defeat if not of utter ruin, or to adventure the risk of involving the other corps—the 10th—in the doom, which, although he had no conception of that all too probable result of the course of action he was blindly pursuing, was inevitably to threaten the 3rd Corps. No, his bitter error was simply that he clung obstinately to the misconception, for which he had not a tittle of warrant, that the French Army was already far forward along the Metz-Verdun road, and that the sole, or at least chief métier for these two corps on the 16th August was to gain that highway and push along it the pursuit of the retreating enemy. Clear evidence that such was his belief and intention is shown in the two curt sentences with which his order for the 16th begins :—"The hostile Army is now in retreat towards the Meuse. The 2nd Army will therefore follow the enemy in that direction without delay."

Dis aliter visum. In accordance with the Prince's orders issued overnight, the 3rd and 10th Corps, in the early morning of the 16th, took up their respective advances towards the Metz-Verdun road. The former during the night had crossed the Moselle at Noveant and Champey, and soon after daylight was on the march by way of Gorze, headed by the 6th Cavalry Division. Its orders gave it the alternative to strike the high road either at Vionville or Mars-la-Tour. Of the 10th Corps, one division had passed the night of the 15th at Thiaucourt, nine miles north-west of Pont-à-Mousson ; its other division back at the latter place. Following his orders, Voights-Rhetz, the corps commander, called up his rearward division, and set out on his fourteen miles march to the north-westward, his designated point on the great road being Maizeray, about

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ten miles west of Mars-la-Tour. The idea governing the respective objectives of the two corps seems obscure. Ten miles apart, they were not within prompt supporting distance of each other. On the hypothesis of a pursuit of the enemy, the more easterly corps would simply be dogging the other at a distance precluding ready co-operation in case of need, for there is no suggestion in the orders that either corps might possess itself of the more northerly road to Verdun by Etain. In the event again, which actually occurred, of the French being still on the 16th between Metz and the Germans, the 10th Corps, because of the intervening distance, could not come to the support of the 3rd, until the latter for five long hours had sustained single-handed a desperate struggle against overwhelming odds.

Voights-Rhetz, although gruff and hasty-tempered, was a cautious and sagacious soldier. There is no evidence whether information had reached Prince Frederick Charles in Pont-à-Mousson of the spectacle which Captain Kotze had seen on the Rezonville upland on the evening of the 15th. If it had not, the neglect or delay in sending in tidings so important tends to weaken our faith in Prussian thoroughness; if it had reached the Prince, then his obstinacy in misconception stands out the more glaringly, and his responsibility for the torrents of wasted blood spent on the 16th is all the more clear and heavy. At all events that piece of significant intelligence reached Voights-Rhetz in Thiaucourt, and perturbed him. Strictly speaking, it was not his affair. His orders sent him away north-west to the high road about Maizeray. But Rheinbaben's Cavalry Division (the 5th) was at his disposal, and he detailed it to the duty of looking into the matter. Quitting its bivouacs about Mars-la-Tour on the morning of the 16th, the division moved eastward in the direction of Vionville. Its shells crashed suddenly into the scared camp of Murat's Dragoon Brigade in front of that village, and then Körber's batteries cannonaded the close-packed camps of French cavalry and infantry about Rezonville. The cavalry stampeded, but at the first cannon shots the French infantry swiftly fell in and took the offensive against the German cavalry. Then there was about an hour of fierce desultory fighting between the German troopers and the supple French skirmishers, the chassepôt bullets answering genially the challenge of shell and sabre. The chassepôts were having the better of it, when, about 10 a.m., the heads of columns of the gallant Alvensleben's gallant corps reached the verge of the plateau south of Vionville, and began to deploy under the French fire. For a short time the Germans were willing to believe that all they had to deal with was an exceptionally strong French

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rear-guard. Indeed, on the assumption that the enemy in his front was withdrawing to the northward, Alvensleben gave orders to one of his divisions to move in a northerly direction past Mars-la-Tour upon Jarny on the Etain road, the object being to bar the adversary's retreat to the westward. But the division had not gone many paces in the indicated direction when Buddenbrock, its chief, realised that a farther advance northward "would no longer be compatible with the existing circumstances," and that there was much more urgent work nearer to his hand calling for all his energies. From ten in the morning until three in the afternoon of the blazing August day that staunch 3rd German Army Corps did a good deal better than hold its own single-handed, save for five casual battalions, against the most strenuous efforts made against it on the part of three French corps. The disproportion in strength between the combatant forces during the period specified discloses itself most perspicuously in the following table:

	Infantry Divisions.	Cavalry Divisions.	Guns.	Mitrailleuses.
Germans	2¼	2	120	—
French	8¾	3¼	210	30

Had Prince Frederick Charles the remotest anticipation that the described advance of either of the two corps which were marching north-westward on the left bank of the Moselle on the morning of the 16th August was to culminate in a prolonged and desperate battle, it may be taken for granted that so ardent a fighting man would not have remained behind in Pont-à-Mousson. He appears to have spent the morning hours in his quarters there in the elaboration of an Army-order dealing with the immediate future. According to this order, the 2nd Army was to resume on the 17th its advance towards the Meuse. Detailed instructions were given regarding that movement to the four corps of the left wing, which the Prince was to accompany personally. Of the three corps of the right, the 10th was to cross the Meuse below Verdun, and should events carry it northwards in pursuit of the enemy, Clermont and Ste-Menehould were specified as its objectives. The 3rd Corps was to march northward upon Etain on the 17th, "in the event of the enemy's proceedings not entailing other arrangements"—the tidings which were now approaching him were soon at last to weaken the deeply-rooted misconception. The 9th Corps was to reach Mars-la-Tour on the 17th. And these three right-wing corps were to be under the chief command of General Voights-Rhetz, "in the case of any large engagement with the enemy," with the métier of driving northward a portion of the French considered to be in a position amenable to that process.

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Noon came and passed without any important intelligence having reached the Prince in Pont-à-Mousson; in the words of the *Staff History*, "even the reports which came in from the 3rd Army Corps up to midday could give no occasion for any modification of the previous orders." All that was thought necessary, and that simply as a precaution, was to order the 9th Corps to cross to the left bank of the Moselle. But about 2 p.m. came the startling tidings that the 3rd Corps was engaged up to the hilt with a greatly superior enemy, and that the 10th Corps was straining every effort in hurrying to its support. Prince Frederick Charles lost no time. Traversing at a headlong gallop the fifteen miles which had intervened between him and his soldiers, he reached the battlefield amid their joyous hurrahs, and took firm and able grasp of the conduct of the strife.

I do not propose to recount the story of the battle of Vionville-Mars-la-Tour. Fortune was kinder to Prince Frederick Charles than the ineptitude of his great and dangerous misconception had deserved. He was saved from disgrace by the resolute and skilful heroism of Alvensleben and by the glorious staunchness of the soldiers of Brandenburg, of whom 7000 fell in the day's fighting. The stars in their courses strangely favoured the man whose reputation had so narrowly escaped eclipse. Good men and true as were the soldiers of the 3rd Corps, in those five hours of their lonely struggle could they have ultimately averted disaster against odds of more than three to one if their enemy had been resolutely bent on heaving them aside and on forcing his right of way, if Bazaine had not been so solicitous in preserving his communications with Metz and in strengthening his left rear with that intent instead of having been whole-souled in the fixed purpose to make good his retreat? No, there are limits to the powers even of Brandenburgers, and they and their Prince might well have cherished a life-long gratitude towards the man who, for what reasons soever, refrained from smothering them in successive avalanches of armed humanity.

The impeachment against Prince Frederick Charles regarding the 15th and 16th of August, 1870, is this:—That, basing his conviction on inconclusive evidence, when, on a matter so momentous, he should have been convinced only by the most trustworthy, conclusive, and definite testimony, he became wedded to the misconception that the French forces "were in hasty retreat towards the Meuse."

That, still clinging to this misconception, he sent two of his corps in parallel but not approximate directions; in the case of one corps (the 3rd), into a region which had been inadequately

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watched and reconnoitred, and regarding which he had no assurance that it was not—as it actually was—in the occupation of the whole concentrated French Army in the act of getting into order its movement of retreat; in the case of the other corps (the 10th) towards a position so eccentric that, march it ever so fast, it could not succour its comrade corps until the latter had been fighting single-handed for five hours against huge odds.

That, in thus blindly and recklessly pushing out these two corps, he took no sufficient precautions against the possibility of their being destroyed in detail one after the other, before reinforcements could reach either.

ARCHIBALD FORBES.

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HARBOURS OF REFUGE.

By Colonel E. Mitchell, *Royal Engineers (Retired).*

After sittings extending over two sessions and examining 168 witnesses, a Committee of the House of Commons have issued a valuable, comprehensive, and scientific report on harbour accommodation—or rather the want of it—throughout the United Kingdom. To those who wish to study in detail the valuable and voluminous evidence taken at the numerous sittings of the Committee, from men in all classes and ranks of life, and of all shades of opinion, who were likely to throw light and give information upon the momentous questions at issue, we commend the "Blue-book" on harbour accommodation, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, and which is issued to the public at fourteen shillings, by Hansard and Sons, then Printers to the House.

Is it too much to hope that in these days when millions are lavished in warfare (fortunately for the nation not on British soil) a few hundreds of thousands may be judiciously expended at no distant date in carrying out the practical suggestions and philanthrophic recommendations of the Committee?

For the benefit of those who have neither time, nor, perhaps, inclination to wade through the mass of evidence taken by the Committee and recorded in the "Blue-book," we endeavour to place before them in popular form the existing condition of the harbours and coast-line of the United Kingdom, and the truly able suggestions to amend and improve them. It is at once obvious that along a coast-line of 750 miles extending from Penzance, in Cornwall, to Northumberland, there are many places that unfortunately keep up sad notoriety for casualties by shipwreck, through not being accessible to vessels at all times of the tides. When we look at the general character and configuration of the coasts of Scotland and Ireland, it is apparent that much of the great annual loss of life and property by wrecks (especially during the winter months), though not altogether of a preventible nature, might be considerably reduced by the formation of deep-water harbours at certain

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given points, or the improvement of existing ones, so that vessels and fishing-boats might have sure and certain points of refuge where they could secure shelter and safety at all times of the tide and in any weather.

During the five years 1877-78, 1878-79, 1879-80, 1880-81, 1881-82, the number of ascertained casualties on or near the coasts of the United Kingdom were:

Total losses by stranding, &c.	2149
Total losses by collisions	336
Casualties involving partial damage	10850
Collisions involving partial damage	3162
Total ..	16497

An average of 3299$\frac{2}{5}$ per annum. The number of vessels totally lost was thus 2485, or an average of 497 per annum. The total loss of life connected with these casualties was 3694, or an average of 738$\frac{4}{5}$ per annum. The corresponding figures for the years 1852 to 1856, both inclusive, as given by the Select Committee of 1857, in relation to total losses alone, were:

Total losses by stranding or otherwise	1940
Total losses by collisions	244
Total ..	2184

The total reported loss of life was 4148, or an average of nearly 830 per annum.

The Committee therefore came to the conclusion, from examination of the wreck-chart and the tables annually prepared by the Board of Trade, that there is on certain parts of our coast *a great and preventible loss of life and property*, which would be materially reduced by an increase of deep-water harbours accessible to vessels using them at all states of the tide.

The Committee considered that too much reliance should not be based on arguments deduced from the number of wrecks occurring at any given spot being a sufficient indication of a proper site for a harbour of refuge, as the main object of such a harbour was not to rescue a vessel from a dangerous trap into which she had fallen, but to afford a place of security into which a vessel can run before she is in danger.

In the interests of the commerce of the United Kingdom, also in the interests of humanity, and on the general ground of public policy, it seems clear that this condition of things ought to be at least ameliorated, and that without delay.

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Judging from a perusal of the report of the Parliamentary Committee there seems unanimity on the part of the 168 witnesses that something ought to be done, although, as was perhaps natural, opinions somewhat diverged as to the method of execution and the positions that should be converted into suitable harbours of refuge. It has not been forgotten that the magnificent and capacious harbours or roadsteads of Dover, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Portland, Pembroke, Holyhead, Cork, and Guernsey are already in existence, and afford ample security and protection to the vessels that are able to avail themselves of their shelter.

Under existing laws, Government aid can be given for harbour construction in the following form: (1) by special Parliamentary grants; (2) by convict labour; and (3) loans through the Public Works Commissioners.

It is an unfortunate fact, elicited by the Committee, that the Public Works Loan Commissioners fail to have sufficient inspection made of harbour works *while in progress.*

This defect should be guarded against in future harbour works, and it seems desirable that some alteration should be made in the principles which apparently guide the Loan Commissioners in never advancing money to private parties for harbour improvements.

If their principle be a legal one, which we beg to question, it seems most harsh and injudicious. Private individuals should undoubtedly receive the same consideration as public bodies, and their efforts to benefit the public in the shape of harbour accommodation should receive every reasonable encouragement. If the security offered for the loan be a good one, it ought to be accepted whether from a private individual or from a corporate body; we are therefore glad to observe that the Committee recommend that harbours selected for construction or improvement on the ground of public policy by the aid of loans, should not only obtain them at a low rate of interest, but have the full benefit of the credit of the State. Indeed the rate of interest ought not to exceed 3½ per cent., and repayment be provided by means of a sinking fund extending over fifty years.

For very many years a similar rule has been in force to enable owners of estates of Ireland to borrow public money for the improvement of their properties, and considerable sums have been borrowed (and expended) from the Irish Board of Works with that laudable object, and no difficulty has, we understand, arisen respecting the repayment, the charge being a first charge on the properties improved.

Repayments are made by small half-yearly instalments

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(including principal and interest) during a period of twenty-one or thirty-five years, as may be arranged.

Many Irish estates have within the last forty years been permanently improved by these loans, as owners having only a life interest in property, and an insufficient income to improve it, have been able to do so by a loan from the Board of Works. In the event of the death of the owner before the loan had been repaid, the liquidation of the balance devolved upon his successor, who necessarily benefited by the improvements on the estate.

The Harbour and Passing Tolls Act of 1861 initiated the good policy of the State advancing money needed by harbour authorities at a low rate of interest, and under clause seven of the Public Works Loan Act, 1882, power is given to local authorities to pledge district rates as security for harbour loan improvements.

In 1881 the town authorities of Wicklow borrowed from the Irish Board of Works £40,000 at 4¼ per cent. for fifty years, and as the town resources were not sufficient for the necessary security, five baronies of the county of Wicklow gave a guarantee in aid of the loan being effected on the condition that as the port developed, and the resources increased, the baronies would be relieved from the responsibility.

We are glad to observe that the Committee not only draw attention to this fact, but recommend that powers of this description should be given for the purposes of the Harbours and Passing Tolls Acts, so that parishes, parts of counties, or counties, may be able, where willing, to pledge their rates as security for loans under the Harbours Acts.

The opinion of witnesses before the Committee was uniformly in favour of this course, though considerable doubts were expressed whether such powers would be largely taken advantage of. Where large districts are found willing to pledge their rates, it is probable that the works executed in consequence are likely to be, in the highest sense, desirable and advantageous to the country, while the pecuniary responsibility incurred by the district will tend to ensure careful supervision of the works and economy in their execution.

The Committee also make the valuable recommendation that when small harbours are weighted with debts at high interest, and when the local authorities are both willing and anxious to carry out useful and important improvements, public money should be advanced to pay off the old loan and consolidate the debt by a fresh loan at a low rate of interest.

There appears to be a lamentable want of general harbour supervision, especially during construction or improvement, and it is hoped some remedy may be early effected in this direction. It

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is alike a curious and unfortunate fact, elicited by the evidence adduced before the Committee, that many harbour works in Ireland have been permitted to fall into disrepair, usually either from want of supervision or from want of power by the local authorities to repair a *sudden* breach. The Committee therefore recommend that, where practicable, *all harbours* of any extent should be placed under the control of local harbour authorities. Whatever course the nation may adopt as regards the future harbours of refuge of the United Kingdom, it should go upon the lines that *all* should, within certain fixed periods, become self-supporting, and that the dues charged upon vessels and boats using them should form the nucleus of funds to that end. Such a principle was adopted when the capacious and excellent harbour of Guernsey was constructed some years ago. We believe this harbour and its lighthouses at the entrance cost £350,000; the money was raised on loan almost entirely within the island at 3 per cent. interest; a portion of the loan, with interest, is annually repaid out of the dues charged, so that in about thirty years the whole loan, including "principal and interest," will be repaid, and the harbour become for ever free to the commerce of the world, and a lasting record of what can be effected by local energy and enterprise.

Should this example be followed in the United Kingdom the practical results will be that considerable sums will be expended locally and find their way, in the shape of wages, into the pockets of the labouring classes; there will also be a large annual saving of human life and shipping. The small, dry-at-low-water fishing-harbours that are dotted along the coast of the United Kingdom should be so altered, where local circumstances permit, as to provide greatly needed refuges to large colonies of fishermen and their families, and to minimise to them the dangers and the risks attending their occupation and means of livelihood.

Moreover, the facts that steam has, in the words of Lord Palmerston, "bridged the channel," and that naval warfare and tactics are widely different to what they were in Lord Nelson's day, render it a national necessity that enough Harbours of Refuge should be constructed along our coasts to give reasonable security to our fleets of fishing-boats and merchant vessels from an active enemy, as well as against the elements. Such harbours as are necessary should be at once commenced and paid for out of funds provided by terminable annuities, and principal and interest repaid within some fixed term (say fifty years) out of the harbour and other dues accruing from vessels that take refuge in these enclosed positions. Loans were granted some years ago for necessary fortifications to protect certain vital points and tactical positions in

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the United Kingdom, they should also be forthcoming for "Harbours of Refuge." It is worthy of note that the Committee examined many eminent engineers, and their opinions did not materially disagree as to the best system of constructing piers and breakwaters. When the destructive principle of the force of water in heavy storms is understood and kept in view, there ought to be no difficulty in constructing piers sufficiently solid to resist the force of storm waves. It is believed the blows given by waves during a storm upon a breakwater are equivalent to blows that would be given by a hammer weighing three tons falling from a height of one foot.

The Committee invite special attention to the following principles:—

1st, that refuge and shelter should be deemed more important than mere facilities to trade. 2nd, that fishery harbours, especially when belonging to, or promoted on behalf of, poor fishermen, should be *very favourably* considered.

It seems clear that works should be constructed at St. Ives, Cornwall, at a cost of £400,000, also at similar cost at the Mumbles and at Swansea to afford harbours of refuge between Land's End and the Welsh coast. As regards the north-east coast between the Tyne and the Humber, both at Filey, and the Tees Bay, suitable works should be constructed.

On the east coast of Great Britain, if we except the natural advantages afforded by the estuary of the Thames, the Firth of Forth, and the Cromarty Firth, there is not one single harbour suitable for naval requirements—especially in time of war.

The Committee were further of opinion that works to provide refuge for fishermen should be undertaken at an average cost of £80,000 to £100,000 each in the following districts: 1st, between Duncansbay Head and the Moray Firth; 2nd, between Aberdeen and the Firth of Tay; 3rd, between Firth of Forth and the Tyne; 4th, on the coast of Yorkshire; 5th, between the South Foreland and Beachy Head; 6th, on the north coast of Cornwall; 7th, on the coast of Ayrshire.

The Manchester Ship Canal—constructed by private enterprise, but for which I understand the Corporation of Manchester pledged some of the rates, may not turn out a paying speculation to the original shareholders, but it gives an inland port on our western coast, well retired from the shore, where vessels can safely ride and load and unload cargoes; a fact that will be of material consequence in war time.

Much is now being done to improve Dover Harbour. The fisheries at Aberdeen, Peterhead, and Fraserburgh in Scotland, and

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at Great Grimsby and Lowestoft in England, have of late years largely developed in consequence of harbour improvements.

This strong evidence greatly supports proposals to provide good harbour accommodation at proper sites to enable fishermen to secure some portion of the immense wealth in the form of fish that abounds in the sea encircling the United Kingdom. No doubt in the end such harbours would *pay their way.*

In Ireland it is clear that a harbour of refuge on the west coast is absolutely essential, and much valuable evidence given to the Committee pointed to Galway as possessing, from its central position and natural capabilities, many advantages for such a harbour.

The harbour of Carlingford, upon which £80,000 has been expended, apparently needs the expenditure of another £100,000, and special attention is invited to the evidence given in favour of dredging the Dungannon Shoal at Waterford. All reasonable encouragement should be given to Irish fishermen to ply their trade and earn a livelihood. The evidence given by his Grace the Duke of Argyle is so interesting and instructive that we cull portions for reproduction here. His Grace informed the Committee that as regards natural harbours there is probably no coast so rich in them as the west coast of Scotland; the whole coast, from Cape Wrath down to the Point of Ardnamurchan, is a series of natural harbours of the most splendid kind. All the sea-locks are harbours, and also many of the passages between the islands. Along the whole extent of sea from Barra Head (the southern end of the Long Island) down to the west coast of Islay, where there are large shoals of herrings, there is virtually no harbour, so that fishing-boats who would often be glad of a speedy return to shore-shelter after a night's fishing, have none accessible to them. His Grace was further of opinion that if a harbour *could* be made on the Island of Tiree it would be a great boon to the poor fishermen, as they have often to go a distance of thirty to forty miles before they get the herrings. Tiree has long been resorted to by people from the east coast, who with great skill and seamanship work the great banks between Tiree and Barra, and often take away valuable cargoes, but being obliged to haul up their vessels at the Isle of Tiree, where there are sandy beaches, they labour under great disadvantages. His Grace also pointed out that if the mouth of Loch Spelve Harbour were improved it would make a very good refuge for fishing-boats, and further intimated that so strongly did he feel the necessity of aiding fishermen to secure their takes with comparative safety that he was willing to undertake an outlay of £10,000 in that

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direction. Foreign nations, during the last twenty years, have expended large sums in harbour construction and improvement. Holland has expended £2,500,000; France, £11,176,632; Belgium, £2,720,000; Germany, £1,110,379; Spain, £1,720,381; Italy and Sardinia, £1,536,233. It is clear from the above facts that foreign countries have somewhat outstripped England in the magnitude of their harbour works during recent years, and they have been mainly the enterprise of government, and to a large extent intended for defence and naval development. It is neither desirable by considerations of Imperial policy nor strategical defence, that the naval, mercantile, and fishing marines of this great nation should be unprotected from storms; and it seems clear that not only should great national harbours (whose site and extent should be carefully surveyed and determined) be commenced without delay, but also those minor works to which we have drawn attention, and thus add a new lustre to Her Most Gracious Majesty's happy reign. It is not intended to convey that harbours of refuge are an absolute necessity at the particular localities indicated, but it is hoped that the further ventilation of the subject may cause something to be done in the direction of aiding those "who go down to the sea in ships, and occupy their business in great waters." The general dangerous condition of the extensive coast-line of the United Kingdom, and the annual losses of life and shipping in our mercantile marine, are all powerful reasons to urge on the attention of Government to this most important work. It has been well said that "the sea is the largest of all cemeteries, and its slumberers sleep without monuments"; and the same waves roll over all, the same requiem by the minstrelsy of the ocean is sung to their honour. Over their remains the same storm beats and the same sun shines.

The Naval Defence Act of 1889 provides for an expenditure of £10,000,000 upon ships of war, and about £30,000,000 are annually voted for the Army and Navy. It is part of the duty of these arms of the Service to *take* human life; but is it not the solemn, the stern, duty of Her Majesty's ministers to protect human life, especially when their hands are strengthened by the House of Commons' Committees? Is it too much to ask this great empire to *lend* five or six millions to construct "Harbours of Refuge," the loan to be paid, with interest (in forty or fifty years), from the Light and Harbour Dues. The annual saving of life and shipping that must result would be a glorious triumph for any government. Politicians seem busy with "combinations of contrivances" to preserve and aid the prosperity of Ireland. Numbers of Irishmen and Irishwomen are ready and willing to aid in fishing operations, but

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are heavily handicapped by want of shelter for boats in stormy weather, and means of landing the fish caught. Irish local industry would be aided, and habits of self-reliance encouraged. The ocean encircling the coast abounds in fish, as plenty of captains of fishing-boats from France and the Isle of Man can testify. The Harbours of Refuge might eventually be defended by first-class fortresses, armed with heavy, long-ranging rifled artillery, and thus contribute in a marked degree to the safety and defence of our Imperial Empire.

E. MITCHELL.

While this article was going through the Press, I have ascertained that a Harbour of Refuge at Sunderland is likely to be placed in an efficient condition at a cost of £175,000, which will be borrowed for the purpose.—E. M.

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To accompany

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THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE. 1808—1830.

By General E. Clive.

By the year 1808 the College at Great Marlow was in full working order. Cadets were admitted at from thirteen to fifteen years of age (ordnance cadets to sixteen years), and were placed on one of three establishments, according to the rate of payment on which they entered, viz.: The 1st Establishment, for orphans, gratis; the 2nd, for sons of officers, at varying rates; and the 3rd, sons of private gentlemen, £100. At the end of the training they passed out with certificates of the first or second order. For the former the cadet possessed a competent knowledge of geometry, plane trigonometry in its application to heights and distances, mensuration of planes and solids, and surveying; the theory of regimental and field fortification, with attack and defence; military drawing, modern history, particularly of England and France. Good testimonials of character were also required from the lieutenant-governor and commandant, and for other cadets, who from inferior abilities or less assiduous application, a certificate of the second order was framed. If a cadet received a commission unexpectedly he might remain at the College to finish his course of instruction, so long as he continued to conduct himself as a cadet. There were two vacations, from the 15th June to the 31st July and from the 15th December to the 31st January, but cadets might remain at the College during the vacations. Cadets were clothed at an estimate of £10 per annum, and a Mr. Stanton, a shoemaker, contracted for their boots; but the contract was unremunerative, and Mr. Stanton petitioned to be released. Cadets were forbidden to wear contractor's shoes when at home. The cadets mounted guard at the grand entrance and performed other military duties, and when for guard duty were absolved from study. There was daily religious service, and the cadets retired at 10 p.m.

In 1808 the Royal Military College Library was sent to High Wycombe, in charge of the Senior Department, presumably because the home of the Junior Department at Great Marlow was only temporary. A library fund had been created from the subscriptions

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of the Senior Department, prior to which the College expenses were included in Army Estimates, and was applied to the purchase of books by the then Secretary at War, Mr. Yorke. The lieutenant-governor resided at High Wycombe, with a staff of a commandant, adjutant, inspector-general of instruction, five civilian professors, and one assistant draughtsman. The officer students were to be over twenty-one years of age. The Junior Department consisted of a governor, commandant, major, three captains, adjutant, three serjeants, three drummers, and over 300 cadets, whose pay amounted to 2s. 6d. per diem. On the 27th May, 1808, a Royal Warrant was issued revoking all warrants of earlier dates.

The expenses of the College had, of course, mounted to large sums. In 1799 and 1800, when the Senior Department was training some thirty or more officers for the staff, the annual expenditure was £1430 and £2430 respectively. In 1806 the estimates for the general staff were £3734; for the Senior Department, £4306; and for the Junior Department, £12,120. That of the College for 1809 was £43,100; for the general staff, £6700; the Senior Department, £5400; and the Junior Department, £31,000. Against this the rent of the estate, amounting to £213; the contributions of thirty students of the Senior Department, at thirty guineas each, to £945; and those of the cadets, including Indian cadets, to £19,100, were to be deducted, leaving a charge to the public of £22,842.

During the years 1809–12 the Junior Department remained at Marlow without material change. The instruction in fortification was given in French and the study of Eastern languages was introduced. An additional house, Mr. Tylecote's, was leased for the accommodation of the cadets, and a house called "The College" was taken in 1810 for two years at a rent of £400. The buildings proposed seem to have been erected. The cadets were classed in upper and lower schools, and in 1809 there were 104 cadets in the former. It was then decided that there should be but one form of certificate awarded to cadets for passing the final examination, and that no cadet should be recommended for a commission, without purchase, without the governor's approval. It was also laid down that "as the age of cadets was sometimes overstated, a standard of height was added, 4ft. 9in. being taken as height of a boy of thirteen, with a statement on oath that thirteen was his real age." The clothing of cadets who retired was to be appropriated to the benefit of orphan cadets. Meanwhile the Treasury discontinued the supply of newspapers, calendars, and almanacs.

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But the establishment was at that period larger than necessary. "The Master-General of Ordnance reported that the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers were complete in officers, and that there would be no necessity for training so many at Royal Military College, those now there to be withdrawn as vacancies occurred at the Royal Military Academy." The establishment of sixteen men servants and sixteen women servants (£1323) was accordingly reduced to twenty-four men and five women. Their duties were carefully defined. They had to make 320 beds, and clean 320 pairs of shoes, 320 silver spoons, 640 knives and forks, and candlesticks and beer-cans; they were to wait at meals, clean dormitories, halls of study, and fire-places, to fill coal-boxes, and keep public buildings swept. The establishment at that time seems to have been 320 cadets, with four staff-sergeants—one to be sergeant-major, one quarter-master-sergeant and three drummers. The summer vacation was to be from the 15th July to 15th September.

The years 1809–12 were occupied at Sandhurst with the actual construction of the College. Estimates of £89,770 had been accepted and were increased by £35,294 for stuccoing the front, and decorating the windows. The bricks made on the property were found unsuitable, and £4000 was allowed for others from London. Gates, lodges, water, and roads, and the general laying out and planting of the College grounds were settled. Ten double houses, four of them for as many professors, and six for twelve junior masters, were to be erected upon two fields belonging to Mr. Parfitt, purchased for £1310, also three double houses for six junior masters, completing the present terrace at a cost of £42,288; they were to be completed by August, 1812. Mr. Bank's mill in the American Garden, Government House, was not to be re-erected, and the tenant was to be turned out with a £10 gratuity. The estate was to be planted and fenced, and a wall built to connect the houses of the lieutenant-governor and surgeon and the hospital at a cost of £2950.

A timber bridge, the present "staff corps bridge," was authorised, but the fencing was ordered to stand over.

The hospital was to be erected at a cost of £5000, and a further sum of £5000 was sanctioned for fittings in the College; while the laundry was subsequently built with materials from Great Marlow, at a cost of £1720. A post office was established at Blackwater. It was directed that the riding pathway between the College and Easthampstead Park was to be rendered practicable for wheel traffic, it being the direct line of communication between the College and Great Marlow; this probably accounts for the wide, sandy ride

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from Wishmoor Cross to Cæsar's Camp. Meantime the building was in active progress.

A house at Farnham was taken for the Senior Department at a cost of £1366. In 1812 Sir Howard Douglas, being on the Continent, it was deemed advisable to replace him; and an offer of his appointment appears to have been made to a General Scharnhorst, of the Prussian Army. The only generals of that name are the famous father, Gerhart Johann Scharnhorst, born in Hanover 1756, who joined the Hanoverian Army in 1780 and the Prussian Army in 1800. He was instructor of cavalry and infantry officers in field training in 1802–6, was raised to the aristocracy in 1804, and was promoted colonel. In 1807 he was at the head of the military organisation commission, chief of war section till 1810 when he was appointed chief of staff and re-organised the whole Army. In 1813 he joined the war, was wounded and died at Prague, 1813. The other of the name was his son, who was born in 1780, joined the artillery, was Governor of Rastadt in 1850; he became a general of infantry, and died in 1858. As the latter was only thirty-two years of age in 1812, while the father was fifty-six, it was to the latter, if to either, that the proposal was probably made.

No answer, however, having been received from General Scharnhorst, Sir Howard Douglas was recalled from Spain and appointed Inspector-General of Instruction to the Senior Department. Sir Alexander Hope had succeeded Earl Harcourt as Governor in July, 1811.

In 1812 everything was ready at Sandhurst for the reception of the Junior Department, except the central portion containing the chapel, board-room, and the entrance hall. On the 15th October, the Junior Department, marching from Great Marlow, entered into possession of the Sandhurst building, in which no provision had been as yet made for the accommodation of the Senior Department, which therefore remained at High Wycombe pending the necessary conversion of a house which had been acquired at Farnham in Surrey, about ten miles south of the College. Meantime the works for completing and generally improving the estate were continued. At the main entrance the design included two lodges, similar in plan, with a guard-house between them, which accounts for its peculiar plan and elevation; for on the occasion of royal visits a cadet guard of increased strength was mounted at this gate. Mr. Wyatt was paid £1260 for preparing the plans for the College.

At the close of 1813–14, cadets unable to pass the examination for commissions, though over age to remain at College, were

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permitted to join the Army in Spain as volunteers with the pay of an ensign, and if on the 1st or 2nd Establishments, *i.e.*, orphan cadets, or sons of officers not above the rank of captain serving on full-pay, were granted a free kit as follows :—

One great coat	£6	6	0
One uniform jacket	5	15	6
One undress jacket	1	18	0
Two pairs overalls	6	6	0
Two pairs boots	4	4	0
One pair shoes	0	12	0
Two pairs gaiters	0	17	0
Two neck handkerchiefs	0	15	0
Two flannel waistcoats	0	18	0
Two nightcaps	0	3	0
Two pairs of gloves	0	10	0
Six shirts	5	2	0
Four pairs short worsted stockings	0	8	0
Six pocket handkerchiefs	0	10	0
One stock and clasp	0	6	10
One razor, case, and comb	0	4	6
One regulation cap	2	12	6
One sword-belt and plate	4	6	6
One case for papers	1	10	0
One portmanteau	3	10	0
Cash for travelling expenses to embark	10	10	0
Total	£57	4	10

In 1813, £500 was sanctioned for an organ for the chapel, and on the 12th October, 1813, the organist and choir from Windsor, with the band of the Royal Sussex Militia, attended to consecrate the first pair of colours deposited in the chapel, at an expense of £8 9s. for the choir and £10 to the band. Application was now made for two 5½ Howitzers, and two 6-pounder guns; while two boats were provided for the cadets in 1813, under the direction of the Admiralty on payment of £109 7s. The additions and repairs to the College made it advisable to establish a depôt for the Royal Staff Corps, for such materials as 7000 bricks, 6000 oak slabs, 4200 tiles, 300 ridge tiles, 80 bushels of lime, with joiners', plasterers', slaters', and other tradesmen's tools. The expenses of the field works had in 1815 already amounted to £461, and in this year £175 more was spent on band instruments. The Governor's commission was to be identical with that of the Governors of other garrisons, including powers to convene and confirm courts-martial, and £500 table-money was provided in addition to his pay; this arrangement was to date from 24th June, 1814. A money allowance of 1s. 6d. per diem in lieu of soldier servants was granted to officers. The Mansion House was reconverted from a temporary barracks to the

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present residence—Government House—at a cost of £3970. Models for the use of the Senior Department valued at £73 were also provided. In the meantime the parish of Sandhurst offered fifty acres of land at £10 an acre to complete any boundary the government wished to complete; and so the estate was consolidated and increased.

In 1815, the manorial rights over 210 acres of forest land were acquired from Mr. Heavyside for £50, and from the commoners for £1250; and a further portion of Tekel's land was acquired at £15 an acre. Thus up to this time the following sums had been expended in the purchase, &c., of land at Sandhurst: Estates, £12,707 18s. 4d.; fees, £709 1s.; and law expenses, £77 7s. 10d.

In 1816 the addition of a riding establishment was proposed, the estimated cost being £12,500 for the riding-master's house, stabling for twenty horses, quarters for two sergeants (rough riders) and eight grooms, and a forage barn, in addition to an annual expense of £1397, but this was not then sanctioned. An observatory was also proposed to be added, but this also was refused, though the acquisition of an astronomical plant was commenced by the purchase of a "great circle" for £150.

Mr. Hanson, solicitor, transmitted his accounts from 1804 to 1814 for business connected with the College, including that of Mr. Hodgson, Secretary to the Bishop of Salisbury, for the following:—

Consecration of chapel	£82	15	0
Bill on miscellaneous matters	156	5	0
„ relating to Parfitt's land	168	14	0
„ „ „ purchase at Farnham	148	16	0
„ Sandhurst and Act of Parliament enclosing 210 acres of waste lands	627	12	0
Mr. Roberts, solicitor, Wokingham	145	4	0
	£1329	6	0

Up to the close of 1817 the fencing of the property was continued, and the working parties from Windsor were increased from twenty to fifty men, while the ground in front of the College was levelled, 3500 loads being removed in country carts at 6d. a load. The permanent enclosure of the heath, now part of the College estate, was directed to be carried out, and £1000 was sanctioned for planting and improvement, and for the erection of one of the three lodges required, viz., that on the Sandhurst Road. The main entrance lodge from Windsor had already been erected. The right of way by the road running east and west through the estate was stopped and gates were

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erected, access from the Sandhurst Road to the main London and South-Western turnpike road being given by a new road from the "Jolly Farmer" public-house into York Town at the west end of the terrace, outside Government House grounds. This was completed in 1817, and taken over by the magistrates of Berks on the part of the county. The northern boundary of the estate at this date ran from the Sandhurst Lodge, immediately in rear of the College building and of the detached hospital, across the Windsor Ride to Woodman's Lodge and the reservoir, which was on the edge of the property. The prevalence of a contagious disorder afforded the Governor the opportunity of pressing upon the Government the completion of the detached hospital, for which £1300 was required. Book-cases were added to the dormitories in 1817, and water supplied to the terrace houses from the well in the plantation to the east of the terrace, 32ft. deep, 6ft. in diameter, with a head of water 7ft. 9in. below high water in the lake; of the water, analysis showed that it is rarely met with in a purer state. The astronomical plant was next acquired, and consisted of an equatorial circle, meridional-circle (4ft. in diameter), telescope, astronomical clock, small sextant, observatory, lunarian globe, and a course of natural philosophy was added to the instruction under Mr. Phillips. By this time the final account for building the Royal Military College and improvement of the estate amounted to £369,630.

In 1819 a small riding establishment was sanctioned during the summer months. The stables and forage-house formerly used by the waggon-train were to be adapted, with a vacant store, as a barrack-room for one troop sergeant-major, with extra pay at 1s. daily; one sergeant rough rider, with extra pay at 1s. 6d. daily; one corporal rough rider, with extra pay at 9d. daily; one private rough rider, with extra pay at 6d. daily; nine privates, with extra pay at 3d. each daily, and twenty horses with necessary kit. This pay was approved by Treasury in November, 1819. But it was not until March, 1820, that a riding-house 160ft. by 50ft. was proposed at an expense of £6000 and a yearly charge of £466. The burial ground was enclosed by a brick wall 2½ft. high surmounted with an iron railing and gate of the same material, at an expenditure of £390. The appointment of the new Governor led to an inquiry whether the education given by the Royal Military College to cadets of the 1st Establishment was an unmixed benefit, inasmuch as while many availed themselves of it who were perfectly able to pay, on the other hand, the hopes of a commission were not considered to be a promise of one if the cadet should be found unsuited for the Service. It was

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proposed therefore that sons of deceased officers should pay two-thirds of the fees paid by parents of cadets on the 2nd Establishment according to the rank they held, and that there should for the future be only ten cadetships free of charge allotted to sons of officers who had died, or who had peculiar claims for consideration.

Turning now to the Senior Department, it appears that the house at Farnham which at first cost £1367, and when re-arranged into halls of study £2593, was occupied by that branch from 1813 till 1821, when it was amalgamated with the Junior Department and accommodated at Sandhurst. By this arrangement it appeared to His Royal Highness the commander-in-chief that public economy would be materially promoted, without lessening the advantages resulting to the Army from the College. Sir Howard Douglas applied for compensation on the reduction of his appointment, and received £500 per annum until in receipt of an income of £800 per annum from Government. The Farnham house was ordered to be pulled down and sold in lots. The removal from Farnham having terminated the second period of the Senior Department's existence, it will be well to glance at the course of instruction, which was now about to be extended. Up to this time fifteen officers yearly had been nominated to it at odd periods, on the grounds of services, seniority, or priority of being noted on the list of candidates, but not by competitive examination. The qualification was therefore elementary, if any indeed existed. The Junior Department of the Royal Military College had, since 1802, afforded an opportunity of a military education for young persons destined for the Army, and Sir George Murray, the Governor, in proposing the transfer to Sandhurst of the Senior Department, stated that the instruction supplied to its students might, without detriment, be made less elementary. Senior Department candidates were therefore to undergo a qualifying examination to show that they were well versed in arithmetic, and likewise possessed a competent knowledge of the elements of geometry, some proficiency in military drawing, and were well grounded in French grammar. The course of study at the Senior Department for the future was to embrace the higher branches of mathematics, surveying and military drawing, astronomy, fortification, German, and French, and was to continue for one year from the date of admission, and not to be prolonged except by permission of the commander-in-chief. The number of students being limited to fifteen. Under these conditions it was thought that the staff of instructors at the Royal Military College would suffice for both departments, and so lead to economy, because the saving on the

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staff of the Senior Department and their allowances would be £4345; and by requiring longer hours from the masters (not to exceed six hours in summer and five and a-half in winter), four masters would suffice, and an additional saving of £847 would result.

The conclusion of peace at the close of the long war resulted in a demand made by the Secretary of State for War for a reduction in the annual expenditure of the College to the extent of £4000 or £5000, and it was proposed to reduce one French master, one landscape drawing master, and three fencing masters; to replace one natural and experimental philosophy master by one German master, and one history and classical master by one military drawing professor. The instructing establishment for 1817 therefore consisted of four fortification, five French, two German, four mathematical, three arithmetic, four history and classical, two landscape drawing, and six military-drawing masters. Reductions were also proposed in the number of horses allowed, and fuel and light allowances, and the Governor lost the £500 for table-money, which had been granted since the 24th June, 1814. The Senior Department was also deprived of the allowance to the mess in lieu of wine, £250, and the commandant of certain allowances, his assistant being also abolished, thus saving £390, and the forage allowance for officers of junior division amounting to £365. The Junior Department commandant lost similar allowances in pay, &c. Changes of masters saved £1029; saving on the messing of cadets, without deterioration of quality or quantity, £1115, which with other minor sums made £3271. The total retrenchments in the estimates were: for general staff, £1130; Senior Department, £1726; and for Junior Department, £3271.

In July, 1817, the Treasury made a second demand for a reduction in the establishment of the College, recommending a reduction in the eleemosynary classes, an increase of subscriptions from the 3rd Establishment, and such changes in the nature of the education as might augment the number of that (paying) class; also additional contributions from officers of Senior Department. It will be recollected that at this time the College consisted of three classes of cadets, entered upon one of these establishments. 1st Establishment: Cadets, orphan sons of officers who had died in the Service, who received maintenance, clothing, and education gratis. 2nd Establishment: Cadets, sons of officers serving or reduced on half-pay, who paid for the education of their sons according to their military rank. 3rd Establishment: Cadets, sons of well-to-do parents, who paid £100 per annum for the education of their sons. The annual estimates of the College had risen

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to between £30,000 and £40,000 per annum, reduced by the fees of the 2nd and 3rd Establishments and by those paid by Ordnance and India Office for cadets belonging to their separate services.

In treating of this important demand the Governor showed that the number of orphans in a period of five years had varied between 147 and 92, and might be computed at 90 to 100 per annum; that of 95 then at the College sixteen were quitting at Christmas (1817) and six more at Midsummer (1818), reducing the number to 73, and that as the orphans waiting for admission in 1818 were only four in number, it was possible without injustice to this class to fix the establishment for 1818 at 80. The 2nd Establishment, on the contrary, was more numerously represented. The number at the College was 100, but 44 were waiting admission in 1818 and 1819, and the proposed 2nd Establishment was fixed at 130. The subscriptions of the 3rd Establishment were to be raised to 120 guineas, and a better education supplied, by the addition of astronomy, an elementary course of natural philosophy, and horsemanship to the course. It was estimated that the saving caused by reduction of the 1st Establishment to eighty cadets would be £4,140, and that the increase in 2nd Establishment from 100 to 130 would cost £800, without including that caused by the rise put on cadets of the 3rd Establishment—some £4000.

The course of education in 1817 included:—Mathematics from arithmetic to algebra, geometry, trigonometry, classics, French, German, permanent and field fortification, military topography, surveying, mensuration, religious instruction, history, geography, perspective and landscape drawing, English literature and composition, and drill three-quarters of an hour only. The entrance examinations were very simple; yet many, from want of education in childhood, either failed to enter or were rejected after the probationary year. The Governor therefore proposed that the entrance examination should be such as to give a reasonable prospect that the candidate would benefit by the instruction received, and that it should be divided into two distinct entrance examinations: (1) Arithmetic and easy classics; (2) Omitting classics, except grammar, and substituting higher qualifications in arithmetic. Rewards given only for mathematics attract to that study many who can never succeed in it, whereas the object of education is to "approach excellence in different branches, and to send into the Army officers possessing a variety of acquirements." Therefore while the mathematical examination might earn the reward of a commission, the governor submitted that to classics, history, and French or German should be given similar rewards, the qualification in military drawing and fortification being obligatory for both. The

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Governor did not recommend an increased subscription from officers of Senior Department, for which fifty-eight candidates were waiting, many being poor men. These proposals having been approved by His Royal Highness the commander-in-chief, the Treasury sanctioned the recommendations made in the Governor's report: That the 1st Establishment should comprise eighty orphans, and the second 130 cadets, to vary if necessary year by year. The 3rd Establishment was to pay 125 guineas, to date from 1st January, 1819, and with immediate effect on those registered from 1st January, 1818. Astronomy and natural philosophy were to be added to the course of instruction, but *not horsemanship*, on the ground of expense. The strength of the 3rd Establishment was to be 120, though left open up to a total strength of 412 cadets. The establishment of an observatory followed, estimated at £1500, and a charge of £250 for the instruction; £100 for honorary prizes and rewards was also sanctioned. The pensions of professors on the retired list were to be half their salary on quitting the College. It followed upon this alteration in the studies at the close of 1817, that cadets who were proficient in several subjects might present themselves for examination in 1818, and that after that date any cadet would be eligible for a commission who knew the first six books of Euclid, was well versed in either classics, French, German, or history, was conversant with first and third systems of Vauban, was proficient in military drawing, and provided that his general conduct was unexceptionable. This system remained in operation for nearly fifty years.

In 1820 the Governor pointed out that the professional education received by cadets since 1802 rendered it no longer necessary to have the training at the Senior Department so elementary as heretofore, and considered that the students at the entrance examination should be well versed in arithmetic, should have a competent knowledge of the elements of geometry, some proficiency in military drawing, and be well grounded in French grammar. Under these circumstances, their education at the Senior Department would be continued in higher mathematics, astronomy, fortification, German, and French. The course was to be continued for one year, and not be extended without special permission. If so carried out, the instructional staff of the Royal Military College would be found sufficient for both departments if one instructor in military drawing and one German master were added. Pay and allowances to the extent of £4345 would moreover be saved. A further reduction of masters at the Royal Military College was still possible, entailing a saving of £847. These proposals having been approved, the quarters vacated were

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made available for and duly occupied, in 1821, by the Senior Department.

In 1820, also, attention was drawn to certain disadvantages of the 1st, or Orphan Establishment, and it was proposed to amend the system as follows :—Firstly, that "the sons of officers who have died in the Service and who have left their families in pecuniary distress should, if sons of majors and upwards, if in Army, and of masters and commanders of R.N., pay two-thirds of the subscription of 2nd Establishment of same relative rank. Sons of captains and subalterns similar rules. Secondly, that there should be ten cadetships free of expense obtainable by such orphans of officers who have died in the Service as should appear to the commander-in-chief to have very peculiar claims for consideration." The Orphan Class, or 1st Establishment, was therefore abolished in 1822.

In 1824 the establishment was reduced by one company of cadets, one captain (Major Otter, aged sixty years) was retired, and two masters were reduced.

The riding-house was completed in 1825. Its cost, including guard-room, forage-shed, and the appliances connected with the stables, was £5475 4s. In 1826 the road from the Royal Military College to Red Lodge, Swinley, was cleared. When Windsor Forest was divided, the table-land upon the top of Bagshot Hills, adjoining the estate of the Royal Military College, was included in the Crown allotment, as was also a strip of ground to connect these hills with Swinley, in order to form a royal riding from the Military College to Windsor, such as might be used by the King or Royal Family when they visited the establishment. Sir Alexander Hope wrote on this subject: "It is the only plan of former time which remains unexecuted, and I therefore feel anxiety to set it going before I take my final leave of this establishment."—December 7th, 1825. This road, which was afterwards gravelled, has since been known as the Windsor Ride. The Governor was instructed to place himself in communication with Mr. Masting, then Deputy-Surveyor of Crown Lands at Bracknel, and in a letter, dated March 27th, 1826, he wrote: "The report includes a small sum for a lodge which will be necessary to take charge of two gates where the road from Bagshot to Bracknel crosses the King's Riding." This accounts for the Red Lodge, Swinley, which is of the same plan as that at York Town and Sandhurst Lodges at the College. The Governor, in the same letter, suggested "that the planting hereafter to be made upon a ridge along which the Royal Riding approached the Royal Military College estate should be so regulated as to keep permanently open two remarkable views." "That upon the right hand passes over the country towards

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Reading, that upon the left extends as far as the Hind's Head on the Portsmouth Road. At the spot whence these views can be seen the Riding sweeps upon a ridge with a double curve, and cannot be mistaken." It is interesting to note that the road was made, and that the views are still to be seen from the spot so closely described by Sir Alexander Hope.

In 1828 the Supreme Board disallowed three charges on the Contingent Fund that had been paid at the College for many years, viz. (1), £3 3s. to the Abbé Buffet for religious instruction to Roman Catholic cadets, informing the Collegiate Board that they were very desirous that every facility should be afforded to those gentlemen cadets who might be of the Roman Catholic persuasion to hear the doctrines of their own church, but they must at the same time observe that the public had not made any provision for the payment of the priest, and therefore the Board could not sanction the continuance of the allowance. (2) A stipend of £40 per annum paid to the Rev. W. Hancock, a mathematical master, for a third service in the chapel for the professors and their families, for whom there was no room at the parade services. (3) An allowance of £15 to Mrs. Sherwin, a former housekeeper. A charge of 3d. per diem to two corporals of the band, paid from the same fund, was allowed.

A further reduction was carried out in 1829, when only 212 cadets were resident at the College, and when the major (Lieutenant-Colonel McDermott), one captain (Abraham), and five masters were struck off the establishment.

The lieutenant-governor (Colonel Butler) retired. The close of capital expenditure is shown by the clerk of works being transferred to Plymouth and succeeded by a workman at 5s. a day.

E. CLIVE.

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FRENCH ARMY SIGNALLING.

By Lieutenant W. P. C. Lethbridge, *Grenadier Guards.*

The English Army has been in the habit of congratulating itself that the method and means of carrying out visual signalling in the field is essentially English, and not as yet seriously contemplated by other powers. This idea can be no longer tenable, and visual signalling in the field is now receiving great attention at the hands of the military authorities of France, Italy, and the United States. It is true the Austrians have had a method for some years past of signalling by means of sails extended by long arms—a sort of diminutive semaphore—but the system is so antiquated and clumsy that it has ceased to be looked upon as any longer practicable. Visual signalling has been practised for some years in our Army, and is carried out, as is well known, by a variety of instruments: (1) Flags or heliograph by day, (2) lime-light or oil-lamp by night. Indeed the equipment of a signalling company is no small item amongst the baggage, and what with retorts, pressure- and gas-bags, boxes of mixture for the lime-light, tripods, and other impedimenta, the baggage of our signalling company is of no small bulk—a serious item in these days. It has been left to our neighbours across the channel to strike new ground, and to perfect an apparatus for the transmission and reception of messages in the field. This instrument has been invented by a Colonel Mangin, a Colonel-in-Chief of the French Engineers. He had charge of the lines of communication during the Franco-German War of 1870 and 1871, and therefore can be looked upon as no theorist, but as one having practical experience in the field. He must have been impressed by the desirability of having other means of communication besides that of the electric telegraph, and the outcome was the "Appareil de Position," as it is termed by the French authorities.

The principles of this instrument are based on scientific grounds, and it is constructed according to optical laws. The "Appareil de Position" is no "rule of thumb" instrument, and certainly on inspection one is drawn to the conclusion at once that it is vastly superior to any other signalling machine as yet devised. These instruments are worked either by sunlight or artificial light, as circumstances permit. The means of obtaining what may be

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termed an artificial illuminant is by the aid of a lamp burning petroleum. This oil is certainly the best illuminant at present known for piercing mist or haze or other obstacles to the penetration of light. The spectral analysis of petroleum light reveals many parti-coloured rays; among these latter, red is the predominating colour. This last-named has the property of being able to penetrate fog or mist more successfully than any other coloured light, hence the great advantage of a lamp burning petroleum; but, owing to the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory results, little has been done towards making it of use to signallers. The Indian authorities seem to have surmounted the difficulty, though the presence of a glass chimney seems to be a drawback. In the French "Appareil" this difficulty has been surmounted, as will be demonstrated farther on in this article. The means by which this light is utilised in the French lamp is certainly most ingenious, and is well worth the study and attention of those interested.

At the risk of becoming too technical, I may remind my readers that the difficulty with all light has been the correct adjustment of the rays or beams. If too scattered the rays soon lose their power and penetration; if too concentrated the beams cross each other, and again eventually lose their brilliancy. The lenses of the "Appareil" are so constructed that the rays of light on being emitted from the lamp are perfectly parallel to each other, and thus every atom of light is utilised. By this means we can decrease the power of the illuminant without detracting from the power of the light and with a decrease in weight.

By an equally ingenious arrangement of glasses the sun's rays are directed through the lens, and thus the two different lights are utilised in one and the same instrument, thus doing away with the several equipment to meet the varying conditions of light, and with the corresponding gain of portability. These instruments are in constant use in the French Service; indeed, in some places they supply the sole means of communication. In Algeria communication is kept up beyond Bishra into the desert with their aid, fixed signal stations being placed at regular intervals connecting one oasis with another. This method has been found most reliable in practice, as the many marauding Arab tribes found in the interior of the Sahara Desert might render the making of a telegraph useless. Thus we see an instance in which visual signalling replaces the electric telegraph, its advantages being clearly demonstrated. Many of the French permanent works are now connected by means of these instruments, though somewhat of a more complicated nature than those described here.

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The "Appareil" in general use are the 14 and 25 centi., so termed from the size of their lenses. There is a smaller one in use among the cavalry, but its range and power is so limited that it



FIG. 1.

cannot be looked upon as being of any material value. On permanent works and fortifications a larger and more complicated instrument is used, its lenses running up to as much as 60 centi., electric light being employed as its auxiliary illuminant; but these

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latter are constructed somewhat differently and require a separate description. On dull days, when the sun's rays can no longer be made use of, the oil-lamp is brought into operation. Although the distances are much reduced, the authorities claim that the range during night is reduced to one-fourth of that during day. Thus in an "Appareil" of 14 centimetre, its light at night is visible from 20 to 30 kilometres, hence during day 4 to 5 kilos. would be its extreme range of operation, about the same distance at which our flag signals are stated to be of use with the aid of glasses.

The illustration (Fig. 1) shows a 14-centi. "Appareil" on its tripod stand and in position for work. As will be noticed, its heliostat is fixed, its auxiliary mirrors being in position for catching the sun's



FIG. 2.

rays and conducting them through the body of the instrument. The telescope visible on the top left-hand corner is used for detecting and reading the signals of the adjoining station: its axis being parallel to the rays of the instrument, it follows that when set its object-glass is directed on the centre of the beam of the other station's light. The large iron door in the body is for access to the main chamber, the smaller one in front being for access to main lens for cleaning and other purposes. The iron door lying back resting on the chimney of the instrument is generally held in position by an iron stay (marked I); this shuts over the main lens when the instrument is not in use. Below the tube of the heliostat is placed the operating-key, and, as will be seen when not in use, it is held in position by a catch moving in a horizontal manner.

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The ratchet-screw on the rear leg of the tripod is for lowering or raising the instrument when desired.

The box attached to the two rear legs of the tripod contains the various implements and other "odds and ends" necessary for keeping the instrument in working order, besides holding the lamp and heliostat and their accessories when the instrument is packed. The following list may appear formidable, and it is a matter of admiration how so many things are packed in such a small compass:—a compass with case, a can of petroleum, a screw-driver, three files, a piercer, a smoke consumer, a metal chimney, a pair of scissors, extra glasses for the chimney, three extra springs of the manipulator, a key for regulating the telescope, a regulating eye-piece with ground glass, an eyepiece for the sun and a rectangular mirror, a rectangular mirror mounted on a standard, a duster, a piece of chamois leather, and a spare wick for the lamp.



FIG. 3.

The sketch (Fig. 2) shows the interior of the instrument. The body is composed of a light iron sheeting, built in two portions A D E F and F E C B, called respectively the receiving chamber and the chamber of emersion, being divided by a thin metal diaphragm, F E, in the centre of which is a small circular opening, G, through which the light is emitted on its way through the main lens, N. B L shows the iron shutter held in position by the stay I; T T shows the telescope; K is the cover to the opening which allows the insertion of the heliostat tube. The lamp, as will be seen, is of the ordinary type, burning petroleum. It is furnished with a metal chimney, J, the body of which is cut away on each of its sides, S, to allow of the egress of the light and, at the same time, of inspection. These openings are covered with slips of glass, readily slid in and out, to allow of their being readily replaced when broken or otherwise. H is a silvered reflector, which is attached to the body of the lamp by a brass upright. The opening G is controlled by the disc N, attached to the

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manipulating key; the arm of this disc works against stop 22, covered with gutta percha, to obviate jars, &c., whilst in use.

When the sun is called into requisition, the lamp is slid out and packed away in the box below. The wick and burner are detached and placed in a small brass cylinder; the aperture thus left in the body of the lamp is covered by a stout brass cap, thus obviating any spilling of oil whilst the instrument is being carried. The screw-cap, K, is detached, and the heliostat tube is inserted and firmly screwed into position. The sketch (Fig 3) shows a



FIG. 4.

section of this tube; as will be seen, the sun's rays are conducted by the rectangular mirror M through the tube. This mirror is attached to the circular collar or ring I, which allows of its being turned in any direction, and its trunnions, C C, allow of its being placed at any angle. The heliostat tube is furnished at its further end with a convex lens, L L, through which the rays pass before being concentrated at the small annular opening, S S, in the diaphragm K K, from which they enter into the body of the instrument. When the sun is facing the operator, or capable of

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adjustment without the aid of auxiliary lenses, the mirror, M N, is moved about until the rays fall on the glass. The glass is then moved until the rays enter the tube, being guided until they are directed through the opening, S S, in the diaphragm, K K, the back of which is blackened over for facilitating the purpose. The heliostat is then ready for use.

Fig. 4 shows the "Appareil" packed ready for transport; the instrument is held on each side by a hook attached to each rear leg, its base resting on the box of accessories. The padded board, the back of which is discernible, rests against the signaller's back whilst being carried, the two leather straps passing over his shoulders keeping it in position.

By the foregoing sketches and explanation the arrangements of a 14-centi. "Appareil" have been described. In the larger ones, the mechanism is more complicated, and two lenses are used instead of one, but as they are more cumbersome they do not enter into the scope of this paper, and cannot be looked upon as of use for service in the field. Thus we see in the foregoing instruments the amalgamation of our lamp and heliograph, or rather heliostat. This latter is certainly worked very simply, and its simplification calls for special merit. It has been urged against these instruments that more skill will be required in working them than in our equipment, and that they are fragile and delicate and will not stand hard usage. In answer to the first objection: the knowledge required in working these instruments is not more, and rather less, than that required in working our lime-light; for successful results in this latter a certain amount of knowledge is called for. As regards the second and third objections: the "Appareil," when packed away, consists of an empty iron box, at one end of which is a mirror, securely covered over by an iron door, as shown in foregoing sketch. The lamp, and all fittings appertaining, are packed away securely in separate partitions, and remain absolutely intact, unless the box is broken by unforeseen circumstances. The brilliancy from the lamp is not so great as that from our lime-light, which is certainly difficult to surpass, but the apparatus necessary for the production of this latter is cumbersome, and for some time it has been open to severe criticism. The electric light is at present in a trial stage as regards being utilised for military signalling; the difficulty of finding a good and reliable working battery still limiting its uses. Although the French "Appareil" is a decided step in a forward direction, its supporters are not oblivious to its defects, which are certainly easily remedied. What is required for visual signalling is some apparatus which uses the minimum of space and can be easily carried about and

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brought into instant operation. Thus the "Appareil de Position" seems to fulfil all the foregoing requirements at present. Still let us hope with increasing scientific knowledge and the better appreciation of the science of optics, the signalling branch of our Army may be furnished with a veritable "multum in parvo." It has yet to be demonstrated what effect this new branch of the Service will have on future European campaigns, but as early and accurate news of the enemy at once strengthens the assailant's strategical position, a well organised and equipped signalling company will certainly prove "no broken reed" for a General to lean on in the time of doubt or perplexity.

W. P. C. LETHBRIDGE.

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REMINISCENCES OF ETSHOWE.

By Captain H. R. Knight (*late the Buffs*).

In January, 1879, three columns of British troops were formed for the invasion of Zululand. That known as No. 1, or the coast column, under the command of Colonel Pearson, consisted of the following troops: Naval Brigade, H.M.S. *Active*, two guns of the 11-7 Royal Artillery, 2nd company Royal Engineers, 2nd battalion the Buffs, six companies 99th regiment, two squadrons mounted infantry and volunteers, two battalions native contingent, one company native Pioneers. Altogether about 300 mounted men, 1500 European infantry, 2000 natives, 4 guns, 1 gatling, 2 rocket-tubes, 1 rocket-trough. Of these, the 2nd battalion the Buffs and the Royal Artillery had been in the colony of Natal for some time previous, and had for the last two months formed a corps of observation on the banks of the Tugela at Thring's Post.

In anticipation of the coming invasion preparations had been made for an advanced base at the point where the waggon road from Natal crosses the Tugela, a few miles from the sea, by a ferry; and a fort to protect the crossing and the depôt of government stores was constructed on a hill commanding the passage, and since known as Fort Pearson. After considerable delay, owing to the slowness with which supplies and stores could be brought across the river, and the want of sufficient transport, the leading section of the column moved off on the 18th January, the second section the next day. The intention was to advance as rapidly as possible to the mission station of Etshowe, which was to be occupied and placed in a state of defence, and the buildings were to be used as an advance depôt for the commissariat

On arrival there all the waggons were to be unloaded and sent back as rapidly as possible for more supplies. As soon as this was done a further advance in the direction of Ulundi was to be made. The columns and 150 ox-waggons advanced but slowly. The country, though undulating and park-like, was intersected by streams, and the delay at the fords or drifts was very great as it was necessary almost always to

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"double-span" the waggons. Considering the small numbers, the length of the columns was very great—nearly seven miles at times—owing to the immense space required by the waggons and their teams, which consisted of from fourteen to sixteen oxen.

In the first few days, beyond a few scouts, nothing was seen of the enemy. As a matter of precaution the numerous kraals in the vicinity of the line of march were burned, as hereafter they might have afforded shelters from which convoys might have been most effectually harassed. The kraals were always circles of beehive-shaped huts, from five to twenty in number, with an inner and outer ring of stout timber palisading; the outer ring being for defensive purposes, and the inner formed a cattle-pen.

Owing to the bad state of the drift across the Amatikulu it was necessary to halt on the 20th to enable it and its approaches to be repaired, and the whole of the following day was occupied in getting the long column of waggons across. The country about here was very wooded and covered with bush. During the day a strong party was sent off to reconnoitre and destroy the large military kraal of Ginginhlovo, which was reported to be occupied, but it was found to have been evacuated, and was set on fire. This kraal consisted of some 300 huts, arranged in groups between the two ring fences. The outer of these was very strongly constructed of stakes, some 8ft. high, interlaced with brushwood, and would have formed a very serious obstacle to any troops unprovided with artillery. The following morning, the whole column having got across the difficult Amatikulu drift the previous day, the leading section moved off at daylight to cross the Inyezane with some hopes of reaching Etshowe that evening. The second section followed later.

The country was becoming densely wooded with mimosa and waterboom, and on the left was very broken. After crossing the Inyezane the road turns up into this broken country, winding in and out up on to the high Etshowe plateau. A few Zulus had been seen all the morning, and just as the leading waggons were forming up on a small clearing after crossing the Inyezane for the breakfast halt, a small body of the enemy were seen on a hill a short distance off. A company of the native contingent was sent to drive them off, but unfortunately fell into a trap. The natives, armed only with assegaies and knobkerries, bolted, leaving their European officers and non-commissioned officers to their fate. At the first sound of firing the leading troops of the column, consisting of the Naval Brigade, two guns Royal Artillery, and two companies of the "Buffs," advanced at the double and seized a small knoll commanding the plain to the right front, across which

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

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the Zulus were swarming, occupying every bush and clump, and evidently making for the rear of the column. To resist this the mounted men, the company of Engineers, and two companies of the Buffs advanced into the bush in skirmishing order, supported by a detachment from the 99th. An attempt was also made to turn the left flank of the column through the broken country. This was checked, however, chiefly by a few of the native contingent and by the fire of the naval rocket-tubes, admirably handled by the boatswain of H.M.S. *Active*, which promptly set on fire a kraal held by the Zulus. Meanwhile, a dense strip of bush, about 300 yards in front of the knoll, was strongly held by the enemy, who, though completely invisible, nevertheless kept up a hot but, on the whole, very harmless fire, nearly all the shots whistling high in the air, this being due to a certain extent, paradoxical as it may seem, to the short range. At first sight it seems strange that the Zulus should have been such hopelessly bad shots, but their want of skill may be attributed in a great measure to a misapprehension as to the use of the sights of their rifles. Knowing that when a white man wants to hit an object a long way off he puts up his back-sight, they concluded that the effect of so doing is to cause the rifle to shoot harder, and wishing to develop the full powers of their arms at all times, they invariably used their rifles with the back-sights up, a misconception to which many a British soldier owes his life. After a time the Zulus, who were attempting to turn the right flank of the column, began to fall back before the skirmishing line, which was soon seen advancing across the openings between the clumps of bush; at the same time the Naval Brigade and a company of the Buffs advanced up the road against the other "horn" of the attacking force and drove them back, and wheeling round to the right at the back of the high Majia Hill, which commands the knoll, took the centre of the attack in rear: thus the Zulus were out-manœuvred at their own pet game of outflanking their enemy. This put an end to the fight, and the attackers retreated hastily into the broken country, through which pursuit with the mounted people was impossible. The losses of the column were ten killed, sixteen wounded, two of the killed being officers of the native contingent, in addition to which Colonel Pearson and Colonel Parnell had their horses shot under them. From statements made by prisoners subsequently taken, the Zulu force consisted of three regiments and detachments amounting to about 4000 men, of whom they lost about 300.

As soon as the fight was over the march was resumed, but it was too late to get as far as Etshowe that day, so the column

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

a. Rocket Tubes.

b. Gatling Gun.

c. Cafonier.

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bivouacked on a ridge in the broken country; it was reached the following day. The station consisted of a small church and a few houses, built of sun-dried bricks and wattle and daub. The church was at once turned into a hospital for the sick and wounded, and the houses were filled with commissariat stores. Preparations were at once made to throw up earthworks round the buildings so as to place them in a state of defence, and a large convoy of empty waggons was sent back on the 25th January to the Tugela to fill up with stores.

In a day or two rumours began to be heard, chiefly from native sources, of a disaster to the centre column, but it was not until the morning of the 28th, that any reliable news was received. The rapidity with which news travels among the natives in South Africa is remarkable. It is transmitted by calling from kraal to kraal across the valleys, the peculiar manner the voice is pitched making words intelligible at great distances. Throughout the war the first news of engagements in which the other columns had taken part was derived in this manner from native sources. On the morning of the 28th, however, a runner arrived with a cypher telegram from Lord Chelmsford informing Colonel Pearson of the disaster which had befallen the centre column at Isandlwhana, cancelling all previous instructions, and directing him to act as he thought best under the circumstances, but in any case to hold, if possible, a fort on the Zulu side of the Lower Tugela. Three alternatives presented themselves: (1) for the whole column to remain where it was; (2) for it to retreat; (3) for a portion to return and the remainder to entrench itself. Want of supplies negatived the first, added to which it was very desirable that the volunteers and native contingent should return to Natal to defend their homes. In favour of the second course was the fact that in the event of a Zulu invasion of Natal, which seemed inevitable, every available man would be required for its defence. On the other hand, the utter loss of prestige and the fatal moral effect retreat would entail were evident, whereas it appeared certain that by remaining in a strong position, well advanced into the enemy's country, the presence of the column would have a far more deterrent effect on the Zulus than by scattering it along the Tugela. The weight of opinion was decidedly in favour of this argument, and the third course was adopted. All the mounted men (volunteers) and native contingent who could be spared were at once sent back to Natal, and the remainder proceeded to entrench themselves. That this was the soundest course to follow there is but little doubt, and it was thoroughly endorsed by the opinion of the Natal colonists; though whether it

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was due to this cause or not, no serious attempt was made by the Zulus to invade Natal.

The next question to be settled was the site of the entrenchment. Etshowe, which had been selected as a depôt by reason of the buildings, had many disadvantages as a permanent fort. It was commanded at short range on three sides, and awkward wooded kloofs lay close below it. Water, however, was good and abundant. Although a better site was available some little distance off, it was decided that, having proceeded so far with defensive works, it would be a serious loss of time to abandon them. The trace of the earthwork, therefore, was modified so as to accommodate the increased garrison, and its profile was altered so as to meet the disadvantage of being commanded.

The mounted people and the native contingent left Etshowe on the 28th January and that evening the convoy returned from the Lower Tugela, numbering seventy-two waggons, six having been abandoned broken down, about seven miles from Etshowe. The force now consisted of the Naval Brigade, two guns Royal Artillery, one company Royal Engineers, six companies of the Buffs, three companies 99th, and sundry details, besides the transport riders, waggon drivers, &c.; the totals being, combatants, 1292 whites, 65 blacks, and non-combatants, 47 whites, 290 blacks.* It was decided, in consequence of the scarcity of grazing for the large number of transport animals, to risk sending as many as could be spared back to the Tugela, and on the 30th about 1,000 left Etshowe to endeavour to reach Natal. Of these, however, 900 were promptly captured by the Zulus, the remainder returning to the fort. The waggons were arranged round the fort a short distance from the parapet and the troops were quartered underneath them, and (in the case of empty waggons) in them as well. The men were thus close to the posts they would have to occupy in case of attack. At first glance this may appear a very uncomfortable method of housing men, but as a matter of fact underneath a waggon is by no means a bad shelter, especially in wet weather, and with the tarpaulin let down on the windward side it forms a very cosy quarter, preferable to a tent. As a proof of this, it may be mentioned that on the march the Colonel commanding the column and his Staff frequently preferred this method of camping to tents. Inside the fort, however, a large number of tents would have been out of the question. The one drawback, however, was the limited amount of headroom, and

* When the mounted people left a certain number of sick horses were left behind, and with these and some officers' horses a small corps of scouts was organised under Lieutenant Rowden of the 99th, and did good service.

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until one got accustomed to it a good many heads were broken in the dark against the numerous nuts and bolts which stud the underside of the South African waggon.

A great source of regret was the unavoidable destruction of the beautiful mission garden, which must have cost the Rev. Mr. Oftebro many an hour's work. A particularly fine orange walk was most reluctantly condemned to be felled. But in cases like this sentiment must give way. The cattle were not allowed inside the fort, but at night were kraaled in a V-shaped enclosure in one of the kloofs, and in the daytime they were taken under escort to graze at distances varying from half a mile to two miles from the fort, the forming of escorts for this purpose being one of the principal occupations of the garrison. All cooking was carried on outside the fort, and as far as possible no one remained inside it during the daytime. A plentiful supply of excellent water was close at hand, and later on a capital bathing-place was formed by damming up the stream.

One very serious difficulty which incessantly presents itself in all South African warfare is the prevention of the contamination of the water supplies by the native auxiliaries and teamsters. The native has a rooted and superstitious objection to the use of anything like an organised latrine, and affects the immediate neighbourhood of running water. The nearer the source the better. What a very serious evil this was may be well imagined, and the utmost vigilance, accompanied by the severest punishments for any infraction of the regulations, was the only way of checking it in the slightest. Food supplies were naturally a source of considerable anxiety, and, from the first, everyone was placed on short rations of tea, coffee, flour, sugar, &c. Meat, however, in the shape of commissariat oxen with trek oxen to fall back upon hereafter, was plentiful, though the less said of its quality the better; extra quantities were issued to make up for the deficiency of groceries. Medicines, unfortunately, were scanty, as, owing to some oversight, only a small supply had been sent up with the convoy. Rum, too, was deficient, and could only be issued on very rare occasions to those who had been exposed for some hours to the tremendous rains which prevailed from time to time.

Although no considerable body of the enemy was in the immediate neighbourhood, the vicinity of the fort was watched by scouts who repeatedly exchanged shots with the mounted vedettes and the cattle guards. Still it was safe for small parties well armed to proceed to some distance from the fort, and many a raid was made on the mealie and pumpkin gardens. Occasionally rather ludicrous scenes occurred. One morning a

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couple of European transport riders fired at a group of natives standing near a kraal, into which they promptly bolted, reappearing, however, in a few minutes carrying a huge, bell-mouthed blunderbuss, which they loaded amid great excitement. It went off with a report like a young cannon, sending the Zulus flying in all directions, but without doing any other damage. The laugh, however, was not always on our side. One vedette was cut off and surprised, his body being found shortly afterwards covered with assegai wounds. Another one who had, contrary to orders, ridden down into a mealie field, was surrounded by fourteen Zulus, who fired a volley at him, one man catching hold of his bridle. However, he managed to break through them, with a bullet through both thighs, one through his right forearm, the fingers of his right hand smashed, and a slight wound in his back. A bullet had flattened also on the lock of his carbine, which he had slung on his back. His horse also was stabbed in the hind quarters. It is remarkable that no attempt was made to harass the fort at night, which might have been done most effectually by very few men, as it was so commanded at short distances. A few shots occasionally from various points would have caused an immense amount of annoyance even if no loss had ensued. However, an occasional call to arms occurred. On one occasion the sentries opened fire on what they declared were Zulus walking about just below the glacis with a light, and sure enough presently a glimmer some distance off revealed some moving forms. Investigation showed that the freshening breeze had revived an imperfectly extinguished cooking-fire, and some embers blown away by the wind had settled beneath a string of clothes which a careless blue-jacket had hung up to dry overnight and had forgotten to take in, and which, waving about in the wind, caused the deception. On another occasion a gunner leaving the fort for a necessary purpose neglected to inform the sentry, as he should have done before crossing the plank over the ditch. The sentry seeing a form moving along the glacis challenged repeatedly without effect, and it was not until two bullets whistled close to his ears that the stupid fellow realised his position. One night an appalling and unearthly yell in the middle of the fort brought everyone within hearing to their feet, under the impression that the Zulus were in possession. After the first yell, however, there was absolute silence, and it was some time before it was discovered that the author of the disturbance was a recruit subject to nightmare, whose face had been stepped upon by a prowling cur while he was dreaming. Few who heard that blood-curdling yell will ever forget it.

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During the first weeks communication with Natal was carried on with difficulty, the natives who undertook the task of carrying letters and despatches down running considerable risks, and several lost their lives. The despatches received from Natal were likewise few and far between. The gist of these, however, was the advisability of reducing the garrison if possible, and on the 11th February a message was sent to Lord Chelmsford informing him that, on receipt of a reply from him, 600 of the garrison would leave Etshowe on the night of the 16th, and make a forced march to the Lower Tugela. The bearer of the message was, however, intercepted by the enemy, and although everything was in readiness for a start no reply came, and the move did not take place. Time wore on with nothing beyond an occasional interchange of shots to enliven the monotony of the occupation. On the 1st March a force of some 400 men marched out to attack and destroy a large kraal some seven miles from the fort. The kraal was found abandoned and set on fire. Desultory skirmishing took place during the return march, the casualties on the side of the garrison being nil. The latest news received by the garrison was dated 8th February, so the excitement was very great when, on the afternoon of Sunday, 2nd March, flashing signals were visible from a point near the Lower Tugela.

The instrument used was an improvised one, and this combined with the inexperience of the signallers rendered the signals very indistinct and difficult to read. However, on the 3rd, the following portion of a message could be made out. "Look out for 1000 men, sally out when you see me to——" Nothing further could be made out until the 5th, when the following complete message was received, "From Colonel Law to Colonel Pearson. About 13th inst., by General's orders, I advance to your support with 1000 men, besides natives, as far as Inyezane. Be prepared to sally out to meet me with your surplus garrison there, by signal. I may come by Dunn's Road. Make answer by flag on church." All this time vain endeavours had been made to acknowledge these signals, but owing to want of apparatus these had failed. It must be remembered that in these days Army signalling was practically in its infancy and the heliograph in an experimental stage, and no one in Etshowe had more than a theoretical knowledge of the instrument which had not yet been adopted for Army use. Various expedients were tried, such as a fire balloon, a large screen on hinges, set up on the sky line, but these all failed. Meanwhile, the signallers at the Tugela, to ensure their message being understood, kept repeating it over and over again—a wise and necessary precaution, but very exasperating to the receivers, who were dying for

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further news. At last the servant of one of the staff officers bethought himself of an old bedroom mirror, which had somehow come into his possession, and rummaging in the baggage-waggon produced it and took it to Capt. McGregor, D.A.Q.M.G., who was superintending the signalling operations. After many experiments communication was established. The signalling was, however, very slow, and from the imperfection of the apparatus and other causes whole messages had constantly to be repeated. An old length of iron gas-piping had been found in the church; how it came there was a mystery. This was turned into a sight-vane, a piece of paper being attached to each end; these were aligned on the distant station, and the glass which had been mounted on a rough stand was so placed as to throw a flash on both pieces of paper. As soon as the flash ceased to light up both, it was necessary to move the glass until the flash was again in the alignment. The signals were made by means of a piece of board alternately held in front of the glass so as to obscure the flash, and removed therefrom. Thus in a slow and laborious manner the dots and dashes of the Morse alphabet were spelled out. One very serious difficulty which presented itself will be readily appreciated by those who have any practical experience of the working of the heliograph. The sun was for the greater part of the day behind the signallers, thus making it very difficult to work with a single mirror. In fact, in the afternoon when the sun got low the mirror had to be laid almost horizontal, and the flash travelled so quickly off the sights that the apparatus had to be re-adjusted after almost every word. Owing to cloudy weather and other causes it was not until the 14th March that communication was satisfactorily established. In the meantime a runner had succeeded in getting through to the Tugela with a message acknowledging the receipt of the signals.

Early in the month road-making had been undertaken, the object being to shorten by some miles the existing road from the river. To do this a new road about three miles in length through a fairly open country was opened, the chief works being cutting down the steep banks of watercourses and carrying the track along the sides of hills. Strong fatigue parties were employed on this daily, constant skirmishes taking place between roving bands of Zulus and the covering parties. The only casualty on our side, however, being an officer of the Buffs, Lieutenant Lewis, who had a very narrow escape, being struck on the forehead by a bullet which passed round under the eyebrow and out just above the temple. Beyond a pair of black eyes for some days he was, however, little the worse. The Zulus, after the working

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parties had retired for the night, were in the habit of doing as much damage to the work as they could, and caused some annoyance by removing posts marking levels, &c.; a trap therefore was laid for them. A mine was prepared and connected with a post, on top of which was a large board with TORPEDO painted in large letters, as a warning to any unwary European. The covering party had hardly got half a mile away at the end of the day's work when a crowd of natives rushed down to inspect the new sign-post. Suddenly a terrific report was heard, and the too inquisitive natives were seen flying in all directions. After this the works were left in peace. On the 13th March a message was received, announcing that the relief was postponed until the 1st April, when the whole garrison was to be relieved. The Zulus would, however, appear to have had full knowledge of the original plan, as on the 15th large bodies were seen on the march towards the Tugela, giving the fort, however, a wide berth.

In March there was a serious increase in the number of sick, and owing to the want of medicines the doctors were terribly handicapped, many poor fellows dying who might have easily been saved had the requisite medicines, stimulants, and nourishing foods been available. On the 20th February the property left behind by those who had been sent back to Natal was searched, and all stimulants, medicines, preserved milk, &c., found were handed over to the doctors; other provisions were taken over by the commissariat, and any luxuries not required by the medical department were put up to auction, fetching enormous prices. A private soldier bid £1 for a small stick of tobacco, and a ham was knocked down to a subaltern of the 99th for £7. Early in March all the commissariat oxen had been slaughtered, and recourse was had to the trek or draught oxen, the ration being increased to 1½lb. This proved, however, a serious trial to one's teeth, and long and careful stewing was the only way to make the flesh at all palatable.

The resource and handiness of the blue jackets was a considerable cause of amusement and wonder to the rest of the garrison. No matter how short the supply of food, nor the time of day, Jack always seemed to have something to cook, and small parties of men were preparing little snacks of some dainty-smelling dish at all hours. The Kroomen, some twelve or fourteen of whom were with the Naval Brigade, afforded a good deal of amusement with their quaint names—Coffee-pot, Foretop, Julius Cæsar, Alfred the Great, &c.—and their merry ways. They were immensely proud of being entrusted with rifles. The vitality of the negro, as represented by the Krooman, must be very great. Two of them having a slight difference of opinion, one snatched

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up a chopper and promptly laid the other's head open. He was carried off insensible to hospital, but much to the astonishment of everyone was walking about again almost well in the course of a couple of days. His assailant, as soon as he was out of danger, was awarded a severe dose of "fum-fum," which was laid on under the superintendence of the boatswain. From all accounts the rope's-ending had far more effect on the gentleman than the blow from the chopper had on the other man.

On the 29th March a message was received from Lord Chelmsford that the relief column was about to start, and that a force of 500 men was to be in readiness to sally out from Etshowe and act in concert with it should it be necessary. On the 31st the mounted men of the advance could be made out by telescope from the high ground near the fort, and on the following day the main body was plainly visible, forming into laager in the afternoon in the valley of the Inyezane. During the whole of this day large numbers of the enemy were seen marching down through the broken country towards the plain, but keeping well out of reach of the garrison of the fort. The order which they preserved was most remarkable; formed in regiments of 1000 to 2000 strong, each in column of companies, they marched with a precision which would have been creditable to regular troops.

As soon as daylight began to break on the morning of the 3rd everyone was listening for the preconcerted signal (three guns fired in rapid succession), on which the Fort-Column was to co-operate with the Relief Column. But the enemy anticipated this arrangement by attacking the laager on all sides as soon as it was daylight, and the field guns fired were in defence of it. Ginginhlovo, the scene of the action, is only a few miles from Etshowe, as the crow flies, but the country in between is so impracticable that a wide detour would have been necessary, entailing four or five hours' march. Under the circumstances, therefore, co-operation was impossible.

Those whose duties enabled them to leave the fort hurried to the edge of the plateau, a few hundred yards away, whence a view of the plain could be had. The sides of the laager, consisting of waggons, could easily be made out with the naked eye fringed with musketry smoke, and every now and then the bright flash of the field guns. The Reverend Mr. Robertson (chaplain and interpreter to the columns) was quickly on the spot, bringing his large and very powerful telescope on a stand. This was in great request. To the naked eye little could be made out of the attacking force, but through this glass the sight was most curious. Swarms of little black specks kept appearing and disappearing

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among the long grass; the appearance of each speck being followed by a minute puff of smoke. This went on for some time, then the smoke from the laager sides began to cease and the faint rattle of musketry stopped. The formed bodies of Zulus could be seen drawing off in a north-westerly direction. Then after a short pause the mounted people could be seen issuing from the laager, in hot pursuit. An amusing story was current next day with reference to this pursuit. The mounted infantry had been armed with swords as a tentative measure. One gallant trooper, anxious to distinguish himself, rode valiantly after one of the flying Zulus and tried to cut him down. After hacking at him ineffectually for some time the Zulu thought it was his turn, and going for his pursuer with his assegai slashed his fingers off, and picking up his sword, which he naturally dropped, made off in triumph.

That afternoon communications were established between the two forces, and Colonel Pearson rode down to meet Lord Chelmsford. On the following afternoon the leading troops of the Relief Column arrived at Etshowe, and on the 4th April the garrison marched for the Lower Tugela, leaving behind them in the little cemetery below the fort four officers and twenty-seven men whose last resting-places were marked by rude wooden crosses carved by their comrades. One hundred and twenty sick accompanied the column back to the river.

H. R. KNIGHT.

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THE EMPLOYMENT OF ROYAL ENGINEER OFFICERS IN TIME OF PEACE.

By a Quondam Division Officer of R.E.

It is proposed in this paper to consider whether the existing mode of employing officers of the Royal Engineers on barrack work in time of peace is advantageous as an economical and efficient mode of building and repairing barracks and military stores and their accessories—as affording a valuable training to officers which will increase their usefulness in time of war—or, lastly, as the most practicable and on the whole a satisfactory way of employing in time of peace a body of officers essential, or at least valuable, in time of war.

I. I shall begin by describing the present machinery for administering War Department barracks and buildings connected with them and the way it works.

Barrack works in the United Kingdom and Ireland are now carried on by Royal Engineer establishment, consisting of Royal Engineer officers, foremen of works, clerks and draftsmen, as well as civilian surveyors, clerks, and foremen of works, clerks and draftsmen. These are organised, broadly speaking, thus: The United Kingdom and Ireland is divided into military districts, each under the command of a major-general, who has as his adviser on all engineering and architectural matters an engineer officer called the Commanding Royal Engineer. This officer is in command of all the Royal Engineers in the district, and is the head of the Royal Engineer establishment; he deals with all Royal Engineer services "by order" of the General, and is responsible to that officer for keeping him acquainted with the business of the branch and for consulting him and acting on his orders whenever necessary. The amount of latitude allowed to him in issuing instructions "by order" of the General without actually consulting him must always depend on the personal relations of the two officers. On the other hand, if the General differs from the Commanding Royal Engineer on any technical matter of engineering architecture or which concerns the construction and maintenance

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of the War Department works, he is bound to forward the Commanding Royal Engineer's opinion to superior authority with his own report. This arrangement is of recent date, and has doubtless been made because it is considered desirable that the Major-General should have his say on all matters connected with the comfort and health of the troops, or which affect the interior economy of the units composing those troops, and the facilities for ensuring good discipline, efficient training, and suitable recreation.

Each district is divided into "sub-districts"; a Royal Engineer officer is in charge of each "sub-district," and has under him the Royal Engineer officers who are in charge of the "divisions" which compose the "sub-district."

The District Commanding Royal Engineers are usually colonels; the Sub-district Commanding Royal Engineers, lieutenant-colonels; the Divisions Officers, majors and captains; but where are the lieutenants? Excepting the few partially employed on departmental work with their companies, there are, or were a few months ago, only two lieutenants employed on departmental work in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

Where, then, do the Division Officers and Commanding Royal Engineers get their training? All officers of the Royal Engineers get six months' training in construction on joining the corps at Chatham as young officers. Some of them get some training abroad, but buildings in India and most other foreign stations are far less complicated structures than buildings at home, and have often no drainage, gas, or water supply connected with them; they are, moreover, estimated and measured with much less elaborate complications, while most of the officers who go on public works in India stay there. Now the average officer remains a lieutenant for ten or eleven years of his service. Is it, I ask, to be expected that he should be fit at the end of that time to take up charge of a large barrack division involving the annual expenditure of possibly many thousand pounds, the preparation of plans and estimates for new works, alterations and maintenance, as well as the supervision of contracts and contractors interested in every sort of scamping, jugglery, and overcharge?

How, then, do Division Officers manage to carry on properly, and how do Commanding Royal Engineers, who have never been Division Officers, manage? To explain this it must be remembered that here at home, so far as barrack work goes, nearly all power is centralised at the War Office; that every plan and estimate goes there for criticism, alteration, and final approval. It must also be remembered that there is attached to the office of every Commanding Royal Engineer a civilian district surveyor,

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whose duty it is not only to take out "quantities" and measure up works, but also to examine all plans and estimates, criticise them, and furnish the Commanding Royal Engineer with a list of critical remarks. Thus a plan and estimate for some service is prepared, say, by a foreman of works and submitted to the Division Officer; the latter directs the foreman to make any alteration he thinks fit, and then sends them to the Commanding Royal Engineer. They usually come before the Commanding Royal Engineer with a paper of observations by the District Surveyor pinned on; usually the Commanding Royal Engineer sends these with the plan and estimate back to the Division Officer for consideration or adoption together with his own remarks. Eventually the plans, &c., go to the War Office for approval; thence they are returned approved or not, but generally with elaborate detailed criticisms, alterations, or corrections on every smallest detail of the construction. These papers are the work of different surveyors and others at the War Office, and are sent down by the Inspector-General with orders that they are to be considered, answered, or adopted.

Now under these circumstances let us consider what is likely to be the position and attitude of the Division Officer. We have seen that under the elaborate system of criticism described shortly above, not only are all faults in plans, &c., likely to be found out, but also every detail which is in any way a matter of opinion is likely to be altered or criticised by some person or other in one or other of the superior offices; often even the dimensions of girders, roof timbers, &c., which have been calculated according to one formula or taken from one engineering book of reference, are altered for those given in another book, and there is no authorised set of typical calculations as there is in the Indian Public Works Department, nor any recognised authority. It must be remembered too that the preparation and examination of plans and estimates involves detailed knowledge of building construction in all its branches, and of the many and various fittings and appliances used in War Department buildings; and that it is impossible for a Division Officer to examine efficiently plans, designs, and estimates that come before him without an intimate acquaintance with those branches of knowledge.

Having regard to this flood of criticism which is sure to be poured out on every plan, the tendency is for a Division Officer only to intervene where he can be pretty sure of doing so effectively; but if he cannot make the necessary criticisms on his subordinates' plans, and leaves this to be done by the District Surveyor and War Office, he must necessarily lose weight with his

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subordinates, and his position as head of his division becomes a semi-sham. Again, in his dealings with the contractors, appeals are continually made from the decisions of Division Officers to the Commanding Royal Engineer, and the latter very often refers the appeal to the District Surveyor, whom he considers his technical adviser (and the meaning and comprehensiveness of that word "technical" varies according to the capabilities and tastes of different Commanding Royal Engineers), and accepts his decision. All this tends to move the centre of gravity of the weight of departmental authority towards the Surveyors and away from the Division Officer and even the Commanding Royal Engineer.

Lastly, what has a Division Officer to gain by throwing himself with zeal and energy into his work? Is his promotion stopped because work in his division is indifferently done? Certainly not. It would be unreasonable to expect a man to be a really competent Division Officer under the present system. Is he likely to be selected as a Commanding Royal Engineer on account of proficiency in building work? Certainly not. Praise and blame when meted out by good judges of the work praised or blamed are powerful stimulants to exertion, but the man who praises or blames must be the man who really knows and can judge of the work done—not merely a man who is advised by those who know it, and who knows that those he praises or blames are also dependent on the advice of others, just as he is himself. The soul-destroying deal level of division work tends to damp down all energies to suit a motiveless and monotonous routine, in which praise and blame find little field for action, because there is little definite responsibility for them to fix on. If you will not allow men to act on their own responsibility, you cannot possibly find out from the work done who are the best men. Undoubtedly, if Division Officers had more power and responsibility they would become more efficient; but, unless there is to be a fiasco, they must be efficient to start with. I am assuming, of course, that they are to be real and not shadowy existences with duties ascribed to them by a fiction but not performed by them.

To get this reality there must be a clear line of demarcation between the duties of Surveyors and those of Division Officers and Commanding Royal Engineers. This line should be that which divides the duties of an architect from those of a surveyor; he would, indeed, be a poor architect who should refer his plans to a surveyor for advice as to constructional detail; yet this is exactly what our Commanding Royal Engineers do. In an architect's office are prepared complete plans and specifications; the surveyor

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steps in to take out the quantities, if he steps in at all. So far as barrack work goes, if Commanding Royal Engineers and Division Officers are not to be equal to doing the work of an architect they are not commercially worth keeping. An intelligent staff officer can see to the suitability of a general plan without knowing anything about construction. If Commanding Royal Engineers are only going to add to this an amateur smattering of construction, which does not fit them to do without a "professional" adviser, then they only relieve the right men from responsibility without taking it themselves. If you make a Division Officer into a real man, you can then give him more power, and let him be the real effective head of his division; if, in addition to this, you leave him long enough in his division to make his work show, then in a few years an efficient inspecting officer will be able to pick out of the Division Officers the best men, so far as barrack work goes, to make Commanding Royal Engineers. In short, the training of a Division Officer should be such, and the powers given him should be such, that he can be really held responsible for work which he thoroughly knows and concerning which he can decide without assistance, instead of being nominally responsible for the work of two branches, neither of which he thoroughly knows. But to get this a man's training in building work as a subaltern must be thorough and long. Moreover, without subalterns to work under them, Division Officers have not, and cannot have, the leisure to keep up their efficiency in military work, though this ought obviously to be a *sine quâ non.* You employ on builder's work a number of men who are not professional builders or architects, because you want to have them as efficient military engineers in time of war; surely then it is folly not to ensure their being, at least, efficient military engineers; and yet their training as such is, in many cases, lamentably insufficient. Years often go by without their getting even one month's practise in military engineering or in drill or manœuvre—not even the one month which is vouchsafed to every militia man.

II. The next question is whether barrack works in the United Kingdom and Ireland afford to Royal Engineer officers a training which will increase their usefulness. The advocates of the present system say it is better for men to be employed on some practical work like barracks than to be drilling or playing at military engineering. The writer would say roundly that barrack works such as ours are not a training at all for a military engineer. As a Division Officer, you hardly ever do anything that would be of use to you on service. A Division

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Officer is always looking on and never having to do things himself. The contractor does everything. Besides this, buildings suited for luxurious civilisation and peace are of little use as a guide for the rough requirements of war. When you leave civilisation, you leave all its contractors, all its specialised markets and elaborate sub-divisions of labour and materials. Lord Wolseley says the best engineer for an Army is one who has practised in a new country. The Public Works Department in India did undoubtedly afford a valuable training to our officers as military engineers. It used to be notorious that generals preferred to have as their field engineers men who had been on the public works rather than men who had stuck to the sappers and miners. But an executive engineer in India used to be in a very different position from that of a Division Officer at home; he had a free hand, and was often thrown on his own resources. He might be set to build a church or barrack, and left to find his own limestone and burn it; find his own clay, and make his own bricks and tiles; fell his own deodars, and make his own woodwork.

III. Lastly comes the general question as to whether the present system is the only practicable and on the whole satisfactory way of employing in time of peace a body of officers essential in time of war. This question divides itself naturally into three parts, which must be taken consecutively.

First, what number of engineer officers do we require for war?

Second, what length and description of annual training should each officer have to ensure his efficiency in war? If further specialisation is desirable, then what training does each special branch require?

Third, what civil employments can be found which (*a*) give the requisite training to any branch of the corps, or (*b*) which will provide employment for officers for the time available after allowing for their training.

As to the first consideration, we aspire to provide three Army corps and a cavalry division; for each Army corps fifty-two engineer officers are required; while we have actually 900 engineer officers. Allowing liberally for Indian requirements, into the merits of which I will not go, and allowing for the requirements of fortresses and defended ports, there is still a large margin over our requirements for war so far as engineer officers go. We no longer live in the days when everything except drill required an engineer officer to do it; what the engineers were then to the rest of the Army, the special corps (telegraph, pontoon, field companies, mounted detachments, fortress companies, submarine

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mining companies, survey companies) are now; it seems evident that the officers required for these special corps must be kept with their men all the year, for they all have certainly more to teach and more to learn than officers in the infantry have. Beyond these, however, it is not apparent that a large number of officers is required for engineer duties; neither is it at all clear to me that for duties which involve no military technique nor the command of men it is necessary to have soldiers at all even in time of war; it would be better to get a special engineer or architect for the special work required. For all such works on which troops are employed under their own officers, and also *not* in connection with sappers, the necessary directions might be given by civilians specially engaged, by a retaining fee if necessary.

I have already quoted Lord Wolseley's opinion concerning the suitability of engineers who have done pioneer work for employment in war.

Secondly, what length and description of annual training should each officer have to keep him fit for war? Evidently, on the face of it, this depends on what the duties are which are to be exacted from him in war. In proportion as you specialise the war duties you reduce the annual training required to keep a man up to the mark; if you intend to keep him fit for all the diversified duties which an engineer officer may now be called on to carry out—if you wish him to be a thoroughly efficient soldier, able to train and handle soldiers and deal judiciously with them in matters of discipline, if you require him to be ready to lay out and make a road in any country, to make a bridge, to arrange a water supply, to make a survey or a good quick reconnaissance or sketch, to erect suitable field-works, siege-works, shelters, &c.; if, in addition, you require him to have any knowledge of submarine mining and telegraphy, then I say you must train him all the year round. What do we actually do? We keep officers on barrack works for five or six years at a stretch, and in all that time they probably do nothing whatever that they will do again in war. If there were subaltern officers employed on the barracks then it might be possible for officers to have leisure enough to attend to their military duties while so employed. But is it necessary that the men who build and repair the barracks should be soldiers at all? Why should there not be further specialisation? If we really do want men who can build, let them be taught to be thorough good practical builders. What a man does in war time he wants to do quickly, and to this end he must know his duties thoroughly; nine men out of ten who are Jacks of all trades are masters of none, and certainly not

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masters of all; the tenth man is perhaps master of all. We arrange the duties of the corps of Royal Engineers to suit the tenth man.

Thirdly, what civil employments can be found which (*a*) give the requisite training to any branch of the corps, and (*b*) which will provide employment for officers for the time they have available from training? As to (*a*) we find employment for our telegraphists in peace time, and what they do in peace is of real use to them in war. In the absence of government railways we cannot employ men similarly on railways, but if we are content to have efficient railway engineers and do not require the same men to do a hundred other things, we might keep a lien on the services of such; we have got already the Railway Volunteer Corps. We might, if we chose, employ as many of our officers as we liked on Indian railways which have a government guarantee. If we must have this great surplus of officers the larger part of them would be much better trained on Indian public works than on English barrack duties; this would be a matter of financial arrangement with India.

As to (*b*), if we *must* have all the officers we have now, and we *cannot* find training for them in civil life, then we must train them for a part of each year, or give them continual training each year while they are employed, *e.g.*, on barrack work—or some other work as useless for their war training—and to do this we must have more men employed on barracks, so that each man may have time for his military duties.

Finally, if it was thought practicable to cut down the corps by the 100 officers or so who are employed on barracks in the United Kingdom and Ireland, then the new barrack department might be provided by giving the officers now employed on barracks the option of remaining on at home on the same conditions of pay, prospective advancement in rate of pay, and pension as they now enjoy; if they choose to retire and become works-officials on those terms you could supply the barrack department in future from the same *class*, who might be trained at Woolwich and Chatham, and then enter the barrack department. This plan would leave comparatively few senior Royal Engineer officers at home, and the tours abroad would be longer; this should be made good by increased pay to those abroad. You will thus be paying more for the Royal Engineers and barrack department combined for a few years, but afterwards you would inevitably gain on the barrack department, as you would certainly either decentralise more and reduce the central staff, or centralise and reduce the expense of the local staffs. It is believed that some such reduction or specialisation would be good for the barracks, as they would be more economically and better done; good for the Army, as it would not be saddled with

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the pay of engineers not properly trained as military engineers, and would be rid of the fiction that they are so trained; and good for the Royal Engineer, as it would be rid of the one set of duties which has not brought credit to the corps.

Doubtless this paper contains much that is crude and insufficiently considered, but my object is to make it understood that the employment and strength constitution of the Royal Engineers requires reconsideration altogether.

R.E.

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THE WAR IN BRAZIL.

By Constance Eaglestone.

Despicable in its aim and in its conduct as a personal war must always be, one has rarely been waged on a moral plane so low as that which is now destroying the past and the future alike of the great country on the other side of the Atlantic. Its cause and its object are alike obscure, and the only point which is clear is that either of the two leaders would rather watch the stones of the last wall in the city blown apart and the hull of the last ship disappear beneath the waters of the bay, than see his rival firmly established in the place of power which he covets for himself. An eminent authority in treating of the States to the south of the Isthmus of Panama generally, said lately, "No dispassionate person could travel through South America and not come to the conclusion that almost the worst monarch must be better than a system under which one man after another plunges nations into ruin and scatters broadcast distress and desolation that either in his own person, or that of his son, or that of his nominee, he may continue to hold the power he has once tasted as head of the State." To no realm can his words be so aptly applied as to the land of Brazil, the fairest and the richest, as it is the most extensive of the countries of the great continent, which has for so many months been devastated by an unneeeded war.

Rio did not pass through the usual preliminary stages of such a conflict—discontent giving place to disturbance, disturbance to riot, and riot to revolution. The majority of the population were as much surprised to find themselves at war last autumn as was the case five years ago when they went to sleep under a Monarchy and awoke under a Republic. "It does not make much difference," they most of them appear to have said, and then continued to play cards, smoke cigarettes, and be merry, and in the intervals to assist the useful foreigners to develop the resources of their country as usual. But now they have found that with their homes devastated and themselves exiled to the suburbs of their own city, it makes a very great deal of difference, and a large proportion of them would cheerfully accept either Peixoto or de Mello on his own terms, provided only the unseemly strife could thereby be brought to an end.

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Let me make a few statements without comment on the condition of affairs during the four years before Army and Navy decided to come to blows. Brazil under the Emperor Dom Pedro, in 1889, was in a prosperous condition; her credit was as good, some, without contradiction, have said better, than that of any European country, except England and France. She was governed by a number of fairly able and energetic statesmen, among them being merchants, planters, and others who represented the commercial and landed interests of the country, and the *milrei*, current coin, was worth two shillings and threepence. In November, 1889, Generals Deodoro, Peixoto, and Benjamin Constant, and Admirals Wandenkok and de Mello proclaimed the Republic. Had the Bourbon prince, the Comte d'Eu, had a particle of spirit, he would have put himself at the head of his regiment, in the name of the father of his consort, and ridden down the mutineers, who then numbered a few hundred only, exclusive of the boys from the military schools; instead, he remained quietly in his room till the self-appointed authorities came to arrest him. The people of Brazil on their part as quietly acquiesced in the change, while they received compliments from this side the water on the success of their "bloodless revolution." The birthdays of the generals were next proclaimed public holidays, and all royal feast days and associations were abolished. Deodoro then declared himself dictator. To this the Brazilians agreed without demur; the House of Representatives was elected, Deodoro was made President and Peixoto Vice-President. Meanwhile the *milrei* had fallen to tenpence.

Deodoro next quarrelled with and dissolved his Parliament, and again proclaimed himself dictator. The Brazilians loaded him with addresses and acclamation. Peixoto and de Mello then deposed Deodora, and popular approval was transferred to them. Peixoto quarrelled with de Mello and proclaimed himself dictator. De Mello made an attempt to oust him from his place. Failing in this, and unwilling to await the result of the general election six months later, he set aside the constituted authorities of his country and subjected it to all the horrors of civil war.

The first part of the Admiral's *coup d'état* was accomplished without any opposition whatever, although he had been looked on with suspicion for some time, and his movements and telegraphic communications carefully watched. At midnight of September 5th he boarded the *Aquidaban*, taking possession at the same time of the ships *Republica*, *Irajano*, and *Marcilio Dias*, with all the gun-boats, torpedo-boats, and most of the Brazilian merchant vessels in the harbour. Being accompanied and supported by different officers,

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members of congress, and other influential men, he next landed at Nictheroy and removed all the ammunition and supplies from the naval arsenal to his ships. The proceedings were repeated on the Ilha das Cobras, any guns which they could not take away being spiked, while coal and provisions were appropriated wherever possible, receipts being given for the goods signed Custodio de Mello. It will thus be seen that the Admiral began his revolt under exceptionally favourable conditions. When the historic whale elects to engage in single combat with the elephant, however, nothing is certain but the uncertain, and whether de Mello will ever issue victorious from his struggle none can say, for if Peixoto has no ships to meet his foe at sea, his opponent has no men to send to pursue his advantages on land, consequently the conflict at close quarters, which alone could bring matters to a crisis, cannot occur.

Admiral da Gama, the most brilliant officer and high-minded man who has come forward during the struggle, did his best to bring about a compromise before he eventually ended his long-preserved neutrality and declared against Peixoto with the words, "I draw the sword against military despotism, making every effort to rescue the country from the anarchy and serfdom to which the rulers have now brought her." There could, however, be no question of a compromise, for de Mello will listen to no terms which do not include the resignation of Marshal Peixoto and the exclusion of him and his partisans from any future share in the government, while the President is yet more determined to work the ruin of his late supporter and present personal foe. It is also unlikely that any decision which may be arrived at during the General Elections on March 1st, will receive a moment's consideration from the party to whom it is unfavourable. Even if the struggle of the moment were ended, there is no guarantee that Brazil would not see a repetition of the history of the last four years, during which the Republic has marched forward at the orders of different military commanders, martial law moving at its right hand, lawless disorder at its left, and revolution in its rear. The condition of affairs before the outbreak was described as follows by one of the few fearless and impartial men in the country, the North American editor of the *Rio News*, who, braving daily threats of assassination (and these threats were not idle, for a victim had already been claimed in the Spanish editor of the *Heraldo*, brutally murdered for presuming to speak favourably of de Mello) continued to write the truth till his paper was suppressed a few weeks ago, since which time it has appeared as a commercial circular only. "This revolt is nothing

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but the natural outcome of a long series of political and administrative mistakes, and it will never be definitely ended until these causes are removed. . . . At the bottom of all this trouble is to be found the evil of military rule, the despotism of the sword; side by side with that is habitual disregard of law and legal form." And, again, writing of the year before the war, he says:—"The history of 1892 is one long record of violence, arbitrary acts, and selfish schemes. Public credit and public interest have suffered almost irreparable injuries, and yet there has not been enough of patriotism, courage, and self-sacrifice to check the downward course of the nation. There has been less personal liberty than under the Monarchy, less respect for law, and less consideration for the good name of the country." These words are the more impressive as coming from the mouth of one who is a Republican by instinct and inheritance as well as by inclination.

A striking feature of the war has been the attitude of the representatives, naval and diplomatic, of the foreign powers. To them too much praise cannot be given for the absolute neutrality they have observed during the long months they have remained in the very heart of the conflict, and for the protection they have been able to afford to the persons, if not to the property, each to those of his own nationality. At the outset they merely put one question to the President: "Is this a naval revolt or is it a civil war?" and had Peixoto deemed it safe or expedient to dub his countrymen rebels, the bombardment of the capital would, in all probability, never have taken place. But there were grave reasons why the executive should not place the city under foreign protection, which would have been the case had they allowed interference, and among them is the fact that their own hold on the population, especially on the mixed race, who form the Submerged Tenth of Rio, is so slight that had they taken the step in question, they might have found themselves unanimously deserted in favour of de Mello. The stormy scene in the Chamber of Deputies which ensued when Nilo Peçanha brought in a Bill for declaring the revolutionary officers pirates, with a rider to the effect that they should be delivered into the hands of the government later, adequately proved what opinion was on the matter in that quarter. The foreign representatives also explained to Peixoto that there would be no infringement of international law on their part if they interfered to prevent de Mello from bombarding Rio "as a defenceless city," but that they could not hinder him from defending himself should he be threatened with attack, as their attitude must be absolutely fair to both sides. The final cause of

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the bombardment was that the Peixotites planted a new battery at a point overlooking the Saúde anchorages and commanding the insurgent vessels. By this act the government distinctly broke the agreement it had made not to provoke the insurgents to fire on the city. Naval officers from the English, French, and American cruisers satisfied themselves that the battery had in reality been planted, and then after conferring together informed Peixoto that, should the bombardment take place, which in effect it did next day, it would not be in their power to interfere. Due weight must be given to this matter, as popular feeling ran very high against the foreign representatives for "inviting the bombardment of the city," as it was expressed, and for some reason best known to themselves, the government organs made it appear that the English and French representatives alone were to blame for it; the consequence being that the legations of those powers were threatened by the mob, though the fact was that every country owning a war-ship in the harbour, took part in the conference where the course of action was decided upon. One of the minor difficulties the said representatives have had to meet, is that of preventing the trading vessels of other countries in the harbour from flying their flags. This is, of course, a grave international offence, and if detected it gives the power whose rights have been infringed the permission to retain the offending craft as a prize. The device is resorted to with a view of ensuring the safety of the cargo, which is promptly appropriated by the insurgents unless it be thus protected.

Before leaving this subject reference may be made to the praiseworthy action of the American Admiral Benham, who after declaring that "if da Gama, the Brazilian admiral, touched an American ship or American goods, he would look on him as a pirate," proceeded to make good his words. Details cannot be given here, but it may be mentioned that the commanders of the other European vessels fully approved of his proceedings, while his own government telegraphed to him through Mr. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy at Washington, as follows: "We are satisfied entirely with the prudence and judgment with which you have carried out your instructions and protected American commerce." On the satisfaction with which the British Chambers of Commerce heard of this incident no comment need be made.

Every turn in the struggle is being watched by the said Chambers of Commerce with an intensity of interest that contrasts oddly with the apathy shown in its regard by the general public. "The war still going on in Brazil, I suppose? They want to restore the Emperor don't they? No!—you're right, of course; he's dead. To restore his son, then? No? I thought they did.

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I don't know much about it. Now let us talk of something else." Business men, however, remember that £100,000,000 have been advanced by British capitalists for the development of the resources of that country which they now see with its commerce paralysed, its business suspended, its banks closed, its business quarter wrecked in part by the shells of the insurgents, its mails undelivered, and its telegraphic and postal communications under strict and unkindly official supervision; one-third of its population ousted from their homes, martial law in full force, peaceful residents killed by the hundred and their homes struck by the thousand, the streets infested night and day by disappointed mercenaries, deserters from Army and Navy, and ill-disciplined soldiers eager for a brawl, while the discontented police force looks indifferently on, and, evil most to be feared of all, a vast seething mass, the dregs of the population, including those of Indian, Chinese, and negro extraction, with an enormous percentage of that million and a half of slaves on whom freedom was bestowed with ill-considered haste half-a-dozen years ago. These are all panting for the moment to come when, the last restraints being withdrawn, they may gratify their longing for plunder and outrage; and those who know the city, and know how absolutely it will lie at the mercy of these hell-hounds if once they break loose, tremble when they think what news the cablegrams might any day during the last weeks have brought them, and what any day they yet may bring, and—for human beings are but human after all—their apprehension is increased, not lessened, when they call to mind that should that day of horror ever dawn, among the first who will leap on shore to prevent it, or to fall victims to it, will be every available man who can be spared from the English cruisers and merchant vessels which at this moment are crowded together in the harbour of Rio. Things were done after the bombardment of Alexandria which some few knew of at the time, and of those some few still remember; but it was a question then of an effete and cowardly population, of numbers most limited, and not such as now swarms in the dens of the capital of Brazil.

To return for one moment to the consideration of the war from the point of view of the Chambers of Commerce. It is generally believed by the partisans of President Peixoto that public sympathy has been enlisted among ourselves in favour of his opponents. It is unnecessary to discuss here whether there be or not any foundation for this belief, but the naval revolt in itself has received the fullest condemnation from the mercantile community of England. To it Dom Pedro of Bragança was merely a man under whose rule their hundred millions brought a

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good return in direct interest, and an excellent one in orders for English goods of every kind, from steam engines to sunshades. Flaviano Peixoto is merely the man who, having persistently pushed them along the downward path for a period of years, was eventually outwitted by a member of his own cabinet, who planted his batteries in the midst of the business section of the city, and who has not only indirectly done them all manner of evil, but has crowned his misdeeds by issuing false reports of the war, which in the cases where they were accepted as correct, have been as will-o'-the-wisps, leading the merchant to the marshes of the courts of bankruptcy. For this, however, the rest would bear him no grudge provided he could put down the rebellion and allow them to order their own affairs in peace. For Custodio de Mello they likewise personally care little, and whether he be Bazaine, MacMahon, or Boulanger concerns them not. If he can overcome his rival, let him, so long as he can give pledges, and prove able to keep them, that their trade will be unmolested and their commercial treaties observed.

What they want is what Brazil wants in like degree—peace and security and settled government, permission to develop the resources of the country, and protection for those among the natives who will care to help them in the task, and a guarantee that if they devote themselves to the improvement of the internal communication it will be to their own profit as well as that of others, and, finally, that the words "*Ordem e Progresso*," which are written across the national standard, shall become the national watchword in deed and in truth. It must be remembered that English merchants, among whom are some of the most gifted and highly-cultured men in the community, now go to Brazil, not merely to see how things are getting on and to return before the rains, but to remain there, as they remain in India, for the best years of their lives. They do not only send over the son or nephew, who on one day will work and on the next won't, but set out with their wives and children, and see that the latter become as conversant with the foreign tongue as with their own, and are trained to be proud of the distinguished positions they hold in the foreign commercial and financial colonies established in the country.

No one who lays his hand on the helm of the State in Brazil, can afford to dispense with the support and flout the loyalty of the foreign merchants to whom so much of the wealth and business activity is due, and who, it is no exaggeration to say, form the backbone of all business enterprise. Yet that attempts to flout that loyalty and dispense with that support

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have been made it would be but too easy to prove. At the opening of the present, the third rebellion during the four years the Republic has been established, the merchants had grievances to complain of a thousand times more real than those of the naval officers who raised the standard of rebellion, but the former were content to wait, patiently bearing their wrongs as they might, till, when peaceful reform was secured, they also might obtain redress.

The actual struggle going on is pursued under conditions almost unique, and the configuration of the bay itself is specially adapted for making the duration of such a struggle indefinite, while in no part of the world could the "gallery" which assembles daily to watch the drama, be so well placed for its own purposes. The entrance to the bay is only a few furlongs in width, and the greatest distance across any part is five miles, while the length is twenty-five miles. From this it is seen that the belligerents are carrying on operations on a sheet of water which has the appearance of a vast inland lake, and on its surface lie anchored not only the war-ships and torpedo-boats of the Brazilians, but the cruisers of the foreign powers and merchant vessels from every quarter of the globe. This lake is surrounded by that magnificent range of hills so often described: the Organ Mountains, named from the regular manner in which peak follows peak, rise to the left, while to the right are the hills of Tijuca and the cones of the Corcovado and the Sugar Loaf, a fortress frowning at the base of the latter; and these heights, whether seen when partially veiled in the white mists of early morning, when a thunder-storm hangs dark and stormy over them, or when under the influence of a tropical sun they assume every hue from tender blue to deep indigo, never fail to justify the terms of enthusiasm which have been lavished upon them. The precipitous nature of the mountain sides are favourable to the formation of splendid water-falls, which may be seen from an immense distance, and, softening the contours of the rocks at their sides, a closer inspection would reveal great cushions of maidenhair and tropical fern. An old aqueduct is a picturesque feature in the scene at one point, and nearer the shore rise the slender shafts of the palms and tree-ferns, many of which have been decapitated in the interests of the artillery men. The size of the harbour is the greatest possible advantage to the insurgents, who are able for the most part to keep out of range of the artillery on shore. On the other hand they are kept in check, and their plan of campaign modified by the forts, which are prepared to prevent them from leaving the bay on the one hand and to admit vessels favourable to the government on the other, though to guard against the consequences of such an entry de Mello has laid

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down a number of torpedoes, and placed his torpedo-boats in readiness for attack. Electric search-lights are kept constantly in use, and these appear to be usually operated by a portable engine and boiler and French 100-volt dynamos. As a phase of maritime warfare it will be realised that the naval revolt in Brazil is without precedent, while the situation as regards the merchant navy is so peculiar that the difficulty in dealing with it is found to be extreme. From the above description it will be realised that the representatives of the government admit merchant vessels into the harbour, but when once arrived there they can neither protect nor exercise any authority over them, nor can they even make the usual port and customs visits, the control of the bay being in the hands of the opponents of the executive. No appeal for redress can be made to that executive should any wrong be suffered by a vessel sailing under a foreign flag, and if they be stormed at with shot and shell their commanders must either treat the matter as an accident or follow the precedent of Admiral Benham and declare such to be an act of piracy—though authorities at home would probably be inclined to expostulate if their representatives should, on their own initiative, take such a big leap as this into the political unknown. Permission to leave the bay is readily accorded by both parties to any merchantman, but as many of the latter drew their last hundredweight of coal from the hold as they steamed in, expecting to find hundreds of tons lying in readiness on shore for them as usual, they are forced to stay on, blocking up the harbour to their own and other's disgust, for no fresh supplies are to be found nearer than Buenos Ayres, that in the English yards having all been long ago seized on by the insurgents. For this Brazil will pay in time; meanwhile the ships' owners on this side of the world and the ships' commanders on that, stand with hands tied in utter bewilderment as to what course to pursue. It might be thought, from the narrowness of the mouth of the harbour and the position of the forts with their well-placed guns, that it would be impossible for any insurgent vessel to leave the bay, yet this feat has been achieved more than once, notably in the case of the warship *Aquidaban*, which Admiral de Mello, with the greatest skill and gallantry, succeeded in taking to the open sea on the last day of November. As the coaling, provisioning, and painting of the man-of-war had to be carried on in full view of those on shore, her intention must have been known for days beforehand, especially as one defect after another having been discovered in her machinery these had to be put right before she could set out, and yet the forts seem to have been taken completely by surprise when, under cover of the midnight darkness, she

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steamed towards them. Before her went the armed merchantman *Esperanca*, keeping close in shore and right under the forts, whose search-lights missing her were directed upon the attack being made as a blind upon the city shore-guards, while at the critical moment the Gloria light was extinguished by a well-directed shot from a rebel gun. After the *Esperanca* the *Aquidaban* came majestically on, disdaining to give her exit from the bay the appearance of flight, while she discharged her heavy turret guns into the forts of Santa Cruz and Lage as she passed. Both forts were badly damaged, but Lage suffered most, as it not only received the fire of the man-of-war but that of its own friends in Santa Cruz, which, unable to see what was going on, continued to fire straight across the bay after the *Aquidaban* had, thanks to the informant on board who was able to indicate the position of Peixoto's torpedoes, reached the open sea.

This running of the gauntlet was one of the finest bits of seamanship which has been displayed during the war, and it is much to be regretted that space cannot be allowed for fuller details. As a rule this struggle appears to have been so far curiously devoid of heroic or romantic episodes, and "incidents" which have crossed the Atlantic are, for the most part, represented by such as that of the poor young Englishman who was struck deaf by the bursting of a shell close to him; of the English baby which was carried to its grave amidst the roar of the guns; of the fragments of the shell, which, making their way through the roof of a tramcar, killed some of the passengers, and so on.

Reference was made in an earlier part of this article to the inexplicable conduct of the Brazilian non-combatants who are to be seen in their hundreds from dawn to dusk on the heights overlooking the bay, as they watch the attempt of their army to destroy their navy and their navy to destroy their capital. "*Ola!*" they cry, as a shot from the fort, missing the gun-boat at which it was aimed, falls into the water to its stern, throwing up a waterspout as it does so. "*Tiro magnifico!*" is pronounced a moment later as the confusion on board shows that another gunner had had better luck. Then they clap their hands as though they were watching a scene got up by the manager of some theatre, and exchange remarks on the skill of the actors, while those who have glasses lend them to those who have none, and so on from day to day, foreigners meanwhile looking at them with amazement and wondering if these can indeed be the people who will be called on to pay during a couple of generations to come for that amusement of to-day which is destroying the work of a couple of generations in the past.

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But sometimes the laugh and the applause are turned into a shriek of terror as the insurgents pour their shot and shell into the heart of the city in the attempt to silence some battery which has given them trouble. No point is safe, for Peixoto, with characteristic indifference to life and property, has planted these batteries anywhere and everywhere, and de Mello's men aim so badly that their shots fall more often where they would not than where they would. One of the worst nights was that of the 10th of December, when the people were just leaving the theatres; as the shells exploded round them they fled madly up and down the darkened streets trying to find their way to their homes, and when these were gained, leaving them again in new fear as the shells burst upon their roofs. A general rush, with bags and parcels in hand, was finally made for the stations of the tramway, and the cars, putting out their lights on the beach-section that they might not afford a mark for the insurgents, carried the citizens by hundreds to the suburbs, leaving their deserted residences to the robber who rarely now troubles to wait for dusk before he begins to make his selection from among those goods of others which he covets for himself.

As there is nothing one forgets so soon as facts, it may be of interest to briefly set down a few with their dates, by which one can in a desultory manner follow the history of Brazil from its discovery in 1500 A.D. to its civil war in 1893-94. Vincent Yañez Pinzon, a companion of Columbus, and Pedro Alvarez Cobral, a Portuguese navigator, dispute the claim of being the first to set their foot in the country; and three decades later, in 1530, Captain Hawkins, of Plymouth, the first Englishman who landed in Brazil, followed them, and on his return journey persuaded a native chief to accompany him. In 1549 the Portuguese sent out a governor, and with him went Jesuit priests, who founded stations at various points. The Jesuits were expelled in 1760. In 1555 Coligny established a colony of Huguenots here, most of whom were massacred by the Portuguese, the remainder being driven from the country. In 1580 Brazil passed under the power of Philip II. of Spain. In 1624 occurred the first invasion of the Dutch, who landed at Bahia, and in 1630 the second invasion, when the men of Holland established themselves at Olinda (Pernambuco). In 1661 the Dutch resigned all claim to the country. In 1806 the British took Buenos Ayres, bringing home with them the richest booty and the conviction that one-half of the great continent of South America would soon become their own. In 1807 these hopes were frustrated for ever, the Spaniards under a French leader driving us out of the country, a feat which was made possible by the inefficiency of

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General Whitelock. In 1808 John of Bragança, with his cabinet and his court, crossed the ocean and established themselves here, having been driven from Portugal by Napoleon. In 1822 Brazil was separated from the mother country, and John's son, Dom Pedro, was made emperor, England and Austria having a hand in the proceeding. In 1831 Pedro abdicated in favour of Dom Pedro II., the late emperor. The marriage of the Princess Imperial to the Comte d'Eu, a prince of the house of Orleans, the visit to Rio of the Duke of Edinburgh, and the return visit to England of the emperor and empress, are later events; and in 1887 took place the liberation of the slaves, followed two years later by the expulsion of the emperor and his family from the country.

The two last acts are probably more closely connected than is often realised. Brazil was not ready for emancipation. Indolent, apathetic, and frivolous, as the lower orders of the race are, as a whole, it was well known among the thoughtful that the moment work ceased to be compulsory it would cease to be done. This would be a difficulty of unusual dimensions in a land which is not suited to general colonisation, and where exaggerated prejudice exists against the introduction of such foreign labour as is generally available. Directly the Act was passed, the agrarian population flocked in vast numbers to the towns, and the coffee and other flourishing and wealth-producing plantations were deserted. This alienated the planters and merchants, while misgivings arose among them as to the possible results of the action of the Princess Imperial (then Regent) in placing power in the hands of the priests, through whose influence she had signed the Act of Emancipation. It may here be mentioned that, though free and compulsory, the standard of education is very low, while general culture in Brazil is so limited that it cannot be said to have any influence in the country whatever.

Apart from the matter of the liberation of the slaves and the favour shown to the priesthood, the public feeling towards the Princess and her husband partook of indifference rather than dislike, as is generally supposed, and it is certain that during the memorable tour of the Comte d'Eu through the provinces in the autumn of 1889, he was received everywhere with enthusiasm and acclamation. However, that is not a matter with which the present article proposes to deal. Against the old emperor, who for nearly sixty years had ruled wisely and well, few, before November of 1889, had a word to say, and not even the fearful drought and famine of the previous season, with the virulent epidemic of yellow fever which followed, can be said to have even indirectly caused his downfall. Dom Pedro had missed his

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mission, he was not a man born to rule millions, but to preside over scientific and literary societies: art, engineering, classic-lore, nothing came amiss to him, and he talked equally well on all subjects, albeit he was inclined to push scholarship into pedantry. He was refined and courtly in manner, and scrupulously careful to avoid hurting the susceptibilities of others; he loved to travel, but his sense of duty generally kept him in his own country; he never refused to visit a school, a hospital, nor institution of any kind; he was in his element in any international exhibition, putting appropriate questions to the expert who showed him over this department or that; he gave foreigners of culture a cordial welcome to his court whatever might be their social position, and he never to the day of his death ceased to puzzle over the problem as to why every Brazilian had not tastes similar to his own. He was not without a sense of humour, as was shown by many instances, one of which, as adapted to the moment, may be quoted: "One thousand revolutions it makes to the minute, does it?" he said, when he was watching the wheels of a machine in an English factory at work; "that beats even South America." This is but one view of Dom Pedro's character, and one view is never a fair view, and it must be admitted that though to rule was not his métier, his long reign was, on the whole, an eminent success, while no finer monument can be raised to his memory than the chaos which followed its abrupt close.

For that chaos not the emperor is to blame, nor yet his family, nor the country, nor even the spirit of the age, to whose door most *fin de siècle* troubles may be laid. A handful of ambitious military and naval men and grasping politicians were seized with a lust for power, and unanimously transferred their allegiance from their emperor to themselves, that syndicate which they elected to consider as the executive of a Republican form of government. Let it not, however, be imagined that an attempt is being made to prove that among the leading Brazilians not one honest man is to be found. They exist in their scores in Rio as elsewhere, but for the moment they are not to the fore. One of them, however, has spoken of late, and he echoed the sentiments of many when he said that though he was a friend of the revolution, if de Mello and his adherents once openly advocated a partition of the country, he would instantly cease to be an opponent of President Peixoto.

CONSTANCE EAGLESTONE.

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TACTICS IN MATABELE LAND. LUCK OR SKILL?

By Colonel F. Maurice, C.B.

From many sources we have now received information which enables us to judge of the character of the operations which were conducted by the South African Company's forces against the Matabele. In particular, the graphic account by Sir Gerald Portal, published in the *Times*, gives most of the necessary details. They seem to me to be well worthy of study as a practical lesson in the conduct of such undertakings. The question in the first instance is whether the success which attended them was accidental and due to good luck alone, or whether there were sound reasons of good sense and right judgment, which determined the course pursued by the invaders, and whether it may be possible to apply in the future some of the experiences which the campaign has supplied.

When the first brief reports came to England of the movements of the columns, it appeared as if three separate bodies without any connection with one another had advanced towards the capital, Buluwayo. Not a few well-informed soldiers in England, and doubtless on the Continent also, were disposed to laugh at a method of warfare which appeared to violate every known principle of success. It is hardly too much to say that not soldiers only, but almost every well-informed Englishman is aware that the principle of which Napoleon continually availed himself in warfare was to take advantage of such a separation of his enemies, to concentrate his forces against one body, and having overwhelmed it, to turn with his still superior strength against each of the others in succession. Nor has experience failed to show us that in general terms the principle, thus exhibited on a large scale by Napoleon and many other soldiers, is true, also in cases where smaller bodies of troops are engaged. The inference was therefore not unnaturally drawn by many critics that the only cause of success of the colonial troops was the fact that their enemy did not understand the advantages of his position, and that the expedition would have failed if the whole Matabele Army had been thrown upon one of the isolated

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columns. Now with all humility I venture to say that I do not think that that is so. If I set forth the reasons for my opinion, it may at least lead others to consider the question under different aspects from those under which they have hitherto treated it. Who actually thought out the conditions of the movement we hardly at present know. Sir John Willoughby is said to have been the military adviser of Dr. Jameson. In my judgment, if Sir John Willoughby thought out the method of the advance, he has shown a very considerable capacity for the application of sound principles to peculiar circumstances. If Dr. Jameson was the real author of the movement, then I think that he deserves similar credit. In the first place, it must be remembered that in order that a concentrated force shall be able to take advantage of its superiority against three separate columns, it must be strong enough to be able to crush one of them, to break up its organisation, and destroy it as a military force before the body so attacked can be supported by others. Secondly, it must be in a position such that it can reach one of the columns before that column has joined another. Even on the large scale, in considering the proposed invasion of France in 1815, Wellington laid it down as a maxim that the several armies of the allies advancing against Napoleon were perfectly safe as long as each of the bodies on which he was able to direct his attack was strong enough to hold its own against him. The common sense of that statement is so obvious that it is curious how often it is forgotten in discussing military operations.

I now turn to the consideration of the actual movement as it was made. Practically the real invading force, so far as Dr. Jameson and Sir J. Willoughby were concerned, was at first divided into two columns. The third column consisted of the Imperial troops, supported by a large body of native auxiliaries. It was very well able to hold its own against any force that was likely to be brought against it, and from the nature of the country through which it had to pass it was difficult for the enemy to approach this column before such pressure had been brought to bear by the other two columns as would necessarily draw off attack from it. As it in fact had very little share in the operations till Buluwayo was reached, the real question of interest concerns the other two columns, and their movements I now propose to consider.

In the first place, it is to be noted that an admirable system of scouting had been carried on prior to the advance of the two columns. The ground had been so thoroughly searched to such a distance in front that it had been ascertained that there was no

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enemy within several days' reach of the columns, and that, if they advanced from the two positions in which they were placed at Charter and Victoria they could reach a point of junction at the Ironstone Mountain, out of reach of the enemy's attack. It was much easier and quicker to move in separate bodies for the purposes of the march to this point, and, in view of the information thus obtained, there could be no risk in such a movement. Next note the constitution of the columns. Each was provided with sixteen waggons. By careful training each of the columns had been taught to be able, when on the march, to form an oval laagar within six minutes. As soon as the two forces from Victoria and Charter had joined, they moved in two parallel columns, each being formed with two waggons abreast. The two columns of waggons kept at a distance from one another of 150 yards. The greatest caution was observed in the conduct of the march. If incidents occurred, such as are common in South African movement, of a waggon from any cause breaking down, the whole force was halted or checked till the mischief had been repaired, so that the regularity of the formation was never broken. Between the two columns of waggons, with each of which there were some 280 well-armed burghers, there marched a native contingent of 500 Mashonas and a certain number of dismounted burghers. The natives had been trained, whilst each column was forming its oval laager, to cut down branches of prickly pear such as were everywhere available. With these the natives formed a strong abattis which closed the front and rear of the opening between the two ovals. When the whole defensive laager was complete, the Salisbury column of waggons formed the right oval, the Victoria column the left, the front and rear connecting them was closed by the abattis. The machine-guns and 7-lb. field-guns were distributed in assigned positions between the waggons, from beneath which the burghers were able to fire with their own repeating rifles in such a way as to cover the whole front. Even in the days of the Boer invasion of Zululand, long before a breechloader or a repeating rifle had been heard of, a laager, much inferior to this, had proved altogether unassailable by the most gallant natives. With the advantage of Maxims, Gardiners, and Nordenfelts, and with repeating rifles, it was certain that the fire would be so deadly that no increase in the numbers of natives, that could be brought to attack it, would do more than add to the extent of the target for these terrible weapons, provided the laager could be placed in such a position that there was range for effective fire. As had been proved by prior colonial experience, and as might be judged as a matter of common sense, the only danger of defeat by the natives lay in the

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possibility of the columns being caught on the march whilst the oxen were still in the waggons, and while there would be no defensive position from which to pour out an effective fire. That danger was amply provided against in several ways. In the first place, by the distant scouting, which had been carried on by mounted parties detached from the columns for four or five days at a time, general information had been obtained as to the whereabouts of the enemy. Throughout the march mounted scouting parties moved five miles ahead of both columns. An advance guard of forty men marched one mile ahead, a rear guard of similar numbers, and flanking parties each also of forty men moved at a distance of about a mile from the columns. Thus it was impossible that the column should be attacked without ample notice; and as six minutes only were required to change from the formation of movement to the formation of defence, it is difficult to see what risk the column ran in any emergency. As might have been seen beforehand, and, as the event proved, victory was certain, if only the column was laagered before it was attacked. So easy was the method adopted for forming the laager, that there was no inconvenience in taking up the defensive position whenever the halt was ordered, either by day or night. All that was necessary was that the two leading waggons in both double columns should turn in towards one another; the two rearmost waggons doing the same, the other waggons widening out right and left so as to extend the oval; the machine-guns being then run into their positions. The horses were then tethered to three or four parallel lines of cord running the long way of the oval, and the oxen and gun-mules strongly tethered between the two ovals.

Now not only were the two columns with their small number of less than 300 men each safe under this arrangement against any attack that could be made upon them, but they were much safer than larger bodies would have been. A large force of several thousand men would have required hundreds of waggons. A long column of many waggons could not have been laagered without great delay. Therefore the risk of such a force being caught on the march, or caught unprepared, as our troops were at Isandlwhana, would have been indefinitely increased. To me it seems that the method which was adopted against the Matabele would have equally succeeded against the Zulus, and that the vast numbers of troops that were employed in the earlier stages of the contest against Ketchwayo not only added unnecessarily and enormously to the expense of the campaign, but involved unnecessary risks which would have been avoided by the employment of a smaller force

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perfectly equipped, thoroughly trained in the use of their weapons and accustomed to the simple operations employed in the Matabele campaign. If I am right, very great credit attaches to the organiser of the expedition, and he ought to be unearthed, in this sense, that we want to know who the man was, whether Dr. Jameson or Sir John Willoughby, who so clearly saw through the conditions that were to be involved in the fighting of the campaign as to apply to them exactly the methods that were necessary for success.

Nor is that all. It seems to me that if the statement of facts which I have here set forth be correct, then it follows that the Matabele campaign was, in no wise whatever, as has been alleged, a brutal massacre, in which those who enlisted in the warfare could tell beforehand that they were going to have a simple walk over without serious risk of heavy loss. It depended, as the success of military operations generally does, upon the skill of the leader, the confidence of his men in him, and the perfection of the training given to them adapted to the particular circumstances of the case. If, as those who knew nothing of Dr. Jameson or Sir John Willoughby beforehand were naturally inclined to suspect might be the case, they had shown themselves incapable of organising and leading such an expedition, the burghers who embarked in it would almost certainly have been massacred by the by no means despicable enemy against whom they advanced.

It is usual, in the judgment which is formed by people at home of the success of any of our campaigns, to take for granted that if everything has gone well then the enemy must have been despicable. My own conviction is that in this instance, as in many more, the skill with which the operations have been conducted caused the rapid and comparatively bloodless success, and has thereby left an impression of feebleness or want of will on the part of the enemy, which is altogether out of keeping with what we have known of them in past African history. A very slight error in judgment on the part of the leaders of the expedition would have left a very different impression of the fighting qualities of the Matabele, who were a particularly warlike offshoot from the tribe which taught us at Isandlwhana what formidable antagonists they could be.

Of course, the moment any misfortune occurs, everybody is disposed to say that it was a great mistake to have incurred the risk from which it resulted. I cannot, however, myself see that it was a mistake, after the complete defeat of the Matabele, to send out comparatively small parties in pursuit of the king. General experience has shown that when once the spirit of a warlike tribe has been broken, the former warriors are very little

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disposed to take advantage of the small numbers at any given spot of those that have defeated them. During the pursuit of Ketchwayo, Lord Gifford and I, with only three other men, were for several days following as close as we could upon the trail of the king, and as we were riding about forty miles a day with nothing with us but what we had on our saddles, we had to obtain our food from the villages filled with youths who had recently been fighting against us. During that time we never met with the smallest opposition, and should certainly have endeavoured to lay hands on the king wherever we found him, if we had been fortunate enough to come up with him. It seems to me, therefore, and I may here speak from tolerably direct personal experience, that the disaster to the pursuing column in Matabeleland was a bit of bad luck such as it is impossible to avoid in war; that at all events the heads of the expedition are in no way to blame for the misfortune. They did what was the right thing to do under the circumstances, and they could do no more.

F. MAURICE.

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NAVAL TACTICS.

By Admiral Sir G. Phipps Hornby.

That our fleet ought immediately to be strengthened, both in ships and men, is a proposition that no one acquainted with its condition will contest, and probably it would be said further that the want of men is the most immediate, while it will take longer to satisfy.

A ship may be built in a year, but we have not found that we can make a seaman in less than seven. We know that those trained in the Queen's service are as good as need be; and why they are to be limited to the number necessary to man ships and coastguard during peace, 44,000, with a nominal reserve of 23,000, who would be absorbed at the beginning of a war, is a thing that no one has yet attempted to explain. The condition of our nearest neighbour is in strong contrast. The French reserve consists of 114,000 able-bodied men, of whom 25,000 are serving in the fleet; but that reserve is a trained one, while of our nominal 23,000 hardly any have served in a man-of-war. Perhaps the best part of them, that is those who know one another best, who come from the extreme north of the islands, are those who know least of the officers and men under and with whom they would have to fight.

If there was any material difficulty in forming a trained and disciplined reserve, similar to that which exists for land warfare in most Continental states, our position, however dangerous, might be accountable; but there is none. Boys can be got from country districts in any number, and the training given to them in the Royal Navy is so good that shipowners will gladly give the disciplined able seamen or petty officer considerably higher wages than he gets from the Crown.

Will only seems to be wanting. We prefer to hazard all we possess by not safeguarding that great domain by which we receive most of our supplies. But when we approach the question of naval tactics, the way is not so clear; and yet the demand is large and precise. What is asked for is to show "the manner in which fleets and individual ships should be worked in the presence of a

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hostile force, from the very beginning to the end of an engagement, including also the methods by which the use of the ram, the gun, and torpedo shall be brought to their highest development."

The gentleman who asks for all this does not seem to have a high opinion of Lord Nelson's capacity to handle a fleet such as we now possess; but perhaps he will allow that Lord Nelson did handle those committed to his charge in a masterful way, particularly at Trafalgar, and with considerable effect. The question seems to arise, Could Lord Nelson himself have described beforehand the manner in which his "fleet and the individual ships in it should be worked from the very beginning to the end of that engagement?" Judging from what he wrote beforehand, even he was incapable of that prevision and precision.

What he wrote as a guide to his admirals and captains on the 9th of October, 1805, was that he should "*probably* make the second in command's signal to lead through *about* the twelfth ship from their rear (or wherever he could fetch); my line would lead through *about* their centre." Then he tells his principal object, viz., "to overpower the ships ahead of their commander-in-chief," and, further, of the proportion in which ships generally were to engage; that is, "British to be one-fourth superior to the enemy cut off."

If captains can get in future, method, object, and proportions as clear from their commander-in-chief—and may I be permitted to say, "I" believe that they would have had such, if he had lived, from the commander-in-chief we lost last year in the Mediterranean—the "tactics" to be discussed in the wardrooms may be omitted. We will hope that the guns and torpedoes will exhibit the highest development. Lord Nelson did not seem to concern himself so much about the weapons; his anxiety was that the ships should reach their proper places, and when we remember how light the wind was when he and Lord Collingwood led in to that action, our reverence must be at the very highest when we think how his captains fulfilled his wish. If the captains of the present day can get as sound and single-minded experience as their predecessors had, they will handle their ships as profitably. But those did not obtain it by gossiping round mess-tables on hypothetical problems; they got it by handling ships small and great; beginning as midshipmen with sailing-boats, as my first chief, the late Sir Robert Stopford, was careful to insist on in his fleet. But we live in an experimental age; let us hope that every captain who may get a chance will try Admiral Thegethof's experiments, and not be nervous about the possible effect on his own ship. We lost the *Victoria*, but the *Camperdown* is still serviceable.

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There is another point of view from which I get a mistrust of the wardroom-table conferences. It savours of a plan in which we indulged when I was a midshipman for improvements in chess problems. It was to devise an opening that should lead infallibly to success. As long as one played it with the right hand against the left it answered admirably, but if for the left hand one substituted a messmate it did not come off at all; he failed "to play the game," and the success usually went the wrong way. So I fear it would be with a plan worked out from the very beginning to the end of an engagement. Some inquiring foreigner would hear of it, and not believing in the infallible or the absolute would be sure to make some move that would spoil the harmony of the whole thing. Perhaps it may be as well to leave "the manner in which fleets and individual ships should be worked in the presence of a hostile force in the hands of those who may be responsible for them," but as we know how much the success of the whole must depend on the handling of each ship, it may be well to point out that any officer may do a great deal to train himself to handle a steamship without being in charge of her. The eye has more to do with it than anything else; and if he can only get near a compass when the ship is manœuvring, he has only to watch when the ship comes on the point on which she has to turn, and form an opinion from time to time when each move should be made. If the move should be made, and successfully, at that instant, the judgment of his eye confirmed. If it should be made earlier or later than expected, the result shows whether the actor or the looker-on is the better practised.

The practice of what is spoken of as "complicated evolutions under steam" has, for its chief object, the acquirement of this power; but to speak of the steam evolutions of our fleets being "complicated" is a wonderment to a disciple of Sir William Martin. It seems to show that either the signal-book has been vitiated, or that little trouble has been taken to examine the principle of the manœuvres he gave the Service thirty years ago. Perhaps their chief merit is their extreme simplicity. When fleets were manœuvred under sail it might frequently happen that one division would have to heave to, or shorten sail, to enable others to form, as directed, on them. In other words, ships could not command equal speed in every direction; but with steam, in moderate weather, it may, for practical purposes, be looked on as equal. Therefore, I presume, it occurred to the just mind of Sir William Martin that it would be more equitable if each ship co-operated equally in the performance of each evolution. To take the most simple case, suppose that seven ships were formed in

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a single line astern of a leader, and that it was desirable to form them in two lines of four in each; under sail it would be necessary for the four leading ships to shorten sail, while the four rear ones made all possible sail to overtake them; or, as an alternative, the four leading ships might keep away while the four rear continued their course. In either case one set only contributed toil to complete the evolution.

But with steamships no change is necessary except two alterations of helm. The four leading ships turn together at right angles to their original course, and proceed so far that when they resume the original course together they shall be, ship to ship, exactly parallel to their consorts. The divisions will have co-operated equally in completing the formation, except that one will have had to alter their helms twice in opposite directions. But when the manœuvre began the rear ship of the leading column was one interval ahead of the leading ship of the rear column. If anyone will put five dots equidistant in a line they will represent the position of the leader of the rear column and the whole of the ships of the leading column; and it will be manifest that if the leading ship of the fleet has to run down at right angles to the course of the fleet until she can turn so as to be abreast of No. 5, that No. 5 must have covered the whole distance that originally separated her from No. 1. That distance then it is that should always separate the columns so as to leave them room to manœuvre freely in any direction in lines. But it is surprising how difficult it is to persuade some people how many intervals separates No. 1 from No. 5. Most people say there must be five. Sir William said there were only four; and so he laid down his rule for the normal distance that columns should be apart, viz., one interval—in our words "two cables" for every ship in the longest line.

Now there is the whole "complication" of Sir William Martin's tactics. Put shortly his secret is, "Equal speed, and leaders of columns to be always as far apart as when in line ahead!"

I am better acquainted with the "Signal-Book" of 1868 than with the present one; and when we consider the different way in which they were drawn up, perhaps it will be accepted that the first was most likely to succeed.

Two clear-headed men, who had served under Sir William Martin in the Mediterranean, or under his captain of the fleet, the late Sir Sydney Dacres, in the Channel, when he followed Sir William's ideas largely, where selected to frame the instructions. Presumably they were expected to agree in their views, and the rules they indicted were plain and logical. They

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went further. They wrote, for the benefit of officers not conversant with the (then) new system, an abstract of its principles. Unfortunately it was not allowed to be published. An idea was started that it meant two signal books, and that it would confuse officers. But as the method of the new manœuvres was so very different from those that preceded, admirals serving abroad were obliged to publish explanations of their own.

There was also an idea, somewhat popular, that for every manœuvre that could be made there ought to be a separate instruction and diagram. Instead of resisting this, and knowing that it was the principle of a manœuvre that every officer should grasp, and that then his way to execute it would be clear, separate signals were given. Thus there was one signal to form columns of divisions, and another to form columns of sub-divisions, though the process in each was identical. Some men were led to suppose that these were two different things. This would have been obviated if a particular flag had been set apart to denote divisions, and another sub-divisions, and then one instruction would govern both, and the book would seem to be, and perhaps would be, less awful.

But it was a very good book. I was ambitious and should have liked to discover some new thing; but I never found anything, so far as I can remember, that that book would not enable me to do with a squadron. But the present book was compiled in a different manner. Instead of two competent and agreeing men working under one admiral—Sir Sydney Dacres—who had seen and moulded the new methods, several able men were thrown together whose views did not always agree.

It is true that more of Sir William Martin's ideas—referring particularly to the use of flags, and showing how largely the signification of any flag or flags might be expanded by the different positions in which they were shown—were before the committee, and have been used to some extent. Still, the result instead of decreasing, as was hoped, the multiplicity of signals, and so reducing those in common use to forms that could easily be carried in the head, have apparently led to an increase. The volume seems to be much larger; certainly it is more difficult to find in it what one wants. For instance, I wanted to find in it that very old order of our forefathers' which would have absolutely forbidden the loss of the *Victoria*. Several officers said it was in the book, but though I had the assistance of a flag-lieutenant, I never found it. It ran thus: "No officer in his desire to maintain his station in the fleet shall risk collision with another ship"—and then it went on to give the convincing reason—"for manifestly less damage to

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the fleet will occur by a ship being temporarily out of station than by two ships fouling one another."

It appears to me that redundant signals necessarily give an idea of "complication" to officers who may read them; and that two signals to express the same manœuvre are inadmissible. The idea that two signals are necessary, the one to direct a division to do a particular thing, and another to tell a sub-division to do it, savours of the ingenuity of the man who, having made a hole in his stable door to let the cat out, kindly made a smaller one for the kitten.

But if I have no faith in ward-room discussions for improving officers in handling their ships, I have great faith in that attained by handling ships of whatever size. I heard the late Sir Robert Stopford say, more than once, that in his experience the midshipman who handled his boat the best became the captain who handled his ship the best. And if this be true, the larger *number* of ships we can keep at sea together the better for the improvement in manœuvring of all. I hope I shall not be accused of a wish to substitute one small ship for one large one; but I believe our squadrons might be much better organized than they are, with a trifling increase, if any, of expense, and much more opportunity for manœuvring. More than three years ago a late First Lord said that no ironclad could be considered complete without two fast consorts to scout for her.

Now, if our squadrons were organized and sent to sea on that footing, the four ironclads in our channel squadron would have eight fast vessels with them instead of three. In the first place that would enable two light ships to represent the "enemy's" scouts every night, and six to surround them in the morning. Whether we like it or not that is what we must learn to do, if we, during war, are to find out where an enemy's squadron is going, and to prevent the same enemy from watching our squadrons.

But further, we may want, as Nelson did, to break the enemy's line at "about" a particular place. To do that we must first get there; but to get there is comparatively simple, and we have the old method, viz., to keep the chase on the same bearing. But when we get there the handling must be nice. If we begin to try it with ironclads, and there should be any mistake (I am in full accord with the opinion given by a late United States Minister of the men who never make mistakes), it may cost money; but if, when an admiral wants to exercise his ironclads, he will make his small ships do "enemy," the practice is as good at equal speed, while the risk is trifling. First, the little ship will be very spry; he can gibbet his big brother if the latter is wrong, because he

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will have bearings of all the ships near. He can always increase speed quicker than the heavier body. He can probably turn his ship quicker; and when he turns his feather edge toward his big brother, he occupies comparatively a very small space on the ocean; let us say, *Heroine* 38ft. wide against *Revenge* 75ft. wide. There cannot be much risk. But I apprehend that the small ships, as "enemy," may afford better practice yet. Captain Mahan has



drawn our attention to the resemblance in principle between Lord Nelson's attack at the Nile and that of Monk on De Ruyter in the four days' fight, 1666. He says: "He had attacked a vastly superior force in such away that only part of it could come into action."

A single line of steamships coming end on, or nearly so, might be put in much the same position. Though it is not likely to happen, it would afford a good opportunity for exercise with ironclads or smaller vessels.

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If in the diagram opposite S represents the six scouts, and I the four ironclads, No. 1 of the latter would turn to starboard, so as to form on the port bow of S^1. A few seconds later No. 2 I would turn the other way, and form on the starboard bow of S^1. The two remaining ironclads would turn outwards at the same time as their leaders and stand far enough to pass outside their consorts; as soon as they had passed these they would turn inwards, so as to form on the bows of S^2. And so on, with as many ironclads as there were to exercise.

At first it would be desirable to practice this at a given speed; but as the captains got cunning and always formed exactly, it would only be necessary to give the cruisers leave to vary their speed, and so oblige the captains of the ironclads to keep their eyes wide open.

As I have said before, such a thing is not likely to happen in war; but I submit that such exercise would probably be more conducive to success than any plans worked out on paper from the very beginning to the end of an engagement.

I admit that the captains of the small ships might deal with his opponents somewhat as my messmates used to deal with me at chess; but as eyes got sharper, so the tricks of changing speed would be more readily recognized, and if a "protest" flag was arranged it would enable the captain of an ironclad to claim that speed was altered at any particular moment. Of course the probable time of doing so would be just as the ironclad began to turn, and it would be for the umpires to say whether the claim was just.

May I point out that no risk could be run in such manœuvres. As the two leading ironclads turn outwards they cannot touch the leading scout; and as the remaining ironclads turn out at the same time, or very shortly after, and pass round their leaders, they cannot, as they come inwards, touch the scouts.

When a ship has to form on one approaching her ahead, the sum of the speeds of the two ships is that which has to be reckoned with, and will be at its maximum. If therefore officers are practised to do this neatly, the passing between two ships at any angle must be less difficult; but that was what Lord Nelson's ships used to do.

I hope my brother officers may agree with me that well-organized squadrons and plenty of exercise will conduce more to efficiency than any plans showing how each individual ship shall be worked.

G. PHIPPS HORNBY.

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THE CYCLES OF THE DAY.

By Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Savile.

(Late the Royal Irish Regiment.)

The remarkable progress that has been made in the cycle trade during the last few years was brought very prominently before the public notice by means of two great exhibitions lately held in London. Cycling has undoubtedly been the means of providing a new industry for a considerable fraction of the population, and has opened up new fields of labour and given fresh outlets for capital in London, Coventry, Birmingham, Wolverhampton, and many other places. Considerable stress was laid upon this subject by Sir Albert Rollit, M.P., in his remarks at the opening ceremony of the Stanley Show, when he drew attention to the fact that the cycle trade had come at a time when many other branches of trade were slack, and that it was obviously an expanding industry.

It would be impossible, within the limits of a magazine article, to include a description of even all the most notable exhibits, and I can only attempt to draw attention to the chief novelties and improvements. Just to clear the ground, it may be stated that the leading features of the two shows were very similar, and they may be summarized in general terms as follows:—The popularity of the rear-driving safety was again fully demonstrated by the overwhelming preponderance of this type of machine, and looking along the long lines of cycles it was really quite a rest to the eye when some other form of build was perceived. Tricycles, though prominently brought into notice by some particularly good performances during the past season, were, with one exception, viz., the exhibit of the Coventry Machinists' Company, not numerously staged, but most of those that I saw were very excellent machines, and I hope to find room to mention them later. Front-drivers, though much talked and written of during several months preceding the shows, and very staunchly upheld by the believers in the type, were few and far between. Several of the larger makers had on view the high-framed safety, commonly known as the "Giraffe," but I was everywhere told that no great demand for this variety was anticipated.

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It seems that makers are now devoting much attention to the improvement of tandems, both bicycle and tricycle, and those who want a machine "built for two" have certainly a splendid lot to choose from. The fair sex can no longer complain that their requirements are not considered by makers. There was hardly an exhibit that did not include carefully designed bicycles and tricycles adapted for feminine use, and no less a personage than the energetic president of the Lady Cyclists' Association declared even a year ago that she had got hardly anything to grumble about.

Machines designed for military use were seen here and there, but did not possess any special features beyond the particular method of attaching the rifle. If any large number of regular troops were required to perform cyclists' duties, it might be well to devise a standard form, but the volunteer cyclist pays for his machine out of his own pocket, and it is only natural that he should select the mount which suits him best for pleasure riding, he being primarily a civilian cyclist, and only on exceptional occasions a soldier. There is a fairly general consensus of opinion in favour of larger tubes for frames; nearly every prominent maker has increased the diameter of each tube by at least $\frac{1}{8}$in., and there can hardly be a doubt that greater strength is thus obtained without appreciable increase of weight. The diamond-shaped frame is universally adopted for all safety bicycles, and it is quite the exception to see any but straight tubes; even those makers who formerly fancied a diagonal, curved more or less to the form of the rear wheel, have abandoned it for the popular style. Double tubes have only had a short life; they will be seen now and then for some time to come upon the builds of those makers who insist upon being different from others just for the sake of being different, but their days are numbered.

During the past year attention seems to have been devoted to perfecting the details of machines rather than to radical alterations of form. Riders are now confronted only with the difficulty of making a selection amongst the numerous luxuries which add so much to the ease and pleasure of cycling. I can hardly enumerate all of them, but I ought certainly not to omit such improvements as detachable gear cases to protect the vital parts from mud, grit, and wet; bearings that are really dust-proof; neat and light double-plate fork-crowns, which are strong enough to obviate all chance of mishap; steering locks which will puzzle the cleverest of thieves; detachable and folding mudguards, weighing next to nothing; ventilated handles, in which the motion of the machine sets up a current of air, and are delightful in warm

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weather; lamps which both give light, and are light to carry; saddles which are comfortable to sit upon; brakes of a character giving confidence to even the most nervous riders; and an endless number of other useful contrivances.

A magnificent set of machines was exhibited by Humber and Company, Limited, Beeston, Notts, and although the general designs are not unlike those of 1893, numerous patented improvements have been introduced, and strength is increased whilst weight is reduced. The greatest novelty is, perhaps, the employment of a semi-tangent arrangement of spoking the driving-wheels of Beeston safeties. Tangent spokes are placed on the chain side of the hub, and direct spokes on the other side. It is claimed that this system gives great strength and rigidity to the part most liable to strain, whilst a lighter hub can be used. The chain adjustment, by means of swinging back-stays, allows the rider's weight to be borne directly on the axle of the driving wheel, and enables the back fork ends to be made much lighter. The detachable chain wheel is combined with a crank, one boss serving for both; thus both width of tread and weight are reduced, and a simple interchangeable gear is effected. A movable pedal nut of conical shape is used for attaching pedals to the cranks for roadster machines; the crank eyes are countersunk to fit the nut, and when screwed tight it grips the pedal axle and locks itself; half the nut is buried in the crank, thus assisting in narrowing the tread. Riders of all heights will now be able to obtain suitable "Humbers," for the safeties are being built in several sizes higher and lower than the standard. The machine in this exhibit which specially took my fancy was a lovely little road racer tricycle, weighing only 33lb. with all on. It was on this pattern that Mr. G. P. Mills accomplished the wonderful feat of riding from Land's End to John o' Groats, 886 miles, in 3 days, 16 hours, 47 minutes, beating the bicycle record for the course by 7 hours 8 minutes. I am sure that a machine which can stand the enormous strain of such a rough journey without injury might safely be used by a light rider as a touring mount, and it seems that the old notion that strength and weight must needs go together has been entirely disproved by the designer of the Humber machines.

The display of the Rudge Cycle Company, Coventry, was in all respects second to none, and fully bore out the claim made by the Company that everything that skilled workmanship and science can do to produce a first-class cycle has been done. The Rudge "Highflier" is one of the new types, and has been constructed in response to the demand for a clean mount for winter riding. The machine is light in construction, and has

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the saddle and handles well placed to ensure comfort. The firm's new pattern machines are fitted with a steering lock arrangement, on the principle of the letter lock; also a new detachable chain wheel which gives a tread of $5\frac{1}{16}$in. with wide ball races. The tandem "Bicyclettes" are built as racers, roadsters, and for ladies; both chains are fixed on the same side of the machine, and the front one is adjusted by moving an eccentric bracket. The triplet safety is announced as the fastest machine in the world, and its makers intend to give ample proof of the truth of the statement at an early date. The celebrated Rudge quadricycle tandem built of specially selected weldless tube, strengthened by bushes where necessary, is exhibited with several improvements in details; it is a two-track machine, and is particularly adapted for touring purposes.

The machines of the New Howe Machine Company, Limited, Glasgow, certainly stand quite in the front rank of fashionable mounts, and as, for some occult reason which may possibly be understood by the National Cyclists' Union, credit for path performances is annexed by the machine rather than by the rider, the bicycles built by this firm appear to be as speedy as any that can be procured. The Shah of Persia has a weakness for the New Howe types, and the front-steering tricycle lately built to his order is a distinctly good machine. A novelty in construction is introduced in the new path-racer by crossing the compression tubes behind the crank-bracket in order to resist side thrust. Critics, possibly taking their ideas one from another, are unanimous in saying that the notion is faulty, but the firm avers that in practice the alteration works well, so we must wait until next season to discover the truth. The transverse stayed bottom bracket possesses several good features, by meeting the strain at every point and giving perfect rigidity and absence of side-sway, combined with a narrow tread. The roller brake relieves the strain at the fork crown and obviates the possibility of ripping the air tyre. The cranks are detachable in the literal sense; there is no cotter-pin to be driven out, but instead there is a bolt and nut clipping the crank boss to the axle, and by unscrewing the nut the cranks are at once removed. The aluminium folding and detachable mud-guards will probably commend themselves even to those riders who reckon up every ounce they carry. A gear-case which is detachable and thoroughly dust-proof has been loudly called for, and, in my opinion, the New Howe Company can supply it.

The "Olympia" tandem tricycle was designed and introduced by Messrs. Marriott and Cooper in the early part of 1887; it at once gained popularity, and its good points are so

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manifest that its model is still almost the only one for which there is a large demand. The world's 100 mile road record for every type of double cycle was gained by this machine as long ago as 1890, and has not yet been beaten; the time was 5 hours 30 minutes. The machine is driven from the rear, but by one wheel only, and is steered by the two front wheels by means of levers from the handle-bar. Although the essential principles of this machine have remained unaltered, numerous improvements in details have been lately effected. The "Special Ripley" tricycle is a very taking mount; the frame, of the open diamond shape used for safety bicycles, has proved a great success; the crank bracket is barrel pattern, which means that the crank axle runs through a tube placed at the junction of the lower tubes of the frame; at each end are the ball bearings on which the crank axle with the driving cog and cranks attached run. The chain, therefore, is at the side of the frame instead of between crank-bracket stays, and a single tube of very large diameter runs between the crank bracket and the main axle; thus the greatest possible amount of rigidity is imparted to that portion of the frame which receives the most severe driving strain. My choice for 1894 fell upon one of these machines, and I have been riding it throughout the winter in all weathers and on all sorts of roads with excellent results. I consider it one of the best machines I have ever possessed.

No one can see the machines turned out by the Coventry Machinists' Company without being struck by their wonderful beauty of finish, and experts are unanimous in saying that both in design and in material they cannot be surpassed. Curved tubes, now so rarely seen, are retained in the Model F "Swift," and in some patterns of the "Marlboro'" tricycle and the wealth of design is so great that a rider must indeed be difficult to please if he cannot find something approaching his ideal machine at the Cheylesmore Works. It was on a tricycle built by this firm that Mr. F. T. Bidlake achieved the wonderful feat of riding 410 miles 1110 yds. in 24 hours at the Herne Hill track last July. The same machine went from start to finish without an accident, and the performance as regards both man and tricycle takes rank as the most notable event that has yet happened in the history of cycling.

A description of the cycles of the day would be very incomplete without allusion to the famous machines of Singer and Company, Coventry, which are known in every country of the civilized world. No very visible alterations have been made in last year's models, and this may be accounted for, perhaps, by perfection having already

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been nearly attained as regards form; but in matters of detail, such as larger gauge tubes, tangent spokes, dust-proof hubs, bearings and pedals, detachable barrel brackets, a new steering lock, and other contrivances, the Singer machines are kept well up to date. A "Modèle de Luxe," nickel-plated all over, and built to the order of a Russian Grand Duke, was a striking sight in the Singer exhibit.

During last autumn an animated, I might almost say ferocious, controversy raged in the cycling journals upon the relative merits of the front-drivers, built by the Crypto Cycle Company, as compared to those of the rear-driving safety. The advocates of the latter type appeared to have some rooted objection to the front-driver being ridden by those who declared that they preferred it, yet their long-winded arguments seemed to turn almost entirely upon the question of relative speed, which, though undoubtedly a very important matter to the majority of riders, is by no means the sole essential quality of the ideal cycle. But even this claim is warmly disputed, and plenty of good judges affirm that the average rider generally improves in pace by changing from the rear-driver to the front-driver. No unprejudiced person can deny that the machine is an exceedingly pleasant winter and touring mount, and the durability of the gear has been demonstrated by the exhibition of a machine which has had nearly 5000 miles use, and which runs quite smoothly and shows no perceptible signs of wear. The special novelty of the firm for the season is the "Bantam," with wheels varying from 22in. to 24in., and gear varying from 60in. to 66in.; it has a straight tube frame braced together by light wire stays. Notwithstanding the small wheels little vibration is felt, as the rider is seated almost exactly midway between the wheels; the stays to the back fork prevent any lateral movement of the back wheel. This machine seems to be well adapted for military purposes.

The high-framed safety bicycle, which has been christened "Giraffe," was lately invented by Mr. S. McCormack, of Dublin. The frame is built up so that when the pedals are at the lowest point they are 14in. from the ground, but the diamond shape of frame is retained. Amongst a list of no less than twenty-one advantages claimed by the inventor for the machine are the following:—Perfect cleanliness, no side-slip, increased speed, rider's weight equally divided on the machine, greater power for hill climbing, and perfect steering. Mr. McCormack tells me that the reason why side-slip does not occur is because the thrust of the crank is carried higher than the centre of the driving wheel, whilst with the low safety, the pressure being at the base of the wheel, causes liability to be thrown out of

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track on a slippery surface. He complains that many of the imitations of the original "Giraffe" now on the market do not do justice to the invention, inasmuch as they are built with too short a wheel base. No fair estimate of the merits of this type can be formed until further trials have been made.

I greatly regret that I am unable to find space to refer to the merits of such sterling machines as the "Rover," "Quadrant," "Referee," "Whitworth," "Raleigh," "Centaur," "Pilot," "Triumph," "Psycho," "Granville," "Reform," and many others, constructed by excellent firms, who spare no effort to combine the very best of materials with thoroughly good workmanship and soundly conceived designs.

The cycle tyre trade has lately increased to colossal dimensions, and during the last autumn and winter hardly a week has passed without news of the birth of at least one air tyre. It would be quite impossible to allude even in the briefest terms to the special features and the merits claimed for each of these. Nor is it necessary to attempt to do so, for the points of difference are often so minute that only an action at law can decide whether a difference exists or not, and many of the novelties gain so little popularity that after the first excitement they are no more heard of. But as no review of the cycles of the day can be complete without mention of their tyres, some details are given concerning a few of the favourites.

The "Dunlop" pneumatic tyre, invented by Mr. J. B. Dunlop, of Belfast, in 1888, was found to be such a complete success that in the following year a company, now known as the Pneumatic Tyre Company, Limited, was formed, and the dividend lately announced of 200 per cent. on the capital is a sufficient indication of the amount of business done and the ability with which the affairs of the concern have been managed. The great success which attended the '93 pattern has decided the Company to adopt it as the standard pattern for this year, and it is satisfactory to know that the one defect manifested, viz., a tendency of the canvas lining of the outer cover to split has been fully dealt with, and the cause has been entirely removed. The tyre is made in two sizes: the full roadster of 2in. in diameter is recommended for rough roads, heavy weights, and for the driving-wheels of light roadsters; the light roadster tyre, 1¾in. in diameter, is suitable for light-weight riders, good roads, and the front wheels of roadsters for average roads. In the construction of the racing tyre every consideration has been made subservient to the one desideratum—speed.

The Seddon, generally known as the "Red" tyre, comes within the category of wired-on tyres, and has lately been much improved.

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The outer cover is attached to the rim by means of a double coil of specially prepared wire at each side, working by a simple lever which occupies but little space. The hook and eye method of fixing is so simple that the makers are enabled to claim that the adjustment "is not a Chinese puzzle." The tyre produced by the Preston Davies Tyre and Valve Company, Limited, has several new features, and seems to commend itself on account of all-round excellence and simplicity. The "Clincher" tyre has long established a sound reputation amongst road riders. It is improved up to date by being formed with graduated corrugations, deep and pronounced at the tread, and gradually reducing near the rim; side-slipping will probably now rarely occur. It was upon these tyres that the French rider, Terront, accomplished his journey from St. Petersburg to Paris, not only without accident, but actually without reinflation of the air tubes, and that Mr. G. P. Mills performed the great "end to end" ride which has been already alluded to.

The remarkable records which have recently been accomplished upon the "Palmer," an American tyre, have directed univeral attention to it. It is of the single-tube pattern, and is certainly vastly superior to any of this description that have previously been invented. Upon the tube two layers of flax threads are wound spirally; each thread is embedded in the rubber and out of contact with the next thread; the two layers are separated by a wall of rubber, and one is wound at an angle of 45deg. to the other. The whole construction is so novel and interesting that I give in Mr. Palmer's own words a summary of the advantages claimed:—"Each thread being laid straight under high tension, and at a tangent to the rim of the wheel, power is transmitted without loss. Each thread being separated from all neighbouring threads by an elastic body of rubber, they are free to move over each other without friction, to the limits of the elasticity of the said rubber. This, in combination with the construction before described, gives the greatest possible speed and resiliency. By reason of the threads being separately cushioned in soft rubber the whole strength of the fibres is utilised. As there is absolutely no friction between the threads they cannot wear each other out, hence durability is assured. As there are about 120 threads in the whole tube, each extending spirally around its entire length and embedded in an elastic body, any inequality in tension adjusts itself. As the tube is seamless, there is no chance of its bursting through bad joints."

The essential feature of the "Edlin" tyre is a plate and flap, through which the air tube can be withdrawn, and all that is

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necessary to withdraw, repair, or re-insert the air tube is a spanner, a piece of string, and some adhesive plaster. The air tube is a loose one, having butted ends, and can be drawn through the flap without disturbing the outer cover, which is permanently fixed to the rim. The "Trigwell" tyre was introduced more than a year ago, and is now presented with several modifications. The cover is now fitted with two plies of canvas woven in a special manner, and intended not only to resist puncture, but also to prevent all chance of splitting. I have read, but have no personal knowledge on the subject, that the military pattern successfully defied the combined attack of a nail, a hammer, and a brawny arm. It is found in practice that as the whole depth of the inner tube is available for cushioning, in consequence of its resting on the flat centre of rim above the lines of fastening, the tyre possesses resiliency in a very high degree.

In addition to the tyres of which I have made brief mention, there are the "Macintosh," "Fleetwood," "Gormully and Jeffery," "Sydney," "Beeston," "Grappler," "Silvertown," "Maltby," "Swift-Sure," and dozens of other English, French, and American types. Nearly every one of them has hosts of admirers, but to enter into particulars concerning them would fill a book.

The Pneumatic Hub, invented by Mr. R. W. Thomas, has attracted a vast amount of attention, and is certainly not only an ingenious contrivance, but is far in advance of previous attempts in this direction. Mr. Thomas claims that the adoption of his patent should give to a cycle fitted with ordinary solid tyres all the resiliency and speed acquired by the use of pneumatic tyres without any of their disadvantages, and he considers that he has overcome the difficulty of placing the air tube at the hub without destroying the rigidity or driving power of the wheel. The axle is so arranged that it rests upon the pneumatic cushion, which is held between two aluminium discs, about 6in. in diameter. Each disc has on its inner face four circular and equidistant recesses, in which run the steel balls inserted in cups at the ends of four tubular pins which, passing from side to side, hold the inflated air tube in position, but permit it to bulge into the spaces between the pins and the outer cover; thus the axle has free play to give to inequalities of road surface. No one can tell yet what the speed obtained with the pneumatic hub will be compared to that given by the pneumatic tyre, but if better results in that respect are not obtained by the use of the former, it is difficult to see where the benefit comes in, for as regards vibration and saving of

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wear and tear of the machine, it must surely be most advantageous to stop all jar at the rim of the wheel where it commences.

Pattisson's Hygienic Saddle deserves mention. By this invention it is claimed that perineal pressure is wholly avoided, and that the weight of the rider is thrown upon the natural and proper support of the body—the ischium bones. The saddle-fork is split from the extreme point, and is so arranged that the leather is compelled always to assume a concave form. The *Lancet* speaks very highly of the correct principles of construction embodied in this new saddle, and as I happen to have been using one myself during the last two months, I am able to add my testimony as regards its perfect comfort.

Only rarely nowadays is the machine known as the "War Cycle" exhibited as such by makers, and even when one of these is noticed, a very short examination suffices to show that it is only the usual safety bicycle ornamented with a rifle. Having had a good deal to do with military cycling in one way or another since its commencement in England in 1887, I arrived long ago at the conclusion that no special build of machine was required for military purposes, and that any really well-designed mount, constructed of the best materials, would do very well. To some people such a statement as this may sound bald and insufficient, but in claiming correct design and perfect material I practically exclude a large number of types and no small quantity of machines. I am willing to agree that the fittings for carrying arms and kit may vary considerably, and that some methods are vastly superior to others. This is a matter which should receive the close attention of commanding officers. Specially fitted machines have lately been exhibited by Singer and Company, Coventry Machinists' Company, Fleetwing Cycle Works, Trent Cycle Company, and others. I consider that everyone of them would do very well to carry the cyclist-infantry soldier somewhere near the place where he is to fight on foot. The Trent No. 1 roadster safety has been specially selected as the high-grade mount of the cyclist officers of the Belgian army, and appears to be a good durable machine. It is not my opinion that the air tyre is by any means an essential part of a military machine, even though it may be protected by a very perfect puncture-proof apparatus, for I think no one will deny that the speed of a solid or cushion-tyred machine is amply sufficient for any operation in war. Indeed, from the observations I made on the occasion of the last competition for the Cyclist-infantry Long-distance Challenge Cup, when every competitor turned out with pneumatic tyres, I came to the conclusion that so much time was

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wasted in repairs and blowing-up tyres that the distance of 100 miles might have been ridden just as fast on solid tyres. The time of the winning team was 10 hours, 22 minutes, 38 seconds, which, in point of fact, was slower than that accomplished in the same competition before the days of air tyres.

In conclusion, I touch lightly upon a new development of the tyre trade in the application of pneumatic tyres to the wheels of ordinary vehicles. I have used with perfect success a dog-cart so fitted, and have seen the tyres on the wheels of a brougham, a jaunting car, a trotting sulky, and an American buggy. As regards the luxury of this addition there can be no possible doubt, but in some cases the appearance is absolutely hideous, and further experiments are necessary to ensure perfect reliability. I fully expect during this year to see rather a startling advance in this direction.

A. R. SAVILE.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

SIR,—At the Chamber of Commerce meeting this afternoon I was much struck with the apparent readiness of those present to spend, or rather offer to spend, freely whatever the Government required for strengthening the Navy.

In this case, at least, there was no difficulty about the "ship money."

I do think, however, that some expression of how that money should be spent ought to accompany the resolution, and although such expression could probably take a general view, still a little forethought and care in the spending of it would be invaluable in case of war soon after arising.

The general view expressed was that our Navy should be at least equal to any other two, but no reasons were given. The old ideas of keeping an enemy in port and convoying fleets are quite obsolete in these days of torpedo and fast steamers; also that one Englishman was equal to three foreigners. There can be little doubt that now in most navies the men are very good and well-trained, they cannot run away, they must fight, therefore the ship that is best handled and shoots straightest and oftenest and keeps afloat longest must win. These four points are the only ones necessary to study or consider therefore generally, and it is absolutely necessary that our men and officers should have every opportunity for such training, not necessarily in big ships, but in gunboats or torpedo-boats in pairs. And now I am going to put forward a view that will perhaps astonish the public, but which after careful consideration for many years I feel satisfied is a practical one. It is to do away with the enormous monster ships and guns entirely, so far as building any more of them is concerned.

They are most costly, nearly one million sterling each, and quite useless except to fight an opposing monster, which I believe can be fought when required much more satisfactorily otherwise.

What is the Navy required for? is the all-important question.

To protect our shores and commerce and possibly assist our colonies must be the answer. I say possibly to the latter, because in case of war it might be best for the colonies to take care of themselves—not a difficult matter, as they are not dependent for food and manufacturing stuffs on outside supplies as we are. And

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now I must try and show how both protection of our shores and commerce can be thoroughly well done without those enormous ships and guns, and at a vastly reduced expense. I don't wish to suggest a penny-wise pound-foolish policy, but because it is most important to keep our expenditure—with the present hinted large deficit in the Budget—as low as is compatible with efficiency.

We have already more ships than we can man, and there would always be a difficulty in largely increasing the number of men and officers, and one more objection to these enormous ships—by no means the least—is, that in the event of two meeting the result is almost certain to be fatal to one, if not both, and the loss of life must be great, every life too that of a skilled person, most difficult to replace.

To protect our shores against invasion. It must be remembered that if such is proposed it will not be in the manner of last war with France, when the troops were all massed ready and vessels prepared waiting for a fair wind.

No, when decided to attempt it will certainly be unknown from what port, and in forty-eight hours an Army of 30,000 to 40,000 men could be put on twenty or thirty steamers, and twelve hours after they would be off the coast where the landing is proposed to be effected—the coast of Norfolk or Suffolk I think the most likely, because the vessels can get close in and there is nothing to prevent them. If ordered up our fleet could not arrive in time, and once landed 40,000 men would probably rule Britannia in an unexpected way.

No, the only means of preventing such an incursion absolutely and maintaining an unlimited nursery for our fleet is to station one, two, or three gunboats and torpedo-vessels at every port round the kingdom, with one engineer and a few stokers, one warrant officer, and a few men—a dozen in all would be ample to maintain them in good order—all to be under the divisional officer of coast-guard. The fishermen, &c., of the port to be encouraged to enter for crews, and to be regularly drilled and exercised on board them instead of in the shore batteries as at present, and only to serve on board their own vessels, which would then be always ready at any notice, and quite able to prevent any unarmed vessels landing, and even if armed to sufficiently delay them so as to allow our other vessels to come up.

Next to protect trade routes. We should have to settle the number of those according to the number of our war-ships available in a way; for assuming America and the Continent as the two principal ones, and possibly India, we should have to patrol those lines with many and fast vessels powerfully armed, for as no

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convoys would, as a rule, be possible, only the fastest steamers would run, and a few cruisers would be ample to divert any enemy from capturing them. For even if the enemy had a heavy fleet of battle-ships, their idea, of course, would be for the battle-ships to engage ours and their fast cruisers to capture the vessels. But here I would suggest is the gist of my view, for if we had only fast cruisers and no battle-ships they would be ample to prevent the enemy's cruisers capturing our steamers and could ignore the battle-ships, which could not keep up with them or the merchant steamers, and dare not venture close in to the ports for fear of torpedo-vessels.

This you will see points to an increase of the Navy fast cruisers, eight or ten of which may be built for one battle-ship, and are more useful in every way, healthier for the crews, and able to keep the sea for months if required, and easily relieved; then as to guns, twenty-five tons, or one that can be worked by manual labour, is quite heavy enough to pierce any armour a ship can carry and travel fast; then officers and men will regain the now-lost confidence in their ships and guns, and when need arises will do their duty to the utmost without dreading that every time their gun is fired it may burst or the engines breaking down leave them at the mercy of the enemy, who then ramming would almost certainly drown them all even if they at once surrendered.

Yours faithfully,

C. C. RISING, late R.N.

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NOTICES OF BOOKS, ETC.

These notices give a brief abstract of the general scope of the volumes referred to, and, without reviewing them at length, call attention to their most striking points.

Gunner Jingo's Jubilee. Dedicated, without permission, to the President of the Disunited States of Greatest Britain. By MAJOR-GENERAL T. BLAND STRANGE, late Royal Artillery. London: Remington and Co. 1893.

Under a somewhat strange title General Bland Strange has written a book containing much readable and interesting matter dealing with personal and other reminiscences. At first it is difficult to see whether the "Lieutenant" and "Colonel Jingo" is a real personage or not. But under this *nom-de-plume* a varied account of military service from days at school and Woolwich to the campaign in the North-west Province of Canada against Riel is pleasantly told. There are some illustrations of varying merit and some useful maps. The detailed experience of the Indian Mutiny is interesting, and there are many amusing anecdotes such as old soldiers like to tell, and those who have to follow may well like to read.

General Bland Strange holds strong political views, and does not fear to advance them, and holds, as others do for that matter, that "if we mean to maintain an Empire we must first be strong." But whether the views he holds as to a sort of modified conscription would be accepted by the people is just one of those matters that it is somewhat difficult to decide.

Historical Records of the 14th Regiment, now the Prince of Wales's Own (West Yorkshire Regiment), from its formation in 1685 *to* 1892. Edited by CAPTAIN H. O'DONNELL. Devonport: A. H. Swiss. 1893.

Nothing tends more to promote that very essential and excellent feeling in a regiment—*esprit de corps*—than regimental histories. They make both officers and men remember what their forebears have done in the glorious past, and what, therefore, they

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themselves must do both in the present and the future, not only to maintain intact the old traditions, but show themselves worthy of carrying on untarnished the record that has been handed down to them. It would be of real value, in keeping this end in view, if officers who have charge of the company training would finish up the course of tactics and road reports by devoting one or two lectures to what the regiment has done. Our modern "Tommy Atkins" is not only observant, but he is no fool. If he were told not only how to fight *tactically*, but why he had to fight or ought to fight *morally*, to preserve unblemished a noble story, it would do him good. He would see that every man fights and dies the death, if need be, because it is his abstract duty. That is his contract with the State. But regimental histories tell him that there is something higher than that. There is the regimental name to keep up, and that appeals to a higher instinct than even mere duty.

Captain O'Donnell, in his preface, hopes in the name of the "Committee" that the history of the old 14th may "meet with the best approval of its readers." There is no reason why he should fear criticism. The volume is well printed, excellently illustrated, and the idea of appending purely regimental details—the family history in fact—in a separate appendix is wise. To all who know or want to know the reason why the "Ça Ira" is the regimental march the book will tell, and it also gives the music of the air,

"When beneath the southern sun
To the Frenchman's tune they won,
The men of the Fourteenth!"

A King's Hussar: Being the Military Memoirs for twenty-five years of a Troop-Sergeant-Major of the 14th (King's) Hussars. Collected and condensed by HERBERT COMPTON. London: Cassell and Co. 1893.

The story of the Army, as told by those who have seen the roughest side of it, that is to say, the men who have served in the ranks or in the non-commissioned grades, is always worth reading, all the more if the story be honestly and plainly told. Mr. Compton has put together, in a very readable form, the anecdotes and adventures of Troop-Sergeant-Major Edwin Mole during his service of twenty-five years in India, at home, and elsewhere. The most interesting part to the general reader is his service in South Africa during the Boer War, when he tells the story of Majuba Hill, as it was told him by those who had taken part in the fighting on that

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disastrous day. But his account differs in many respects from what has been already written on the subject, and he states that Sir George Colley was holding out a white handkerchief as a flag of truce when the Boers advanced, "shouting and hurling coarse abuse at the Englishman's cowardice." And then, to their eternal disgrace, one of their number advanced to within a few yards of their side of the ravine and levelling his rifle deliberately shot Sir George Pomeroy Colley through the head.

A Historical Geography of the British Colonies. By C. P. LUCAS, B.A. Vol. III., West Africa. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1894.

The first two volumes of this series, which have already appeared, deal with the British Colonies in the West Indies, Europe, and Asia. This, the third, has to do with West Africa, is quite as well done and is as valuable as its predecessors. It is illustrated with maps, which, though small, are practically sufficient for the purpose. The upgrowth of the European settlements and the early exploration of the country is carefully dealt with, and in a useful appendix much information is given as to the oil nuts and seeds of British West Africa. The new volume is well indexed.

Catalogue of English Official Military Works published by the British Government. On sale January 16th, 1893. Compiled by BASIL HARRINGTON SOULSBY. London. 1894.

The author has produced a very useful catalogue of the existing official works for military readers, has arranged the list in alphabetical order, with numerous cross references, and has added a brief abstract of what the principal volumes contain. It is to be published annually, so as to bring it periodically up to date, and can be obtained from Messrs. Stanford, 25, Cockspur Street, for the very low price of sixpence. It is a valuable book of reference to our official military literature.

The Oxfordshire Light Infantry Calendar, 1894. Compiled by CAPTAIN A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1894.

This excellent regimental almanack is well illustrated with portraits of commanding officers, a view of the Cowley Barracks, groups showing rallying squares, a piquet, the Royal Bucks Militia, &c., besides containing in the pages devoted to the successive months of the year a great deal of regimental history.

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The Yoruba-speaking People of the Slave Coast of West Africa; their Religion, Manners, Customs, Laws, Language, &c. With an Appendix, containing a comparison of the Tshi, Ga, E.W.E., and Yoruba Languages. By A. B. ELLIS, Lieutenant-Colonel, First Battalion West India Regiment. London: Chapman and Hall. 1894.

Colonel Ellis gives in this very interesting volume the result of evidently many years careful thought and experience about a difficult anthropological subject. He deals with the chief and minor gods of these people, their priests and worship; their superstitions and ceremonies regarding birth, marriage, and death; their laws, customs, and folk-lore; and furnishes the book with a careful appendix, giving a comparison between the different dialects. This is not the first effort of the author to deal with a somewhat obscure subject, as he has already given us three volumes relating to the people of the West Coast of Africa; but in this he has provided much interesting information on these ever old and ever new questions which bear on the "childhood of religions," and the superstitions which attend their birth. Equally curious are some other traditional customs: that relating to "the number of men required for a military expedition" states that "an ox-hide was pegged down in front of the general's tent, and the horsemen made to ride over it in succession between two spears. When, by this process, a hole had been worn in the hide the number of men was thought sufficient for an ordinary campaign. For serious operations two ox-hides were used, one placed over the other." All who are interested in the early life of peoples will appreciate Colonel Ellis's last work.

Deferred Pay; or a Major's Dilemma. By Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. M'CAUSLAND. London: Digby, Long, and Co. 1894.

Except in the sense that each character in the book gets eventually paid out for either good deeds or bad deeds, it is difficult to say why the author chose "Deferred Pay" for his title. But putting that aside the book is amusing, with many personal reminiscences of Indian and other life. The hero, after many strange adventures, falls in love with a Miss Edow, whose other admirer attempts to take his life by pushing him down a precipice in the Himalayas, and marries the lady. But the enemy gets his deferred pay by going mad and dying, and Cloudesley, of course, marries the widow. Other complications equally arrange themselves, and bring an amusing and interesting book to a satisfactory termination.

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The White Aigrette. By VIN VINCENT. London: Hurst and Blackett. 1894.

This also is a soldier story, with the usual admixture of love-making, quarrels, and war, and is briskly and pleasantly written. Captain Fortescue, of the 24th Hussars—whence, we presume, the title of the book is derived—falls in love with Daisy Gardiner, and, like all good novel heroes, at once falls into difficulties. First his own past is not blameless, but this is condoned; then Daisy's father comes to grief, and at first it is assumed dishonourably, and the lady refuses to dream of marrying her lover until the stain is cleared. Then he goes to Egypt, and in a well-described fight is wounded in the lungs. Meanwhile, another admirer of Daisy's, who has shown great sympathy with the Gardiners, nurses him to recovery. And on his return home the proper results follow; the charge of forgery is found to be false, and the lovers marry and are happy ever afterwards. Brome, the faithful friend of both, gets the V.C. for bravery and returns to regimental duty. He is the true hero, shy, patient, and unselfish. A very readable military book.

The A B C and A1 Universal International Night Signal Code, adapted for Use between Vessels at Sea and Stations on Land; also for Naval and Military Purposes. By W. CLAUSON-THUE, F.R.G.S., Author of the "A B C and A1 Telegraphic Codes. London: Eden, Fisher & Co. 1894.

In a small monograph of some forty pages, with coloured illustrations of the proposed method of signalling, the author has given his views as to how an efficient system of night signalling, either on shore or afloat, can be carried out. He proposes to utilise the ordinary red, white, and green lights which all vessels possess—and could be obtained on shore—and from the perpendicular, horizontal, or triangular arrangement of them he proposes, by a system of permutations, to provide an easily-understood and yet very exhaustive code. The plan appears simple, but it remains to be proved whether simple lamps will be seen at sufficiently long distances. There is certainly no difficulty in understanding Mr. Clauson-Thue's plan of signalling.

Francis Bacon, the Author of Shakespeare. By GEORGE JAMES. London: Simpson, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. 1893.

There are others beyond the writer of what may be termed the "great cryptogram" who wish to destroy one of our most cherished idols. To most Englishmen the name of Shakespeare is as much a

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household word as passages in his plays are household sayings. So strongly founded in the English mind is the feeling that Shakespeare was an author as well as an actor that it would require a very strong lever to upset the opinion. Mr. James has not feared to face the difficulty, and, believing as he does, has certainly the courage of his convictions. The book is worth reading, if only to see that this is so. But what passes understanding is the magnificent self-denial of Bacon if he wrote the plays attributed to Shakespeare and would not, for reasons that no ordinary mind can grasp, take to himself the literary credit of his work. What object had he?

Cavalry Advanced and Rear-Guard Cavalry on Out-post Duty. Arranged by CAPTAIN S. G. L. SLEETE, 2nd Bengal Lancers, Aldershot. Gale and Polden. 1894.

Captain Sleete, in the above, has provided a concise abstract of the regulations relating to the subject with which he deals. Though there is no new matter, the abstracts—printed on one sheet of stout paper and folded so as to be very portable and easily carried in the pocket—are useful and correct, while they save the trouble of carrying about the more cumbrous manual and drill book that deal with cavalry movements.

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LIST OF BOOKS, ETC., RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

A King's Hussar, by Herbert Compton. Cassell and Co.
Revue Militaire Suisse. A. Borgeand.
The White Aigrette (3 vols.), by Vin Vincent. Hurst and Blackett.
Die Reichswehr. Vienna.
Gunner Jingo's Jubilee, by Major-General T. Bland Strange. Remington and Co.
Memoirs of the Mutiny (2 vols.), by Francis Cornwallis Maude, V.C., C.B. Remington and Co.
Geography of the British Colonies, by J. Lucas, B.A. Clarendon Press.
Army and Navy Journal. New York.
Militaire Zeitschrift. Wilhelm Braumüller.
New Review, by Archibald Groves. W. Heinemann.
Revue Militaire de l'Etranger. Paris.
Militarische Blätter, by E. Von Glasenapp. Dievenow-on-Baltic.
A Lecture, by Vice-Admiral Colomb; delivered before the Aldershot Military Society. Gale and Polden.
Francis Bacon the Author of Shakespeare, by George James. Simpkin Marshall and Co.
Canadian Military Gazette. Montreal.
Cavalry Advance and Rear Guards, by Captain G. L. Steele. Gale and Polden.
Marine Rundschau. Berlin.
The A B C and A1 Night Signal Code, by W. Clauson Thue, F.R.G.S. Eden, Fisher, and Co.
Review of Reviews. London.

All communications for the Editor should be addressed "THE EDITOR, UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, *care of Messrs. William Clowes and Son, Ltd.*, 13 *and* 14, *Charing Cross, W.C.*," *and, if intended for insertion, should be written on one side of the paper only. The Editor does not undertake to return rejected communications unless accompanied by stamped and addressed envelope.*

Communications concerning subscriptions or the business of the Magazine must be addressed to the Publisher.

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THE

UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE.

No. 785.—APRIL, 1894.

THE COMING WAR MINISTRY.

THE late debate on Sir Charles Dilke's motion shows that an attempt is to be made, with the consent of the leaders of both parties, to create a body charged with the defence of the realm. Its form is most unsettled. It may be a committee of the Cabinet. It may take some other shape. In any case it must practically become a Ministry of "War," having authority both over Navy and Army. Hitherto it has been assumed in most Parliamentary references to our future arrangements for national defence that the proposals of Lord Hartington's Commission held the field and were only for the time in abeyance. Some means must be taken to remove the anxiety of certain naval officers; but the necessity for greater unity of method, suggested by the now famous circular letter, has been so long felt that we cannot but think that the proposal only requires to be properly worked out in detail to ensure general approval. In particular, radical as is the contrast between the scheme of the letter and that of the report of the Commission, we are anxious to show cause for believing that the change in the terms employed is one altogether for the better, and that it is by no means impossible that the distinguished statesmen who signed the report may on reflection see reason to accept the amendment, which, if adopted, would in no wise impair the value of their work. The four signatories of the letter have hit a blot in the report which, as we hope

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to show, was almost certainly allowed to appear in it, because the greater number of those who signed did not realise what their use of military terms would imply when interpreted according to the long established practice of Armies.

In the first number of the present series of this Magazine,* we, in criticising the report of the Commission, pointed out that the proposal to make "the chief of the staff to the Secretary of State for War" responsible for the Army was a contradiction in terms. In a sense, no doubt the most serious defect lay in the choice of a name. But there are some cases in which names are almost, if not quite, as important as facts. In this instance the name covered only too well the conditions of the proposed office. The very essence of the idea of a staff officer in the Army is that he has, and can have, no responsibility whatever to anyone but his own chief. He violates his duty, or at all events abnegates his functions as a staff officer, from the moment that he says officially, "I think so and so." "I insist upon so and so." "I must resign if such and such a thing is not done." His duty, his function, his position as a staff officer is merely that of the mouthpiece of his commanding officer. He is bound, of course, to have intelligent opinions of his own, and to state them to his commanding officer, but to the outer world he is known only as expressing the views and exercising the authority of the man whose staff officer he is. In the practice of staff work in current military life this is of very great importance, because usually very junior officers are in high positions on the staff and have to issue orders based solely on the fact that they do express the views of the officer on whose staff they are. Now, as the four signatories of the circular have admirably pointed out, this is precisely what we do not want in the case of the expert adviser who, at the head of Army or Navy, has to lay his views before Minister or Cabinet. There is no question at all that no expert adviser, commander-in-chief, or other of Navy or Army, can determine finally what shall be done with Navy or Army. That decision must rest with the Cabinet. But the Cabinet is bound to act straightforwardly with Parliament. The danger to which we have been exposed hitherto was admirably illustrated by the incidents of the debate on Lord George Hamilton's motion about the Navy. Those who knew how profound was the anxiety of all naval experts in proportion to their knowledge as to the relative rate of ship-building now going on in Russia and France on the one side, and in England on the other, listened aghast when the Chancellor

* April, 1890.

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of the Exchequer declared, or was supposed to declare, that he was supported by the naval lords. It is true that those who watched most closely the exact phraseology employed were able to detect the fact that Sir William Harcourt was using terms, for the purposes of debate, which would yet allow him, without direct personal untruthfulness, to make the statements he did, even though they were straight in the teeth, as for practical purposes it was certain that they were, of the opinion of every naval lord at the Admiralty. Fortunately, however, in this exceptional instance, the impression conveyed by Sir William Harcourt's words was so universal and so definite that no naval lord who really believed the country to be endangered by the procrastination, to put it in its mildest form, to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had committed himself, could sit still under the imputation conveyed in that remarkable speech. Sir William found himself obliged to offer a personal explanation in which he announced that he had not said that he was expressing the views of his naval advisers. Though he limited himself to that negative statement and declined to extend it, it is certainly not too much to say that the impression left by his explanation was the flat reverse of that which had been left by the speech in the debate. The illustration however, telling as it is, of the extent to which the House of Commons may be led to vote under a false impression that all those who alone can really have the facts before them and also know how to weigh them support the proposals of a Government, is only an illustration. It represents the ordinary and normal conditions of debate under present circumstances. If the proposals of Lord Hartington's Commission were carried out in their exact form this habitual deception of the House of Commons would be established as the authorised and designed condition of things. A "chief of the staff" would have no right to resign, no status for resigning if his proposals were not adopted. His responsibility would be nil. No matter how clear his statements and his arguments might have been in showing to his chief the fatal risk which the country was running by the rejection of his advice, yet, if they were rejected, his duty would have been done. We say unhesitatingly that the abler the more distinguished the more influential the man selected for such a post under these conditions the greater would the danger be. Suppose, for instance, that the Duke of Wellington could have been placed in this position. What House of Commons would not have felt safe in voting for any economical proposals of a Government which had the Duke of Wellington as its supposed expert adviser. Yet no one ever had so strong a sense as the Duke of the exact limits of

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any function that he undertook. We admit that we do not believe that under any terms or any conditions he would have accepted such an office as that proposed for the expert head of the Army by the Commission. He would have said, "I will not put myself in a position in which my authority may be invoked to ruin the country." To say that on those grounds the Duke would not have accepted it is perhaps as complete a condemnation of the proposal as any that could be made. But in order to illustrate the necessary conditions under which any soldier would accept such an office, let us suppose the Duke actually installed in it. The man who signed the Convention of Cintra avowedly and solely because he thought himself bound to support his superior officer, although he entirely disapproved of its terms, would not have hesitated to carry out strictly what he conceived to be his duty as a chief of the staff. Now there is no sort of doubt what he would have considered to be his duty in such a place. The definition of the duties and functions of a staff officer which is laid down in Lord Wolseley's Pocket-book only embodies the ideas of those duties and functions which the Duke instilled into our Army. He would have said, "Her Majesty's Government is responsible for the defence of the realm. My duty as a staff officer to the Minister is to give him the best advice that I can; but if he rejects it my duty is equally not to embarrass the Government by announcing my views or tendering my resignation. As a staff officer I have no right to speak except as the mouthpiece of my chief." The more we consider the matter the more it appears to us that this proposal of Lord Hartington's Commission was due to a misunderstanding on the part of the lay members of the Commission of the military phraseology they employed.

A commission largely composed of ex-Secretaries of State was under great temptation to rid themselves of the embarrassment of any independent expert advice. Mr. Balfour, in the recent debate, admirably brought out the just grounds that such a body has for wishing themselves to deal with the whole question of the Estimates, and for not leaving it to the House of Commons. He seemed to carry the House with him "as men of business." We venture, however, to urge that the reasons we shall set forth show that there are great dangers in this course, and that at least there is one of which we may warn them, from their not realising the highly technical terms employed by the Commission. There is at least the greatest danger lest they, in proposing to appoint a "chief of the staff," should mean one thing, and lest any officer who accepts the position should necessarily understand it in another.

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The proposal of the circular letter, in the best possible way, suggests the proper alternative. When the writers propose the appointment of a minister of national defence, to be generally responsible for the work of both Army and Navy, having under him expert heads of either service, *responsible* for their advice, and bound to resign if it is not substantially accepted, they suggest a system the exact reverse of that of the Commission's scheme. Clearly it is to be understood that the recommendations of responsible men must, if they resign their offices, be laid before Parliament. That means that the country will have to judge between them and the Government. Above all, it means that the House of Commons will be frankly dealt with. Hitherto there has always been the most serious danger lest each particular Ministry should be tempted to run the most serious risk of national disaster rather than incur expenditure in a particular year. Both parties are equally liable to be affected by this influence. If a general election is likely soon to take place the temptation to hope that the evil day will be deferred, that it is not necessary just at that moment to face expenditure which may very likely after all be just as well put off for another year, is enormous. General elections have of late been so often possible, that the one year is dangerously apt to run on to many years during the very time that other powers, regardless of such considerations, are straining every nerve to distance us in the race. Strong as are party ties in the House of Commons, there are two feelings which have always hitherto proved yet stronger. If in unmistakable form it can be shown that there is real danger to national safety, there is sufficient patriotism in the House to force any Ministry to meet at any cost that danger. If a direct affront is offered to the dignity of the House as a whole, the members of all parties are sufficiently keen to insist upon the respect which is due to the whole body. Surely it is not too much to expect that in a case where both these influences ought to work together, the House will insist upon that arrangement which appeals alike to its patriotism and its own self-respect. What can be more degrading to the House than that it should be treated like a child to whom Ministers cannot venture to tell the truth about the advice that has been tendered to them, because forsooth the House cannot be trusted to consider it on its merits?

The really important part of the letter lies in the proposal as to the nature of these offices, and we cannot too heartily support it. Nevertheless in our judgment the writers have illustrated the wisdom of that ancient judge who having given his decision carefully abstained from giving reasons for it. In the name of

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common sense what can be more preposterous than to assign as one of the chief reasons for the creation of a Ministry to deal with the combined services of Army and Navy, the fact that at the present time the expenditure on the Army is larger than that on the Navy. It is just as reasonable as for a man to complain that his butcher's bill is larger than his baker's bill, and therefore ought to be cut down. Bread may be the staff of life, meat relatively a luxury, but, if meat is to be used at all in your house, you can only judge whether or no it has been used with reasonable economy by examining your butcher's bills, your household management, and considering the state of the meat market. The flour market and the consumption of bread has nothing to do with the matter, and must be dealt with on its own merits. It is such an obvious truism that the Army may be costing too much even though it costs less than the Navy, and may be starved into inefficiency although it costs more, that it is quite certain that four such able men would not have committed themselves to so palpable a fallacy if there had not been a reason for it altogether independent of the merits of the argument. The fact is that, though Mr. Balfour was fully justified in saying that on most subjects the four have sufficiently divergent views to make their agreement in the present proposal more important than it would otherwise be, there is one question as to which they are all alike committed; and the real source of this particular reference to Army expenditure is that they have all hitherto failed to get their views on that one question adopted.

They have all alike, from different points of view, endeavoured to press upon the country the wisdom of creating a separate local Army for India. It is obviously a subject that cannot be discussed without most careful examination of all the facts connected with it. Every time that it has been so discussed the weight of authority and of evidence has been against the proposal, and one investigating body after another has decided against it. Nevertheless, by putting forth figures which will not bear cross-examination, most of the signatories have convinced themselves that the Army expenditure might be greatly reduced if we had a local Army in India. It is therefore in order to cast affectionate greetings and pious hopes of a coming resurrection towards the graves of some of their still-born projects, that by common consent and from tender sympathy of feeling they have introduced these references to the relative cost of Army and Navy. It would be cruel to object to so innocent a self-indulgence in so generally excellent a letter.

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PARTY POLITICS AND THE NAVY. THE "EXPLANATORY STATEMENT."

By Stephen Hardcastle Clarke.

The "Explanatory Statement on the Naval Estimates," just published, by Lord Spencer, is both in its excellencies and defects the inevitable sequel to the long discussions which have occupied the last seven months. It is unfortunate that the present agitation on behalf of the Navy should have become involved in the contest between the two great political parties in the State. The agitation is unquestionably a genuine one, independent of party aims and purposes. Lord George Hamilton's motion could not have borne good fruit if its roots had not struck into good soil. No dissentient voice worth listening to has been heard to disparage his qualifications as spokesman of the cause of naval supremacy. As chief author and administrator of the great ship-building programme, now nearly approaching completion, and as a reformer of our Admiralty, his claims to the position are paramount. Nor could his action be fairly termed vexatious towards the Government. No less than four months had been allowed to intervene between his speech on Mr. Hanbury's motion on August the 28th last and his own motion above referred to. Ample time had been given for the present Administration to show what they proposed to do when the old programme came to an end. There is nothing extraordinary in the history of the agitation itself as a whole, except, perhaps, its exceeding vitality. It has followed the customary routine of all such agitations as begin in Parliament and are afterwards carried on on public platforms and in the newspapers. Mr. Hanbury's motion to reduce the Salaries' Vote by £1000 set the ball rolling. As a result of the disclosures made in the debate on that motion, and the absence of any promised action by the Government, there followed everywhere meetings, speeches, and articles. These culminated in the great meeting on December 12th, of the London Chambers of Commerce, over which, but for unfortunate illness, the Lord Mayor was to have presided.

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On December 20th came Lord George Hamilton's motion for the immediate commencement of additions to the Navy, and calling on the Government to make a statement before the Christmas recess. The speeches on the debates may, like all speeches on similar motions, be divided into three classes: (1) the more or less technical speeches of past and present naval administators; (2) the purely Parliamentary or *fighting* speeches; (3) the speeches of members who made the subject a mere stalking horse for their own political hobbies. The first-named were, no doubt, of some value. The unfortunate effect of the others on the agitation, as a whole, has been to convert a national demand into a party cry. Such was the melancholy outcome of patriotic endeavour, but it was inevitable. Lord George Hamilton has the fortune or misfortune to belong to a political party, and protest as he may about the purity of his purposes, that motion was duly stamped as a party manœuvre. Mr. Gladstone in appointing a day for its discussion, accepted it as a motion of want of confidence. So far as Parliament was concerned, the consequence was inevitable.

It only remained for public opinion to deliver its verdict. Speedily, and with no uncertain voice, the country declared itself still discontented with the prospects of the Navy, and demanded that something should be done without delay. Thereupon, despite the previously declared impossibility of making any announcement till the Naval Estimates were ready, a new programme was issued. The anxiety of the moment was allayed. Public attention was drawn off to other things. Clearly, however, whether the programme was issued as a blind or as a *bonâ fide* announcement, the result justified Lord George's motion despite the party vote. On the other hand, it was not to be expected that those who had been elected to support the Government would, for the sake of the Navy, give up the hope of carrying out the rest of the legislative programme. Therefore, to avow one day that the country has reason to be well content with the Navy, and on the next to issue a hitherto undreamed of ship-building programme, does not constitute political inconsistency. It is the natural sequence of events under our present political procedure. The leaders of the party in power, which holds its position by virtue of a not very secure majority, cannot afford to mince words when that position is imperilled. Self-preservation is the first law of nature.

But this is not the whole of the picture. We are confronted with a stranger spectacle still, the spectacle of a host of public men whose genuine patriotism is unquestioned, and who, like Lord

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George Hamilton, happen to be members of one or the other party, lamenting on the one hand that the Navy should be made a party question, and on the other, introducing it at every possible opportunity into their political speeches and manifestoes. They, too, like their leaders, cannot help themselves. However zealous they may be for the Navy, and thoroughly as their statements may be based on real knowledge, yet they by their position necessarily appeal for votes when they advocate a particular policy, and are therefore met by party opposition. One thing at least seems to follow from this, that under the present dispensation, whatever is said about the Navy on a party platform, or by a member of a party, can be effectually stigmatised as a party statement. To this may be added the corollary that direct parliamentary control implies not only the danger but the certainty of party control. I have no wish in these statements to make a hopeless and unpractical attack upon our party system, inextricably involved as it is in our political life. Everyone admits that there are certain evils incidental to government by party. Nobody wishes to urge the perfection of the system, we are most of us content with the fact that it works decently on the whole. Does it therefore follow that this particular mischief, which prevents the nation itself from obtaining the security for which it is most anxious, cannot be remedied.

That certainly is the question. Can it be helped? Is the nation content with that costly diet of alternate lulls and panics on which it has lived so long, and which is admittedly the result of the present system of naval administration? Assuredly there are signs abroad that it is not content. In spite of the programme lately issued we see that the agitation has not ceased. The anxiety is not abated. There remains the uncomfortable feeling that things are not being done in the right way, and that whatever be the truth about the adequacy or inadequacy of the Navy, this vital question is dealt with in a very haphazard fashion. If, then, this feeling is founded on fact, and the effect of the discussion has been to enlist the public sense on the side of stable naval government, what cause is at work to keep us in the present condition of instability? Certainly there is no serious disagreement about the wants of the Navy, either as regards the nature or number of ships required. Indeed, putting aside the small and ever diminishing party which deprecates the manufacture of ships and guns in any form, it is safe to say that naval advisers on both sides in Parliament are well agreed in all essential particulars as to our wants. It is not, therefore, their mutual difference of opinion which keeps them apart. It is party, and party only. The

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subservience of a First Lord to the policy of the Government as a whole so complicates his action as to make it unsafe for him to commit himself to a fair understanding with his political opponents. He is bound to consult the interests of his colleague, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. A pleasing Budget is the *sine quâ non* of every Government which wishes to preserve its existence, and the extensive building of ships does not help to make a popular budget. It is not that the public grudges the money for an adequate Navy, but that an increased expenditure involves a choice of difficulties in providing the means. No one will argue that when the nation's existence depends on our obtaining what is necessary, the difficulties in detail of a Chancellor of the Exchequer in choosing objects of taxation, are a satisfactory reason for keeping the Navy inefficient.

The recent discussions on the wisdom of a programme which distributes the expenditure over a term of years have made it clear that the real objection to it is the wish of the Treasury to manipulate the Budget of each particular year, not with a view to permanent economy, but to the statement for the year. No one supposes that before the end of a period of five, or ten, or fifteen years, our need of maritime supremacy will have lessened, or that the method of maintaining that supremacy will have been entirely revolutionised. No one can doubt that by the end of such a term we shall have obtained better results for a given sum expended than we do by the inconvenient method of annual votes for ships that take years in building. Might not a reasonable extension of this system relieve us of nearly all our difficulties. Should we not escape from the present vicious circle, in which we are involved, if larger interests could be brought into the question. At present in any national movement the very leaders for whom the nation calls, cannot speak without being suspected of party motives. Whatever difficulties are involved in many aspects of the subject of Imperial federation, on the question of the Navy our colonial cousins have been always ready to meet us more than half way. Would it not be for the reasons here given a positive advantage to us to be pledged to the colonies to provide a specified fund for the Navy to which they would contribute?

To deal with this fund a Naval Council must be created, with the First Lord as President. The council would include representatives from all the colonies contributing to the fund. Its members would be appointed by our own Government, and by the various colonial Governments. Their tenure of office would be for a term of years. Its numbers would be so regulated as to ensure the proper ratio of representation to taxation. So

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long as all ship-building industry is centred in the British Isles, it is clear that all the technical and expert portion of the naval officials must be drawn therefrom also. Thus little or no change would be necessary here, except as regards the naval lords. These must be chosen by the council, and not by the Government of the day. I, of course, offer this only as the merest sketch of a scheme, but I believe that it will be found to contain a suggestion which promises an escape from the present unsatisfactory condition of things. Space forbids me to enter into its elaboration. Passing allusion, however, must be made to the scheme recently promulgated by Sir Charles Dilke, Sir George Chesney, Mr. H. O. Arnold Forster, and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson. Their ministry of defence is undoubtedly a bolder conception than a Naval Council, in that it implies the united working of military and naval forces, and it would probably supply our immediate wants admirably at all times. But it seems to contain one fatal flaw. Whatever the scheme is to be, it must be in some way framed with a view to some future scheme for united Imperial Defence. Now the difficulties in the way of combining all the military forces of the Empire with the Imperial Navy under one centralised Government do at present appear to be insuperable. Perhaps this may be the reason why the larger view has been left untouched by them. I cannot but regret it nevertheless. Fifty years ago perhaps England's policy toward her outlying possessions and her colonies was a debated question; at the present moment it is certainly not so. The federation of the Empire is a dream which members of all parties are glad to share. The numerous writers who appear to take for granted that the best we can hope for is to evade the evils which party Government inflicts upon the Navy, and not to abolish them altogether, seem to me not to recognise the opportunity which this condition of things offers for realising the larger hope. They cannot have felt the full force of the anomaly that while all other subjects of national importance, such as public morality and public charity, can be dealt with by the combined action of people of all shades of political opinion, and while in Parliament itself an honourable understanding has ever existed on these points, the subject of National Defence is treated as carelessly as if it was the adjournment over the Derby Day.

The benefits incidental to such a change would be not few. The congestion of parliamentary business would be in great measure relieved, and no one would feel the loss, if they knew that the detail of our naval policy was being satisfactorily settled outside the give and take of question time in the House of Commons. It

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cannot be considered a wholesome education for the mass of the people, into whose minds it is our acknowledged desire to instil a sense of national duty, that they should read of acrimonious disputes among the chief of their legislators on one of the indisputable articles of the national creed. It cannot be wholesome for a Board of Admiralty to be confronted in all its endeavours by the spectre of an outraged Chancellor of the Exchequer, and bound by the consideration that all the credit it can gain must be straightway paid over to the general fund of a political party, to be used as a political emblem alongside the big loaf on election placards.

Even if we are as yet unready for such a scheme as has been here drawn in outline, differences of opinion on all sides have become slight enough to admit of a solid compromise to serve the present occasion and the immediate future. So long as things remain as they are the Government of the day will be forced to make use of the navy for its own ends. It is true that while this use consists in putting naval supremacy in the fore-front, and voting adequate sums for its preservation, no harm will be done. But the administrative principle which places our only means of National Defence at the mercy of a Parish Councils' Bill is, and must always remain, a terribly dangerous one. To return to the so-called new "Naval programme" to which I referred at the beginning of this article, no better illustration of the disadvantages of our present methods could be found than is afforded by the explanatory statement just put forward by Lord Spencer. It shows clearly enough that the Government have felt themselves bound to yield to the national cry for better defence. On the other hand, it is not possible for any unbiassed outsider not to see that the absence of any continuous programme is purely forced on the Government by party necessity. The inconvenience of paying back into the Treasury each year unexpended money, that will be required in a week or two, and the delay involved in waiting till new estimates are at least prepared, is recognised by all. Yet, because one party introduced the improved system, the other was bound to oppose it. Now that they are in office they are hampered by their own action when in opposition. *Delirant reges. Plectunter Achivi.* Parties squabble. John Bull is fleeced.

STEPHEN H. CLARKE.

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THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY MANŒUVRES, 1893, IN THE WARSAW DISTRICT.

From the "Militär Wochenblatt."

BY MAJOR C. PETERS.

EACH year sees more attention devoted in Russia to special cavalry manœuvres, but never have they been held on so extensive a scale as in the autumn of 1893. Not only in the Warsaw district, with its large cavalry contingent, but also in the districts of Kiev, Wilna, and St. Petersburg, the exercises hitherto carried out by divisions have been extended to entire corps of cavalry. This points pretty conclusively to the way in which Russia intends employing her cavalry in a future war against the West. Till now the divisions of cavalry have been exercised with the other arms, but this year they have been brought out by themselves after the regular manœuvres, that their free movement in large masses should not be impeded by standing crops.

In the Warsaw district the whole of the cavalry (except two Cossack Divisions) assembled at three points close to each other—viz., the 5th and 14th Divisions at Skiernewice; the 13th Division, the Guard Brigade in garrison at Warsaw, and two sotnias of Kuban Cossacks at Warsaw; and the 6th and 14th Divisions at Rembertowo (to the east of Warsaw). After a few days' independent work the divisions commenced on the 28th September as a corps against a skeleton enemy, General Gourko being present. The general idea for the day was that a corps of cavalry consisting of thirty squadrons, six sotnias, and twelve guns, had been sent on to Warsaw to seize the stores which lay in the suburbs there, and which were protected by the skeleton enemy of four battalions, twelve squadrons, and fourteen guns. This idea made an engagement in front of Warsaw almost certain between the cavalry corps, as it advanced from the village of Bobitke, and the skeleton enemy.

Operations commenced by the Guard Brigade and the two Cossack sotnias moving forward to reconnoitre; they were met by the cavalry of the marked enemy, which had been kept in front of its own right wing. The engagement resulted in the retirement of the skeleton cavalry in rear of its infantry, whose fire obliged the attackers in their turn to move off to their left flank, in order to clear the front for the attack of their own main body. The latter

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moved forward with one brigade (twelve squadrons) in first line, and one regiment in reserve. The Orenburg Cossack Regiment belonging to the division was ordered to advance through a wood and fall on the enemy's right flank. While the 13th Division thus made a general attack on the infantry, the Guard Brigade had the task of meeting a fresh advance of the skeleton enemy's cavalry.

General Gourko made the following criticisms on the morning's work :—

(1) The cavalry should reconnoitre on a broader front—this should be the special care of the leaders. The plan and place of the day's exercise (*i.e., where the enemy would be found*) should only be known to the Commander and his Chief of the Staff, otherwise the practice would fail in its object and be of little value.

(2) Advanced guards must be far enough ahead of the main body to ensure the requisite information as to the enemy's position and strength reaching the leader of it in good time, otherwise he may be forced to alter his dispositions at the last moment, always a dangerous task. For the same reason the reconnoitring of the ground to the front and flanks must be thorough.

(3) The horse artillery, when its cavalry advances past it to the attack, must either increase its fire upon the enemy or, if that is not possible, must move forward with its cavalry to support it. In no case must the artillery, when its fire becomes masked, remain in its position.

In the afternoon of the same day, operations were carried out at Rembertowo under a similar idea. The skeleton enemy, considered to be retiring, consisted of eight cavalry regiments and three batteries. The attacking force (6th and 15th Divisions) strengthened their patrols, pushed them forward, and then detached one brigade of the 6th Division as advanced guard. The main body had the other brigade of the division in the first line, and behind it the 15th Division on the right flank. The advanced guard, strengthened by the leading brigade of the main body, broke through the opposing forces, while the second line made an attack on the main body of the skeleton enemy, which was endeavouring to outflank the right wing of the division.

General Gourko's remarks were :

(1) The first reconnaissance was necessarily carried out on a very broad front, far to each flank, in order to guard against surprises.

(2) There should be no (*large*) intervals in the fighting line, each unit ought to keep closed in to the directing hand.

(3) The skeleton enemy ought constantly to take the initiative in order to quicken the leaders on the other side, compel them to

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make rapid decisions, and the troops to carry out their wishes promptly and correctly.

The manœuvre carried out on September 29th by the two Skiernewice Divisions against one another was more complicated, inasmuch as one of the brigades of the Northern Corps (14th Division), covering a requisition of supplies, was not available till later in the day, and the 1st Brigade had, in the meanwhile, to hold several crossings over the river Skiernewice against a superior force. Here reconnoitring proved of the greatest use. The river, however, was too insignificant an obstacle to delay the attacker for long; he pressed on with overwhelming forces, while the reinforcements only came up at the last moment to assist the retreating defender. General Gourko was very pleased with this manœuvre, and only objected that the Southern Corps, although stronger than the enemy, had not secured itself by a sufficient reserve against a surprise by the approaching reinforcements of the Northern Corps.

The greatest number of troops placed in the field during the manœuvres was on the 29th and 30th September. The West Corps numbered sixty squadrons and sotnias and twenty-eight guns; the East Corps, sixty-nine squadrons and sotnias and twenty-four guns. According to the general idea the cavalry of the West Corps moving on Warsaw had, on the 29th September, reached the town of Skiernewice, encamped there, and sent forward advanced guards.

It was reported that a large force of infantry was concentrated at Warsaw, and that the river Weichsel, south of the town, was watched by a corps of cavalry. In order to cover the concentration by railway of the Army at Skiernewice the leader of the Western Cavalry received instructions to push forward on the morning of the 30th September to the line Tortschin-Shabja-Wolja-Crodish, and to oppose any attack of the enemy. The foregoing in itself explains the task of the East Corps, which (minus one division close to Warsaw) was posted at three points along the line of the Weichsel, and which had in the course of the 29th gained all necessary information by reconnoitring. The advance of both main bodies, originally distant fifty-five to sixty-five kilometres apart, was ordered to commence at 7 a.m. on the 30th.

The leader of the East Corps, to clear the situation, decided to concentrate his corps on the 30th at Nadorfhin, twenty-three versts beyond the Weichsel, and to advance from there in the following formation, viz.: advanced guard—the three dragoon regiments of the 13th Division, with one battery, through Moshul and Shabja-Wolja to Mschtschonoff; the 6th Division, with the Orenburg Cossack Regiment and twelve guns, in rear of the

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advanced guard; and as a right column, three versts to the north of the left, the 15th Division with one battery.

The Western Corps was also moving in the direction of Shabja-Wolja, with fourteen squadrons and one battery as advanced guard. After passing Mschtschonoff its commander despatched a regiment to cover each flank. The advanced guard of this corps, on reaching Fort Kostowjez, and hearing of the approach of the East Corps from Nadorfhin, moved through a small wood and halted the other side, supported by the battery, in readiness to receive the enemy. The latter attacked with his advanced guard, which, however, in attempting to deploy under fire, was obliged to withdraw. This engagement brought on the concentration of both the main bodies on the battlefield. The East Corps, with two divisions in the first line and the third on the right in second line, attacked in superior force, and drove the West Corps, which was not yet fully concentrated, back through the wood. The deciding engagement took place near Shabja-Wolja. The following faults were remarked by General Gourko:—

(1) The West Corps, on hearing of the approach from Nadorfhin of the enemy's main forces, should not have moved through the wood, but rather waited on this side of it for the West Corps as it debouched.

(2) The retirement of the West Corps through the narrow defile of the wood was not rapid enough, some detachments moving leisurely at a walk.

(3) The subordinate commanders did not show sufficient independence, often waiting for orders to attack the enemy's troops opposed to them.

On the whole, however, the General was very pleased with the work done, and ordered the 129 squadrons and fifty-two guns to march past. Horses and men seemed fresh in spite of the long hours.

This short account is sufficient to show that in Russia great weight is laid on the employment of cavalry masses for strategical ends, as well as for battlefield work. It is remarkable that there is no more talk about extending the employment of the dragoon dismounted.

C. PETERS.

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BOURBAKI—PART I.

By Archibald Forbes.

It certainly was a curious blend of race, that of the Greek of the Morea with the Basque of the Basses Pyrénées. The modern Greek is subtle and cringing; the Basque is passionate, unscrupulous, and occasionally treacherous. Bourbaki was a marked improvement on either strain of his ancestry. Hot-tempered he was on provocation, no bad trait in a high-souled man; he was proud, frank, and honest, chivalrous as a paladin of old, a soldier of brilliant daring and valour, a good comrade, a staunch friend, and a zealously loyal subject. With the virtues he had of course the defects of his nature. He was too impatient to have the calm steadfastness which characterises the really great commander. He had more than his share of that lack of imperturbability which is sometimes the strength, but oftener the weakness of the French nation. With his acute nervous system he was not the man who could practically realise the truth of the axiom, that everything comes to him who will wait. Through his mental system, with all his dash and all his frankness, there ran a strain of brooding pessimism, which misfortune naturally accentuated.

Born at Pau in 1816, and joining a Zouave regiment as a lieutenant in 1836, he passed through the successive grades until he found himself a general of division in 1857. He distinguished himself greatly as a brigadier in the Crimea, he commanded a division with skill and success in the Franco-Austrian War of 1859, he had won many laurels and received not a few wounds in campaign after campaign in Algeria. Handsome, chivalrous, debonair, his sister the confidential lady-in-waiting of the Empress, he was a distinguished figure in the most intimate circle of the Second Empire. He was one of the aides-de-camp of the Emperor, and when the Franco-German War began in July, 1870, he held the high post of commander of the Imperial Guard. That corps d'élite was also for the most part a corps of reserve. During the fighting around Metz, it took an active part only in the battle of Mars-la-

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Tour, and then not chiefly in the front where the struggle was bloodiest, but on the left flank, where, however, its losses were serious, reaching about 2700 officers and men. During the first month of the beleaguerment of Metz, Bourbaki continued to command the Guard, but towards the end of September he was beguiled into quitting the Army and betaking himself to England by the specious representations of the busy-body or traitorous Regnier, who, supported by Bazaine, urged on him the argument that the Empress Regent, then a fugitive in England, had need of his services by her side. Bourbaki, with much misgiving, left Metz with Regnier in the disguise of a Luxembourg surgeon, travelling in the name of Regnier, and on that person's passport. How bitter was the animosity of the French Army in Metz against its Teuton besiegers is illustrated by Bourbaki's reply to an intimation that General Stiehle, Prince Frederick Charles' chief of staff, desired to pay his respects to a soldier for whose bravery and character he expressed great admiration. "Tell them," said he, "that I will see none of them, nor even eat a morsel of their bread, which would choke me." Hurrying to England, he was told by the Empress, to his profound mortification, that he had been made the victim of a mystification, that she did not desire his presence nor had any use for his services. Wounded to the heart, and regarding his honour as compromised, he begged the British Foreign Minister to facilitate his return to his post. The Prussian King intimated his consent, and Bourbaki went to the Luxembourg frontier, there to await the permission which should enable him to re-enter Metz; but a delay occurred in its transmission; his constitutional impatience got the mastery of him, and in an impulse of chagrin he went to Tours and tendered his services to the Delegation of the Provisional Government, of which Gambetta was the master soul. Thenceforth Bourbaki was a soured and disappointed man, hating and despising himself for that he, an Imperialist of the Imperialists, should be fighting under the Republican banner.

Gambetta sent him to the north to rouse the fighting spirit of that region, but the hostile demonstrations which he encountered at Lille when he was attempting to constitute an "Army of the North," had the effect of irritating and disconcerting him. He returned to Tours, where, on November 20th, he was appointed to the command of the 18th Corps, belonging to d'Aurelles' Army of Orleans. He might have shared its fortunes in the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande on the 28th, but instead he remained at Tours, disquieted and hesitating. When told of the details of his command, and the satisfactory elements of which it consisted, he exclaimed: "It is not misgiving as to the qualities of the soldiers that holds

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me back, but that I realise here what is in store for me. Whether it rains or whether it snows, the soldiers will cry that I am betraying them. And, if it comes to that," he added, despairingly, "why should they not believe I am betraying them—I, who am the aide-de-camp of the Emperor!" His scruples and discouragements were stimulated and renewed daily by the receipt of letters in which his friends who remained staunch partisans of the Empire covered him with reproaches for having taken service with the "rebel government." The acute Freycinet recognised the danger in such an idiosyncracy as that now of Bourbaki, when he wrote from Tours to Gambetta: "You ask me what impression this officer gave me during his stay here. He appeared to me to be profoundly discouraged, and therefore far from fit to make the supreme efforts for which the situation calls."

When, after the untoward result of the Battle of Orleans fought on 3rd and 4th December, d'Aurelle de Paladines was deprived by Gambetta of the command of the Army of Orleans, Bourbaki assumed the command of its right wing, consisting of the 15th, 18th, and 20th Corps. Having gathered the shattered divisions about Bourges, he absolutely refused to act on the repeated and urgent orders that he should march on Blois, asserting, and with truth, that the operation would entail absolute ruin. Gambetta came to Bourges to enforce his own orders, but when he saw the state of the troops, he exclaimed, "I have never seen anything so wretched." But by the middle of December, by Gambetta's energy and Bourbaki's steady discipline, the Army, strongly reinforced and supplied anew with equipments and munitions, began to recover its form; and Gambetta, who was again in Bourges engaged in the refitment of the Army and in fortifying Bourbaki's moral tone, had resolved to send it northward, with Fontainebleau as its ulterior objective. But the position at Auxerre of the 7th Prussian Corps interfered with that enterprise; and then it occurred to the war ministry at Bordeaux that it would be a fine sensational coup to strike a sudden blow away in the far east of France. The project, which was Freycinet's conception, was to leave the 15th Corps to cover Bourges and Nevers, and to despatch the 18th and 20th swiftly by train to Beaune. These two corps, in conjunction with the commands of Garibaldi and Cremer, were to seize and hold Dijon, while the 24th Corps from Lyons should come up to Besançon, to find there in the garrison a reinforcement of some 15,000 or 20,000 men. The coalition of the Besançon troops with those coming on from Dijon "would not have any trouble in raising the siege of Belfort, even without so much as striking a blow; and there would be available a compact force of some

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110,000 men capable of cutting the communications of the enemy in the east of France." These were the strategical anticipations of MM. Gambetta and Freycinet.

On the night of November 19th Gambetta visited Bourbaki's head-quarter in Baugy, and, after some discussion, the new scheme was approved and accepted by the latter, who expressed himself as regarding it as much preferable to the previously intended movement on Paris. Without an hour's delay the preparations were begun, and on the following day the embarkation of the 18th and 20th Corps was commenced. This important diversion, if the original plan had been adhered to, might, perhaps, have had a chance of success. It is certain that the relief of Belfort, had it been accomplished, would have had incalculable results, material and moral. It is more than probable that the leading misfortune of the operation was that its conduct should have been confided to a man whose *moral* and whose military capacity was not equal to a task so heavy. Gambetta was always sanguine, and he had come to expect much from Bourbaki; it was hoped that, once in the field, he would manifest powers of command and display enterprise and spirit. A French writer, M. Henri Genevois, gives us a vivid picture of the two men in contact with each other: "Gambetta had an extraordinary moral ascendant; he charmed, persuaded, and inspired. After an hour's conversation with Gambetta, Bourbaki was not the same man. Gambetta had faith in the duration of this transfiguration; he did not perceive that the self-reliance which shone in Bourbaki's eyes, the energy which animated his features, were simply the momentary reflection of Gambetta's own self-reliance and glow of energy. He did not comprehend that it was a spark of electricity communicated from himself which galvanised the man who hung on his accents, and that as soon as the inspiring agency was removed the object magnetised sank back into inertness."

Certainly Bourbaki was not hampered in his arrangements and preparations by the powers at Bourdeaux. No better chief of staff could have been found in the French Army than General Borel, at once a scientific soldier and a brilliant officer in the field. Whatever Bourbaki asked for was ungrudgingly accorded, and even his whims were indulged. The hurry of the movement in itself occasioned delay. The Lyons railway officials interposed an unpatriotic obstructiveness, which was one of the causes of the disasters that ultimately befell the Army; and in the thick of the confusion, when Gambetta had scarcely quitted Bourges, Bourbaki was already telegraphing that he must have given to him the 15th Corps, the utility of whose services in the Bourges district he

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professed to be unable to see. Freycinet was furious. "If General Bourbaki does not at the last moment," he wrote to Gambetta, "consider it his duty to execute a scheme of which he had fully approved, let him resign once and for all. For my part I shall be enchanted, for I have always thought and said that Bourbaki is not the man for such a service. If, on the contrary, he continues to approve of the plan"—the plan, it has to be remembered, was Freycinet's own pet project—"then let him carry it out honestly, without treacherous reserves and recriminations." Notwithstanding this outburst, the Bordeaux Delegation, very much against the grain, conceded to Bourbaki's demands and let him have the 15th Corps. It was of no service to him, while its withdrawal from the Bourges district restored to the 7th German Corps its freedom of action and detracted materially from the risks encountered by Manteuffel in his daring march from Chatillon-sur-Seine across the plateau of Langres and further southward to the Doubs. Bourbaki, in demanding to have the 15th Corps, certainly could not put forward the plea of any lack of superior numerical power. Not reckoning the garrison of Besançon, and apart from the 15th Corps, he had at his disposition in Eastern France 80,000 men and 280 guns. He could have had no difficulty in learning the strength of Werder's force, his only then probable opponent, since it had occupied Dijon until a few days before his arrival there. Apart from the 17,600 men engaged in the siege of Belfort, the 14th Corps, which was Werder's sole command, consisted of 37,000 men and 120 guns, with which force he was expected by the supreme headquarter in Versailles, where his difficulties were by no means fully appreciated, to hold in subjection all Franche Comte, and large parts of the Cote d'Or and Bourgogne. It may be added that at the date when Bourbaki requisitioned the 15th Corps, Manteuffel's southern march had not even been thought of at Versailles, and that it did not begin until January 13th, so that it could not have ranked as an element in influencing Bourbaki to exact the services of that corps. Once assured of the corps, it might have been expected that he should reckon it as his reserve, and should have moved as soon as the rest of his Army should have been concentrated. That was the case on January 2nd, 1871; the 24th Corps (Bressoles) being at Besançon, the 18th (Billot) at Pesmes, the 20th (Clinchant) at Voray, the Division Cremer between Dijon and Gray. Thus he could have begun his advance toward the enemy on the 3rd, but instead of doing so, it was his strange determination not to take the offensive until he should have the 15th Corps actually in his hand, and his advance therefore did not really begin until January 8th.

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The transport of the 15th Corps was characterised by disgraceful delays and unimaginable disorder. It did not begin until the 3rd, Besançon to be the terminus. Bourbaki demanded, however, that the terminus should be Clerval, further to the north-east, and after a wrangle which lasted until the 6th, he carried his point. At this petty wayside station there were no appliances for debarkation, and the confusion was horrible, with a vast accumulation of unemptied waggons and rows of trains several kilomètres long, motionless and unable to turn a wheel either backwards or forward. The debarkation of the 15th Corps did not begin until January 8th, and it lasted until the 14th, convoys of provisions and munitions continually being sent in wrong directions. Long confinement in the carriages caused cruel sufferings among the soldiers, and materially weakened the teams. One regiment lived entirely in the trains about Besançon during five bitter winter days. The temperature was below zero, the ground was covered with deep snow, and the poor fellows, scantily clad and lacking food, suffered abominably. During the frequent halts they would alight, kindle a bit of fire, and try to make a little soup or coffee to restore in them some warmth, when the call of "*En voiture!*" would compel them to remount. It is little wonder that some of the men could not endure their sufferings and disappeared. On reaching Clerval at 2 a.m. on the morning of the 9th, a great number were found to have their feet frost-bitten and were unable to march. Slow as were those preparatory movements, they had occasioned to the Germans not a little concern. So early as December 23rd the warning had come to Werder from Berne that 25,000 men had quitted Lyons on the errand of raising the siege of Belfort. This was the 24th Corps, whose temporary destination at least was Besançon. On the 26th, General v. Tresekow, commanding the siege operations before Belfort, learned by means of reconnaissances that 60,000 men were expected at Besançon.

Werder, who had not been very prosperous in his offensive operations to the southward of Dijon, had evacuated that city on December 27th, with the intention of concentrating his force about Vesoul, his wings extending to Porte-sur-Saône on the west, and to Lure on the east. His concentration was accomplished on New Year's Day, 1871, when his troops occupied the following positions: In and immediately about Vesoul, the 1st and 2nd Baden Brigades; at Neuville-les-la-Charité and Fresnes-Saint-Mamès, the 3rd Baden Brigade; from Vesoul to Calmontier and Lure, the Prussian Brigade von der Goltz (30th and 34th regiments); at Villersexel, with a strong detachment in Rougemont, the 4th Reserve Division (Schmeling); from Vesoul to Porte-sur-Saône,

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the *gros* of the cavalry. Werder saw cause within a few days to close in his various detachments, so that on the 4th January the mass of his troops were between Vesoul and Villersexel with a portion of the 4th Reserve Division thrown out considerably further to the eastward about Arcey, to confront the French forces which might be debouching irom Clerval and heading towards Belfort.

Werder, however, was very much in the dark as to the French dispositions, and the great head-quarters at Versailles were no better informed. Moltke frankly owns that Gambetta had stolen a march on the Germans, in having succeeded in concealing from them for a whole fortnight the transportation to the east of France of a great Army commanded by Bourbaki. It was true that articles in French newspapers had given some inkling of the operation, but confirmation was lacking. Indeed, German cavalry, scouting in the Soloyne, had observed strong French columns marching upon Aubigny-Ville, and apparently heading northward toward Gien on the upper Loire, into which place, in fact, the Hessian Division at Briare had been driven back by superior forces on New Year's Day. Those movements in effect were engaged in with the purpose of distracting attention from the movement eastward of Bourbaki's Army, which now had the name of "The Army of the East." This purpose was in a measure accomplished, and dust was not unskilfully thrown in the eyes of Werder and his superiors in Versailles. As a matter of fact Werder only escaped a surprise which might have gone far to ruin him, by reason of Bourbaki's insensate determination to have the 15th Corps given to him, with the result of its removal from a locality in which it was performing really useful services; and by reason further of the delay in Bourbaki's operations occasioned by his stupid resolve to have that Corps actually with him before he should begin the offensive. It is a fact that Werder knew nothing positive up to January 3rd, as to the presence of Bourbaki's Army. On the 4th he was ordered from Versailles to take the offensive with all his forces in order to clear up the situation; and it was as the result of his engagement at Vesoul on the 5th, that for the first time he was able to inform his superiors at Versailles of the certainty that Bourbaki's Army was in his front.

Bourbaki had not yet taken the field, when already the powers at Bourdeaux became impatient at his slowness and delays. That Bourbaki's energy was not conspicuous, may be accepted; yet it is true that he encountered many obstacles in the rawness and indiscipline of his troops, in the confusion which he was unable to surmount, in the deficiency of his communications and the

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scantiness of supplies. Gambetta's headlong impatience for results made but scant allowance for Bourbaki's difficulties, and probably none at all for his peculiar idiosyncrasy. The haughty soldier of the Empire chafed under the harrow of Gambetta's Republican despotism; and a rift in their relations was already imminent, when "the Dictator" telegraphed imperiously to the General on the 3rd January. "At this very moment," wired Gambetta, "when it is most important that we should be fully informed, we know absolutely nothing of the dispositions of your forces nor of the direction of their movements. It is above all things absolutely essential, so as to be able to enlighten Generals Trochu and Chanzy, that you immediately furnish us with the following particulars:—1st. Full details of the complete situation of your forces distributed on their respective given objectives; 2nd. The marches which you intend to make to-morrow; 3rd. The general plan of your operations for the succeeding days; 4th. What at the present moment is your actual chief objective, and at what date you consider yourself able to attain it; 5th. What are your ideas in regard to the operations to be accomplished; in one word, to inform us, as the General-in-Chief of the 2nd Army has done, what is your tactical plan. . . . I have noticed with painful surprise the vagueness of certain of your dispatches; as, for instance, in your dispatch of last night you state: 'General Cremer, who lies to-night between Champlitte and Dijon, will retire on the latter city to take part in its defence, if he shall judge that necessary.' It would appear that you are ignorant of the exact locality where that general is, and that you have left to your subordinate the power of deciding for himself the extremely grave question whether he should or should not undertake the defence of Dijon. It is your duty, as General-in-Chief, to decide on such questions, and General Cremer ought to receive from you clear and precise orders on the subject, and never to have to act on his own responsibility. I require of you a prompt answer." It is told of Sir Evelyn Wood, when engaged in unpalatable negotiations with the gentlemen of the Transvaal after the Majuba Hill disaster, that he nightly prayed with extreme fervour that Providence in its mercy should effect the severance of the telegraph wire between him and Cape Town which bound that gallant soldier to a distasteful policy dictated to him *de die in diem* from Downing Street. How poor proud-souled Bourbaki must have writhed under such a communication as that from which the foregoing extract has been quoted, and how ardently he must have hoped that a German patrol would cut the wire which held him at the mercy of those high-handed civilians scolding him in instalments from Bourdeaux!

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The first actual collision between the adversaries occurred on January 5th. It consisted merely of a series of unimportant fore-post skirmishes, in which the French lost only about 100 men and the Germans probably fewer; their casualties are not reported. Werder's position, extending as it did from north of Vesoul along the line Echenoz-Villefaux-Dampierre to Montbozon on the Ognon, in a measure covered the siege of Belfort. He gained his point by means of reconnaissances of ascertaining that Bourbaki's Army was in his immediate front, and as a matter of fact he had a sharp affair with part of its right. In the conviction that the fore-post skirmishes of the 5th were the prelude of a general attack, he fell back on the 6th into a strong position behind the Durgun brook, his right resting on Vesoul. Bourbaki did not stir, shunning the fair opportunity offered him by Werder. He called up to join his already extremely strong main army the Division Cremer, some 8500 strong with thirty guns, and he remained inactive until the 9th. On the 7th the unfortunate man was assailed over the wire by Gambetta and Freycinet almost simultaneously. The former objurgated him for his slowness. "You say, in your despatch of this morning," said Gambetta, "that you do not mean to move to-day, and complain also that you have no information as to the arrival at Besançon of a brigade of the 15th Corps. I am surprised that this latter circumstance should cause your inaction, since you undertook the enterprise originally without requiring that corps at all, and since the despatch of it has been so rapid that 45,000 men have been entrained in three and a half days. I cannot understand what can be your motive in delaying your operations. I insist all the more that you should be active, since, for one thing, Paris goes on consuming, and for another that, if you proceed thus sluggishly, the end will be that your enemy will be so reinforced as to render you numerically inferior. Look how much time has already been let slip; I bind you to accelerate your movements. The bad roads at which you shudder in advance do not stop the Prussians, whose marching is at least twice as fast as yours. You have yourself told me that you would reach Vesoul on the 5th or 6th; I wish I could be sure that you will be there on the 8th." Then Freycinet takes up the discordant strain. "It is my duty to call your attention," said Gambetta's understudy, "to the opportunity which, at the moment, offers itself to utilise the service of the Division Cremer, not to swell your strength between Vesoul and Belfort, but to march on Langres and strike the hostile columns on their march from Vesoul towards Chaumont. I believe that if Cremer is definitely instructed by you to quit Dijon, and my scheme is favoured by

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you, he will probably fill a more useful *rôle* in the service which I have indicated, than in purely and simply adding his force to the mass of your Army." Freycinet's strategy had the defect of being generally of the cock-sure order. He assumed that Werder, in the face of a strength so overwhelming, would necessarily have to abandon any hope of covering the siege of Belfort, and, finding Franche Comte too hot to hold, would get out of mischief by marching northward on Chaumont, while as yet he had escaped destruction. Werder did not happen to see the situation through the pince-nez of M. Freycinet, and although there came a time when he had sore misgivings, a telegram from Moltke braced his nerves, and he became himself again. It was while still in Vesoul that there came to him from Versailles definite instructions in regard to future operations. He was informed that Manteuffel was concentrating the 2nd and 7th Corps in the line Châtillon-sur-Seine–Nuits-sous-Ravières, at the head of which Army he was to march south-east and incorporate Werder's command along with the two corps named into an "Army of the South," of which he, Manteuffel, was to be the chief. Meantime Werder was to conduct the operations between Vesoul and Belfort, to cover the siege of the latter place at all costs, to wreck the roads south of the Vosges, to watch French tentatives in that direction, and to act with the sternest rigour in repressing any attempt at a rising on the part of the local population; while on the retreat he was on no account to lose touch of Bourbaki's Army, and promptly to renew the offensive should that Army become weakened, and should attempt to turn against Manteuffel's Corps on their march. Inclusive of detailed instructions for the breaking-up of the South Alsace railways, those duties were certainly a somewhat onerous commission devolved on a force barely 35,000 strong in face of an enemy approximating to a triple numerical superiority.

Belfort was the common objective; the anxiety of the Germans being to cover and support their siege operations against the place, the French errand to compel the raising of the siege. The line of the Lisaine was traversed by the roads converging on Belfort. The problem which the next few days would solve was this: Which of the two Armies should outstrip its adversary, and so be the first to seize that barrier strategically so important, tactically so strong? The start was fairly level. Werder was at Noroy-le-Bourg, north-west of Villersexel, Bourbaki at Montbozon, about an equal distance south-west of that town. Both began their general advance on January 9th. Which would the sooner reach Héricourt, the central point of the defensive line of the Lisaine?

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The battle of Villersexel, of which I do not intend to give a detailed account, was fought on January 9th. Bourbaki's dispositions were soldier-like. The 15th Corps, taking no share in the fighting, was put on march as the details were detrained at Clerval, straight in the direction of Arcey, in face of Montbéliard, the stronghold at the extreme south of the line of the Lisaine, which there falls into the Allain. Its destination for the day was the positions from Languinette to Onans, somewhat short of Arcey, The 24th Corps, marching from the villages in front of Rougemont. south of Villersexel, was to proceed north-eastward to its respective points for the night, of Grammont, Georgans, and Villechevreux, in face of the section of the line of the Lisaine between Montbéliard and Héricourt, where lay the villages of Bethencourt and Bussurel. Except for a few detachments from this latter corps, neither the 24th nor the 15th Corps participated in the day's fighting—the combatant *rôle* was assigned to the 18th and 20th Corps. Of the former, the 1st Division stood about Esprels and Autrey-le-Vay, with the forest of Chassey in its rear, the whole division being on the right bank of the Ognon. Its 2nd Division came up somewhat late, and, taking up a position on the left bank south of Villersexel, took part with the 20th Corps in the winning of the town. Its 3rd Division came up too late to share in the fighting. The initial positions of the 20th Corps were Villars-la-Ville and Villargent to the eastward, and Les Magny to the southward of Villersexel. It should be mentioned that in the course of the night the French had occupied Villersexel with a couple of battalions and some details.

The strategic consequence of Villersexel consisted in the circumstance that it was the point of intersection of two great highways. Commanding the course of the Ognon, and *à cheval* of the crossing-point of the roads from Vesoul to Montbéliard, and from Besançon to Héricourt, the little town was really the key of the situation. Whichever force should succeed in taking and holding it would have the ownership of the interior lines towards the east, and therefore, given equal rates of marching, could the sooner reach the all-important line of the Lisaine, with the future of Belfort in its hands.

The fighting was sharp for several hours. Von der Goltz, at Moimay, "held" the 1st French Division of the 18th Corps in its positions at Esprels and Autrey, but could not succeed in forcing it back, and indeed had ultimately to retire. By one o'clock the Germans, however, had carried the town, taking some 500 unwounded prisoners, and had debouched from it to the south-east with infantry and artillery. But the French resorted to the

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offensive so threateningly that Werder had to recall the main body of the Baden Division which was already on the march to Athesans. His attempts to carry Marast had failed, although about nightfall that village was captured. About the same time French troops of the 20th Corps and the 2nd Division of the 18th pushed back the Germans into the town, recovered the park and château of Villersexel, and retrieved the prisoners taken by the Germans. Bourbaki himself led on his troops with the brilliant intrepidity which the glow of battle inspired. His young troops were staggered by the violent artillery fire under which houses and barricades were crumbling; the hero of the Mamelon placed himself at their head, swept them forward with enthusiastic shouts of "Vive la France," and re-entered the town. The German *Staff History* remarks in its glozing manner, "that the general situation did not absolutely require that Villersexel should be permanently occupied." Moltke, who, under stress of events, was a master-hand at making the worse appear the better reason, remarks that "Werder concluded that there was less to be gained by forcing his own passage across the Ognon than by opposing that of the French, since the river covered his line of approach to Belfort"; a sophistical argument, since that line condemned him to the exterior lines and a more circuitous route. Anyhow, General Tresckow ordered the evacuation of Villersexel; but Werder seems to have changed his mind. The evacuation had been all but completed, when he issued the order that it should be retaken and held. But the accomplishment was more easily ordered than effected. A landwehr battalion assailed the château and occupied its ground floor, but the French garrison maintained a stubborn defence in the upper floors and the cellars. On the staircases and in the passages of the blazing building, a hot and changeful fight raged, in which all the attempts on the German part to carry the building proved abortive. There was furious fighting in the streets until early morning, when Werder had to change his mind again, enforce the breaking off of the strife, and withdraw his troops to Aillevant, some distance to the north of Villersexel.

He had been fairly worsted in a fair fight in which he had been the aggressor. It was his clear duty to fight, in his own material interest; and he probably would have conquered had he not under-valued his enemy and brought into action but one-half of his command. He had incurred no disgrace; 30,000 troops must be sheer rubbish to be beaten by 15,000, and these were probably about the real odds on the day of Villersexel, although French authorities make them less. Naturally the French were greatly inspirited. They had won a clear victory which might well have

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proved for them a fruitful one. As it was, the men who fought that day could look back on the only actual victory which the French obtained over the Germans in the whole course of the Franco-German War. Coulmiers comes nearest to it, but the Bavarians fought wholly on the defensive there, whereas at Villersexel the Prussians took the offensive, and were worsted by French troops who made a successful counter-offensive.

ARCHIBALD FORBES.

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THE ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY.

By G. Garrow Greene, Ex.-D.I.R.I.C.

The officer in supreme command of this unique and splendid force is the Inspector-General, who has his head-quarters in Dublin Castle, where he is assisted by the Deputy-Inspector-General, an Assistant-Inspector-General, a County Inspector, his private secretary, and a large staff of clerks.

Discipline, rewards and punishments, finance, the uniform, instruction by circulars, and codes of rules, with many other departmental matters, are all dealt with at the castle. Triennial inspections of every district in Ireland are made by the Inspectors-General, and they are assisted in these by the Commandant of the Depôt, who is also an Assistant-Inspector-General. Next in importance comes the Town Inspector of Belfast, the Irish centre of manufacturing wealth. Owing to sectarian differences, often leading to desperate conflicts between opposing mobs on certain anniversaries in Belfast, this command is considered a very high one, requiring great discretion and judgment. Of late years, however, this sort of rioting has almost ceased. Next in rank come the County Inspectors, who are to the district inspectors under them what a regimental colonel is to his officers, save that the latter do not work under their personal supervision. Although there are but thirty-two counties in Ireland, three of them—Tipperary, Galway, and Cork—are divided into two ridings each, severally under command of a county inspector, so that these officers, including one at head-quarters, number thirty-six. They are responsible for the discipline of the force under them and the good order of their counties. They reside, as a rule, in the towns where assizes are held, and furnish the judges with the records of all criminal cases occurring between the sittings, whether detected and sent for trial or not. They periodically inspect each barracks in their counties by day every three months. They receive the various returns and all reports from their district inspectors, consolidating the former and commenting on the latter for the information of the Inspector-General. They personally investigate the more important outrages and take charge of all large detachments when serious rioting is apprehended. As the designation imports, district inspectors are officers in charge of districts which average about six to each county or

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riding. There are altogether 230 district inspectors, including the adjutant and company officers at depôt, the inspector general's private secretary, five officers stationed in Belfast, and ten divisional district inspectors. The last are stationed at the divisional head-quarters, of which there are five, two officers to each. Their duty is to assist the divisional commissioners for crime, who are a comparatively recent creation, and whose mission is to further the decentralisation scheme by removing the burden of criminal investigation and correspondence from the castle, which became unduly heavy during the land-league agitation. Since the commencement of this unhappy conspiracy the duties of district inspectors have immensely increased, and may be summed up as follows: To inspect once every month by day each barrack in their districts, and once by night every quarter, when within a radius of ten miles; to visit a certain number of night and early morning patrols, besides day ones, in each month; to perform a fixed proportion of duty on horseback; to visit, immediately on receiving the information, every outrage, such as murders, attempts at same, incendiary fires, the receipt or posting up of threatening letters or notices, mutilations of cattle, stealings, boycottings, &c., &c., in short, all matters bearing on crime; to advise and personally assist their men in the detection and prosecution of same; to take command of detachments at important fairs, race meetings, political meetings, &c., in order to prevent rioting, and when ejectment notices are being served, as well as at the evictions themselves, when the sheriff requires protection; to attend every petty sessions court held in the district; to attend, as president or member, courts of inquiry held in the county (similar to Army courts-martial), or as prosecutors if held in their districts; to attend the Board of Survey on the annual issue of the men's clothing, &c., at the county head-quarters; to attend the assize and quarter sessions courts; to superintend, as qualified instructors of musketry, the annual blank and ball firing target-practice of their district force. Besides all these duties, the district inspector has a vast amount of office work to transact, and is paymaster for his district, even when stationed in the town where a County Inspector resides. In his absence his head constable (the highest rank of non-commissioned officers) is permitted to do the office, petty sessions, and criminal investigation duties, but not inspections. The annual leave must not exceed fifty days, save under exceptional circumstances. Of this the County Inspector is empowered to grant ten days, together or separately, in every four months. A month's leave can only be granted by the Inspector-General. All sick leave is counted in the

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annual allowance. Officers are entitled to twelve hours' leave once a week if not required for special duty on that day, which is granted by the County Inspector, and does not count. Absence for a night counts in the general leave. If reported sick it is necessary that a medical certificate be immediately obtained from the local doctor, who acts as Royal Irish Constabulary medical attendant, and is paid by Government. When a County Inspector is on leave, the district inspector at the county head-quarters acts for him in all duties except inspections. Save promotions from the ranks, which are made in the proportion of one-fourth of the officers, district inspectors join as cadets. The examination is competitive, usually ten candidates for one vacancy. Some influence is required to have the candidate's name placed on the Chief Secretary's (for Ireland) list, and for a nomination to compete which is issued one month before the examination, and indicates the date on which it will commence. It usually lasts three or four days, and the result is communicated to each competitor about a fortnight later. Candidates must be medically examined by the surgeon to the force at depôt the day before the examination begins. Some twenty years ago the doctor's marks counted in the total, but this practice is now obsolete. The papers are forwarded to the Civil Service Commissioners in London, who adjudge the marks. The successful aspirants are soon after ordered to the depôt for about six months' instruction in battalion and company drill, a course of musketry, riding-school, and all the subjects bearing on the duties of their profession. They have to undergo a searching examination in these before they can be allocated to a country district. There they reside in the principal town, which is the district head-quarters, and have from three to ten out-barracks under their control according to the size of the district. In disaffected districts there are besides numerous iron huts and protection posts, all of which must be inspected monthly by day. Cadets are generally promoted to the rank and pay of district inspectors in six or eight weeks, and they only receive a sergeant's pay till so promoted. During the cadet period it is obligatory on their friends to assist them monthly at the rate of £50 per annum. Officers must supply their uniforms and a horse not less than fifteen hands high with accoutrements when sent to the country. It is not obligatory to purchase the regulation cavalry horse-trappings, which are very handsome, but most young officers do so. Those promoted from the ranks are granted £100 by Government to procure themselves uniform and a horse. The age for competitors is from twenty-one to twenty-six years, save for naval and military officers wishing to join, when it is extended to twenty-

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eight years. An exception is made in the case of the sons of officers of the Force, who may compete at nineteen years. Moreover, the latter only compete among themselves. They are entitled to three nominations from the Inspector-General, and if "plucked" in all these are disqualified. Civilians can compete as often as they can secure nominations.

The subjects for examination comprise the following, with allotment of marks for each :—

	Marks.
Arithmetic	150
Separate addition	50
Orthography	150
Handwriting	150
Intelligence in dictation	100
English composition, including epistolary correspondence ..	200
Précis	150
Geography, especially that of the British Isles	150
British history	200
Latin or French (the candidate permitted the option)	200
Elementary principles of law, as treated in Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England (10th edition), Vol. I., introduction; Book I.; Book II., introductory chapter entitled "As to Property in General." Vol. IV. Book VI., Chapters 1 to 12, omitting Sections i. to viii. of Chapter VII.	150
Law of Evidence—Digest of the Law of Evidence, by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen	150
Total	1800 Marks.

To have a chance of success, all candidates should go to one of the Dublin "grinders," of whom Mr. Chetwode Crawley, LL.D., Ely Place, is considered the best.

There are three grades of district inspectors—1st, 2nd, and 3rd class. When a young officer leaves the depôt for a country station he is placed on the seniority list at the bottom of the 3rd class, and gradually works his way up by vacancies, and in a few cases by special service until qualified for the rank of county inspector, which usually takes some twenty-four years to attain. There is a strict constabulary examination for this rank, and while many district inspectors are passed over, those who fail remain in the 1st class of the subordinate rank for the remainder of their service. A county inspector cannot serve after sixty-five years of age, nor a district inspector after sixty years. The Royal Irish Constabulary Service is under the control of the Crown, and is paid from the Consolidated Fund. The rates of pay and allowances are as below :—

PAY.	per annum.
3rd class District Inspector	£125
2nd ,, ,, ,, during first five years	165
2nd ,, ,, ,, during remainder of service in that class	180
1st ,, ,, ,, during first three years	225
1st ,, ,, ,, during subsequent three years	250
1st ,, ,, ,, during subsequent six years	275
1st ,, ,, ,, during remainder of service in that class	300
Thirty-one County Inspectors	350
By increment of £20 per annum to	450

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Besides the above, £12 per annum (called "good service pay") is granted to twenty-three district inspectors of the 2nd and 3rd class; £30 per annum to six district inspectors of the 1st class; and £50 per annum to five county inspectors. Good service pay goes by seniority when there is nothing damaging to the reputation of officers, but it is given also in special cases.

	ALLOWANCES.	per annum.
3rd class District Inspector,	forage	£50 0 0
,, ,,	lodging	21 2 11
,, ,,	servant (civilian)	45 0 0
,, ,,	for night absent on duty ..	0 15 0
,, ,,	for ten hours	0 5 0
,, ,,	public stationery..	3 0 0

Car hire, when proceeding beyond a radius of ten miles outside his district on special duty, counting from his head-quarter barracks, 9d. per mile.

2nd class district inspector, same, save lodging allowance, which is £27 10s. for first five years, and £30 for remainder of service in that class.

1st class district inspector, same, except lodging allowance, which is £40 per annum.

County Inspector, same, except lodging allowance, which is £50 per annum, stationery £10 per annum, and car hire 9d. per mile beyond a radius of six miles.

The pay of the Town Inspector of Belfast is £600.

An Assistant-Inspector-General, same.

Deputy-Inspector-General, £800.

The Inspector-General, £1500.

The superior officers have higher allowances in some instances.

The Town Inspector of Belfast and the assistant-inspectors-general are promoted from the rank of county inspector, and the present head-quarter officers have all served as district inspectors.

The uniform is rifle green, somewhat like that of the Rifle Brigade pantaloons; jack boots and spurs are worn on mounted duty, with white gloves; gaiters and black cape gloves are used on infantry duty, and officers are armed with basket-hilted swords and revolvers. The ornaments are bronze, and the badge is the crown and harp. Recently the large badge on the cartouche-belt has been changed to silver, with chain and whistle. Cadets wear the mess-jacket hooked up when learning squad drill.

When an officer incurs punishment it takes the form of either an unfavourable record against his name, a reduction on the seniority list, or a transfer at his own expense to some remote station. Rewards consist in special pecuniary grants or in favourable records. A district inspector is bound to remain for one year at a station to which he has been sent. He may then apply for a

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transfer if there be others vacant, but if deemed inexpedient this is liable to be refused. Should he obtain the district for which he applies, he must remain there two years before he can again seek a transfer. When transferred by the inspector-general, his travelling expenses (including carriage of furniture) are paid by the Government, but if at his own request he must defray these himself. Exchanges between officers are not permitted. Pensions are granted on retirement and are computed at one-sixtieth of the pay, plus servants and lodging allowances, for every year of service up to forty-sixtieths.

Income-tax is stopped from the gross pay and lodging allowance, and there is a monthly stoppage of 1½ per cent. for the Constabulary Force Fund. A Government imprest is received from the Paymaster-General at Dublin Castle on the 2nd of each month, when the district inspector acts as paymaster for himself and men and has a pretty hard time of it over the accounts. He is assisted in clerical duty by his head-constable, and in most districts a clerk is now allowed, chosen from the men.

On the whole the life is a very pleasant one, and it is to be hoped that Mr. W. S. Gilbert did not refer to us when writing "The Pirates of Penzance." A great deal of the happiness of Royal Irish Constabulary Officers—at least, the district inspectors—depends on the sort of country district they get. Some of these are delightful stations where field-sports, tennis and garden parties, balls, dances, and teas fill up their leisure hours most agreeably, for, as a rule, the surrounding gentry are most hospitable. But there are some wild, dreary districts, all bog and mountain, wheer the luckless district inspector has none of these delights, unless, perhaps, some of the first, and where he may have no one to speak to but the parson, doctor, and priest. The first glorious burst of manhood, the pride of command and sense of the responsibility of the position alleviate the trials of such stations to young officers, but to older hands they are woeful places. However, as a district inspector rises in the service and exhibits tact and discretion he gets better stations. At all of them there is plenty of work to be done, and if there be danger in some duties it only adds a zest to a career which is alike honourable in itself and has proved invaluable in the service of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen.

G. GARROW GREENE, EX.-D.I.R.I.C.

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HOW WE LEARNT ITALIAN.

By a Sailor's Wife.

That a poor man is poorer on half- than on full-pay is a self-evident proposition. Even Sir Gorgius Midas, as the perfect type of the wealthy and unenlightened civilian, should be able to grapple with it, though he might find a difficulty in appreciating the difference between insignificance on £800 or £900 a year, and insignificance on £500 or £600. To scrape along on £500 a year in England is a dismal thing. Comfort, propriety, and enjoyment, all three are hardly to be maintained on such an income. Many people prefer to sacrifice their comfort so as to keep up a show of respectability, and even smartness; others boldly throw appearances to the winds, and cling to big fires and big joints; while a few reckless folks manage to have a good time at the expense of their butcher and baker, and look to the next spell of full pay to perform the miracle of pulling themselves square with these and other creditors. It is not my plan to weigh the comparative disadvantages of the three systems; but to point out that, by living on the Continent for at least a part of two or three years, which generally follow a man's promotion from commander to captain, he may enjoy a larger amount of propriety, comfort, and amusement than he could hope to obtain at home for the same money. It is not too much to say that, as a general rule in France and Italy, the franc will go as far as the shilling in England, which means that living here is about twenty per cent. dearer that there, where an income of £500 a year will do as much as one of £600 in this country. There is one thing, however, that no amount of francs will buy, and, unless one is content to do without it, one had better potter along as best one can on this side of the Channel, and that is the British atmosphere. Not the aërial atmosphere most certainly, but the atmosphere of which the English language, Sunday closing and observances, exclusive bathing, and good beer and tobacco are necessary ingredients. There are many excellent people who would pine away in abject home-sickness were an unknown tongue, Sunday fêtes, public bathing, Regie tobacco, and red wine to be substituted for what they have been used to. They could not

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breathe amidst such surroundings. But there are many quite as excellent people who can.

It was primarily the wish to live frugally, but neither joylessly nor meanly, that drove my husband and me to Italy. Combined with this wish there was yet another, and that was to learn Italian. Besides the unquestionable advantage to a sailor of being able to speak other languages than his own, there is a certain remuneration, not too small to be despised by a poor man, offered by the Admiralty to any officer above the rank of commander, who satisfactorily passes an examination on his return from abroad in the language he has taken up. It amounts, I believe, to the difference between full-pay and half-pay for four months. For lieutenants some slightly different, and rather more advantageous arrangement is made, I fancy.

Naturally, among the languages of Europe, some are of more practical use to the naval man than others. French must come first of course, and Italian next. But, until the German Navy and the German colonies are full grown, Spanish, as the most valuable language on the naval stations of the Western hemisphere, is entitled to the third place in the list. The year before we went to Italy we had spent four months in France, and my husband had wrestled so successfully with the language that he managed to pass his examination on his return to England. But our sojourn, though pleasant enough in some ways, was not to be compared with our nine months in Tuscany. French people do not take for granted that English men and women are amiable, straightforward, and kindly disposed; and until we have with patience and humility, proved ourselves (individually, at any rate) to be neither brutal nor treacherous, nor yet deliberately insulting, they will not cease to suspect us. Most Italians, on the other hand, give us credit for all the virtues! Even the exceptions allow us the benefit of the doubt. Consequently life among them is an easier matter than among our neighbours across the Channel. The Lords of the Admiralty naturally prefer that naval officers studying a foreign language abroad should reside, if possible, in a naval port. But, if a British naval officer takes it into his head to settle down for a few months at Cherbourg, Brest, or L'Orient, the chances are that he is set down as a spy, and treated—unofficially, of course—accordingly.

When we arrived in Italy we boldly planted ourselves in the best hotel at Spezia, with no sponsors, and no credentials of any kind, and straightway found ourselves in the midst of friends. No one doubted but that my husband was what he represented himself to be, viz., a captain in the British Navy on half-pay, and anxious to learn Italian. Unless they are in the habit of doing kind

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actions in secret I do not think we owed the cordiality of our reception at Spezia to the intervention of the powers that be at Downing Street or at Whitehall. It so happened that my neighbour at *table d'hôte* was the captain in charge of the ordnance department at the arsenal, and an intelligent and distinguished officer into the bargain; but he rather annoyed me at first by making pointed and perfectly justifiable remarks upon the latitude then allowed in matters of uniform in the British Navy; and, if we had not found common ground for indignation in the forward manners of the hotel cat, I doubt whether we should ever have made friends.

Of course we spoke French at first, but, after a day or two, his kindness and my ambition resulted in what I was pleased to consider Italian conversation. At every tenth word I dropped back into French, and at every fifth I murdered an inflection. It was very barbarous of me, for the poor man suffered terribly from neuralgia. At first my husband made Manuele, the old boatman attached to the hotel, his instructor, and learnt from him the name of everything in a boat or on the jetty. He did not have neuralgia, and was rather pleased than otherwise to have his words taken down in a little book. Hugh and I used to compare notes about three times a day, and add our vocabularies together. Before long we tackled the newspapers and spelt through long paragraphs in the *Tribuna* or the *Caffarò*. Besides that Hugh took in the *Rivista Marittima*, of which he used to translate little bits into English, and then put them back again into Italian. Captain X., of the Ordnance Department, was not satisfied with the Ollendorfian nature of the exercises which I used to write every day with painstaking zeal, and insisted upon my composing themes for him instead, which he corrected with every symptom of acute physical agony. The use of the subjunctive is a terrible stumbling-block, but unless it is mastered, it is no good pretending to speak Italian correctly. To *write* the language really well is almost impossible for a foreigner, and exceedingly difficult even for a native. Of course Hugh exchanged cards with Captain X., who introduced two or three other naval officers to us, all of whom showed us the utmost courtesy and kindness. They made Hugh an honorary member of the Naval Club, and gave us both the run of the naval lawn-tennis courts. There was a gymnasium, too, to which my husband went almost every day for three months to fence with a large and truculent-looking fencing-master.

As Italian swordsmanship is the best in the world, this was not an opportunity to be neglected. And, indeed, it helped to pass some of the time, which, as the winter advanced, hung somewhat

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heavily upon my husband's hands. Even though he worked away steadily at his grammar—Sauer's was the book we both used—read Italian aloud to a lieutenant who retaliated in English, and talked English " shop " with a particularly intelligent commander, who was of great use in supplying Italian technical terms for his little note-book. There were still some hours of the day to be got through. He could not yet speak the language well enough to button-hole anyone except old Manuele, or Pistoja, the " boots." *They* could not fall back upon French, as their superiors almost invariably did after the first two or three stumbles. The fact that the naval officers, and indeed almost all the well-educated gentlefolks of northern and central Italy are able to speak French fluently, makes a knowledge of Italian, so long as one is in their society, almost superfluous; but with the lower classes it is far otherwise. We went out a good deal in the evening at Spezia, and there was always dancing. Unfortunately, there were very few ladies, and some of them only danced the old-fashioned *valse à deux temps*, with which poor Hugh never could cope. Still he had some excellent partners, and at least kept up his French under their care. The naval men were, almost without exception, capital dancers, unlike both the soldiers and civilians, who did not impress us at all by their performances in the ball-room. It was not until we left Spezia for Viareggio, a bathing-place about thirty miles further south, that my husband really started *speaking* Italian. There we knew nobody. The bathing season was still two months off, and the weather was miserable. We had an old Lucchese servant who spoke a very pure and intelligible Italian, and was inexhaustibly good natured. She was of great use to both of us in supplying our vocabulary with every-day words; and so were the men on the pier and at the bathing-places, who were excellent company and never too busy for a chat. They were always full of information about the rig of the passing ships, or about tides and currents and landmarks, and had amazing stories to tell us of the coral fisheries, or of their experiences when they were in the Navy, all in the simplest Italian, and helped out by diagrams drawn on the sand with a bit of reed or bamboo. The note-book overflowed into a second volume long before we left Viareggio. There, too, we read De Amicis' delightful " Vita Militare," and the "Legende," and " Bozette di Mare"—sketches of naval life—by Jack la Bolina, who is the Italian Pierre Loti.

We lived in a funny, much-shuttered little house in the Piazza d'Azeglio, ill-furnished, truly, but with cool marble floors, elaborately-painted ceilings, and excellent spring beds, and in June we did not want much more. Our good Caterina cooked well, if

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inelegantly, and in a country where the average income of an upper-class family is considerably less than £500 a year, our establishment and way of living generally was in no wise remarkable for its simplicity. The necessaries of life are in most cases very much cheaper in Italy than they are at home, and at Viareggio the milk, fruit, and vegetables were all excellent. The quantities of lovely flowers which I bought every day at the door helped us to forget the roughness of the table equipage, hired on the spot at so much a month, while the more glaring crudities of a drawing-room gave way before the humanising influence of books, photographs, sketches, and a few pleasant-coloured bits of brocade and embroidery. There were hardly any English people at Viareggio during our time there, so my husband had no temptation to neglect his Italian. Besides, the fear of his impending examination was before his eyes. When he left Italy he was able to talk commonplace coherently, and make intelligent struggles at expressing himself on out-of-the-way topics. Italians are as good at understanding *à demi-mot* as the French, and a great deal more patient.

When we came to sum up our experiences in the pursuit of the Italian language, we were rather inclined to compliment ourselves on the line we had taken. As a matter of fact it was a series of fortunate accidents which made our nine months in Italy a success. We had meant to take a house outside Spezia as being more comfortable and more economical than living in a hotel; but we could find no house to suit us. If we had done so we should certainly have had fewer opportunities of learning Italian and of making friendships. As to our expenses, we found that fifteen shillings a day will keep two people—without a private sitting-room, of course—at the Croce di Malta. The hotel stands by itself close to the shore of the beautiful gulf of Spezia; its two managers are half English, and wholly obliging; and it is itself a fine, clear, airy palace, with an excellent record for health.

Again, we did not know that in going to Spezia and Viareggio we were choosing a part of the world where good, sound, fairly grammatical Italian was spoken by the lower classes. At Venice—a far more interesting place, of course—we should have been unable to understand a word of the dialect; and at Venice, also, there are a most distracting number of charming English and American residents. But at Spezia one can count on the fingers of one hand the English-speaking families.

All that we gained by going to Italy during that "lean year" of ours makes a good long list: (1) a large amount of sunshine; (2) the enjoyment of beautiful scenery; (3) two months of

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ideally pleasant bathing; (4) several pleasant friends; (5) some knowledge of the Italian language, people, customs, politics, and naval matters; (6) a greatly improved opinion of the Italian nation; (7) a considerable amount of innocent entertainment at "popular" prices; (8) perfect freedom from domestic worry on a small income; (9) a complete change of groove; (10) a large store of pleasant recollections. Mentally, morally, physically, and financially we did better than if we had stagnated at home, at Southsea or at Blackheath.

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SOLDIERS AND THE CIVIL POWER.

THERE is great danger lest, in the excitement attending Mr. Gladstone's retirement from public life and the establishment of a new Government, oblivion should cover many things of which it is very important not to lose sight. At the time when the admirable report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the circumstances of the Featherstone riot was presented to Parliament, there seemed to be a universal concensus of opinion that some better regulation should be established as to the conditions under which soldiers are employed in aid of the civil power. Hitherto there had been a tendency at least to take for granted that, no matter how reckless were the assaults of the mob upon the men who were doing their duty, the soldiers being entirely unlike other men, unaffected by the same feelings as would stir the breasts of any of their countrymen, were, in fact, to all intents and purposes, automata, moving so mechanically under discipline that they might be treated as so many machines, warranted to charge or fire when they were ordered to do so, and otherwise to remain in a condition of passive immobility. The clear evidence given before the Commission, and especially the well-weighed words of the Adjutant-General seemed, so far as could be judged by the comments both in the House and in the Press, to have made a deep impression upon the general public.

It was, if we may venture to say it, in some ways almost a misfortune that the particular inquiry which attracted so much attention should have been one which dealt with a case in which there was no sign whatever that the aggravating conditions to which the men were exposed had overstrained the bonds of discipline. Naturally we are delighted that in this instance the effect of the inquiry was to vindicate completely the action both of officers and men. But we certainly think that the cases in which the hardest measure has often been meted out by public opinion to soldiers engaged in such work have been those in which after endless patience the men have taken the law into their own hands. In most instances this has happened when the mob themselves have removed the bonds of restraint by knocking over with stones or other missiles the very officers who were keeping the

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men in hand. If in all such cases the facts could be fully brought out we believe that the effect would be to place matters on a very different footing from that at present existing.

We cannot help thinking that one reason why there seems to be so little sympathy for the soldiers or constabulary who are injured and insulted, for no other offence than that they have done their duty, is that all the talk has been on one side; the men having neither for the most part the faculty or the freedom needed to state their own experiences that is possessed by their assailants. Usually where there are riots there are leaders of some kind who have been for the most part selected because of their fluency of speech. What cause can be judged aright where only one side is heard? What aggravation of the injustice is it that these specially fluent speakers should not only talk to large bodies of their followers in all parts of the country without reply, but that their speeches should be spread broadcast by newspaper reporters. The conditions of discipline keep those whom they accuse gagged. No one who has studied the speeches of this type of man can fail to be aware that, however great their other virtues may be, a faculty for doing the least justice to those whom they oppose is not among them. The appetite for vindictive accusation of all who do not accept their dictation grows by what it feeds on. They are obliged to use one-sided statements because their audience requires it of them if they are to retain their power. Their audiences grow more and more exacting in that respect because they never hear any but highly coloured reports and come to believe that no one but themselves has or can have any justice on their side.

However suspicious the general reader may at first be of one-sided statements so made, yet when there is and can be no reply, and he has nothing to set against them, he rapidly comes to assume that if there is some exaggeration there is a large basis of fact. In the case of quarrels between employers and employed every pains is taken by both sides to make sure that the facts are fully laid before the country. The side which most indulges in violent language and violent twisting of evidence does not gain by the process in the long run. In the case of soldiers and the constabulary the conditions are altogether different. The men are not allowed to defend themselves; judgment goes by default against them in the public mind. When case after case of this kind occurs, a presumption that the silent constabulary and the silent soldiers must be in the wrong becomes so established that when any fresh incident occurs it is almost a foregone conclusion that the mob have been blessed and innocent martyrs, the soldiers men who have

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joyfully taken advantage of the possession of armed power to abuse it. It seems to us therefore that it would be greatly in the interests of truth, of justice, and of order if a fair tribunal could be appointed for the investigation of the facts in all cases where violent accusations are brought against either policemen, constabulary, or soldiers. It would ungag the gagged. On the other hand, it ought clearly to be understood that the appointment of such a tribunal is an act of justice to those who otherwise would have no opportunity of explaining their conduct, and that the presumption is to be on the side of law and order—not on the side of riot. Hitherto the refusal of an inquiry has been constantly a manly acceptance of responsibility on the part of a refusing Minister. Nothing gave greater confidence to those who served under him than Mr. Balfour's refusal of an investigation into the Michelstone affair. It was felt by them that he knew how hard it would be to appoint anyone to make the inquiry who would not be accused of partisanship, and who would yet make due allowance for the difficulties of men trying to do their duty under most embarrassing conditions. In England, however, no such obstacle exists. If on all occasions an inquiry were made it could hardly be long before the sympathy of all those who love law and order passed to the side of its guardians. At present there is the most dangerous tendency for much of it to be enlisted on the wrong side, because the circumstances are not understood.

In the meantime our special purpose in this article is to draw attention to a description which has recently appeared in a volume otherwise full of most interesting and lively reading of one of these incidents. We recently inserted a very brief notice of the "King's Hussar." We regret that at the time lack of space prevented us from giving it a more ample review. . It is a book in all ways to be much commended to the notice both of military and civil readers. It is not often that a personal narrative practically altogether of peace service can be so full of good stories or give occasion for so many a burst of hearty laughter as this does. We no doubt owe much of the value of the book to the literary skill with which Mr. Herbert Compton has put together the stories told him by Sergeant-Major Edwin Mole, but there is an unmistakable stamp of genuineness about every line of the volume. We evidently have not only a true account of these varied experiences, but a true picture of the feelings of the man and of his companions. At one time in Ireland he was employed in keeping order at elections. No doubt that particular form of duty has been greatly changed in its character by the introduction of the ballot. But we have never had before from a

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man serving in the ranks any statement which gives anything like so graphic an account both of the experiences and of the feelings of the men under such circumstances. We propose therefore to make extracts from some of the most interesting passages and to draw attention to certain inferences to be drawn from them. "After a rough long march," he tells us, "through slush and mud, in many places fording streams (for the floods were out all over the country), we reached our destination, and took up our quarters in some old dilapidated cavalry barracks perched up on the high banks of a river, which ran through the town and divided it into two parts. Bandon was full of a riotous, screeching, Irish mob, collected there for the morrow, which was nomination day, and all through that night, wet and tired though we were, we were kept under arms, and our horses ready saddled for any emergency. In the same barracks with us was a detachment of infantry, whilst a body of Irish constabulary was quartered in a large factory adjoining.

"The following morning the commanding officer addressed a few words to us, the pith of them being that we were to keep our temper under the trying circumstances we should shortly find ourselves in. All this time the mob outside the gates were roaring and shouting out the name of Shaw (their candidate), and working themselves into a perfect pitch of frenzy, which reached a climax when the gates were opened and the infantry endeavoured to pass out. They were met with a shower of stones, and many of the poor fellows were carried to the rear, bleeding from ugly wounds in their heads and faces, whilst soldiers and mob were soon fairly jammed in the gateway, until it looked as if the latter would force themselves in instead of the former marching out.

"Our captain now gave the word to draw swords, and when the moment came use them with vigour, but only with the flat sides. Presently the word was given for the infantry to stand aside, and then with a bound we were in the thick of it, laying about us right and left and keeping well together, for in this sort of scrimmage a trooper once isolated is done for. We soon drove the rioters back, though they continued to face us, calling us all the bad names in Ireland, and paying little or no heed to the exhortations of several priests in their midst, who did their utmost to keep them in check, shouting out 'Whativer ye do, boys, don't touch the drag-hoons! Remember Dungarvan!' And well they might recall that name, for only a short time before a troop of Lancers, employed on duty similar to ours, were so badly mauled that they could stand it no longer, and turning on their opponents spitted them right and left, killing several and maiming many more.

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"Early in the morning of the polling day the troops and constabulary marched into the market-place and took up their several stations. The town was, if anything, crammed with a greater and more disorderly mob than on the nomination day, and, from a few words I overheard between the officers and the town authorities, I gathered that unusually rough work was expected; the contending parties being equally balanced, and both imbued with an undying spirit of victory, or—break the other chap's head.

"There were two polling stations, and the chief duty of the cavalry lay in keeping the road open for the electors to come up and record their votes. As it drew towards mid-day the votes began to come in thickly, and fighting started in real earnest. The constabulary had to bear the brunt of it, their work being to line the road up which the electors came, and, as the political opinions of every voter appeared to be public property, one half of the mob tried to kill him, and the other half to pass him through. The constabulary were consequently placed between two fires, and got pelted and clubbed impartially by both parties. Sticks and stones were as common as oaths and curses, and it made our blood boil to see the constant rushes of the mob against these plucky fellows who lost their helmets and had their clothes torn off their backs, till many of them stood in rags at their posts with the blood streaming from their heads and faces.

"Now and again, when matters grew desperate, the infantry came to the rescue, and, clubbing their rifles, laid stoutly about them; and I am open to say that the thuds of the butts falling on the heads and shoulders of the mob was pleasant music to us, who all this time were sitting with drawn swords, eager to be in the fray, but not allowed to make a move. I will say this for the priests, of whom there were several present, that they used their best endeavours to keep the people from attacking the soldiery constantly repeating the warning cry, 'Remember Dungarvan.' Behind the infuriated Irishmen, groups of women, bare-headed and bare-footed, kept coming up in relays with their aprons full of stones, which they shot down by the side of the men, who kept up a perfect fusilade at everybody and everything. The Mayor, who sat on horse-back just in front of us, threatened every minute to read the Riot Act, but in reply the stones came hurtling along in his direction just to remind him he was flesh and blood, and law and order to be pelted the same as everyone else.

"After this sort of work had been going on for a considerable time, there suddenly came a tremendous roar from one part of the town, and a mounted constabulary man dashed up with the

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information that the mob had broken into one of the committee rooms, and was wrecking it. The mayor gave our captain orders to follow him with his troop, and away we went, the crowd prudently opening before us as they recognised we meant mischief. We were too late to save the building, for the rioters had already entered it and demolished all the furniture and woodwork; but we went at them right and left as they came triumphantly pouring out, and, assisted by some of the infantry, managed to clear the wrecked house. We then formed up in a line in front of it, and there remained on guard, detaching a man every now and then as orderly to carry messages backwards and forwards between us and the rest of the troops. Presently one of these orderlies, a man named Johnny Duckling, was struck by a stone as he neared us on his return, and fell from his horse, and for a moment we thought he was badly wounded, if not killed. The troop waited for no order this time, but with one impulse dashed up to where he lay, the mob surging forward at the same moment to try and club him. We were too quick for them, or they would, perhaps, have killed him. Some infantry and constabulary coming up, we handed Duckling and his horse over to them, and then proceeded in a serious way to take it out of his assailants. In spite of the remonstrances of our officers, who did their utmost to restrain us, we made up in ten minutes for all the insult, abuse, and injury we had been forced to passively suffer during the morning. It was not until our arms were tired with smiting that we returned to our station, whilst the mob, like beaten dogs, slunk back and glared at us from under their eyelids at a very respectful distance."

Now the points to which we are anxious to draw attention in that narrative are, first, this: that the description of what was actually seen by the 14th Hussars of the conduct of the mob towards the constabulary, of whom they knew nothing beforehand, is suggestive of much. When have we ever had so graphic a description of the nature of the provocation to which these men are subjected? Will any one who reads it believe that it is an isolated instance? Yet even in Conservative journals, when the reports of riots at evictions and on other occasions appear, this side of the question is almost wholly omitted. The fact is that all English newspapers have as a rule, when sudden emergency arises, necessarily to depend on the reports of local writers, and that the chances are enormous that the local scribe has no wish to do justice to the constabulary. Secondly, the use made by the priests of the Dungarvan incident is most suggestive. Apparently it was the fact that the Lancers had actually used their lances at Dungarvan which alone put any restraint upon the mob at Bandon.

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It will be remembered that at the Featherstone inquiry it appeared that the mob had a mistaken notion that the soldiers always at first fired with blank ammunition. Much of the riot and almost all the necessity for actually firing was due to that belief. As Sir Redvers Buller told the commissioners, nothing could be more dangerous, or in the long run more bloody, than any such practice, which has always been forbidden. It seems to us, however, that the principle which is involved in that rule might and ought to be carried much further. There was an attempt on the part of the men at Featherstone to resent the employment of soldiers, not as being unnecessary under the circumstances, but as interfering with their using the force they wished to use. Now it seems to us that the principle on which alone military action ought to take place is that the law in England is supreme: that all questions in dispute must be submitted to the arbitrament of decision in open law-courts, and that no force can be allowed to exist in England to be employed against any English subject except under the authority of law. It is a question between "the good old law, the simple plan that he should take who has the power and he should keep who can," and the threshing out of the rights of the question on the fairest and best principles we can arrive at. In other words, it is the first condition of the existence of civilisation.

Now, if that is so, then it follows as a necessary corollary that, from the moment that violence is used, enough force should be available on the side of law to make the force on the side of violence obviously impotent. As long as police force is sufficient that is the legitimate force for use in support of civil power. But the ultimate power of the law rests on all the organised force of the realm, and it seems to us monstrous that when soldiers are present a mob should be allowed to treat police or constabulary as though they were the weaker force than the mob; that neither constables nor police ought to be subjected to such violence as was in this case, for instance, allowed to be meted out to them. When the mob begin to pelt with stones and club policemen, long before many of them stand in rags at their posts with blood streaming from their heads and faces, it seems to us that they ought to be made to understand that such an attempt of disorder to assume the powers of order is in itself a sufficient reason for putting forth the strength of the law; that if they take advantage of their apparent and momentary strength to appeal in such degree to the power of force, force in its most effective form will be used against them. In other words, we believe that the soldiers should not appear on the scene at all until they are to be used as an armed force; but that

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the mob should be made clearly to understand that if soldiers do appear they will be used with effect.

We seem to have forgotten the admirable method by which the Duke of Wellington saved London at the time of the Chartists in 1848. No soldiers were anywhere visible, but it was thoroughly understood that if they were called upon they would shoot with ball cartridge and would charge with sharp lances or swords. We believe that those are the only methods which in the long run save bloodshed. Nothing can be more significant than this story of the priests and their "Remember Dungarvan." As long as the practice obtains of allowing police constables or soldiery to show their "exemplary patience and discipline" by sitting still whilst the mob is stoning them, what is really being accomplished is the training of the mob to despise the power of law and right and justice in England. By all means let the utmost patience be used in making sure that the mob realise what is going to happen; but, in a case where soldiery have been already ordered to be at hand, it seems to us that it is the duty of the magistrates to let the mob know that the police will not be allowed to be stoned or to have their coats torn off their backs, or their heads broken with sticks; and that, if the stone-throwing does not cease, nor the attacks on the police, then the soldiers will be brought on to the scene, not to "show their exemplary patience and discipline" by sitting to be stoned, but in order to shoot and charge effectually. If, in this way the person of a constable as the representative of law and order is made sacred, then the police will be able to dispense with active military assistance. That is the true way to save bloodshed.

The rest of the story speaks for itself of the dangers we prepare by our present method. You may write as many copy-book maxims as you like about what soldiers ought to do under given emergencies, but you will never prevent such an incident as this sergeant-major describes; where the men, seeing one of their comrades about to be murdered by the mob, acted according to the instinct which it has been part of your whole military training to implant in them, and rushed to his rescue without waiting for orders. Then, mingled as they are in fighting with the mob, the power to restrain them is gone. Talk platitudes about it as you will, the thing will happen, and some day will happen with appalling effect. Beneath that red coat is not a wooden figure, but a man, full of all the passions of a man, restrained certainly by discipline, but liable, when you have by your iniquitous mismanagement roused them too far, to burst forth in a way that will burn your copy-books badly. The one thing that is wanted is that this

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clear principle of the necessity that the law should alone hold power in the land should be consistently applied and rigidly enforced.

There is yet one other point that we are most anxious to make. It usually happens when one of these riots has occurred, that some "innocent outsider" is wounded by a chance shot. The utmost sympathy is excited in his behalf. Now it seems to us that that is the first thing that has to be stopped. It ought to be the first duty of the magistrates to make it impossible that any onlooker should be "innocent." In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the motive which brings any onlookers to such a scene is not innocent at all, but the very basest and the very meanest of which human nature is capable. It is the desire to see without risk other men bleed and suffer. Proclamation ought to be made at as early a moment as possible, warning all those who do not wish to assist in the riot to stay within doors, and if, in the face of that, men will run the risk, their blood should be on their own heads. Every penny given in compensation to them is spent in making riot easy and its suppression difficult. We hope that some member of Parliament will take care that the Government are held to their promise to deal with this very serious question.

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THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE. 1830-1862.

(Including the birth of the Staff College.)

BY GENERAL E. CLIVE, LATE GOVERNOR ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE.

IN 1830 the report of the Board gives the following as the subjects of instruction and examination:—(1) French; (2) German; (3) Latin; (4) History; (5) Euclid, first six books; (6) The remaining books with plane trigonometry and mensuration; (7) Fortification—field and permanent; (8) Attack and defence of places. Any five of the above qualified for a commission, provided that Nos. 5 and 7 were taken and that a half-year's practical instruction had been received by the cadet. The discipline was under captains of companies. The punishments that might be inflicted were: For insubordination or for being intolerably troublesome, solitary confinement; when so confined meals to be bread and water; Cadets were released during the night: For general misconduct out of study:—Extra guards or drills, confinement to College grounds, close arrest in own room, solitary confinement: For drunkenness:—Detention during vacation and solitary confinement. The Governor had the power to order confinement to College grounds, detention during vacation, suspending of qualifications for commissions, sending home, recommending public expulsion as not likely to profit by further residence, or public expulsion and barring the service for a given period from two to four years. In matters of interior economy captains of companies were held responsible. "It is not intended," we are told, "to tie the Governor's hands; he can make any change that seems good, reporting it to the Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Board."

In 1830 one non-commissioned officer and twelve men of the Royal Engineers with working tools were attached to the Royal Military College as a working party for field fortification. This party has been continued ever since. The cost of working tools, £10 18s., was charged to the College.

In 1831 the York Town Lodge was erected from fear of cholera, which was then very prevalent. The Collegiate Board

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represented that: "It was absolutely necessary to secure the gates into the College grounds from the High London and Western Roads, opposite to the Professor's Terrace, by a small lodge." The building materials were then in the general store of the College, and with an expenditure of £50 for labour the building could be completed. Fortunately a surplus to that amount was available in the account from which the postman was paid. This fund was created by a penny charge on every letter delivered at the College. The Royal Military College Postman was to be paid out of the College fund, as formerly. He now continues to be paid from the same fund.

In 1832 the Junior Department was by successive reductions brought down to an establishment of 180 cadets divided into two companies. In this year the parliamentary votes in aid of the College, which in 1815 had amounted to £34,000, ceased. For the first five years following 1832, however, the financial affairs of the College were not flourishing, and each year the College showed a debt, which duly appeared in the estimates.

In 1837 Lord Althorp, Clerk of Exchequer, wrote to Sir J. C. Hobhouse, then Secretary at War, that the Government wished the Royal Military College not to appear in the estimates even in this way. "The Government are willing that an estimate for this year, founded on Lord Hill's proposal, should be submitted, it being understood that reductions should be immediate and not prospective. It is suggested that a further reduction in the number of cadets receiving gratuitous education might be effected, and indeed it is doubtful whether it is desirable in time of peace to introduce into the Army officers without means." The Government disclaimed any wish to suppress the Royal Military College, but considered that it should be self-supporting. An estimate would be submitted for £2700 for 1837.

In 1838 attention was called by the Government to the expenditure of the College in 1836 and 1837, which had been in excess of the income as shown by following extract:—

		£	s.		£	s.
1832	Income	19,851	10	less	111	4
	Expenditure	19,740	6			
1833	Income	17,387	4	less	33	7
	Expenditure	17,347	16			
1834	Income	18,515	4	less	29	11
	Expenditure	18,486	3			
1835	Income	19,187	7	less	30	4
	Expenditure	19,157	3			
1836	Income	18,810	11	more	1340	3
	Expenditure	20,150	14			
1837	Income	17,943	15	more	1698	0
	Expenditure	19,641	15			

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The Governor replied that the refusal of parliamentary aid in 1832 had caused the building to get into a bad state, which required remedy, and that many repairs had become necessary which had caused the excess of expenditure; but that, with an establishment of 190 instead of 180 cadets, a gain of £400 would accrue. By not filling up vacancies among musicians, College servants, and by restricting expenses on field fortification, the accounts could be balanced. The Commissioners answered, "Expenses, whether ordinary or contingent, *must* be kept within income. Doubtless the twenty-six professors' houses which had not been painted nor repaired for twenty years caused much debt. Yet the debt does go on increasing, and it is undesirable that further outlay should take place in 1838 upon the repairs said to be necessary to Government House. Therefore nothing more than £50 must be spent without estimate and sanction for it being obtained."

In 1839 the debt was reduced to £969, and the cadets from 192 back to 180. In the following year the debt was reduced to £169, even after meeting the expense of reconstructing, at a cost of £290, the workshops which had been destroyed by a great fire in the previous year.

From 1840 salaries were computed by the year and not by the day, a saving of £2 10s. per head, as £182 10s. became £180.

In 1841 the money accruing from the sale of the House at Farnham (decided upon in 1829) was spent on the external painting of the building. The debt at the close of 1840 was £779 12s., and in 1841 £563 17s. 9d.

Lieutenant-Colonel Procter, who had joined the Royal Military College as Professor of Fortification in 1816, was

Appointed	to act as Adjutant	1818
,,	Brevet Captain	1825
,,	Substantive Captain	1831
,,	Superintendent of Studies	1835
,,	Brevet Major	1837
,,	Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel	1841

He was transferred to India, and died in Arabia on his way out. His name and services are only introduced here in connection with the last appointment he held at the College, *i.e.*, Superintendent of Studies. This appointment had been held by Lieutenant-Colonel McDermott until 1825, when it was abolished. From that time the different branches of instruction had been independent of each other. Presumably this was not found satisfactory, as, soon after the abolition of the appointment, Lieutenant-Colonel (then Captain) Procter performed the duties without emolument, and continued so to do until 1835, when the appointment was re-created. The Governor, in writing about

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Lieutenant-Colonel Procter's services at the time of his death, stated that the duties of this officer were found not only to be indispensable to the well-being of the College, but that they had been well performed for a period of years before the restoration of the appointment in 1835 took place. The re-appointment of a superintendent of studies was balanced by the reduction of the adjutant. The subjects taught at the Royal Military College are, at the present time, 1894, all military, and widely different from the instruction given fifty years ago. Nevertheless, it is still a question for consideration whether it would or would not be an advantage if a superintendent of studies replaced the three professors now employed.

In 1842 Lieutenant-Colonel Procter was succeeded as superintendent by Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser. The Rev. Dr. Wheeler, chaplain of the College, had died on the 29th October of the previous year, and was now succeeded by Dr. Chepmell, the author of the history so familiar to officers who are at the present date of general or field rank. On the 3rd August, 1842, the Commissariat Corps petitioned that the advantages of a military education at Sandhurst should be conceded to their sons as to those of other branches of the service. This was granted to them, and in 1847 the same privilege was given to the sons of paymasters and of officers of the permanent staff of militia regiments of corresponding relative rank. In 1842 the College debt was cleared off. The details attached to the College at this time were as follows:—Fifteen officers, students forming Senior Department; riding troop, one sergeant and twelve privates; working party, one sergeant and twelve sappers Royal Engineers. A Library Committee was formed to take charge of the library and the collection of models. President, Superintendent of Studies; members, the Chaplain and three professors. A librarian was appointed at a salary of £20 a year out of the Library Fund. The Chaplain still received £10 10s. for performing service during vacations. The retirement of Lieutenant-Colonel Diggle after twenty-three years' service as captain of a company shows the length of time for which these appointments were then held.

In 1843, the cadets were divided into two schools, the upper and lower, so as to separate those over fifteen from those under fifteen years of age. In this year Lieutenant Gillies was appointed riding-master. This implied a change in the system which had been on trial since Captain Chadwick's death. Since then a quarter-master-sergeant had acted as instructor in riding.

In 1845 there were only 155 cadets in the College. In 1850 application was made for a second German master to replace the

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one reduced in 1829, on the plea that in former years there were but 145 cadets, whereas in this year there were 180. It is clear therefore that at this time all cadets were taught German.

THE COLLEGE ESTATE.—In 1848 a site, facing the high road and east of York Town Lodge, was granted for a parish church and churchyard. Five years later, in 1853, one and a half acres on the east side of and adjoining the above-named site was granted to the vicar, the Rev. Percy Smith, afterwards rector at Cannes, for a vicarage. In 1859 application was made for a site for a parish school. This was granted on the condition that the school should receive children from the College at the rates usually paid in Army schools by parents for their children. This grant of a site for the parish schools led to an examination of the title deeds of the estate, to see with whom the legal title lay. It was ascertained by Mr. Clode, Solicitor to the War Office, that the deeds of the estate related to five different purchases of land:—

(1) The legal title of the estate purchased in 1801 was vested in the heir-at-law of the late General de Lancey.

(2) and (3) The title of the estates purchased in 1802 and 1803 was vested in the heir-at-law of the late John Earl of Chatham, being the last survivor named in the deed.

(4) The title of the estate purchased in 1802 was vested in the heir-at-law of H.R.H. the late Duke of York.

(5) The title of the estate purchased in 1812 was vested in the heir-at-law of the late Lord Palmerston.

To clear up this complication the Commissioners suggested that the heirs-at-law should legally renounce their title, so that the Board of Commissioners might be reinstated in the legal title according to the original intention. In 1822 and 1835, in which years General de Lancey and the Earl of Chatham had respectively died, the title of the Board appears to have lapsed owing to the omission of the then authorities of the College to supply fresh trustees in place of such as had become non-effective. No detriment to the public service had, in fact, resulted from this, but the Commissioners advised that the estate should be vested in the Secretary of State for War. This was carried out in 1862.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT.—The Senior Department Royal Military College continued in occupation of their quarters in the College without incident until 1855. In that year a Select Committee of the House of Commons, reporting upon Sandhurst, called attention to its then condition.

Instituted, as has been mentioned, to enable officers to qualify themselves for employment in the quarter-master-general's

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or adjutant-general's branches, it had, in its earlier years, furnished a great part of the quarter-master-general's staff in the Peninsular War. Lord Hardinge stated that the establishment enjoyed at that time so great a reputation for efficiency as a school of instruction for staff officers that it was made the model on which the French Ecole d'Etat-major was subsequently established. "In later years, however, the Senior Department entirely ceased to fulfil the purposes of a staff school. From having originally had a separate military staff and a distinct body of professors, it became little more than a class attached to the Junior Department of the Military College. The number of students on the establishment was reduced from thirty to fifteen, and even this latter number was seldom complete, for as no reward in the shape of staff employment was held out to those who obtained certificates at the department, there was little inducement to officers to seek admission to the institution. Indeed, in 1854, the department only contained six students, and may be said to have become all but extinct. The course of study appeared also to have gradually become almost entirely mathematical, to the exclusion of nearly all practical military instruction with the exception of surveying."

Sir Howard Douglas' evidence before a Select Committee, in 1855, caused that Committee to report: "In earlier times the Senior Department had its own military staff. General Le Marchant was attached to it. General Jarry, an eminent officer who had been on the staff of Frederick II. during his campaigns, was engaged as scientific instructor, and a sufficient number of professors for fortification, for mathematics, and languages were attached to the department. At the present moment, two professors compose the whole establishment exclusively attached to the Senior Department. M. Narrien, the senior professor of mathematics, teaches in addition to his own proper branch, fortification, gunnery, tactics, and castrametation. The other professor teaches military surveying. Languages are taught by aid of the professors of the Junior Department, paid for by the cadets, and as your committee are inclined to believe, when there is ample demand on their exertions and all their time for instructing the cadets. Your committee are of opinion that this state of things is unsatisfactory, and requires revision and reform." They advocated various changes to improve the Senior Department, amongst others that a military officer should be placed at its head, and that it should have a separate staff of professors. The report continues:—"Your Committee must add one remark. They have not shrunk from recommending that Parliament should

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be called upon to vote money to render the Senior Department efficient; but if Parliament grant the money, your Committee consider that officers so educated, if otherwise fit, should not be neglected in appointments to the staff. The expectations of Parliament in granting the funds, and the labours of officers who have undergone a severe course of study, should not be overlooked. Your committee have the satisfaction of observing that some cases have come before them from which they are led to believe that Lord Hardinge has not lost sight of this important point. Your committee believe that it will be of great advantage to the officers under instruction in the Senior Department if arrangements were made by which they should be employed at the Camps of Instruction. They also suggest that facilities should be given to officers who have passed the Senior Department with good certificates to attend courses of instruction at Chatham and at Woolwich, and they should be attached to cavalry or infantry regiments, so that they may become acquainted with all the branches of the profession."

No immediate steps were taken to carry these recommendations into effect, and the Commissioners, in 1856, appointed to consider the training of officers report in the same sense :—

"There is also a Senior Department at Sandhurst, of which it appears that the original object, or, to use the words of Sir Howard Douglas, the 'special, distinct, and separate form' was to be 'an establishment for training officers for the general staff.' This institution does not seem, at least recently, to have been regarded as a staff school in the sense in which schools bearing the same name in France, Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia educate for the Staff Corps; since in these countries it is necessary that all officers on the general staff should have frequented for some years the staff school, whilst it appears that out of 216 officers who have received certificates at the Senior Department of Sandhurst since 1836 only fifteen were employed on the staff in May, 1854. Nor can it be doubted that both the importance and the education of the Senior Department, whatever may be the cause, have greatly diminished of late years, since latterly there has been only an attendance of nine or ten officers, whilst the whole instruction has been in the hands of two, indeed, it may almost be said of one professor. The significance of this last fact may be estimated when we mention that for the staff school in France there are thirteen military and five civil professors."

Another commission in 1857 reported to the same effect :—

"Lastly, a good staff college, to be frequented by officers already in the Army, is necessary to complete the means of

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military education. Such a college, if attendance at it be made a *sine quâ non* for a staff appointment, and still more if staff appointments are given in accordance with the distinctions of its pupils, will almost necessarily be frequented by most of the young officers of talent and energy in the Army."

And again:—

"A college for the staff is indeed the completion, and may be termed the strongest encouragement, of general military education, although the schools of the special corps may carry their own science to a still higher point. The chief defect noticed in connection with our own Senior Department at Sandhurst has been that its course of study was regarded as no recommendation for promotion. Nor could two professors be expected adequately to discharge functions for which eighteen are required in the French staff school. "The contrast presented by all foreign staff schools is certainly striking. There are differences indeed between these schools in France and Austria as to the period of admission and other points, but both are alike in *this*, that they are so framed as to give every conceivable premium and encouragement to such military acquirements as the service of the staff is thought to require. In both the officers enter by competition, and after a laborious course obtain their appointments on the staff as the reward of their distinctions in the school. It seems needless to urge that a college of this kind, opening the door to advancement and frequented when the mind is full of vigour, would possess every inducement to call forth the energies of young officers of talent. But a Senior Department offering a bare opportunity for military study with no ulterior results stands in a wholly different position."

Thus it happened that the same letter, dated 6th April, 1857, from the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State for War, which recommended the institution of the Council of Military Education to replace the Board of Commissioners appointed by Royal Warrant in 1802, proposed also a system of examination for staff appointments as a preliminary instalment of a more comprehensive plan by enlarging the Senior Department into a staff school; and the instructions to the Council on appointment, dated 22nd April, 1857, desired them in the first instance to direct their attention to the proper strength of the present students at the Senior Department at Sandhurst, the number of which should be doubled, and that the name of the department should be changed to that of Staff College, to be presided over by a commandant with a proper staff of professors. In the course of the year the Council of Military Education submitted the plan for the

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organisation of the Staff College. It decided that the Sandhurst Estate afforded the most eligible site, and recommended that the contribution of £30 hitherto required from officer students should be thenceforward discontinued. On the 17th December, 1857, a general order gave effect to the above recommendations, and fixed the establishment at thirty officers, officers at the Senior Department being allowed to finish their course. The first examination took place in February, 1858.

An adjutant was appointed to the Staff College in 1858, was abolished in 1870, and has not since been re-appointed. The present building was not commenced until the end of 1859, the Staff College students continuing, in the interim, at the Cadet College. In September, 1862, the building was occupied. The "M.C.C." certificate given up to 1857 was as valid, as a qualification for the Staff, as the "P.S.C." gained in 1858 and later. After passing the final examination, officers were attached to arms of the service other than their own for six months in 1860, but this period was reduced to four months, in 1863 to three months, and in 1865 to six weeks.

JUNIOR DEPARTMENT.—"At the time of the inquiry by the Select Committee of the House of Commons (1855) the Junior Department of the College was a school for boys. The limits of age for admission were from thirteen to fifteen; candidates were admitted by application to the Governor, on passing a qualifying examination before the professors of the College in elementary subjects of ordinary education. The maximum term of residence was four years, the average period being three years. The course of study was intended to complete the general education of the youth in addition to giving him military instruction, and included history, geography, and Latin, as well as more professional subjects. The establishment of the College at that time (1855) was: one governor, one lieutenant-governor. Senior Department: Two instructors, fifteen students. Junior Department: One major and superintendent of studies, two captains of companies, 180 gentlemen cadets, one chaplain, one secretary to the Board of Commissioners, one paymaster and quartermaster, one surgeon, one assistant-surgeon, one riding-master, sixteen instructors. This continued, without material change, to be the establishment till 1858. The distinction between the upper and lower schools of the Junior Department was of little importance. The real distinction in each separate branch was the line that divided the cadets in "Board Class," *i.e.*, those about to qualify for a step, from those not in "Board Class." The system was this: A cadet had to pass six successive examinations in each branch of study before

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the Board. As soon as a cadet seemed likely to be able to pass his next step he was put into a "Board Class." All the remainder were only working in preparatory classes. The six steps qualified for a commission. The Select Committee (1855) made no proposal to alter the character of the Junior Department as a place for juvenile education. They, however, proposed to create a system of Queen's cadetships which were decided upon in 1856, though none entered till 1860.

In 1857 a proposal was made for amalgamating Woolwich and Sandhurst, but a decision was given against this in 1858. It was at this date that the title of the "Senior Department" was changed to "Staff College," the "Junior Department" becoming the "Cadet College." In the same year the age of cadets on admission was altered from sixteen to eighteen years. Revised regulations were issued under which Royal Military College cadets might compete for Woolwich and return to Sandhurst if unsuccessful. The establishment was still 180 cadets—in two companies. The rates of payment were revised and a parliamentary vote defrayed the difference between the expenditure and income of the College caused by the cheaper rates, at which officers' sons were admitted. The same year Mr. Narrien (professor of mathematics, fortification, and astronomy) retired after forty-one years' service. He joined the College on 13th January, 1817. A fine bust of him and two portraits are now in the Staff College Library. His retirement marks the period of the separation of the Staff College from the Royal Military College, and of a complete change in the nature of the instruction supplied to officers desirous of being admitted to the staff of the Army.

By Royal Warrant, 1858, the Council of Military Education were appointed visitors of the Royal Military College, and such part of the Royal Warrant of 1808 as related to appointment and removal of professors and masters was revoked and vested in the new council, their authority sufficed. In this year the attention of the College authorities was called to the dietary of the cadets, which was said to require revision. "A greater variety would be more conducive to the general health, stamina, and comfort of the youths who are at present restricted to milk for breakfast. Also the dinners are not sufficiently varied from day to day, either in the meat itself or in the manner of cooking it; also that the cadets might be better provided at their evening meal." The Governor thereupon applied for a grant from Government to meet the expense of an improved breakfast and tea. A grant was made by the Secretary of State for War, but found insufficient, and the Governor reported that: "With increased expenditure and reduced

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income it is not possible that the present system of instruction can be carried out as when the College was self-supporting." In 1857 the buildings had been transferred to the then Office of Woods—now Woods and Forests. Now in 1858, a War Office letter states: The Lords of the Treasury have transferred the buildings from the Office of Woods to the War Office, all repairs to be done through annual estimates. In this year the College was lighted with gas, War Office Gasworks being erected on Government property on the west side of the main Portsmouth road. A second gas-holder was added in 1892.

The College, during the years from 1832 to 1857, when it was self-supporting, had purchased all the plant that was necessary for the carrying on of the establishment. The transfer of the building to the War Office could not affect furniture, &c., which had been thus bought. The stores, which were thenceforward required, were, however, to be drawn from Aldershot, and the Governor was instructed to cause a distinction to be made between such stores and the College property. The transfer to the Aldershot district did not actually take place till 1860, but the responsibility for such stores as were public property was vested in the Quarter-Master Royal Military College, who thus acted as barrack-master from April, 1859.

In 1858 Her Majesty visited the College on the 24th Nov. and made a Royal inspection. The Wellingtonia cedar between the College and the lake was planted by H.R.H. the late Prince Consort.

The appointments to the College for instruction and medical staff became from this time more military Thus a vacancy on the medical staff having occurred in 1859, it was notified that the Director-General of the Medical Department would appoint the successor. The letter states :—" That it would be for the benefit of the service that the appointments as surgeons to the Royal Military College, to the Royal Military Asylum, to the Hibernian and Kilmainham Hospitals, should in future be given to deserving half-pay medical officers who have been compelled to retire on half-pay in consequence of having attained the age of fifty-five years, as fixed by the recent warrant, receiving during their tenure of office the difference between their half-pay and the full-pay of which they were in receipt at the time of their retirement, in addition to their quarters, fuel, &c., and that the officers holding such appointments should be required to retire upon their former half-pay on completing sixty-five years of age, or sooner if found unfit to perform the duties required of them."

Gunnery drill was now added to the course of study. Four light 6-pounder guns were applied for, with fittings, stores, and

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twelve pontoons. The clothing for the servants up to this date consisted of one dress and one undress suit, the former uniform with that of Chelsea pensioners. The appointment of a French master from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, to be professor over the heads of French masters at the Royal Military College, one of whom (Mr. Marrillier) had been thirty years in the service of the College, led to a complaint from the latter. The Council of Military Education adhered to their recommendation, saying that the seniority principle is highly injurious, as having a tendency to place in the position of professor men who have passed the active period of their lives, and thereby to stop the introduction of improvement. "It appears to the Council that the introduction of a professor unshackled by long use of a bad system, and possessing the requisite ability and energy of character to amend it, would be advantageous."

The Governor reports, in estimating for clothing for 1860-61, that it is desirable, considering the advanced age at which gentlemen cadets are now admitted, that they should be furnished with two tunics per annum out of the clothing fund contributed by parents. The boats on the College lake were found to be of inconvenient size: man-of-war gigs were applied for. The water supply was found to be inadequate for the service of the College. The attempts to supply it from wells sunk in rear of the College were ineffectual, and it was decided to lay down iron pipes from the Wish Stream. The reservoir in rear of the College was lined with cement, and water obtained in superabundant quantities—23,000 gallons in four and a half hours, at an expenditure of £823.

In 1860-61, part of the estate was drained at a cost of £160. In 1862, £180 more was spent on completing the work.

E. CLIVE.

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ROUND FOREIGN BATTLEFIELDS. SUGGESTIONS FOR A TRIP.

By Colonel F. Maurice, C.B.

It has often struck me that if, when people in England were arranging for their summer or autumn tour, they knew how to set about it, some of them at least would find it interesting to pay a visit to the scenes of the battles on which the German and the Frenchman fought out their great struggle nearly a quarter of a century ago. There has, I think, been an impression that the border-land between France and Germany and almost all of the old provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, now become the Reichsland of Elsass Lothringen, is in a condition of such chronic disturbance that visitors would not find themselves very comfortable. That is a quite mistaken idea. I have myself been over most of these fields some fourteen times during recent years, and I never met with anything but the greatest courtesy and friendliness on either side of the border. The journey is a very easy one. You can see the greater number of the most interesting battles in little more than a week, so that an Easter holiday is almost sufficient for the purpose, and you may, if you like, see the field of Waterloo on your way without losing much if any time. I fancy that a good many people besides soldiers find an interest in looking at the ground on which men have struggled with one another at the death-grip, the fields on the issue of which the conditions of so much of the after peaceful time has depended. For Waterloo is every year visited by apparently ever-increasing crowds of sight-seers, and though Waterloo has some attractions that no other battlefield can offer, it has also some very serious drawbacks to its interest. In the first place it is horribly overrun with guides and touters and the whole race that attends any place that sight-seers much frequent. You cannot, if you know anything of the great story, study it for yourself without constant interruption. In the second place the Belgian Lion has, as the Duke of Wellington said when he first saw

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it, "spoiled his battlefield." The soil has been to such an extent removed, in order to make up the great pile, that many of the very accidents of the ground on which the incidents of the battle depended have been destroyed. Furthermore, in the case of the Waterloo campaign, for anyone who really cares to study the history, the chief interest lies outside the actual battle site. It is hardly too much to say that by a few minutes after noon on June 18th, 1815, say half-an-hour after Napoleon began the battle of Waterloo, his fate was to all intents and purposes sealed. The Englishmen who fought and bled so gallantly, the French squadrons that dashed with their hopeless valour against the British squares were but working out a result which, given those known qualities on both sides, was as certain as any future event can be. The ground which, to the student of history, military or other, is of real interest, is not there, hardly even on the fields of Ligny or Quatre Bras. It is rather between them, on the roads over which on June 16th d'Erlon's corps pursued its strange wanderings, and farther north in the fields over which Grouchy might have made his movement towards Waterloo on the morning of the 18th. Some recent experience has taught me that no one, or hardly anyone, in twenty years passes over this part of the country for the purposes of studying these events. Nor, from the same experience, can I recommend the attempt to those who require comfort in lodgment as an accessory to pleasant travel. On the other hand, in the great campaign which has for a quarter of a century at least determined the conditions of European politics, and has become as much the starting point of our modern era as Waterloo was of the long years of peace which followed it, the interest is centred on the battlefields. Whilst the movements outside the field of Waterloo determined the conditions under which it should be fought, the battles of 1870, few of them designed in any sense by the head-quarters of either Army, determined absolutely the movements which took place beyond their rayon, and it would be little more than hyperbole to say that they were hardly affected by those which they did not determine. At all events there is no other campaign known to me of which the whole story is to be so completely traced on the battlefields themselves. Moreover, the stagnation which for many years fell upon the border-land, in consequence of the exodus of French families, has left these battlefields untouched. A very little building has gone on at Amanvilliers on an unimportant part of the field of Gravelotte. The maps of the date of the war require a little correction, for some of the ground on the eastern slopes of the Gravelotte plateau, that is on the Metz side and near the town, where new roads have been

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made, new forts erected, and the features generally a good deal changed. None of this affects the actual battlefields. All the battlefields are, it is true, covered with a forest of monuments; but the Germans have taken care in building these not to make the mistake of the Belgians. Many of the memorials are of great dignity or beauty, and will of themselves interest many visitors; but they in no way disturb the study of the conditions of the battle-ground. Ample accommodation in the way of obtaining food and conveyances of all kinds is to be had for all the battlefields. If my readers will follow the guidance I now offer, I shall have some lovely scenery through which to lead them. They will certainly be welcomed wherever they go, and, if I may judge by the universal experience of, I think I may say, all who have travelled with me, they will have had a very pleasant time by the end of the trip. Now there is hardly any namable weather during which I have not passed over this ground, not having been as freely able, as no doubt most of my readers will be, to choose my own time for going. I have tramped over some of the battle-grounds under broiling sunshine; I have been assailed by some of the fiercest blizzards of wind, hail, and snow that I have almost ever known; and I have had to provide against drenching rain. Though therefore my general experience of the weather in the Reichsland is that it is normally very pleasant, I think I shall be able to warn those who travel under my guidance how best to provide against emergencies.

To begin with, the first question is What sized party is the most convenient for the purpose? There can be no doubt that for a soldier who wishes to study for himself the circumstances under which the battles were fought, and can afford time to settle down for a day or two on the spot in each instance, there will be advantage in travelling alone or with a single companion. Everybody does not wish to spend time on the same points, and in a larger party something must be sacrificed to the general convenience. Supposing, however, that a party of regular or volunteer officers, or any others who have heard or read much about these great battles and would like to see something of the actual sites, agree to travel together, probably under the guidance of some one who has studied the subject more than the rest, then I should not recommend the party in any case to be made up to more than nine, and should in preference limit it to seven. The reason of this is that for much of the ground it is specially convenient to use certain local brakes, which are usually so constructed that whilst one of the party can sit on the box beside the driver, the inside accommodates six comfortably, and eight not so comfortably. I

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would as far as possible avoid using two carriages for the party, because it is exceedingly difficult to keep the whole so well together if two separate vehicles of any kind are used. Delays and waste of time occur, and much of the comfort of the trip is lost. Supposing, as sometimes happens, that a family party would like to travel together, and that there are ladies who would wish to take part in the trip, there is no reason why they should be deterred by fear of any other discomforts than the ordinary ones of weather and foreign travel. I do not propose to land the party at any hotel where English ladies will not find such accommodation as is usual on the continent outside a few of the chief towns. In Metz, where our head-quarters will be for the longest time, they will find quite a society of English ladies married to German officers. I remember being once startled as I walked through the streets of the great fortress by hearing two ladies, obviously belonging to the garrison society, part with the words, "Well, my dear, then you will be at my house to-morrow at three." "Certainly! Good-bye till then!" both evidently speaking their native tongue. Such ladies are particularly glad to welcome any countryman or countrywoman from home, and as the only other places where it is necessary to sleep are Strassburg, a fine old German town containing excellent hotels, Niederbronn, a beautiful German watering-place with hotels connected with the Kursaal, where some English ladies go for the waters almost every season, and Brussels, the conditions of travel are not unsatisfactory, even for ladies who accompany their husbands or brothers. On the other hand, if they do not care for the sight of either the monuments or the battlefields, or take interest in seeing the German soldiers at work, I fear they will find the time hang heavy on their hands whilst the men of the party are paying their visits to the battle-ground. Life in a German garrison town is dull for all purposes outside its military interest.

Next as to routes. I think myself that for those who do not mind a rather longer sea passage, the most comfortable route is by Harwich and Antwerp for this reason. You leave London from Liverpool Street Station at 8 p.m. in the evening. You get into your berth whilst the ship is in perfectly smooth water. The following morning you wake up to find yourself in the smooth water of the Schelde, get your breakfast comfortably on board, and arrive at Antwerp about 10 a.m. You can then take your choice either to go on at once to Brussels, or to spend some hours in Antwerp. In either town there is much of interest to be seen. You may visit the famous cathedral in Antwerp, containing amongst other treasures Rubens descent from the Cross, and much else of which the ordinary guide-books will give you full information. In

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Brussels, you have a feast of good things in the public galleries, and in what in my judgment is the most stately of modern buildings, the Belgian Law Courts. As your train for Strassburg does not leave till the evening, you can if you like pay a visit to Waterloo, and be back in ample time. At Waterloo, which you reach from the station at Braine la Leud you will not lack guides, though you need not believe everything that they tell you. I happened on one occasion to travel there in the chance companionship of one of our most famous comic actors. He happily expressed my own feeling when, in parting with a guide to whose romance he had listened with exemplary patience, and who in gratitude for a douceur was effusive in wishing farewell, he retorted, "Oh yes, good-bye! good-bye! and may the Lord forgive you." To return, however, to the more extended trip. My own idea is that, if you really would care to follow through the sequence of events as they occurred, it is better for you to go straight through to Strassburg. The only objection to that course is that you arrive at Strassburg at the uncomfortable hour of 3.55 a.m. If, however, you have written beforehand to warn the people at the hotel to be ready for you, and you choose the hotel nearest to the station—the "Hotel National"—which I have always found most comfortable and very reasonable, you need only be disturbed for a very short time, and you need not be up at any very early hour in the morning. On the other hand you can, if you please, stop at Metz, which you reach at 2 a.m. You, of course, then get to bed at a rather more convenient hour. As, however, as I shall show, there are considerable advantages in beginning as I propose, so far as the following up of the campaign is concerned, I think that usually by the morning on which they wake up in Strassburg most people are glad that they have come on so far. As, in any case, either Metz or Strassburg must be the starting-point of your trip, I may now return to consider the alternative routes. For those who like at all cost to shorten the sea journey, undoubtedly the passage from Dover to Calais is the line to choose. If a party of any size proposes to travel together, I should strongly recommend them to communicate either with the London, Chatham, and Dover or with the South-Eastern Railway beforehand. The manager of either of them will issue instructions for carriages to be kept through the journey, and it adds very much to the comfort of travel. Personally, however, I must say that the frequent breaks of a night journey are to me much more worrying than the continuous passage by the other line. It is possible, however, to do the journey straight through to Strassburg by either the Calais or the Dover and

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Ostend line, not by the other, and when time presses that is decisive. By either the Ostend or Calais line, if you leave Charing Cross at 8.15 p.m., you reach Strassburg at 4.52 p.m. the following day. If you leave at 10 a.m. you reach Strassburg at 3.55 a.m. next day. You can also travel viâ Holland and pass down the Rhine. This is, however, a much slower route.

In Strassburg it is worth while to visit the old cathedral. The architecture of some of the fronts is very elaborate and striking, and the view from the terrace just below the spire, to which you ascend, is magnificent.

Now as to the course of visiting the battlefields. The earlier part of the invasion was carried out on two lines: that to the north by the First Army under General Steinmetz, with the Second Army under Prince Frederick Charles, both under the immediate orders of the King's head-quarters; while to the south the Third Army, under the Crown Prince, though in full communication with the others and receiving general directions from Von Moltke, moved on an independent line of its own. As the intention of the general advance was to turn the French out of the Vosges region and to throw them back upon the line of the Moselle, it was advisable that the Crown Prince's Army, which was, relatively to a line parallel to the general course of the Moselle, very much thrown back, should advance first, whilst the others, and especially the First Army, which was on the right and farthest westward, should stay its movement to allow the general front of the whole Army to swing round. Hence the earliest battle of the invasion took place at Weissenburg in consequence of the advance of the Crown Prince's Army. Two days later, however, whilst the Crown Prince's Army in pursuing its advance from Weissenburg became engaged with McMahon's Army at Woerth, portions of both the First and Second Army became involved in a somewhat premature and haphazard action at Spicheren. In my judgment it is much more interesting for those who want to get a clear idea of the course of the campaign to follow it through as nearly as possible in the order in which events happened, and therefore it is that I like to start from Strassburg, because from there, and from there only, can you conveniently get to Weissenburg after reaching a station of the main European Railway, one of the regular stopping stations of the great trans-Continental line for which you get the advantage of the quickest trains and the best service. It is true that Weissenburg in itself was the least important of these battles, but it is one which has several interesting features, and I have generally found that those who are going to the battlefields for the first time pick them up more easily by studying first the

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smaller battles, which can be easily taken in, and not by first looking at the immense fields of the battles round Metz. Moreover, there is very great interest in following the march across the Vosges of the German Army from Weissenburg to Woerth. This can be done by chartering a brake at Weissenburg and driving through to Woerth, and, as Niederbronn is much the most satisfactory place to put up at, forward on the same night to Niederbronn. There you can arrive, after seeing Weissenburg and a part of Woerth, in very good time for dinner. From Niederbronn you drive to Woerth next day. By starting off on the afternoon of the day on which you have visited Woerth, you can reach Spicheren, and after seeing it very fairly can either get in to Metz that night in time for rather a late meal or dine at Saarbruck and only get in late to Metz. I shall give more details of these movements when I come to speak of the several battlefields, but at present I want only to sketch out the general course of the visit when time is an object. In the way I speak of you see Weissenburg and Woerth with a good deal of the country between them in their regular sequence. You then visit the battle of Spicheren fought simultaneously with that at Woerth. As after these battles there was a long pause in the course of the fighting, you then lose nothing by transferring yourself to Metz, as to a centre for the next series of battles. Both on the northern and on the southern line the Germans, after these earlier battles, lost touch of the French. In the south McMahon's Army, very much broken, was ultimately transferred westward by train, and did not come into the field of operations again until after it had been made up at Challons with other elements beside those that had fought at Woerth. In the north, touch with the French was not regained by the Germans after Spicheren until they reached the river Nied, and the first serious operation that followed was the battle of Colombey-Nouilly, almost under the guns of the eastern forts round the town. Then followed, on the west of Metz, the battle of Mars-la-Tour, undertaken at first by only a single German corps and two cavalry divisions, and having the effect of preventing the retreating Army from making good its escape westwards. Then came, two days later, the great battle of Gravelotte, the result of which was to throw back Bazaine's beaten Army into Metz and to reduce it to the condition of a besieged force.

Thus, by following the course I suggest, each of these battles can be taken in their regular sequence. Moreover, from the point of view of making the trip one of as pleasing reminiscence as possible, it is no small consideration that in any ordinary weather the drive across the Vosges from Weissenburg to Woerth

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is one of the most pleasant that can be made. For a party of seven or eight it costs no more than the railway journey, and the scenery is most striking.

Of course, if time permits, it is much more satisfactory to allow more hours or days for each battle. My advice, however, as to the points of view from which each should be seen would not be affected by a longer time being allowed. I propose to go over each of them and show how far time may be saved by the use of carriages over the less interesting parts of the ground and where it is well to take points of observation or to walk. Experience has gradually enabled me to see so much more in a few hours than I could at first have done in many that I hope in this way to be of some use to those who will follow my advice. Having, however, now sketched the general course of the journey, I shall be able to make intelligible the advice I propose to give to those who are about to start. It is certainly well to fix beforehand approximately the time that is to be allowed for the journey at all events as far as Metz. When once arrived there it is easy to extend the visit at pleasure for the greater battles that took place round it. But as you are sure to get much better rooms, if you give notice some days beforehand, and to find much greater convenience in the way of carriages if you have made arrangements first, it is certainly well to select some member of the party who will undertake to write letters such as I shall now describe. First there is the negotiation with the railway company to which I have already referred. Then letters should be written to the chosen hotel at Strassburg, naming the morning on which the party will arrive by the trans-Continental train, and saying how many bedrooms will be required. There are several good hotels in the town, but I should certainly for choice name the Hotel Continental, because it is in the same large square as the station, and you can have your luggage taken across at once by a porter. Next you want a carriage of some kind, according to the size of the party, to meet the train at the station of Weissenburg, to drive you round the field of battle and afterwards take you on to Niederbronn. I have always found the German station-master at Weissenburg most courteous and kindly in procuring one. Of course, however, it has to be asked of him as a favour, and the letter to him should be worded accordingly. There is no other method that insures your having one without delay on arrival. I fancy he does not dislike having the little bit of patronage to bestow in the place. There is plenty of time to see this little battlefield well if you arrive at Weissenburg by the quick train starting from Strassburg at 12.35, and reaching Weissenburg at 1.49, and you

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will still have time enough to get into Niederbronn as it is just getting dark.

If you have fixed the programme of your journey so far it would be well also to write to the manager of the Goldene Kette at Niederbronn, saying when you will arrive, desiring him to have dinner or supper ready for you, and ordering the rooms you require. If you have quite decided only to spend one day at Niederbronn and to be at Metz on the next night, it would be well also to engage rooms there before you leave England. The Grand Hotel de Metz, formerly the Hotel de l'Europe, is, on the whole, the best. The rooms are good enough, but the place is rather a dead-alive one, and the hotel suffers accordingly. Still, as the battlefields will occupy most of your daylight, you will do well enough there.

It is certainly advantageous that some, if not every one of the party, should take passports with them, and should have them visées at the German and French Embassies. Theoretically, no doubt, they are not required in France, but as far as my experience goes you are much more likely to have to produce them in France than in Germany. All the gensdarmes along the frontier are most friendly as soon as they are sure you are English people, but some of them are nervously afraid lest German officers should give them the slip and look over the frontier. The German officers are forbidden by their own authorities to cross it, and there is unspeakable joy in the heart of a French frontier officer if he thinks he has caught one of them, whom he can get into trouble.

Theoretically, on the other hand, passports visées by the German Embassy were required at one time of everybody crossing from the French frontier into the Reichsland. The rule may exist still; but I cannot say that in going by the Brussels route, at all events, I have had any occasion to be aware of its existence. Nevertheless I strongly advise passports. There is no trouble in getting them, and it is better to have them. Next, as to luggage. Of course the length of the trip must determine this a good deal; but if you must have with you more than you can pack in such a fair-sized Gladstone or two as you can on emergency carry in your hands, then I should certainly register it through to Metz and trust for the one or two intermediate days to what I could carry in my hand. Often it is not possible at wayside stations to get porters at all, and you may have to change carriages at great inconvenience if you are taking with you too much. If, as you probably will find convenient, you go to an hotel in Brussels, for your day there, you can, of course, register through only to Brussels

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and then on to Metz. As, however, your time there is short, and there is often much delay before the registered luggage is looked at on arrival, it is certainly better to avoid this and depend in Brussels on what you carry with you. In any case, either from Brussels or from London, I should register through to Metz, and not attempt to get at heavy baggage, either at Strassburg or Niederbronn, that is assuming always that you are only going to spend one night at each. I ought, however, to say that the mountain scenery and the mountain streams, with their fishing, are often so attractive to visitors that I have known many wish to extend their stay there or to return. My advice therefore here turns on the assumption that your trip is one rigidly limited as to time. Though, of course, much as to kit must depend on the time of year of your visit, I should not recommend you, unless you go in the height of summer, to take for granted that you are going to meet with heat or cold. I have at Easter known the weather hotter than in the end of August of the same year. You want wraps with you, both for the night journeys by train and for the open carriage trip through the Vosges. At the same time you want to have with you cool clothing and especially cool head-gear, even if you go at Easter. My experiences of the coupé-lits are not very favourable. That is to say, that whether because of the comparatively small number of travellers who go by this route, or in the coupé-lits, or for some reason I am unable to fathom, I do not think that the company are specially fortunate in their employés. I think that anyone who would take the trouble to report to the company any unpleasant experiences in that respect would do a great service both to them and to other travellers. The difficulty, no doubt, arises from the fact that most of us when the journey is over do not care to take the necessary steps. Easter, of course, is the most crowded time of the whole year, and on that account to be avoided by those who can go at any other. If arrangements have been made to secure either a second or first-class through carriage, I incline to think that, as conditions at present exist, it will be quite as comfortable as the more costly coupé-lit. The seats all draw out, and can be made up very well. With good attendants there can, however, be no question of the comfort for a long night journey of a coupé-lit. The cost additional to a first-class ticket is twelve francs. It is very much therefore, a question of what you wish to spend on the journey.

If you allow yourself nine days for the trip you will have time to visit the field of Waterloo in the way I have named, and to see Weissenburg, Woerth, Spicheren, Colombey-Nouilly,

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Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte, and Sedan. To those who like to have a complete change from home-life during their foreign trip, and to have some entirely new subject of interest, I think the trip may be commended. I propose to take each of the battlefields in succession, and to note the points of most interest about them and the places on the battlefields from which these can best be seen. The most satisfactory plans to take with you are those published in connection with the Prussian Offical History. As these are, however, somewhat scarce, it is possible that you may not be able to procure them. Plans of all the battlefields are to be had in Metz and other places, and in case there should be any difficulty in getting them in England, it would be as well to give an English bookseller notice a little beforehand that you wish to procure these. He may have to get them from abroad.

In this article I have endeavoured first to persuade some, at least, of my readers to make the trip, and have given them such general directions as may assist them in making it. I shall take up the journey from Strassburg in my next article, and give a sketch of the first day I propose for the battlefields.

F. MAURICE.

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OUR NAVAL OFFICERS.

A Reply to "Nauticus."

By a Simple Sailor.

In common, doubtless, with many others, I confess to having read the article by "Nauticus," in the February number of the *New Review*, with the deepest concern. To say that the perusal of it caused a feeling of utter consternation, is but a mild way of expressing the sensation of alarm this terrible indictment of our naval inefficiency created in my mind.

That the Navy is going to the dogs is, of course, an old, old story. Has it not been the plaint of every officer who has ceased to take an active part in its affairs since "the days of Noe"? But here is a writer, of high intelligence, wide research, and presumably sane, who comes in the robe of the "candid friend," and tells us, in the most solemn and impressive manner, that in the opinion of every observant foreigner the once powerful British Navy has not only gone to the dogs, but to the devil. "Nauticus" does not use these precise words; he is far too courteous, besides being too deeply imbued with a "sincere affection" for England—these are his words—to say anything so calculated to wound our self-love. This is a very, very sad state of things. That we had neither ships that would swim, guns that would shoot, nor men that would fight, was already known. That the British Admiralty was a very hot-bed of jobbery has been proved over and over again. Does not every schoolboy know that when once an officer enters its portals he parts company with his brains, and ceases forthwith to conduct himself like a sane person, or even after the manner of an English gentleman? All this has been proved to demonstration. But through all these dark days—and very sad, dark days they have been—Britons have been wont to solace themselves with the reflection that their naval officers were of the right sort and even fairly efficient, and that, if the worst came to the worst even in default of ships, guns, and men, naval officers would manage somehow to pull the old country through. Vain dream! We have been putting our trust in a broken reed.

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It has been reserved for "Nauticus" to knock away our last support. Tearing aside the mask, somewhat brusquely, it must be confessed, this candid friend now shows that the much-vaunted efficiency of the British naval officer is but a foolish and perilous delusion; that, in fact, this highly-paid public servant is ignorant, incompetent, devoid of high aims, and really a very poor creature; and "Nauticus" knows! So it has come to this at last—we haven't a leg left to stand on! Poor old Empire, built up at such a fearful sacrifice of blood and treasure, your doom is at hand! "Nauticus" can see those terrible words, "Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin," beginning to appear dimly on the corner stone!

At such a crisis, the only advice I have to give my countrymen is to be brave and keep cool; and I am encouraged in the belief that it will be faced in a manner that becomes Britons, by the calm and dignified way in which the news has been received. There has been no panic, no wild accusations of treachery, and notwithstanding that the article in which the awful announcement was conveyed to the world appeared in the closing days of January—dark January, as it will always henceforward be called—there has been no fall in the funds, no panic on the stock exchange, while even the Bankruptcy Court has not been more crowded than usual. So let us take heart! We may yet pull through. Thank goodness, there is still, it seems, a ray of hope. Indeed, if we will only consent to mend our ways, and place ourselves under the guidance of "Nauticus," who, like a true friend, stands on the edge of the abyss holding out the proverbial straw for poor drowning Britons to clutch at, all may yet be well. *En avant!* With "Nauticus" at our side who would fear? What have we done amiss? How have we managed, in our heedlessness, to bring the Empire to the verge of dis—ruption? For it appears that our poor "British prejudices" have blinded us, not only to our "most salient shortcomings" but to our imminent danger of collapse!

Briefly, it would seem that with all our wisdom and nautical experience, we don't know how to train up our naval officers in the way they should go—certainly not in a manner calculated to fit them for "such varied and responsible duties as British naval officers have to undertake." Our system of education is not only antiquated but faulty, not to say rotten, with the result that "the British naval officer, with a few brilliant exceptions, resigns himself to living and moving in deep and well-worn grooves. He thinks little, he speculates less"—and herein sets a noble example to the unregenerate civilian dabbler in stocks and shares. —"He almost fails to realise, save in a dull and general way, that

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some day the storm of battle will again rage around him, and that he will be expected by an unreasonable country to repeat the triumphs of his ancestors. The really serious aspect of his profession is comparatively lost sight of." And then, by way of bringing all this home to the dull British intellect, friend "Nauticus" "interjects" a series of nautical conundrums, just by way of showing that, although of serious habits of thought, he is not altogether wanting in the perception of the humorous side of things. He airily assumes that the British naval officer is incapable of solving them, and goes on to remark in his wise way that "the results will surprise you," and even boldly hazards the suggestion that "they may even shake your Gallio-like indifference to the subject of British naval efficiency." Pro—di—gious! as the great lexicographer would have exclaimed. But the worst is to come, and proves beyond cavil that the British naval officer is a perfect monster of iniquity. "He is a poor martyr to routine. He is not what he ought to be." Alas! no, and—"In scientific, as well as in general attainments, he is far behind his French, his German, his Austrian, his American, his Italian, and his Russian rivals." Shocking! but why stop there? Why not complete the list and include the Greeks, the Turks, the Chinese, and the Portuguese? The reader in his simplicity may be tempted to ask this, and thereby display his lack of appreciation of our critic's noble qualities and fine tact, for does he not assure us that he does "not want to institute unnecessarily offensive comparisons."

"Nauticus" is pleased to allow—by way of gilding the pill—that this personification of stupidity and ignorance, the British naval officer, has one or two respectable qualities. "Courage, manliness, resourcefulness, natural aptitude, high honour. All these virtues I grant him in perfection." Let us be thankful for small mercies. Still, he is a poor creature at best, and when, on top of all his shortcomings, we are gravely assured that the education he receives "is not of a kind to fit him to shine in general society," the climax is reached. Ever since that dark period in our naval history when those rough, brutal sailors—Drake, Raleigh, Frobisher, &c.—disgraced the name of Englishmen by their ignorance of society small-talk, and by the too free use of their mother tongue, brought a blush to the cheek of every British maiden, it has been the firm and fixed determination of Britons that their naval officers should shine in general society. But, alas! It seems we have failed—lamentably failed—and "Nauticus" is merely giving utterance to the thought which is uppermost in the mind of every patriotic Briton at this moment

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when he declares that if the British naval officer "remains what he is, a great catastrophe is in store for his country." We had thought, with characteristic "British perversity," that something had been done of late years in the way of improving the "shining" virtues of the naval officer; but it seems we are on the wrong tack, and a kind Providence has sent "Nauticus" to show us a more excellent way. And we know that if we disregard his warning, and neglect to follow his advice, the collapse of the Empire is but a question of days.

It seems that "they manage these things better in France," as Sterne would say. How is it that this great truth has never been brought home to our understandings before? "Nauticus" will explain. "Insular always, and 'know-nothing,' in the old American political sense of the expression." "You look with so much contempt upon everything foreign that you often will not condescend to examine it seriously for a single moment." Well now! that this charge is well deserved in the matter of champagne and music, perhaps even the fashions, every dull Briton must admit, but what possible connection can it have with naval education? The explanation is forthcoming from one, too, "who has the amplest opportunities of observing"—"Nauticus," to wit! According to this profound observer, our neighbours over the water, and not the French alone, have gradually evolved and brought to absolute perfection a system of training and education for their naval officers which may well excite the admiration and envy of the civilised world. This clever, go-ahead people across the Channel who think nothing of rattling off a battleship in five years, which same article we poor blundering Britons, with our rotten administration and clumsy workmen, can only manage to produce after three years' intense and concentrated effort, it seems, I say, that the French, with their charming manners, their innate genius for production, and bold grasp of things, have succeeded in solving the vexed problem of naval education in a way that is destined to revolutionise all previously existing systems, and to open up for the French marine "a future more brilliant than its warmest admirers venture to hope for." *Vive la République!*

That Nauticus, with his avowed contempt for that "poor martyr to routine," the British naval officer, and for the system under which he is moulded, should see much to admire in French ways of doing things goes without saying. Let us hear what this profound student of men and manners has to say on the subject, and putting aside our wretched British prejudices let us read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest his observations. Says "Nauticus," "It

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is, indeed, characteristic of the French Navy of to-day that it thinks and that it looks forward." Quite right! "There are everywhere signs of the healthiest and most promising mental activity." What a contrast to our own benighted Navy! "Not only do all, from highest to lowest, appear anxious to learn and to improve themselves in every sphere of knowledge that can possibly benefit them," but even grizzly old lieutenants of six and forty "think and scheme, and display a singularly energetic spirit." No wonder "the French Navy is essentially progressive, and therefore essentially modern." No "poor martyrs to routine" are tolerated in that brilliant service! Again, he says, "I can only bear admiring testimony to the truth that in the French Navy keenness, rivalry, invention, anxiety for progress, interest in other navies, real devotion to the service, and a high standard of competency are professional virtues so common that the absence of them in any officer seems to render him an Ishmaelite amongst his fellows." And to think of all this existing so near to us without our being aware of it! The mere enumeration of the virtues and professional acquirements of these naval paragons is enough to take an ordinary person's breath away! "Look on this picture and on that," the patriotic Briton may well exclaim on being reminded of the deficiencies of his own naval officers. Even "Nauticus" ingenuously admits that he "does not exactly know how the result has been secured." But this is only his modesty. Here, if any where, is Utopia—unlimited, from an educational point of view. Some people might think that "Nauticus" is quizzing us in his naïve way. And, of a truth, if we look beneath the surface there is in "Nauticus," as in Professor Teufelsdröckh, "always the strangest dualism: light dancing with guitar-music will be going on in the fore-court, while by fits from within comes the faint whimpering of woe and wail." Cynics might even venture the assertion that these Admirable Crichton's of naval education—these walking embodiments of all that is best in every system—had no real existence outside the imagination of our critic! But there, of course, they are wrong.

Yes, they certainly manage these things better in France. We know now what our British stupidity prevented us even guessing at before, that certain remarks of a complimentary nature apropos of British naval affairs that appeared some little while ago from the pen of an unknown and ignorant person signing himself "M. Weyl," in a paper called the *Temps*, were nothing more than a bit of finely-polished sarcasm. "I offer one prayer," said this foolish fellow, after an inspection of Portsmouth dockyard, addressing his countrymen—"I offer one prayer: let us try and profit by the good terms

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we are on with these grand masters in naval matters to assimilate some of their methods."

For my own part, I have always hitherto regarded with a certain amount of suspicion the writer who would trot me off to a far country in search of perfection, and have always held that the criticism which indulges in wild panegyrics on everything of foreign origin and has nothing but scorn for the productions of poor benighted Britain is every whit as silly as that which proceeds on the reverse method. But now I see my mistake. Nevertheless, there are still, I grieve to say, many of my countrymen who remain wedded to this old-fashioned prejudice, and whose "perversity" and "evil conservatism" may incline them to resent "rough but friendly criticism" at the hands of an anonymous writer. It is possible that these foolish folk may doubt the *bona fides* of the candid friend, and hint that an ex-cathedrâ style of utterance, even when coupled with a Latin pseudonym, does not necessarily imply that the writer combines in his person the wisdom of a Solon with the prophetic insight of a Daniel. Therefore, by way of bringing home to these poor deluded folk the error of their ways, and reminding them, moreover, that in welcoming critics even when caustic and anonymous, and strangers withal, they may be entertaining angels unawares, I venture to introduce a little story.

"Once upon a time there was a great and good man, belonging to the accountant branch, who, grieved at the indifference and want of zeal of his brother officers, conceived it to be his mission—and herein he resembled "Nauticus"—to drive them from their evil ways by applying the lash of criticism. After pondering all this in his mind for many years he gave the result of his meditations to the world in a work of three volumes, and herein he differed from "Nauticus," who modestly contents himself with twenty pages of the *New Review*. The appearance of this epoch-marking work, created, as was no doubt the author's intention, quite a mild sensation amongst that very small circle of British readers who ever search between the covers of a naval book. But cynics said, and herein of course they lied, that these strictures on naval officers, though smart, caustic, and severe, were unjust; that, in fact, the studies in black or white, mostly black, compiled by this gifted person, were the creations of a disordered mind, and that the naval officer, as herein depicted, had no real existence outside of the author's imagination. Suffice it here to remark that the British naval officer was painted in very much the same colours as we find on the palette of "Nauticus," only with a more heavily-charged brush, representing

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him as ignorant, narrow-minded, brimful of "perversity" and evil conservatism—altogether a shocking person, a disgrace to his cloth and country. And as a matter of course all sorts of dreadful things were predicted of his country unless he changed his ways instanter.

But the strangest part of the story is to follow, showing how true is the saying that no prophet has honour in his own country. Scarcely had the last volume been given to an unappreciative world than certain lewd fellows of the baser sort, lashed to fury by the strictures of this great and good man, sought out false witnesses, who hauled him before wicked judges, admirals, captains, and commanders, and charged him with robbing the public chest of certain monies committed to his charge, and these wicked judges, remembering how the Jews of old stoned their prophets, cast this great and good man into the common gaol with murderers and malefactors, where he was kept to hard labour for many months. Thus does an ungrateful people requite those who seek to lift the lives of its naval officers to a higher plane of existence.

Now I would not have the reader carry away the impression from this little story that all anonymous critics are necessarily angels in disguise, but I do implore them to disabuse their minds of the delusion that because a writer chooses to hide the light of his countenance under the veil of anonymity his utterances are unworthy of notice. If it is not our privilege to know "Nauticus" in the flesh, his writings furnish ample internal evidence of their author being both a great and a good man. His critical acumen and fine sense of humour shines forth on every page, while the fact—we take it on his own assurance—that he does "not buy a 'British penknife' without having first tried its temper," bespeaks a person of no ordinary intelligence, not to say of caution, suggestive of the "land o' cakes." That he is a person of wide culture and deep research is evident from his familiarity with the writings of Racine. A person, indeed, who quotes Racine to a British admiral must be a man of real nerve! And finally, the masterly grasp he has acquired of the whole question of naval education is evident to the meanest capacity. It is clear then that in "Nauticus" we have to deal with no ordinary individual, and under the guidance of a person who has so thoroughly grasped the peculiarities of our disposition as is shown in a masterly analysis of the British character, occupying an entire page and commencing with the startling words "You are the ostrich among the Great Powers." . . . . I say, under such able guidance there need be no fear of going astray. If we are wrong, "Nauticus" will show us where! If we

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are earnestly desirous of amending our ways, "Nauticus" will show us how!

Well now, stripped of what the perverse British ostrich would stigmatise as mere windy verbiage and rhetorical flourish, what does the gravamen of the indictments amount to? Apparently this: That while science and general education have progressed enormously, and "naval science has progressed still more enormously and has correspondingly widened its sphere," we alone, among the great powers of the earth, have failed to realise the change or to adapt our systems to modern requirements, with the inevitable result that "in the matter of general knowledge and social experience the British naval officer too frequently remains much where his fifteenth year left him." And then, with the diffidence which characterises all great and noble minds, "Nauticus" backs up his opinions by a quotation from a certain "Marc Laudry," whose learned dissertations on naval education are doubtless familiar to every French schoolboy, though less well-known amongst Englishmen. "The English," observes this high authority, "remain of opinion that the career of a sailor demands a special initiation which can only be effected in infancy, and they still believe that a seaman, worthy of the name, needs a long apprenticeship, which must be begun in extreme youth." *Mais nous avons changé tous cela*, the French educationist may now proudly boast. "We in France," he continues, "used to be of the same mind, but we have modified our views in proportion as the development of nautical science has modified the conditions of sea-service." And he then goes on to ask, "What ought our naval officer of to-day to be?" Note the answer! "A gunner, a torpedo-man, a scientist, an engineer. His peculiar business is with science, and with solid science," not with seamanship or the sea, be it observed, *that* is a long exploded notion which has been discarded by all the Great Powers—but one. And thus has "British prejudice" and "contempt for everything foreign" blinded us to our "most salient shortcomings." But for this we should have long ago recognised that they manage these things better in France.

Happily, "Nauticus" does not leave us in the dark as concerns our future procedure. "It is impertinent," he says, "to find fault and to offer no suggestions for improvement." And now let us hear what in the opinion of a "very candid outsider" constitutes the educational equipment of a "modern model naval officers." After enunciating the sound principle that "there is now very little that a naval officer ought not to know," "Nauticus"

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passes from the general to the particular, and assures us that "in order to raise himself out of the ruck, he ought to know much of chemistry, steam, law, electricity, pneumatics, hydraulics, hydrostatics, dynamics, metallurgy, and, above all, of current naval literature, home and foreign, together with at least a little of as many other subjects as possible." Our model officer must also, we are told, be "a man of culture, and be able to read and speak one or two languages besides his own, and be familiar with modern history and international politics." He must further "have a very deep knowledge of foreign navies." But even now, the curriculum is not complete. "The officer," "Nauticus" tells us, "ought to have at his fingers' ends a number of 'ologies," such for instance, we suppose, as theology, physiology, astrology and zoology. And now we know where we are, or rather where we ought to be, and on what lines we ought to proceed in developing that astounding *fin de siècle* product—the modern model naval officer. I am sure no one will gainsay the sweet reasonableness of it all. Indeed, any young man of ordinary intelligence could master these elementary subjects in a year or two, at the outside—to say nothing of seamanship, navigation, pilotage, gunnery — not forgetting "a little of as many other subjects as possible." *Ars longa, vita brevis*, I fancy I hear some flippant reader mumbling to himself on recovering his breath. He may even half suspect that "Nauticus" is poking fun at us in his genial way. Nothing of the sort, our critic was never more serious in his life.

Now it is to be noted as showing how completely "Nauticus" has emancipated his mind from the shackles of "British prejudice," and "evil conservatism," that throughout the whole twenty pages of the *New Review*, there is scarcely more than a passing allusion to the dead and buried art of seamanship. Beyond a scornful allusion to our system being exclusively directed to making "a mere sailor" of the British officer, the reader may search in vain for any real appreciation of an art which was once supposed to be a useful adjunct to the education of young men destined to manage ships at sea. It is passing strange how little the managers of our great ocean steamship lines understand their business. They have always regarded this particular branch of knowledge as decidedly useful to those entrusted with the navigation of their ships; but it seems they are all wrong. No wonder dividends have been so low of late! Let them put themselves under the guidance of "Nauticus" and all will yet be well. The art of seamanship, it seems, cometh not by observation. It is doubtless acquired intuitively, or by some occult and hitherto

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unexplained process. Or, happy thought, it is possibly an instinct implanted in us in the same way as the art of nest-building is in birds. Any way, according to our candid friend, it is not worth bothering about in view of the far more pressing claims of science and the 'ologies! Seamanship is a sort of knowledge which anyone can pick up, at any time of life, by simply keeping his eyes about him. While as for seamen, why they have long ago been relegated to the limbo of "forgotten worthies."

For my own part I have always held that naval education is far too serious a subject to joke about, or even to speak lightly of, for is it not, in a sense, one of the keystones of empire? And, keeping this very solemn fact in view, I have formed in my own mind a very lofty conception of what the ideal British naval officer ought to be. But, alas! my naval friends, with their old-fashioned notions, tell me that I am unreasonable, and assure me that if I insist on all aspirants to naval fame attaining to my high ideal before they are permitted to don the Queen's uniform, they would be octogenarians before they set foot on shipboard. And why not? Just conceive what an ornament these ripe scholars would be to their profession, and how they would shine in general society! My friends keep reminding me that the business of naval officers is with war, that war is a rough game, and that to wage it successfully we must have young officers—to which end we must be prepared to make some educational sacrifice, and that if anything is to be sacrificed it must be the 'ologies, and so overboard go the 'ologies, in true British style. They put it to me thus — and I must say there is some *appearance* of reason in what they say—that if a ship was lost in time of war, or even in peace for the matter of that, through age, infirmity, and want of nerve on the part of the captain; or say for lack of practical acquaintance with such a simple piece of furniture as the rudder; or forgetfulness of the engines, it would be no consolation to an indignant country to be told that the venerable old gentleman in command was a person of wide culture, could speak half-a-dozen foreign languages, and had the 'ologies at his fingers' ends. The true business of naval officers, they declare, is not to shine in general society, but, in the words of one of England's greatest captains, "to keep the enemy from fooling us." To enable our officers to accomplish this they must, before all things, be seamen. Indeed, were it otherwise, it has been pointed out to me that there are certain gentlemen of Bengal, yclept "baboos," who would meet all my requirements and command the British fleet with distinction. Therefore, say these perverse friends, to enable us to have young officers, and, furthermore, to enable

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the most capable of these to rise to posts of high command before they become confirmed valetudinarians, we must afford them the opportunity of acquiring the requisite knowledge and sea experience at an early age. They must, in fact, take to the water early, like young ducks, who, by-the-bye, acquire remarkable proficiency in swimming without having even mastered the laws of flotation, which is all very wrong and contrary to the modern ideas of the *New Review*.

Regarded from the standpoint of the prejudiced Briton, naval education is one of the most complicated questions of the day, beset with pitfalls at every turn. It needs the clear insight of a "Nauticus," an insight which, alas! is granted to but one, or at most two gifted minds in a century, to see the way straight to that radical reform which he "solemnly urges upon all Englishmen," if their "Navy is to continue to lead the navies of the world." Wise "Nauticus" is troubled with no foolish qualms on this score. The whole thing is as plain as a pikestaff —the road to Utopia lies before him straight and clear. It is simplicity itself, a mere question of "solid science," 'ologies, and examination papers, and what is more Britons have only to place themselves under his guidance and their salvation is assured. They manage all this better in France, "Nauticus" tells us. Our far-seeing neighbours keep their "young gentlemen" at school and under college training till they are twenty or more, by which time they have got safely through all their infantile complaints, such as teething, thrush, croup, measles, chicken-pox, &c.; have got the better of sea-sickness, gained their sea legs, learnt the whole nautical vocabulary by heart; mastered the 'ologies, not forgetting the "other subjects," and are now thoroughly competent to handle ships at sea, from tea clippers (old style) to torpedo-boats, from bum boats to battle ships.

Well, it is easy enough to prove one system better than another on paper, but the only real proof of a pudding is in the eating of it; and similarly the only true test of the relative values of the several systems of naval education and training now in vogue is the rough test of war. And when the perverse British reader has had time thoroughly to digest our candid friend's wonderful receipt for the production of the modern model naval officer, he will probably incline to the opinion that there is a vast deal not included in "Nauticus'" little system of philosophy.

A SIMPLE SAILOR.

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BAZAINE AND MACMAHON.

By Colonel Alfred E. Turner, C.B., R.A.

Both leaders of the two last Imperial Armies of France have gone to their eternal rest, but under vastly different circumstances. The one, Marshal MacMahon, though twice totally routed and his Army destroyed and captured at Sedan came out of the war, not only not disgraced, but sufficiently honoured and respected to be shortly afterwards appointed President of the Republic. The other, Marshal Bazaine, fought with credit to the arms of France three great battles, those of Colombey-Nouilly, Vionville, and Gravelotte. His troops, though eventually compelled to surrender through famine, were never put to such utter rout as was MacMahon's Army both at Wörth and Sedan. Yet after the war he was arraigned before a court-martial on the charge of treason, and being convicted was condemned to degradation and death, the latter being commuted to life-long imprisonment in a fortress. From his incarceration he escaped only to die in exile in a foreign land. His memory is execrated in France, and the delusion is fondly hugged to this day by that nation, that had it not been for Bazaine's treachery the result of the war would have been very different. I think it can be shown that Marshal Bazaine, though undoubtedly unfit to command a large army of 200,000 men, to which position he was suddenly appointed by the Emperor, was quite equal in ability to any other French commander in the first period of the war, and that the sins of omission and commission, which lay to his charge, were due to want of experience and knowledge of the duties of supreme command, and not to any wish or intention to betray his trust.

Let us briefly investigate the steps which Bazaine took to carry out the orders which he received on the 12th August, when taking over the supreme command of the Army of Metz from the Emperor. It must be borne in mind that on that day, one corps of the Army, Frossard's, was much demoralised by its defeat at Spicheren and subsequent retreat, and that the whole Army had suffered in morale owing to the indecision and want of plan on the part of the Emperor, which had led to nearly a fortnight of

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marches and counter-marches, orders and counter-orders. Added to this two huge magazines of provisions and stores which had been collected at Saargemund and Luneville, in view of carrying the war across the frontier into Germany, had fallen into the hands of the Prussians, to their great advantage and to the great embarrassment of the French. No arrangements whatever were made in view of the possibility of reverse and retreat, by the Emperor and his staff. Had these stores been, where they should have been, at Metz, Bazaine's task would have been a much easier one. As it was, when once driven back on Metz with his huge Army, the want of food made itself felt in a few days; and even if a successful sortie had taken place, the Army would have marched unsupplied with provisions, and through a country already nearly bare owing to the numbers of troops which had drawn on it for supplies. Moreover, no steps to obtain proper information had been taken by the Emperor's staff. The members of that staff were hostile to Bazaine, and did not even join him for some days. Yet it was the only staff on which he had to depend. On the 14th August the battle of Colombey-Nouilly was fought on the east side of Metz, the result being that the retreat of the French was delayed for a day. Bazaine's orders for the 15th August appear to have been defective in that he gave only the general direction of Gravelotte and left too much to his corps commanders in not defining their routes. The intention evidently was to march on that place by the two roads through Mars-la-Tour and Doncourt, while the road to Briey was held to guard against any attack from the north of Metz. Had they been complied with there can be no doubt that the Army would have carried out its retreat on Verdun with a good start. But such was not the case. Frossard reached Rezonville at 9.30 a.m., and sent on his divisional cavalry to join Forton at Vionville. He encamped on the left of the road facing west, with one brigade facing south and guarding the road from Gorze. Canrobert also reached Rezonville, but not till 6.30 p.m., his march having been greatly delayed owing to the road being blocked by trains. He encamped on the north side of the road facing west with his right as far as St. Marcel. The Guard also arrived at their appointed positions at Gravelotte and Point-du-Jour. The 3rd Corps, whose march by Plappeville and St. Quentin was terribly impeded by baggage and other trains, only arrived on the line Malmaison-Verneville at 1 a.m. with two divisions, the Third (Metmann's) being left far behind at Moulins les Metz. With regard to the 4th Corps, Ladmirault did not obey orders. He considered,

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he stated afterwards, that rest was necessary for his men after the severe fighting on the 14th, and he spent the whole day replenishing ammunition. Towards evening he marched, but only reached Woippy. This delay of Ladmirault had a most disastrous effect upon the campaign. Le Boeuf's Corps had been quite as heavily engaged on the 14th as the 4th Corps, and if the greater part of the former corps could nearly reach their positions Ladmirault could have done the same. Bazaine's head-quarters were at Gravelotte on the night of the 15th.

The marshal did not learn till 2 a.m. on the 16th that the whole of his Army had not reached the positions as ordered by him; his orders for the 16th were that the march on Verdun was to be continued at 4.30 a.m., which, if carried out, would have evaded the possibility of any flank attack on the part of the Prussians, as no troops except the 5th Cavalry Division were near, and no infantry arrived at Tronville and the edge of the Rezonville plateau till about 10 o'clock. Soon after 2 a.m., Bazaine received an urgent message from Le Boeuf, begging him to suspend the forward march in order to enable him to bring up the division so far in rear and concentrate his corps, and also to enable Ladmirault to take post in front of him as directed. Bazaine then made the fatal mistake which led to all his misfortunes. He acceded to Le Boeuf's request, and put off his march to the afternoon.

Bazaine has been blamed for many of his dispositions, which it is stated tend to show that he never meant to leave Metz. First his drawing up Canrobert's Corps on the right of Frossard's, instead of pushing it in front of it on the road to Verdun, by which ground would have been gained in the desired direction and the two corps would have been in position to form front to the left and crush the portions of the 3rd and 10th German Corps as they successively neared the field of battle, and would have made the establishment of the German batteries, which played such a great part, especially early in the day, impossible. Next he is blamed for placing Frossard's Corps upon his left, on which he knew that the enemy was advancing; this corps being more demoralised than the others. The reply to this is that Frossard was not engaged at all on the 14th, as were the 3rd and 4th Corps; and as to the 6th Corps, Canrobert had only forty battalions out of his forty-nine with him, only thirty-six guns out of 114, and not a single mitrailleuse. It was always from time immemorial the custom of French commanders to keep the Guard in reserve. It is further pointed out that he might easily have reached Verdun if he had directed the 2nd and 4th Corps, followed by the Guard, to march by the Mars-

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la-Tour road at half-past four, and ordered the 3rd and 4th Corps to follow later in echelon upon the Doncourt-Jarny road; or better still, have sent the part of the 3rd Corps which was on his right between Malmaison and Verneville to march at once by Doncourt and Jarny and leave Ladmirault's Corps with Metmann's Division to proceed by the northern road viâ Briey and Etain. There can be no doubt that, had he adopted either of these plans, his Army would have reached Verdun and Chalons, while Metz, with its garrison of 16,000 men, would have been able to hold out for months.

That Bazaine failed to grasp the situation, that he underestimated the enormous marching powers and determination of his enemy, that he clung to the necessity of concentrating his five corps, prove that he was no great commander, no heaven-born leader of men; but there is nothing whatever in his conduct to show that he was false to his country or inferior in capacity to any other of the French commanders. He received no proper information from his cavalry, while that of the Germans was ubiquitous, veiling every movement of their own Army and discovering every stir of the French. He certainly clung to his communications with Metz, and attached an importance to them which proved fatal. He is, however, by no means the first commander who has looked upon the strong walls of a fortress as his salvation and found them to be his ruin.

In 1863 General Grant was operating against the Confederate Army of Vicksburg under General Pemberton. Instead of manœuvring so as to leave Vicksburg and join forces with General Johnston, Pemberton allowed himself to be thrown back on the fortress. Johnston, one of the most capable and astute commanders whom the war produced, wrote as follows: "If the battle of Champion Hill had not been fought, the conviction which had taken root in the mind of Pemberton that Vicksburg was the true base of his operations, would have resulted in the inevitable destruction of his Army, for he would have been besieged there, and must have surrendered. The larger the Army, which he brought within the Vicksburg lines, the sooner and greater the catastrophe. His disasters were due not only to the fact that he allowed himself to be enclosed within the toils of a greatly superior enemy, who surrounded him before he was aware of their propinquity, but also to his evident intention to allow himself to be thrown back on and blockaded in Vicksburg, instead of doing all that lay in his power to avoid it." Substitute Bazaine for Pemberton, Metz for Vicksburg, and the application of the above words to the proceedings of the commander of the Metz Army is singularly

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appropriate. No one has, however, attempted to attribute treachery to General Pemberton.

The losses on both sides at Vionville were enormous and nearly equal, that of the Germans being just 16,000, and that of the French, including many prisoners, 17,000; but whereas the Germans had no reserves whatever left, Bazaine had a very strong force in hand, with which, had he attacked with vigour early on the 17th August, he would, in all probability, have driven back the Germans sufficiently to enable him to continue his march on Verdun. He was, however, convinced that his own Army was so shaken by the terrific struggles of the day previous, that though he had about 125,000 men and 390 guns opposed to 72,000 and 246 guns, he decided to fall back to a position of very great natural strength, covering Metz on the west side and extending from Roncourt to St. Ruffine. This decision is often quoted as having been dictated by treachery, but it was clearly nothing more than that of a weak man out of his depth who saw safety behind the forts of Metz, and feared to meet unknown dangers outside.

Bazaine also, as well as the French generally, were profoundly struck by the tremendous marches which had brought the Prussians upon their left flank long before they believed it to be possible, as well as by their magnificent fighting and that tenacity with which they held to every position, to every foot of ground gained. He therefore issued the following order: "The great expenditure of ammunition which has taken place, and the circumstance that provisions for several days are not available, prevent our commencing the march which was provisionally decided on, we will therefore at once withdraw to the Plappeville Plateau." This order, which really sealed the fate of the Army of Metz, has also been adduced as a proof that its author was playing a traitor's part. As to his supply of ammunition at the battles of Colombey-Nouilly, Vionville, and Gravelotte, the French artillery fired forty-two rounds per gun and the infantry thirty-two rounds per man, which left 105 per gun and 103 per rifle, more than ample for fighting a battle on the 17th. With regard to the provisions, the men only carried rations for the 14th, 15th, and 16th, as it was intended to issue further supplies at Verdun on the last day. They, however, managed to get through the 17th and 18th without being reduced to extremities, so that neither of these reasons can be held to justify the retreat and desperate resolve to meet the enemy in a position, which, like that at Sedan, must either lead to decisive victory or destruction; each of them having only one line of retreat, and that upon a fortress. The real reason for such a move on the part of Bazaine was,

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there can be little doubt, that being awestricken by the deeds of his enemy, and doubting the power of his own troops to meet him in the open, he determined to take up, on the 18th, the position St. Privat Point du Jour, which he deemed impregnable, thinking that the Germans would, like waves against a rock, be so shattered by their attacks on it that they would be incapable of further opposing his march. Besides this, Marshal Niel had not long before laid down a new system of tactics for the French Army, having regard to the long range of the chassepot and mitrailleuse. Positions were to be taken up, the ground in front of which could be swept by fire; the attack of the enemy was to be awaited, and when he was shaken by a tremendous fire, a counter attack was to be made to complete his defeat. Shelter, trenches, gun-pits, &c., were to be made wherever possible.

On the 18th Bazaine's right being turned, nothing further was left but a retreat behind the forts of Metz, and on the 19th this movement was carried out. The investment was so promptly and so skilfully organised by the German Staff that, in a very few days, it was complete, and the subsequent fate of the Army was inevitable, for if it could not continue its march when opposed by an enemy half its strength, as at Vionville, or hold an enormously strong position like that which Bazaine called the Lines of Amanvilliers on the 18th, it was not likely that after being demoralised by constant retreats it would succeed in carrying out successfully one of the most difficult and dangerous operations of war, viz., a sortie and escape from beleaguerment by a large Army with all its main communications in the hands of the enemy. In the case of General Pemberton's Army and Vicksburg, General Johnston evidently considered that once driven back within the fortress and blockaded by a superior force the former was lost. Von Moltke was of the same opinion with respect to Bazaine and Metz, after the battle of Gravelotte; for on August 19th a fourth Army was formed under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, and the Guard, 4th and 12th Corps, with the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were withdrawn from the 2nd Army to constitute the new "Army of the Meuse." This was at once sent to support the 3rd Army, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, in its march on Chalons and Paris. Had there been any doubt in the mind of the Prussian Staff as to the result of the blockade, we may rest assured that the Prussian King would not have authorised the withdrawal of such a formidable force from the investing Army.

Bazaine has been accused of having purposely allowed himself to be driven back and blockaded in Metz. On the 20th August

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his chief commissariat officer reported that for a force of 200,000 men and 50,000 horses the magazine of Metz held corn for fifteen days, flour for fifteen days, meat for six, and oats for only two. Had the marshal had the smallest apprehension of the fate which befel him, he certainly would have collected supplies from all the villages near Metz before they fell into the hands of the Prussians.

From the 19th to the 30th Bazaine occupied himself in replenishing ammunition and making arrangements for his first and only serious attempt to break out of his prison, in which he was held by seven German corps and a division of Landwehr under General Kummer. This investing Army consisted of about 210,000 men, of which 140,000 were on the left and 70,000 on the right bank, the outposts occupying a line of over thirty-one miles. An Army besieged possesses this advantage over its enemy, that it can choose the time and place for its attack, and can concentrate its forces under cover without the knowledge of the latter, a great portion of whose troops it can draw off from the selected point by means of a feigned attack in another direction. The battle of Dresden in 1813 and that of Mayence in 1795 are striking examples of what may be done in such a case. In the latter instance, Clerfayt, the Austrian commander, during the night passed his Army over from the right to the left bank of the Rhine, where he formed it in three columns, two of which were ordered to attack the right of the French position, while the third was to make a feint against the centre. Before daybreak another force was ordered to advance and attack the French left in order to draw his attention to that flank. As soon as this was done the attack on the enemy's right was pushed with vigour, and the French, taken by surprise, were driven in; while the Austrians, though in very inferior numbers, succeeded completely in breaking through his line.

On the 29th August the 2nd and 3rd Corps of the investing Army were sent to support the Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, as it was feared that he might be attacked and overwhelmed by vast superiority of force on the Meuse before the 3rd Army could come to his assistance. Bazaine hearing of this, determined to make an attempt to break through the Prussian lines; but no promptness or energy was shown in his arrangements, and it was not till the 31st, at 4 p.m., that, supported by the fire from Fort St. Julien and a number of field batteries, Le Boeuf's Corps issued from their lines and advanced by Bellecroix upon Nouilly and Noisseville. Le Boeuf conducted the attack with skill and vigour, and in little less than an hour, in spite of the fire of sixty guns concentrated by the Prussians in front of Poix and Servigny,

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both the former places were taken. About 6 o'clock Ladmirault's Corps developed their attack against Poix and Servigny, and being supported by part of Le Boeuf's Corps, which wheeled to the left, a determined assault was made on these villages. The Prussians, however, held to them with the greatest bravery and tenacity, though enormously outnumbered, and a vigorous counter-attack drove the French back along their whole line just as darkness set in. At 9 o'clock General Aymard's Division made a sudden assault on Servigny, which was occupied by only four companies, and carried it after a short hand-to-hand struggle. The French appear to have thought their work done, and the possession of this most important point secured, for they took no precautions, and at 10 o'clock nine Prussian companies advanced noiselessly upon the village, and finding no outposts to impede them or give notice of their approach, in their turn recaptured Servigny by a *coup de main.* On the French right, Frossard's Corps, after a series of severe struggles, drove the Germans out of Flanville, St. Agnan, Colombey Aubigny, and Coincy. The French therefore scored a distinct and important success on the 31st August, and one can hardly help thinking that if Bazaine had commenced his operations at an earlier hour, had thrown a number of bridges over the Moselle, and made a demonstration upon another part of the Prussian line, his object to free himself from Metz would have been gained.

In the meantime the Germans arrived on the scene from all directions, and on the morning of the 1st September they commenced operations by an advance on Noisseville; two attacks failed, but when at 10.30 a.m. they advanced a third time the place was found already evacuated by the French. Flanville was also taken by assault, and Frossard's Corps began to retreat, which compelled Le Boeuf on its left to give up Noisseville and also retire.. The French held Coincy and Aubigny for some time and in the north of the battlefield Canrobert's Corps fought with varying success, but mostly on the defensive. At noon, Bazaine seeing Le Boeuf retiring from Noisseville, looked upon his object of breaking through the investment as impossible to attain, and gave a general order to his Army to retreat on their former positions. There appears to have been a singular want of combination among the different portions of the Army, and especially on the 31st: this was due to the absence of all proper preparations for such an affair as a sortie by a large Army. In order to secure the simultaneous advance of the different Corps, a large number of bridges were essential; Bazaine though having ample time at his disposal only had three extra ones thrown across the river, of which one was only practicable for infantry. The result of this

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was that the 6th Corps only arrived at its position at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 31st, the Guard not till 3 p.m., the reserve Artillery not till 6 p.m., and the Cavalry much later! This too on an occasion when promptness, resolution, and suddenness of attack could alone secure the object in view.

It is interesting to compare the passage of the Danube by Napoleon before the Battle of Wagram, one of his greatest feats, with Bazaine's crossing of the Moselle on 31st August, 1870. In the former case, the French Emperor at nightfall threw six bridges across the river, gave the most minute orders for the passage of each corps, and directed the movement himself. 200,000 men crossed the river without obstruction or confusion, and by the appointed time. Bazaine gave no detailed orders, only commenced his operations at 6 a.m., did not go near the scene himself, and though he had many days to prepare, failed altogether to convey half his Army of 100,000 men across the river in time to execute his plans for the 31st. Such singular incapacity, such "navrante ineptie" is rare in the history of war, but it would only be looked upon as treachery by the nation which insisted that Bazaine should be placed in command of the Army of Metz, to repair the errors and indecision of the Emperor and Le Boeuf, and which was itself responsible for the appointment of a man who, because he was an excellent Corps or Divisional Commander, and a man of the people, was expected to be able to lead a huge Army, already shaken by the defeat of Spicheren and subsequent retreat, and whose discipline had not stood the test of reverses. Bazaine was bewildered by the size of his task and the weight of his responsibility; he was discouraged by paucity of ammunition and supplies; and though his errors were many and great, it was only the burning desire of France to mitigate the stigma of defeat which could see treachery in a long-tried officer who had devoted his life to her service, and whose career had been so successful that he was called to the supreme command by common acclamation, passing over the head of Marshal Canrobert.

A new victim has lately been found in the person of the well-known General Brialmont, who, in an article on "La Perte des Etats et les Camps retranchés," by A. G., in the French journal "Des Sciences Militaires," is thus made responsible for the loss of the army of Metz: "Il est certain que si l'on n'avait pas suivi plus ou moins les idées du General Brialmont, l'armée française ne se serait point laissé enfermer dans Metz. Nos généraux, sans peutêtre s'en rendre bien compte s'etaient laissé impregner du venin de ses doctrines!"

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We will now turn to Marshal MacMahon, whose share in the campaign commenced at the battle of Wörth and ended at Sedan. As early as the 25th July a singularly bold reconnaissance by a party of Baden Dragoons under Captain Count von Zappellin of the German Staff, was pushed as far as the heights west of Wörth and discovered that the French were in force between Hagenau and Bitsche. They made little advance for many days, but General Abel Douay's Division was pushed forward to the frontier to Weissenburg, about twelve miles from the rest of the corps and quite unsupported. On the 4th August the Crown Prince's Army crossed the Rhine, and falling on this division utterly defeated it, taking over 1000 prisoners. Douay's Division having only arrived on the previous evening no outposts had been posted and no precautions were taken, except the sending forward in the morning of a very ineffective cavalry patrol which obtained no information. The Prussian shells fell into the town before there was any idea of the propinquity of the enemy. The general idea had been that MacMahon should close on Bitsche, and this division was detached to guard his right flank, but its distance from its main body was much too great, and it was virtually left alone and unsupported. It appears that its general, who was killed in the action, remonstrated strongly as to his perilous position, but that the French commissariat obtained an order from Paris for the post to be held in order to cover the supplies which they had collected for the invasion of Germany. The utter want of information possessed by the French as to the movements of their enemy, though they had a numerous and excellent cavalry, thus bore effect from the outbreak of the war. On the 6th August the Crown Prince's Army attacked and routed MacMahon in a very strong position, which he had taken up on the heights above Wörth. The marshal, who does not appear to have had the slightest idea as to the strength of the Germans, sent to De Failly, commanding the 5th Corps, and to General Felix Douay, commanding the 7th Corps, which was at Belfort, asking for assistance; one division of the latter corps joined him, but none of De Failly's troops appeared till the battle was over. The French were greatly outnumbered, having about 45,000 to 120,000. The position taken up by MacMahon was in many ways tactically very strong, but it possessed the disadvantage of being both on its right and left covered by woods, which once penetrated by the attacking force give him equal protection with the defenders, besides much impeding counter attacks. As at Weissenburg, the French fought magnificently; the change of front right back, covered by a gallant charge of Michel's Cuirassiers was admirably carried out. Eventually the

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Germans carried all before them, and the French, pierced in the centre and enveloped on both flanks, broke and fled in disorder on Bitsche, and thence retired to Chalons. Here MacMahon reorganised his beaten troops, and had he been allowed a free hand to carry out what he saw to be the only means of saving the country, namely, to retire on Paris and cover it, he would, with Ducrot's 1st, de Failly's 5th, Douay's 7th, and Le Brun's 12th Corps, have been at the head of an Army of 120,000 to 130,000 men, which would, behind the forts of Paris, have recovered discipline and formed a most formidable nucleus for the formation of fresh Armies, and would probably have made the siege impossible.

The marshal, on the 16th, was joined by the Emperor, who thoroughly agreed with him as to the necessity of retiring on Paris; but he and his Army were driven forward by the Empress and Count Palikao on the deadly undertaking which resulted in the defeat and slaughter of Sedan. The Emperor, shattered by disease, and a mere shadow of authority, allowed himself to be overruled, and MacMahon, straight and honest as the day, but not a strong man, except on the field of battle, would not take the responsibility of acting independently of the vice-government at Paris, who were totally ignorant of the real situation at the seat of war. If ever man was justified in taking a lead and acting on his own responsibility, it was MacMahon. He knew his Army was, in its present condition, totally unfit to meet the Germans; its corps were incomplete, and newly put together; it was insufficiently provided with supplies, and indiscipline was rampant, as the following order, issued by General Ducrot, commanding the 1st Corps, will show: "L'indiscipline et le désordre prennent des proportions vraiment inquiétantes. Des officiers ont été insultés, des habitants pillés par des misérables indignes de nos soldats. Un pareil état des choses ne peut durer. Il y va de l'honneur du soldat et de l'armée." Such was the condition of the Army of MacMahon, which, for dynastic and political reasons, was now ordered to advance. Though demoralised by defeat, short of food, and without any of that confidence in its leaders which goes so far to secure success, it was required to make a most difficult flank march in the propinquity of an enemy who greatly outnumbered it, who was flushed by repeated success, and in as fine fighting order, in every detail, as any force which ever stepped into the arena of war.

On the 17th, at a council of war at which the Emperor presided, the formal decision was given that the troops at Chalons should march on Paris, of which General Trochu was appointed

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commandant. The National Guard was sent to Vincennes. The 7th Corps, commanded by General Douay, was at Belfort, and was ordered to proceed by rail to Paris, but subsequently it was sent through Paris to join MacMahon at Rheims. When the Government at Paris received information of the decision of the military council, both the Empress and Palikao protested by telegram against it, the latter stating that it would look like leaving the Army of Metz to its fate. On the 18th MacMahon received, in reply to a telegram he had sent asking for instructions, an answer to the effect that though he was under Bazaine, the latter was too far off to direct him, and *he must act on his own responsibility.* On the 19th, the Emperor having yielded to the pressure from Paris, MacMahon telegraphed that he would join Bazaine, yet in fact remained undecided until the 21st, seeing the inevitable dangers to which his Army would be exposed by marching east, and further that Paris would be uncovered. The pressure of the Empress and Palikao proved too strong, and on the 23rd he began his march on Montmédy. The movement was conducted without spirit or proper precautions, and on the 25th most of the Army was still between Rethel and Vouziers. On that day the Germans becoming aware of the direction MacMahon was taking commenced that great right wheel of two Armies, which resulted in their enclosing the French Army as in a trap. On the 27th Marshal MacMahon reached La Chène Populeux. By this time the German cavalry had literally fastened on his right flank, harassing his troops and cutting off stragglers. His own cavalry was useless to him, being kept in front of his centre and in rear.

He saw more than ever the utter futility of his enterprise, and determined to abandon it, marching north on Mezières-Charleville. Again, the Empress and ministers interfered, and ordered him to continue the march to the Meuse, which he knew meant merely leading his troops to the slaughter. The Emperor gave him the weight of whatever authority he still possessed, and told him not to go on the road to sure ruin. But he persisted in obeying the order from Paris; countermanded his orders for the march on Mezières, which had much improved the spirit of his troops, and once more led his Army, dejected, half starved, and with their discipline gone, to its destruction. With the German masses closing on him he managed to concentrate his force on the right bank of the Moselle by the evening of the 30th, on which day the 5th Corps, under De Failly, was surprised by a Prussian Division, coming up through the forest of Dieulet, and completely shattered and put to rout. The 7th Corps, which was in rear of it, and which heard the firing, did not attempt to hurry to its assistance, but left

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it to itself, as De Failly had left MacMahon in the lurch at Wörth. Through the first period of the war, the difference of the conduct of the French and German leaders was marked in most respects, but in none so much as in this, that whenever the latter heard heavy firing they hurried up their troops to the scene of it, whatever their orders were; while the French took no steps whatever, even though they heard the sound of firing, to aid other of their corps or divisions, unless they received orders from higher command. Thus, Frossard at Spicheren, MacMahon at Wörth, and De Failly at Beaumont, all of whom might have been reinforced had other troops who heard the fire of the guns proceeded in the direction of it, were left to their own resources; and on the 16th August Metmann's Division of the 3rd Corps, which was left in rear of its corps on the day previous, though it heard the guns and saw their smoke from the Plappeville Plateau at 9.30 a.m., did not stir till it received an order at 1.30 p.m., and did not reach the field of battle till nightfall; while Lorencez's Division of the 4th Corps, which was halted behind Woippy, though it also heard the firing, did not move till 3 p.m.

The result of Beaumont made any further attempt to advance in the direction of Metz impossible, and MacMahon decided to retire on Sedan, whither on the 31st his Army marched to its doom, to be encircled in an iron cage, of which the bars were 500 German guns. His idea appears to have been to provision his Army and retreat to Mezières. Arrived at Sedan vacillation prevailed, and no orders for the morrow were given. To show that the marshal did not know his mind, when at 3 o'clock on the 31st General Douay informed him that the Germans were advancing on the Meuse, at Donchery, he took no steps to destroy the bridges or to hold them. He sent the following message to General Ducrot: "Je vous avait fait donner l'ordre de vous rendre de Carignan à Sedan, et nullement à Mezières, où je n'avais pas l'intention d'aller—je vous prie de prendre vos dispositions pour vous rabattre dans la soirée sur Sedan, dans la partie est. Vous viendrez vous placer à la gauche du 12e Corps." During the night the 11th German Corps and the Wurtemberg Division crossed the Moselle, of which the bridges, as well as those over the Chiers, were left intact by the French.

Having regard to the position of the German troops on the 31st, MacMahon's dispositions for the 1st were most peculiar. On the south, from which the great proportion of the Germans were coming, he placed hardly any of his forces. From Bazeilles to the north behind the Givonne rivulet, and thence by Illy to the Floing Plateau, he drew up all his Army facing east and north, except the

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5th Corps, which was kept in reserve. The first attack was made on his extreme right at Bazeilles by the Bavarians long before any other German troops arrived on the scene. Had his whole line been attacked simultaneously, he had no line of retreat except on the old fortress, which meant certain destruction, as it proved; though up to the time that the 11th Corps arrived round the big bend of the Moselle and held the defile of St. Albert, a retreat in a northerly direction was not impracticable. It is quite impossible to see on what military grounds MacMahon thus posted his force, why he left the south and south-west of Sedan unprotected, why he left all the bridges unguarded and unbroken, and why, finally, he held to Sedan, which could not lead otherwise than to the surrounding of his Army in a small place in which they could not be supported more than two or three days. The position of the 7th Corps above Floing was a most dangerous one; it was reached by the fire of the batteries about Frénois from the south, and later it was literally swept by the batteries of the 5th and 11th Corps between St. Menges and Fleigneux, while the guns of the Guard Corps crossed their fire with that of the latter from above Givonne.

Very early in the morning of the 1st September MacMahon, in consequence of a message received from General Lebrun, that his troops were engaged at Bazeilles, rode out to join him and then proceeded to La Moncelle. He was here badly wounded, and was carried to Sedan. It has been said that had it not been for this the result of the day would probably have been different. This can hardly be regarded as within the region of possibility, for all the harm was done, and the mighty German masses were rapidly converging on the doomed Army, to which every egress of escape was even then closed.

An English officer who visited Sedan a few days after the battle writes that the French soldiers reviled the Emperor and their officers, except Bazaine and MacMahon. Both these leaders failed, not so much from their own fault as from the crying defects of a system. The French people had lived on tradition, believed defeat impossible; the Army was neglected and quite unfit for war on a large scale. Marshal Niel had seen this, and set himself energetically to work to reorganise. Unfortunately for the nation he died, and was succeeded by Marshal Le Boeuf, who allowed everything to drift. A characteristic story of him is told just before the outbreak of the war. He was visited by a certain *Deputé*, who did not share in the general confidence as to a rapid walk over to Berlin. He anxiously inquired if the officers knew the country and had maps. He replied:

"Certainement, ils ont les meilleurs que existent."

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"Vous me faîtes bien plaisir, Maréchal, et tous les officiers en ont?"

"Tous; et tenez j'ai la mienne sur moi."

With this he half drew his sword from the scabbard, and said, "Là voilà!"

It was perhaps fortunate for Marshal MacMahon that he was struck down at Sedan, or he too might have been branded as a traitor for the loss of his Army, which he, like Bazaine, led to ruin on a fortress. I think the time has come when all fair-minded men must acquit the latter of treachery. He was simply incompetent to lead a large Army, and he, like MacMahon, failed to rise superior to a system which under the last Napoleon corrupted the nation and destroyed the vitality and efficiency of the Army.*

A. E. TURNER.

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* The following from the pen of an officer who accompanied one of the German Armies is instructive: "Mais la France ne trouva, ni un homme ni une idée: on eût dit que ses Armées étaient secrètement dirigées par M. V. Moltke, tellement elles sécondait ses vues, et donnaient lourdement dans ses piéges les plus grossiers. Metz imprénable par la force n'avait q'une chose à redouter: une Armée française sous ses murs qui consummait ses provisions. On se hata de commettre cette faute suprême. Sans l'Armée de Bazaine Metz eût tenu indéfiniment. Une fois cette Armée cernée autour de Metz, c'en était fait de la France."

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ON KITS FOR SERVICE—AND OTHERS.

By Major-General Sir William Butler, K.C.B.

Kit—a small harp, a large bottle, a beaker, a diminutive fiddle, a fish-basket, a decanter, a wooden tub, a box of tools—these are chiefly, the definitions of the word which for something like one hundred years has been associated with the outfit of a soldier, and to-day is employed to distinguish some particular form of dress and accoutrement designed for the work of war, colonisation, travel, or exploration. That the word is old is certain. It is not found in Shakespeare, but Chaucer used it 250 years earlier. Whether it is derived from the small fiddle, the big bottle, the wooden tub, or the box of tools, matters not to our present purpose; but the curious in such questions would probably find their most promising road of inquiry to lie in the direction of the bottle and the fiddle. My object in this paper is to endeavour to do something towards simplifying the labour of kit selection to those who, ordered on foreign service, or electing travel on their own account, find themselves face to face—often at very short notice—with the necessity of providing themselves with kits.

The first thing that I would desire to say to such persons would be that, like so many other wants which civilisation has imposed upon man, that of a kit is far more a fancied necessity than a real one; in other words, the dread of being without the article is very much greater than the fact of being without it. There is no more extraordinary thing in life than all that a man can do without. In doing without a pair of breeches a Highlander is only at the beginning of the lesson, and it has always appeared strange to us why he should have begun there. The Blue-coat Boys get on very well without caps. Blue Jackets do remarkably well without boots, and one of the most active "irregulars" I ever met on service was a West African negro, whose kit literally fulfilled the exact primitive meaning of the word, for it consisted solely of a large, empty, square-sided gin bottle, which he wore suspended from the left shoulder, after the manner of the old Hussar or Hungarian jacket.

The fact is health, strength, and spirit are better to soldier, sailor, or traveller than all the kits that London ever produced. Gold comes next on the list, and is in reality a kit in itself. Gold can do much; it can simulate or strengthen or buttress what may be

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weak or wanting in the three great factors of war or travel, above-named. The man who has gold will go farther and do more than the man that hasn't it, both men being evenly matched in other respects; but all the gold in the Bank of England won't supply the want of these three things, or make a man a soldier, a sailor, or a traveller, if Nature has seen fit to build him otherwise.

It is a very noticeable fact that the pilgrim with his staff has done more exploration and braved greater dangers of climate and nature and savage than the richest and best equipped professional explorers. The first man who looked upon the Missouri River was a French priest. The first who reached the lake system of Central Africa was a Portuguese one. Of the few travellers who have penetrated to the sacred city of Lhassa, more than half have been missionaries. Nor is the race of these unkitted travellers yet extinct. I remember some four-and-twenty years ago coming across the trail of a man who, when the immense region between Lake Superior and the Pacific was a wilderness, only inhabited by hostile Indian tribes and wild animals, had made his way, alone and unarmed, from the Red to the Fraser River. That man's adventures, had he been able to write them, would have filled two volumes. The Indians said he was a very great "medicine man." In England he had been a grocer's assistant, I was told, and the only training he had ever received for his two thousand miles tramp through Red Indians—and black and grizzly bears—vast plains, dark forests and great mountains, had been learned in a London back street. They said he had been a failure in the assistant-grocer business, had probably preferred reading Robinson Crusoe to attending to the more respectable and profitable occupation of studying how many parts of yellow sand can be put into a pound of brown sugar before the blender became liable to prosecution for poisoning. His name was Tom Collins.

Quite recently I had the pleasure of meeting a very fragile looking clergyman, who disappeared from civilisation some years ago in Central America, and came out somewhere south of the Brazils. He had had many strange adventures and escapes, nevertheless the London publisher knows him not, a circumstance I regret when I reflect upon the alluring alliterative title which is thereby lost to the literature of modern travel, for instance, "A Priest's Perigrinations from Panama to Patagonia, with Peeps at Paraguay and Peru."

Still it must be admitted that these men are the rare exceptions; enthusiasm, backed by health and courage, cannot always be found. The ordinary traveller and soldier want kits, and besides it is a duty they owe to the outfitter that they should get them.

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If everybody went on a campaign with the traditional towel, piece of soap, tooth-brush, and scissors of the Conqueror of Scinde, what I should like to know would become of the London shop-keeper?

Admitting then that some sort of a kit is necessary for the work of modern war and exploration, let us inquire what that kit should consist of. Perhaps the easiest way of considering the question will be to take the human body from head to foot, and clothe it as we go along. For the head, a helmet of cork or leather, a red woollen nightcap, a deer-stalker cap. For the body, flannel shirt, Norfolk jacket of home spun, tweed, or canvas, flannel vest with sleeves. For the legs, breeches of cord, home spun, or moleskin, thickness according to climate. Leggings of strong canvas or light leather, to fasten to the breeches below the knee. For the feet, stockings or socks strongest and best merino, shooting-boots broad in soles, strong but not too heavy; a nice point is that where strength and lightness meet in a joint compromise. A pair of easy canvas shoes for camp use. For general use the man considered collectively will require pocket handkerchiefs—one dozen silk, blankets three, waterproof sheet one, great coat (with capote) one; camp bedstead one, pillow one, mosquito curtains one set, a small canteen made in can or bucket-shape, carrying table and cooking necessaries, a small folding-table, a folding chair, a waterproof tub, a waterproof basin, a small leather hold-all carrying brush, comb, razors, tooth-brushes, &c.

For arms he will want in war, only his sword and revolver; for travel he will require a double gun, a double rifle, and a revolver. In both instances some two or three canvas bags, and a good leather belt carrying an all-work knife will be useful; a small canvas hold-all containing buttons, thread, needles, and spare boot-laces, a field glass, compass, and note-book, and cholera belt should complete the outfit.

The whole of this kit, except canteen, arms, and bed, should pack into two bullock trunks—twenty-six inches in length, twelve in width, and fifteen in depth—having leather straps riveted to the bottom, and having rings attached for slinging. These, when packed, should weigh about 60lb. each. I will deal later on with the numbers of the various items of clothing which should be taken —this question would, of course, largely depend upon the length of time over which operations or exploration would extend.

All the articles of clothing and equipment mentioned above are the necessaries of travel, and, with certain modifications, or particulars as to colour, cut, and number, they are also the essentials of a campaign-outfit. The fatigue or forage cap will take the place of the deer-stalker; the red or blue or Kaki patrol jacket will

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replace the Norfolk, but the principle in each case will be the same —for just as a pound of meat, a pound of bread or biscuit, and a ration of groceries are the sole really important items of daily food for the inner-man on service, so, in the matter of the body's outer covering, the list so varied and complex in civilisation dwindles down to very simple limits. The campaign has not well begun before blacking and pipe-clay disappear. White is turned into brown. Black becomes rusty. In fact, the thing that is named "ceremonial," in the latest edition of the "Infantry Drill Book," never appears either in drill or dress to get beyond the base of operations.

So far my remarks have dealt with the general principle of a kit, a kit that, subject to certain variations in texture, would serve for all seasons and lands, but in climates so varied as those in which a British officer may be required to serve it will happen, of course, that some particular article of clothing or equipment may be specially necessary. In the last five-and-twenty or thirty years there have been many little expeditions and minor campaigns, some in hot and dry climates, some in hot and damp climates, some in cold, and some in hot and cold combined, but for all of these expeditions the kit I have specified would have been suitable, subject to differences in texture or thickness. In all tropical countries it is even more necessary to protect the body from chill than it is to save it from the sun. The late Mr. Winwood Reade has remarked in one of his books on African travel, that it was "cold that killed in the tropics." It is not, of course, real cold, but relative cold; the body weakened by the great perspiration caused by walking or riding in a temperature of perhaps 150deg., easily chills when exposed after sunset or at night to a temperature 70deg. lower. The dry flannel shirt, the flannel vest, the "Kumerbund," the great coat or blanket are then more necessary to preserve health than the helmet and the cotton jackets were requisite for the same purpose six or eight hours earlier.

In very wet tropical countries, such as the West Coast of Africa, a waterproof cape will be found very useful. In the deserts of the Middle Nile the winter nights are as cold as the days are warm, and warm woollen clothing is a necessity, for the dry winds blow over these elevated sands with piercing intensity.

In South Africa both wool and waterproof will be required, for there, too, the nights are cold, and in the higher altitudes of the interior states snow, hail, and frost are of frequent occurrence during July and August.

The question of the duration or lasting power of a service kit will next claim attention, and for this purpose it will be well if I

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give the average lengths of life of the principal articles comprising it. Approximately they would be as follows :—A flannel shirt, two to three months ; a Norfolk jacket, seven months; a pair of breeches, five months ; a pair of boots, five months ; a pair of socks, two months. These estimates of existence are based on continuous work and continuous wear. In the minor articles the calculation of life would be collective, as, for instance : Four shirts, one year ; six pair of socks, one year ; two pairs of boots, ten months.

The fitness of all articles of clothing for use in war and travel is largely a question of durability—everything therefore should not only be new, but should be of the best ; part worn things, or new clothing of cheap or shoddy nature should have no place in the kit. The strength of a leather strap may mean the safety of a life.

In order to meet the possibility of prolonged operations there should be a reserve supply of clothing and boots left at the base. This reserve should include some of each of the articles of clothing taken to the front. They should be packed in one of the bullock trunks first mentioned ; this piece of baggage, marked very legibly, should be entered in the register of the officer in charge of the baggage at the base ; this will facilitate its being found and forwarded to the front whenever the demand for it is made.

Of all the expeditions of the past twenty years, that of the Nile was most destructive to clothing, a camel saddle or the thwart of a boat being found equally opposed to the continuity of continuations. The great length over which the line of communications extended rendered the arrival of reserve supplies difficult. Still, where all suffered more or less alike, criticism was disarmed and comment ceased, and it was quite wonderful to observe the equanimity with which owners of dilapidated garments wore their patched and often patchless clothing. It is only when the lining for the inner man, the food supply, gives out that the machine of life stops, and of that inner lining there was never an hour's want. I may omit the specification of kits necessary for India or Canada ; both countries know their own business too well to need hints from outsiders. The winter kit for Canada is a Canadian speciality, which can be procured in any town or city of the Dominion ; and the Indian kit can be had in India for half the money at which it can be bought in England. Boots and saddlery are, however, always an exception ; the English shooting boot has no rival, and the English hunting saddle is without an equal all the world over.

To the British officer about to proceed on a campaign, the painful part of his contemplated kit lies in the fact that both on the road to the war and the road from it—if he be destined to

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travel this latter—he may be called upon to array himself in the full dress, the undress, and the mess-dress of the regiment or corps to which he belongs. He has, therefore, to burden himself with many articles of uniform which are at once expensive and useless, and as our military uniform has been ingeniously arranged so as to preclude the possibility of making it interchangeable—as the boots that do with one description of trousers will not do with another, the trouser-stripe changing with the coat, the cap varying when the coat is changed—it follows that the number and variety of things to be carried must be excessive.

The fact is the sooner we realize that the entire conditions of war have undergone a radical revolution since the guiding principle, or central idea of English uniform was devised, the better it will be for us. So far it is only a question of inconvenience and extra expense to the individual officer, but at any moment it might become the cause of a grave national misfortune. There never was a time in history when a nation can afford less to make a plaything of its army than the present; every day that passes shears off some old bit of tinsel from the grim figure of war and leaves more and more exposed to view the real form below. "Fine feathers make fine birds," says the proverb, but fine feathers and flaming colours in war make fat birds (of prey) on the battlefield.

The dress of the British Army has never been considered in strict relation to the entirely new conditions of tactics which modern weapons have necessitated. When the range of a musket was from seventy to ninety yards, and that of a cannon ball was 800 or 900 yards, and when, above all, the bayonet was usually the deciding factor in battle, too much prominence could scarcely be given to bodies of infantry. One thousand men dressed in red struck and impressed the eye as much, or perhaps more, than 1500 dressed in green or blue would have done; but now the whole object is to conceal and not to show. Smokeless powder, men lying hidden behind hill or bush or undulation of ground, barely showing the tops of their heads over earth-works, or rushing nimbly forward in scattered groups from one place of shelter to another. All this has taken the place of the imposing masses of men standing shoulder to shoulder, or moving in serried columns and with measured step to front or flank in full view of the hostile Army.

It would appear to be incredible that the dress, whose merit of old was its conspicuousness, should still be used when the whole object of tactics is to conceal, and when the changed condition of arms has made concealment of force a more absolute necessity in warfare than display was formerly essential to it; but the key of the apparent puzzle is not far to seek. The vested interest in

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the Army, which the London military tailor possesses, is too strong for common sense or experience to prevail against it. It used to be said that it required the death of a cabinet minister or an archbishop to remove or remedy some universally admitted danger to public life. It will seemingly require the destruction of an Army before the lesson which every other Army, save ours, has long since learned will be driven home to the brain of the nation. If the Russian arms had been as good forty years ago as the Russian frost was keen, and our own supply departments were inefficient, the changes necessary in our Army dress would long since have been made; the voice of vested interest would have been hushed under the weight of the loss the Army must have suffered in the field.

So universally recognised is the unsuitability of the present regulation dress for fighting and campaign purposes, that whenever a little war is announced, the fortunate aspirant for glory who has been selected for service with the forthcoming expedition instantly discards all idea of proceeding to the scene of strife in the habiliments he has heretofore been wont to wear. Going straight to his tailor he orders a fighting kit more or less in accordance, so far as clothing is concerned, with what he has worn at polo, deer stalking, or salmon fishing. Canadian homespun, Bedford cord, Indian kaki, French merino, moleskin, are severally or collectively called into use. Indian putties, pith, leather or cork helmets, puggarees of various colours, strange sword-belts, boots of buff, gauntlets, revolver-cases, and broad swords appear as if by magic; and the man who, during his period of tuition at Aldershot or the Curragh, has been rigidly restrained to the eighth of an inch in width of trouser stripe, and the exactest measure of cuff and collar, becomes all at once the most variously dressed and accoutred military unit that any Army has ever seen. The fault and absurdity of the thing is in reality not his. It lies at the door of the system which has adhered in military uniform, to a colour, cut, and costume totally unsuited to the needs of marching and fighting. And the curious part of the anomally is this, that while no Army in the world is uniformed in a manner so opposite to common sense, no people in the world are so cute and common sense in their manner of finding out the good and fitting thing to be worn in sport, in travel, in recreation. The dress in which we go to shoot a snipe, to stalk a stag, to throw a fly over a salmon, to play a game of polo or of cricket, is the very best and most sensible that could be devised. Our grooms, our engine-drivers, our navvies are dressed with sense and to purpose; even our crossing-sweeper is clad according to the object in view,

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but when our warrior is ordered to the war he has to discard all his clothes, to recast his outfit, and begin to clothe himself on totally new lines, and this in spite of the fact that no Army has had such wide experience as ours has had, and no people know more of climates and the physical features of distant lands than our people know. Strange and marvellous inconsistency. When the question is a sport and a game our sense is beyond dispute, when it is a matter of life and death, of victory or defeat, sense and nonsense change places. It is not many years since one of our leading generals, while drawing attention to the dress of the Army, remarked that the soldier was dressed to catch the eye of the servant girl, and our general officers were habited after the costume of a monkey on a barrel organ. The latter portion of the statement evoked considerable criticism at the time. When closely scanned, however, the simile was quite unfair to the monkey. That animal on the barrel organ is costumed with a clever intention of fitting him for the work he is designed to do, viz., to collect the pence of the public. Experience has long ago shown his Italian owner that robed in red and with a bunch of red or white feathers on the top of his head he adequately fulfils the object in view. Can any such reason be adduced in favour of the general's uniform. The primary object of a general is to lead his troops to victory, defeat the enemy, and defend his country. Clad in scarlet and gold, and with a large plume of red and white feathers in his hat, he offers to that enemy every facility of achieving an easy victory. He is a target discernable at a great distance, and if he is not brought down by a concentrated fire of rifles, machine-guns, and artillery in the preliminary stages of the action, the accuracy of modern weapons of precision has been greatly over-rated. The true solution of the question would appear to lie in a broad and distinct line being drawn between a field service kit and a show or ceremonial kit; the first being designed solely on account of its use and suitability to the needs and requirements of modern war; the second, simplified and made inexpensive, should never pass beyond the limits of ceremonial in the British Islands and the colonies.

Until this or something like this has been done, our military uniform must remain as it now is—the conspicuous target to an enemy, the tailor's delight, the terror to the father who has sons in the Army, the discomfort to those who wear it.

W. F. B.

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NOTICES OF BOOKS, ETC.

These notices give a brief abstract of the general scope of the volumes referred to, and, without reviewing them at length, call attention to their most striking points.

Lecture at the Prince Consort's Library on Tuesday, 20th March, 1894. GENERAL HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT, K.G., K.C.B., Commanding the Division in the Chair.

With the Victoria Column in Matabele land. By CAPTAIN C. H W. DONOVAN, Army Service Corps.

This lecture, which was attended by a large audience, brought out many points in relation to our recent little war which are new. Amongst others, Captain Donovan showed that the effect of the raids of the Matabele in July had been so completely to drive out all the Mashonas, on whose work the success of the colonists depended, that the colony could not have been carried on if these raids had been allowed to continue. He further showed that there were plenty of people in Victoria who looked upon the expedition as so mad a one that many of them, including several Dutch families, fled the country, whilst others in the service of the Company resigned their appointments; not because they thought that the Matabele were going to be massacred, but because they believed that the 700 men who were to invade Matabele land would be destroyed. He gave very interesting details of the difficulties of the transport and of the feeding both of horses and oxen. This was mainly due to the necessity of reaching Buluwayo before the rains came on, and therefore of pressing the pace, so that it was difficult to give the oxen time for proper feeding. In reference to the laagar, which was described in our columns last month by Colonel Maurice, on Sir Gerald Portal's authority, he gives further details. It appears that the form ultimately adopted was that of a diamond-shaped enclosure, and he gave these particulars. A Maxim gun was brought forward to form the leading point. The leading waggon on right and left formed up with the front of the waggon in line with the axle of the Maxim gun. The next waggons, slightly inclining outwards till clear of those in formation, then moved forward and

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And whether he's on India's coral strand,
Or pouring out his blood in the Soudan,
To keep our flag a-flying, he's a-doing and a-dying,
Every inch of him a soldier and a man.

Oh, Tommy, Tommy Atkins, you're a good'un, heart hand,
You're a credit to your calling and to all your native land;
May your luck be never failing, may your Poll be ever true;
God bless you, Tommy Atkins, here's your country's love to you.

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halted as soon as the fore end of the naves jammed against the hind end of those in front. When there were five waggons on each side, spaces were left for the Hotchkiss and Maxim, and the remainder of the waggons instead of inclining outwards inclined inwards. Thus when complete all the oxen were on the outside of the laager. The laagers of the two columns being thus formed, the spaces in front and rear between them were protected by prickly thorn, as described in our article last month. He said that though the forming of these laagers required much practise, the Kaffir drivers became at last so expert that on one occasion the whole was complete, every man in his place, and the bush cut down for a distance of thirty yards all round, within four minutes of the order being given. He bore emphatic testimony to the all-important services of the Maxim gun, as much in giving confidence to our men and in making the natives hopeless, as in its terrible destructive effects. "We could hear," he said, "the Indians shouting at the men, but they would have none of it. They had seen the effect on the first lot, and knew they could not face the leaden hailstorm with any chance of getting through." He declared that the column would never have started at all had they not had Maxim guns. With their aid every man felt confident of success. He insisted on the fact that it was the unity of action, heart and mind, and the absence of petty jealousies and grumblings, which under the very able leadership, tact, and genial kindliness of Major Wilson and Doctor Jameson insured the success of the expedition.

The Swiss Army.

A re-organisation is about to take place in the Swiss Army, the scheme for which, as prepared by the Federal Council, is being very fully set forth in successive numbers of the *Revue Militaire Suisse.* The general effect is very much to increase the strength of field artillery, and especially of the mountain artillery. The whole Army is to be so completely organised with a view to war, that it is to be hoped that when the scheme is complete the Intelligence Department will give us a fresh edition of Colonel Bowdler's valuable work on the subject. At present, however, the scheme meets with considerable opposition, especially from the officers of Engineers, the number of whose men it is proposed considerably to reduce. The Swiss Army is one so unique in its organisation that its development is of much interest.

The *Reveu Militaire de l'Etranger*, after noticing the same manœuvres of Russian cavalry with which Major Peters deals in our columns this month, in an article which pressure of space obliged us to postpone last month, has two interesting articles

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on changes in the Austrian Army. One is on the increase in the Austrian Field Artillery. It shows that under the new organization of 1894 the dual monarchy will have on a war footing 280 batteries of eight guns each, of which fifty-six will be depôt batteries, sixteen batteries of horse artillery of six guns each, and thirty-six mountain batteries of four guns each. They have also four special batteries for service in the Tyrol. The other article deals with the experiences in Austria of the use of umpires at manœuvres in which they seem to have succeeded better than we have, apparently because they take much better steps to ascertain facts prior to deciding questions on principle. The article is short and worth the consideration of all those who are engaged on such operations.

The *Militärische Zeitschrift* is almost entirely occupied with the translation of two books which have appeared in Russia, one "A strategical sketch of the West Russian border-land," the second "The Russian Network of Communications under their Military Aspect." It is certainly interesting to have, from a Russian point of view, a statement of the case which we have had already very fully given on the other side in regard to the theatre of possible war between Russia on the one hand and Austria and Germany on the other. We have for some time contemplated giving our readers a translation from the Russian of one of these works, but have been frightened by the mass of detail involved. We may, perhaps, give a summary of the most important points hereafter. At present it will be sufficient to say that the Russian authors appear to be convinced that the theatre of war presents great advantages to them. They admit the exposure of Poland to Austro-German attack, but believe that the Russian authorities have successfully met the difficulty by their large concentration of troops in the western side of the great empire.

All communications for the Editor should be addressed "THE EDITOR, UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, *care of Messrs. William Clowes and Sons, Limited,* 13, *Charing Cross, S. W.,*" *and, if intended for insertion, should be written on one side of the paper only. The Editor does not undertake to return rejected communications unless accompanied by stamped and addressed envelope.*

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REVIEWS AND REVIEWERS.

LITERARY NOTES.*

A PRACTICE has grown up of late years of which those concerned in it seem to be half ashamed. It appears to us to be in itself a very desirable one, though it is liable to abuse. It therefore requires to be acknowledged and regulated. When an important book, which has taken many years in composing, is at last presented to the public, nothing can be more unsatisfactory than that the best of critics should be required to deal with it, for the purposes of review, between one morning and another. The public, which is always, like the Athenians, curious to hear and tell of some new thing, rushes eagerly to read the earliest review of the long-expected work.

This obliges editors who have to cater for the public in accordance with its tastes to compete eagerly with one another to be first in the field in dealing with any volume which is really of interest. The choice, therefore, lies between two possible courses. Either the advanced sheets of the coming work must be sent to the press for review before the work is bound up, or every reviewer is forced to deal too hastily with an important subject. No doubt it is a *tour de force* for a brilliant literary man to produce in a few hours an exceedingly readable article, which is supposed to summarize work which it has taken another no less able man ten or twenty years to compose.

We doubt, however, if in any case the result is really satisfactory, or whether it ever represents the view of the book which the writer would take after more mature study. There is a famous story of a well-known literary man, whose loss we all had occasion to deplore some ten years ago, who, in talking of a production of the kind, said frankly to a friend: "Ah! well, you know, when I reviewed that book I thought so-and-so! Since I have read it I have rather changed my mind!"

That in its general effect on the average of such reviews the result is only mischievous we are quite sure. The public draws

* From the *Pall Mall Gazette*, Nov. 18th, 1893.

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its impressions from the early reviews, which cannot be accurate where the book is only reviewed immediately before it is noticed. Impressions once fixed in the public mind are very powerful, though sometimes they prove afterwards to have been purely delusive.

A notable instance of this occurred a short time ago, when a thoroughly defective and trashy translation of a posthumous work of Von Moltké was received with almost universal praise, and secured a great sale before its defects were exposed. Yet so manifest were its errors that, when they were pointed out in an article in the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, after there had been time for the book to be properly examined by experts who were German students, the book was simply killed. Its publishers very honourably and sensibly withdrew it, and substituted for it a better translation.

An experience of these dangers has induced publishers of late years to supply newspapers generally with copies of important books some time before they are issued to the public. The public is in every way the gainer. The period at which they receive the book is in no way retarded, because there is always a long delay in the binding up of volumes. If either paper-bound copies or a few early-bound copies are sent to those whose business it is to taste them in the first instance in behalf of the public, the date of publication is not delayed by a day.

One condition, however, is indispensable. A date must be fixed prior to which no notice of the book is to appear. It must be plainly placed on the outside of these early copies, so that there can be no mistake about it. Otherwise the mischief will be as bad as before. Each newspaper, anxious to attract the first rush of the public, will try to get out an earlier review than its neighbours. The same hastiness of criticism will take place as before this excellent system was introduced. When the system is once recognised and established as it ought to be, it must be made a matter of professional honour that no paper attempts to anticipate the assigned day. There is no fear, under these circumstances, that any respectable journal will break faith. If publishers will have the courage of their opinions and of their interests, and will absolutely boycott any newspaper that in this way violates what ought to be an unwritten law of the press, they will have the support of the whole body of influential newspapers on their side. Instances have occurred—some very recently—in which second-rate journals

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have taken advantage of their being in possession of advanced copies to gain a fictitious advantage.

It must be said, however, that the rule has hitherto been not sufficiently acknowledged and understood to be acted on with strictness. Moreover, publishers are sometimes careless, as we have ourselves experienced, in notifying the date for publication. For the reasons we have assigned the subject ought to be dealt with strictly and impartially.

The publisher of the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, in directing attention to the foregoing extract, desires to point out that since the NEW SERIES was projected three years ago, the proprietors, in order to ensure that works of merit, whether of a Military, Naval, National, or Colonial character, should be satisfactorily treated, have invariably engaged the services of Specialists as occasion required. Thus General Lord Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., and Colonel Maurice, R.A., C.B., have repeatedly reviewed military books and contributed other important articles on *Military* subjects. Sir Geoffrey Hornby, the late Sir George Tryon, Lord C. Beresford, Admiral Colomb, and others have been frequent contributors on *Naval* questions. Sir M. E. Grant Duff (late Governor of Madras) dealt—in a series of important articles—with Indian biographies; and a similar standard of Specialists has been kept up on all Imperial and Colonial questions. No doubt it was due to this that the UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE, as noted by the *Pall Mall Gazette*, was able to correct an almost universal error in regard to a book which had acquired a false reputation, as it has been able on several similar occasions to establish the reputation of really valuable books.

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